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ABSTRACT
Chapter one examines the reasons for the establish­
ment of a British protectorate over the Lower Niger in 1885, 
and the placing of part of the Protectorate under the adminis 
tration of a Chartered Company, leaving the other part under 
Consul. In chapter two the early career of Macdonald is 
examined providing the necessary personal background to the 
central figure in the work.
The years 1886-9 saw the breakdown of consular 
administration in the Niger Delta, accusations against the 
Company’s administration, and government policy of extending 
the Charter over the coastal region coming under increasing 
attack. Doubts as to the future government of the area, and 
German pressure, caused Britain to appoint a commissioner to 
make a comprehensive enquiry in a bid to settle all problems 
(chapter three). The enquiry conducted by Macdonald and its 
results are discussed in chapter four. Chapters five and six 
deal with the mechanics of the new administration for the 
coastal region. Chapters seven, eight and nine look at the 
administration’s policy towards trade and the missions; its 
attempts at hinterland penetration as part of the process of 
civilisation; and its relations with its neighbours during a
period of general progress up to 189^. During the latter part 
of 189^ and throughout 1895 the administration went through a 
series of political crises which determined the government after 
enquiry to establish a greater control over its functions. A 
resurgence of enthusiasm at the Colonial Office for ruling 
subject peoples meant that greater control took the form of a 
more orthodox colonial administration which passed from the 
purview of the Foreign Office in 1900>(chapter ten). The con­
clusion assesses Macdonald the person, the significance of his 
report, and the administration emerging from it.
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INTRODUCTION
l,No part of history is more difficult to record 
intelligibly than administration'1 (Margery Perham, Lugard 
Vol.2 p.138).
During the course of writing this thesis I have 
found no cause to dissent from Miss Perham's verdict. Indeed 
the opposite is the case. As time has progressed, I have be­
come increasingly aware how much more difficult it is to record 
good administration which, unlike bad, has no advertisement and 
therefore apparently no history. My problems do not finish 
here. I am well aware that the number of people is small to 
whom the name Macdonald has any meaning whatever. Goldie, 
Johnston and Lugard have had their biographers; Macdonald does 
not even merit an article in a learned journal. His death in 
1915 went unnoticed at any government level amidst the toils 
of war; there was a brief obituary in The Times - that was all. 
Macdonald, unlike Johnston, was no writer, and left no testa­
ment by which posterity may judge his acts. To all intents and 
purposes his name sank without trace amongst the myriad of 
British administrators who plagued the coasts of Africa during 
the later part of the nineteenth century.
Why resuscitate it? Mainly because of a growing 
conviction that here was a man worthy to take his place along­
side the greatest of the nineteenth century imperialist diplo­
matists. On three separate occasions when international events 
blazed across the national scene, Macdonald was at the centre 
of affairs. In China, when the Boxers rose against European 
influence, it was Macdonald who led the defence of the lega­
tions; in Japan, when England ended her period of diplomatic 
isolation by signing the alliance of 1902, it was Macdonald who 
was the ambassador. Each of these tales would be well worth 
the telling from a biographical point of view. It is, however, 
with the third of such occasions, and the first in time, that 
this book is concerned.
In 1885 Britain declared a protectorate over the 
Lower Niger and handed over a portion of that territory to the 
Royal Niger Company under charter to administer. The other 
portion (the coastal area) was placed under the temporary 
administration of a consul, pending an arrangement between the 
Company and independent traders to enable the Charter to be 
extended over the whole Protectorate. The basic assumption on 
the part of government was that the Charter would be extended 
as a way of meeting imperial responsibilities at minimum cost.
In 1889 German pressure and a chaotic political situation in 
the coastal area known as the Oil Rivers forced an investigation 
into the way the Niger Company exercised its powers of govern­
ment and the mode by which the Oil Rivers might be administered. 
The investigator, Macdonald, produced a report which not only 
prevented the extension of the Charter, but shook the faith of 
the British Government completely in Company administration. 
Macdonald was paid the high compliment of being asked to im­
plement his recommendations and administer the portion of the 
Protectorate left outside Company rule, and the result was a 
highly successful empirical administration which, briefly, 
before being absorbed by the Colonial Office, provided a model 
for the government of semi-independent communities in the 
tropics.
Macdonald’s previous career in the army, as military 
attach^ in Egypt to first Malet and then to Baring from 1882 to 
I887, and as Acting Consul General at Zanzibar for nearly a 
year, provide one background in which this study is set. The 
other background is the steady growth of British trade and in­
fluence in the Bights of Benin and Biafra from the seventeenth 
century up to the establishment of the Protectorate in 1885.
In 1889 the two backgrounds merge and the study becomes an 
integrated whole. What is then attempted is an administrative
study of the beginnings of British rule in what was later to 
become a part of Southern Nigeria. In this study, in which the 
mechanics of government are very much to the fore, one figure 
by virtue of his position and personality assumes a central 
role.
There are two published works in which Macdonald is 
more than a name. It was Dr. John Flint who in his book
Sir George Goldie and the Making of Nigeria (London i960) first
brought the Macdonald Report to the light of day after over 
sixty years of obscurity, and revealed its importance as “the 
only source in existence which can show us what Goldie’s 
company really did on the Niger, and what its presence meant 
to the people who lived there” (p.130). Flint, however, is 
concerned mainly with the effect of the report on the Niger
Company and those aspects which touched on Goldie: with the
Oil Rivers side of the Report he hardly deals, except in so 
far as it involved the collapse of the plan for charter ex­
tension. Since the mechanics of Company rule on the Niger- 
Benue are peripheral to my study, I have touched on this aspect 
lightly, but I have indicated that I interpret Macdonald to be 
far more critical of Company rule than Flint suggests, and that 
his criticisms not only governed but pointed to the type of 
future administration in the Oil Rivers. I have also examined
the Company’s treaty rights in the delta, since these had a 
bearing on boundaries with the Macdonald administration. The 
Oil Rivers part of the investigation is given the fullest 
treatment in Chapter IV of my thesis; and it is on this part 
of the report that I think the emphasis ought to lie.
After the collapse of plans to extend the Charter, 
the ways of Company and Oil Rivers drifted apart. To me , a key 
linking factor in the years after 1891 is the antagonism of 
Goldie and Macdonald. The relationships between Company and 
Consul I have examined in Chapter IX. On the Brass affair in 
1895, Dr. Flint’s path and mine again cross; for this I make 
no apology, as our interpretations of the events in some aspects 
differ.
The other work in which Macdonald figures to some 
degree is that by the late J.C.Anene - Southern Nigeria in 
Transition 1885-1906 (Cambridge 1966). The period when 
Macdonald was Consul General is treated as a small part of an 
everchanging kaleidoscope, in which the key factors are the 
overthrow of indigenous authority extending over a period of 
twenty years, and the impact of British rule on traditional 
institutions. In Anene' s own words he is “attempting to ana­
lyse the structure of an indigenous society” and how “British 
rule unleashed forces which almost completely transformed the 
social and economic life of the peoples of Southern Nigeria”
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(Preface pp.IX and X). I can make no claims in these direc­
tions. My canvas is smaller, my time scale more concentrated. 
In a sense I would like to feel that my work is complementary 
to Anene! s - he makes no attempt to examine the bones of 
British administration, the workings of customs, treasury, 
post office etc., while I regard the question of impact on the 
indigenous peoples as important, but beyond the scope of my 
present work, except in so far as the administration was forced 
to change its views about administration.
In putting forward this last statement I must 
emphasise that I am, in no way, attempting to decry the impor­
tance of works analysing what Africans thought about Europeans 
and how they reacted to European government. The sort of 
studies produced, for instance, by Leonard Thompson and Monica 
Wilson in South Africa, Roland Oliver in East Africa, and the 
Ibadan history school for West Africa are long overdue. But I 
do believe that one ignores what Europeans thought about 
Africa at one’s peril. Thesis and antithesis provide the 
necessary synthesis for a broad and balanced view of African 
history. Herein lies my defence and justification for the 
present work. If my concern seems overmuch with European 
matters in an essentially African field, it is not only because 
I believe that that is where* what competence I have%  lies, it
/
is also because I believe that administrative studies - that is, 
actually what the European did to govern when he got to Africa-- 
have been all too much neglected in the past. It was not until 
1969 in fact that the first scholarly administrative analysis of 
Nigeria as a whole was published. But I.F.Nicholson in The 
Administration of Nigeria (Oxford 1969) takes as his starting 
point the year 1900. I hope to show that an administration did 
exist in at least part of the area under discussion before then.
If this work is mainly concerned with an administra­
tion and how it came into being, it is not quite the whole story. 
Nor is the central personality of Macdonald. An attempt is made 
to put flesh on the bones by recapturing some of the characters 
of the people who ruled, and the atmosphere in which they lived. 
What was life like for a European in the Niger Delta before the 
turn of the century? Much more could be said on this score, 
but to do so would take us beyond the limits imposed by a 
thesis. Again, the administration within the limits imposed 
by the Foreign Office carried on its own rudimentary ’foreign1 
policy with its neighbours. In this context Macdonald’s visits 
to Berlin established him as a diplomat. The Protectorate had 
a distinct commercial policy. All these aspects are examined 
in the limited space available and an attempt made to paint a 
picture of an embryonic but integrated government. Binding all
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together was Macdonald, who in twenty years travelled from 
Captain in Her Majesty’s army to a senior ambassadorship and 
the Privy Council. Despite its problems I feel, therefore, 
that this work was worth the labour, and hope that in a modest 
way it will prove a distinct contribution to the knowledge of 
the early years of British rule in Nigeria.
Two further points need to be made. Ill health and 
the political situation in Nigeria prevented me from undertak­
ing field-work in the Eastern Delta during 1969. Disappointing 
though this was, it did not prove crippling. Archival material 
in Nigeria on the British administration before 1896 is limited 
(with the exception of that relating to Lagos). Nearly all of
what there is, for example, dispatches to and. from consuls, is
duplicated in the Public Record Office, London, which also 
contains the more illuminating minutes of the government 
officials. In the National Archives at Ibadan are a few docu­
ments in the Cal. Prof, Series particularly under heads 6 to 10 
containing district reports and minutes on special subjects re­
lating to the Macdonald administration not in the Public Record 
Office. Thanks to the good offices of friends in Nigeria, I am 
aware of the contents of these.
The second point is one of terminology. As far as
names are concerned, I have tried to maintain some consistency
in spelling, even where administrators were at their most
I 1!-.
perverse. I have tended to use the generally accepted Nigerian 
official English terms for African people e.g. ’Urhobo' for 
‘Sobo’ except, of course, when quoting. For place names I 
have adhered to the European designations as being for the most 
part more recognisable on a modern map e.g. Bonny, Brass,
Opobo etc. A word is needed as to my use of the term 
‘Protectorate*. Unless the text indicates otherwise, ‘protec­
torate1 refers only to the administration under Macdonald.
The area under the Niger Company I call the ‘Company’s terri­
tories* or, as it was known after 1893 > the ’Niger Territories’ 
This use is purely a matter of convenience to avoid confusion, 
as I am aware it is not strictly correct. Up to 1893 the 
Company and Consular administrations together constituted the 
Protectorate. After 1893 all territories within the whole 
Protectorate, not ruled by the Company, were put under Mac­
donald and received the legal title ’Niger Coast Protectorate'. 
The title ‘Oil Rivers Protectorate' used by officials before 
that date.had no legal force whatever.
Naturally in writing this week I have some debts to 
acknowledge. The major quarry for this thesis was the Public 
Record Office in London. The bibliography indicates the extent 
to which the records there were used. For access to these my 
thanks are due to the officers and attendants who work there 
with such commendable efficiency in such miserable surroundings
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Quotations from Crown Copy-right records appear by kind per­
mission of the Controller of H.M. Stationery Office. I have 
to thank also the British Consuls at Bonn and The Hague for 
exertions on my behalf which enabled me to see, on the one 
hand, the captured German documents relating to the Cameroons, 
and on the other to collect information on the Dutch liquor 
traffic to the Protectorate; the Librarians of the Church 
Missionary Society, Lambeth Palace, and the National Library 
of Scotland, for permission to see various mission records; 
the Warden and Librarian of Rhodes House, Oxford, for access 
to the Niger Company Papers, the Aborigines Protection Society 
Papers, and the Lugard Papers; the Librarian of the Brown, 
Picton and Hornby Libraries, Liverpool, for access to odd 
papers by Macdonald and relating to him; John Holt and 
Company, Liverpool, for permission to see and quote from the 
Holt papers; and Lord Salisbury, for permission to see and 
quote from the private papers of the Third Marquis.
Finally it is with very great pleasure that I record 
my thanks to those personal friends without whose prodding and 
support this work would never have been undertaken in the first 
place and who ensured that the end product is rather less poor 
than it might have been: my friends in Nigeria^ too numerous to 
mention by name^who have undertaken labours on my behalf in
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that trouble torn country at considerable inconvenience to 
themselves; Dr. John Flint for much helpful criticism and 
advice, for permission to quote from 'Goldie', and for the 
initial suggestion that my youthful labours might be profitably 
expended in a study of Macdonald; Professor Roland Oliver who 
supervised my research, providing me along the way with a pleni­
tude of useful suggestions and advice; and Mr. and Mrs. P.J. 
Pinkney and Miss D.M. Barron who underwent long hours for little 
reward at the typewriter, and who took me to task for certain 
enormities of English. My last and greatest acknowledgment is 
to my mother and father, who by steadfast counsel and ready 
encouragement bred in me the will and determination to complete 
this task. The debt* I owe to them* is beyond repayment.
CHAPTER ONE
THE BIRTH OF A PROTECTORATE
Axiomatic in West African history is the intimate 
connection between trade and politics. It was the understand­
ing of this which made‘Africans wish to keep European traders 
at a distance, insisting on their own role as middlemen, from 
the fifteenth to the eighteenth century. It was the under­
standing of this which caused Europeans increasingly to inter­
fere in the internal politics of African states during the 
nineteenth century. To understand why Europe, and Britain in 
particular, came to the conclusion that without political power 
trade could not flourish, it is necessary to examine'briefly 
the activities of traders on the Bights of Benin and Biafra, 
and the attitude of the British government towards their 
interests.
Until the great sugar boom of the- 16301s in the West 
Indies, trade, and therefore contact, with the West Coast had 
been intermittent. The demand for slaves, which the growth of 
that industry implied, had revolutionised the situation. The 
slave trade-was the key to the Atlantic triangle, which in turn 
was the centre of the old mercantile system. At its height in 
the eighteenth century, some 70,000 to 80,000 people per year 
were transported across the Atlantic.
1. Figures given in C. Lloyd, The Navy and the Slave Trade. 
19^ .
Despite the crucial importance of the slave trade, 
government saw no need to ensure supply by annexing large areas 
of territory. Rather, since slavery was indigenous to the West 
Coast, it was felt to be far better to leave well alone and 
merely tap the sources of supply, the more so as the African 
states on the coast were willing and able to adapt themselves 
as middlemen. Armed with European weapons, the coastal states 
were able to ensure regular supplies to the slavers from the 
interior. There was no incentive to alter a system which, in 
addition to being cheap, kept the Europeans from too close or 
too long a contact with the deadly fever-ridden swamps of the 
Niger Delta area.
That peculiar blend of evangelical fervour and cold 
commercial amorality which produced a revolution in politics 
in Britain during the early part of the nineteenth century was 
to have a profound effect on the West Coast. The abolition of 
the slave trade in 1807 was not merely a disastrous blow to the 
Liverpool merchants, in whose hands the lion's share of the 
slave trade of the Niger region had been concentrated, it 
necessitated the development of alternative trade products if 
trade was not to cease. To facilitate the growth of legiti­
mate commerce and the suppression of slavery presupposed a 
certain amount of interference in African societies, which 
had to be educated to the change.
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A pattern of direct interference was, however, slow 
to develop. This was mainly because coincidence had ensured 
that a new natural product, palm oil, was at hand to take the 
place of the old trade in slaves. Palm oil, as an agent in 
the manufacture of soap, became increasingly important as, 
with the industrial revolution in Europe, came changes in 
social customs and economic wants. Washing was recognized as 
a vital factor to health, the moving parts of machinery needed 
lubrication. The Liverpool traders seized the opportunity to 
get back in big business, and progress on the coast was rapid.
In 1808 less than 200 tons of oil had been shipped to Liverpool; 
by 183*+ the figure was more than 1^000 tons.^
If, however, the change in cargoes had been so easily 
made from the British end, it produced no revolution in Africa. 
Once the incomprehensible British had made it clear that they 
would no longer buy humans, but were instead very interested 
in the fruit of a particular kind of palm (EloUis Guineensis). 
which grew wild in the forest area just behind the mangrove 
swamps on either side of the delta, the native middlemen 
adapted themselves in precisely the same way as had the Liver­
pool merchants. Trade continued to run along the customary 
channels. Vested interest and malarial fever discouraged any
1. Dike, Trade and Politics in the Niger Delta, Oxford 1956, 
p.63.
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incentive to change. Gradually the situation recrystallised, 
with native middlemen on the coast partitioning the interior 
markets amongst themselves, and the Liverpool merchants, 
dependent for their supplies on the coastal rulers, supporting 
them both from within and without.
One of the main factors which did cause the pattern 
to alter slowly was the increasing success of penetration into 
the interior up the Niger itself. As it became clear to the 
humanitarians, in the years immediately after 1807, that the 
slave trade was if anything increasing in the hands of other 
nations, it was argued with some plausibility that, the source 
of slaves being "the interior tribes of the Sudan", an attempt 
ought to be made to make direct contact with them, in order to 
conduct legitimate commerce which would effectively "by its 
own virtue suppress slavery".^ This theory was brought nearer 
to realisation by Lander’s epoch-making discovery of the mouth 
of the Niger in 1830. At last a way to the interior was opened; 
not only could the slave trade be stifled at its source, but the 
vast trans-Saharan trade carried on by the Arabs could be 
captured by traders using the Bights route. Here was Eldorado 
indeed.
1. Buxton, The African Slave Trade and its Remedy. 
London lBVj ”
The first attempts to use Lander’s discovery were, 
however, disastrous. Between 1832 and 183^, the Birkenhead 
shipbuilder Macgregor Laird ascended the Niger as far as Nupe, 
and although he made a profit, thirty-nine of the forty-eight 
Europeans died. Even more disastrous was the Niger expedition 
of l8Li 1 , which was inspired by the humanitarians, who at the 
height of their influence were able to get government support 
for their venture. Forty-eight Europeans failed to return, with 
the result that the penetration of the Niger was delayed for 
over a decade.
In 185*+, however, the health problem was solved. 
W.B.Baikie, backed by Laird, had led an expedition up the 
Niger-Benue in an attempt to link up with Barth, the explorer 
who was coming overland across the Sahara. He failed to achieve 
contact, but not a single life was lost on the expedition, owing 
to a daily use of quinine. Moreover the expedition achieved 
a small trading surplus, a subsidy was obtained from the govern­
ment by Laird’s Steamship Company to open up trade on the Niger, 
and thus the period of regular commerce up-river was inaugurated.
The significance of these activities was not lost 
either on Laird or on the Liverpool traders in the Oil Rivers 
(as the coastal estuaries had come to be called). Laird during 
the first expedition up the Niger could already imagine the
impact of a regular cargo service from Liverpool on the people 
of the river banks, who were only too willing to encourage 
competition and to escape the clutches of the middlemen on the 
coast. Laird realised that not only was the real source of 
wealth the palm-producing regions of the Niger, and not the 
Islamic states further to the north, but also, the corollary 
of this, that the inevitable hostility of the coastal middle­
men, particularly of Brass, would have to be faced if trade was
to be won. And behind the coastal rulers were the Liverpool 
merchants. Up to the establishment of the Protectorate in 
1885, the opposition of the Liverpool merchants to traders 
penetrating the Niger was implacable. They bitterly opposed 
the government subsidy to Laird and effectively prevented its 
renewal in l86k. They resented any attempt to divert trade 
from the coastal middlemen, and bombarded the Foreign Office
with memoranda arguing that the system of African middlemen
ought to be strengthened. As for the middlemen themselves, 
armed by the Liverpool merchants, they resorted increasingly 
to force, in order to hold what they regarded as their own. 
Riverain peoples were coerced, and in 1859 Laird's steamer on 
its way down river was* itself* attacked. This pattern was to
continue throughout the sixties and seventies.
* * * * *
1. P.P. 186k XLI.
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However equivocal government policy towards West 
Africa appeared, it was based on two principles which in fact 
never altered. These were, first, that the visible cost of any 
policy must be minimal and secondly that the effort to stamp out 
the slave trade must be continued. This could be done, it was 
believed, with two weapons: the navy and legitimate commerce.
Thus, a subsidy was given to the former and every encouragement 
consistent with economy to the taxpayer to the latter.
Annexation of territory as an instrument of policy 
was ruled out both on practical and on theoretical grounds.
There was little incentive to establish uneconomic colonies 
on fever-ridden coasts where the revenue was uncertain; 
besides, it offended free trade morality. All that was needed 
to encourage and protect traders was the visit of an occasional 
gun-boat.
There were various forces militating against official 
hopes. In the first place it was axiomatic that with penetra­
tion inland of white missionaries and traders, and the conflicts 
that ensued, government would become more and more involved in 
African politics. Not only would British subjects demand pro­
tection, but also the conflict between the Niger traders on the 
one hand and the Liverpool traders on the other would not per­
mit government to escape implication. Throughout the nineteenth 
century the pattern of relationships with African states was
2k.
becoming increasingly complex. Government refused to prevent 
the activities of the Niger traders for the sake of the Liver­
pool traders; the former demanded protection, and the activi­
ties of the navy in keeping open the rivers to trade brought 
conflicts with the native peoples.
In the second place sheer ignorance and slow communi­
cations (until the laying of the telegraphic cable to Bonny in 
1879 it took a minimum of two months for despatches to be sent 
from the West Coast, received and answered - and it was usually 
nearer three) prevented the application of any consistent policy 
to African affairs. The man on the spot, be he consul (the 
first Consul to the Bights was appointed in 18^9) or trader, 
often in the absence of sufficient instructions from home, had 
to act as he thought fit, and often the British government was 
presented with a fait accompli.
Finally, the necessity for economy meant that 
governments were sometimes not in control of policy even at 
home. The Treasury could and often did impose a barrier on any 
schemes for expansion during the middle of the century, knowing 
full well that sufficient support could always be drummed up in 
parliament against any increase in government expenditure.
Burnt fingers on the African scene always produced the Select 
Committee, and it was one such, appointed in 1865, after the 
disastrous Ashanti war of the previous year, which attempted to
remove policy from the hands of officials and put it under the 
watchful eye of parliament. Its report advised rigid economy 
in administration, the eventual abandonment of all settlements 
on the West Coast except for Sierra Leone, and no further ex­
pansion of territory in the meantime.^
Although the implementation of the report was hardly 
seriously attempted, and the diplomatic situation in Europe 
caused it to be forgotten during the ’eighties, such a weighty 
document could not be wholly ignored nor fail to have immediate 
repercussions in the Bights. Although there was no attempt at 
withdrawal from the Bights altogether, government took much 
more pains to ascertain ambitions of local officials and keep
them in check. In the Oil Rivers, the powers of the Courts of 
2
Equity were defined by the 1872 West Africa Order in Council,
not only to give them some legal basis but to limit precisely
3
the extent of any British responsibility for their actions.
The tendency to reduce or define official commitments was 
paralleled on the Niger. In 1869 the consulate which had been 
established at Lokoja in 1866 in order to protect trade was with­
drawn, and in 1871 the regular annual naval expedition up the 
Niger, continuous since l859? was also withdrawn.
1. P.P. 1865 V, Report of Select Committee.
2. Arbitration tribunals for the settlement of trade disputes 
on which both native and European merchants were represen­
ted. Operated on basis of fine and trade boycott, often 
calling on consul to enforce decisions.
3. F.0.8V1356. Livingston to Granville, 29.*+.72.
Government could not however solve the latent conflict 
between a policy of official withdrawal and unofficial advance. 
Through the ’seventies, the traders and missionaries were advan­
cing on all fronts with more or less official encouragement, 
and government could not escape some responsibility for their 
acts. A cheap method of protection upriver was achieved only 
by passing responsibility on to someone else. In 1871 an agree­
ment was negotiated with Masaba, Emir of Nupe , whereby he under­
took to protect British subjects in return for the recognition 
of his role as middleman on the Niger-Benue. Since large-scale 
penetration by Europeans beyond Nupe was as yet not feasible, 
this was for the moment readily agreed to. However, it was not 
a solution which could be applied to the Oil Rivers. European 
penetration had already been made behind the middlemen, and was 
likely to increase rather than diminish. Moreover there was no 
one strong authority like Nupe with whom the British could 
negotiate such protection. Throughout the‘seventies, the 
policy of the British government became in practise less tenable. 
Trade was expanding, the economic opportunities in the Bights 
were great. Effective exploitation required peace and security 
without which trade could not flourish. The penetration of 
Europeans had, however, produced conflicts amongst the Delta 
states which made trade insecure. Naval bombardment had only 
been effective for so long as the warships had remained on the
27.
Coast. As soon as they were withdrawn the old troubles re­
appeared. Consuls endeavouring to settle trade disputes by that 
very act involved themselves in African politics. Some time, 
a decision would have to be made one way or the other: either
direct government intervention in a situation which was rapidly 
becoming anarchic, or a complete official withdrawal from the 
Bights, carrying the 1865 report to its logical conclusion.
That decision might have remained in the distant 
future but for two new factors which entered the situation and 
which were not altogether unconnected. The one was a trade 
crisis on the Niger, the other was the prospect of foreign 
competition in what had hitherto been almost exclusively a 
British preserve.
In addition to the hostility of the native middlemen, 
trade expansion produced its economic corollary: cut-throat
competition. The extent of this competition was expanded by 
the nature of the vested interest which the Liverpool merchants 
had created on the coast. This drove new firms into the Niger 
to circumvent the middlemen, where high profits were possible. 
Over-competition combined with increased prices and heavy losses 
sustained through attacks by hostile communities threatened to 
send a number of firms to the wall. One man of vision and 
energy saw the only cure - monopoly backed by political power.
28.
George Goldie was by any standards an extraordinary 
man.1 Born in l8k6, the fourth son of the Speaker of the 
House of Keys, he had a tempestuous early career, and one which 
was not calculated to carry him into the higher echelons of 
Victorian society. He was left a fortune in the ’sixties, 
which caused him to abandon the army and run off to Egypt, 
where he lived for three years with an Arab mistress. On his 
return to England, he eloped to France with the family 
governess, to whom he was married the following year. Highly 
intelligent, he had no career and lacked the temperament to 
work up from a subordinate position. He had a reputation for 
irresponsibility, which he combined with a convinced atheism 
and an atrocious temper. He had however a personal magnetism 
which engendered unquestioning loyalty. This was the man who 
was to dominate Nigerian affairs for nearly twenty years.
In 1875 Goldie joined the firm of Holland Jacques 
and Company, which had been trading on the Niger for some six / 
years. The firm, owing to severe competition, was in serious 
financial difficulties, and Goldie went out to the Niger in 
1877 to find out why. It was then that he propounded his , 
remedy.
1. Real name George Dashwood Goldie Taubman. See Flint,
Sir George Goldie and the Making of Nigeria, i960, p . 3•
Work hereafter cited as Flint Goldie.
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To prescribe a cure was one thing, to achieve it
quite another. Yet the impossible happened. By a brilliant
stroke, Goldie in November 1879 succeeded in merging the four
main companies on the Niger1 into the United African Company,
with obvious monopolistic intentions. Although the amalgamation
2
did not give Goldie any financial control over the new company ?
he was the moving spirit behind it. It is doubtful if as yet
he had any political ambitions. The immediate object was
commercial, and the move was made “in order to present a firm
3
front to aggression’1 (on the part of the natives) • Anyway, 
the idea that the government could be induced to give political 
sanction to a commercial transaction by establishing a colony 
was quite fantastic.
What translated fantasy into reality was the sudden 
appearance of foreign colonial activity in the Bights. British 
policy had hitherto rested on the assumption that other European 
powers would not or could not interfere with the- commercial 
hegemony established by Britain. The shattering of this assump­
tion brought about a basic rethinking in government policy.
1. West African Company; Central African Company (until 1876 
Holland Jacques 8c Co.); Alexander Miller, Brother & Co.;
J. Pinnock. Flint, Goldie, pp.31-2.
2. Flint, Goldie , p.30.
3. F.O. C.P. lK)92. Goldie to Salisbury 18.12.79*
It was all very well to advocate a policy of ’’open door” whilst 
British industrial supremacy was unchallenged. But after 1870 
Europe underwent an industrial revolution, and the gap between 
Britain and the world closed. Britain could hardly look on with 
equanimity while foreign colonies, especially those of France, 
were established and the door was slammed, A foreign colony 
usually meant protective tariffs.
Precisely what sparked off what is usually called the 
"partition of Africa" is a matter of some controversy. One 
theory sees partition in isolation, a scramble directly caused 
by the English occupation of Egypt in 1882.1 This interpreta­
tion is perhaps too facile. The other school of thought sees 
the partition as the culmination of the penetration of Africa 
by Europe which had been going on since the early sixteenth 
century. This movement received a decisive check in the late 
1780 1 s as Europe plunged into a period of revolution and in­
ternal unrest, only to emerge again in the late 1870' s as a new
2
pattern of stability emerged. The power vacuums of Germany 
and Italy had been filled, and the crushing defeat of France 
in 1870 had not only brought a Bismarckian peace to Europe, but 
had brought fundamental political change to France for what
1. E.g. Robinson, Gallagher & Denny, Africa and the Victorians, 
1961.
2. See inter alia Hargreaves, Prelude to the Partition of West 
Africa, 19 6 Y; Flint, Nigeria and Ghana, New Jersey i960.
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turned, out to be the last time. The decisive date here is 
1879, three years before Britain occupied Egypt. In that year 
all the threats to the Third Republic in France were removed.
The monarchist President MacMahon resigned, the Senate with the 
Chamber returned a republican majority, and the Napoleonic heir, 
the Prince Imperial, was killed at Isandhlwana.1 As shares 
picked up on the Bourse, France began to turn to Africa as a 
field for expansion for her infant industries. Bismarck was 
only too willing to encourage France's colonial ambitions, not 
only as a method of driving Britain and France apart, but also 
to divert French energy away from Europe and the running sore 
of Alsace-Lorraine. As far as France was concerned, if colonies 
were to have any value, they must be exclusive and protective, 
enabling her backward industry to compete with Britain. This 
was bound to lead to friction.
The general renaissance of French political activity 
in Africa was marked in 1879 in Senegal with the military 
campaign against the Tokolors at Saboucire.^ In the same year 
began the French intervention on the lower Niger, with the visit 
of the Comte de Senelle to the Emir of Nupe. His object was to 
acquire land to build a trading station, and to obtain a promise 
of free trade. With these concessions he formed the Compagnie 
francaise de l'Afrique Equatoriale.
1. Cobban, A History of Modern France 1961, II, pp. 211-218.
2. Hargreaves, op.cit. , pp.256-257.
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Goldie set feverishly to work, fearful that the French 
had some grandiose plan for linking the Niger and Senegal rivers 
in one vast French colony to the exclusion of British trade. 
Negotiations with Umoru, Emir of Nupe, in 1879 gave the United 
African Company a monopoly of trade, and when Seme lie returned 
in 1880 he was told his concession was rescinded. When Semelle 
died later that year, the French threat seemed to have been met. 
This was only the beginning, however. Semelle1 s place was taken 
by Commandant Mattei of the French War Ministry , who was given 
Consular rank by the Ministry of Marine. When a  revolt broke 
out in Nupe, Mattei, by insisting on helping the National 
African Company to suppress it, won free trade lor the French.
By 1882, therefore, the French had broken into the 
Niger-Benue trade. On the lower river the Compagnie had done 
well enough in the palm-oil trade to attract a aecond French 
company, the Compagnie du Senegal et de la Cote Occidentale de 
l ’Afrique. By the middle of 1883 this new company had founded 
about twenty factories, with their headquarters amongst the 
Brassmen^ enemies to all upriver traders and particularly of 
the British company.
1. Hargreaves, op.cit., pp.277*
'
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As far as Goldie was concerned, the threat which the 
French posed was real. Not only were the French companies the 
equals of the National African Company in strength, but it 
seemed as if the bad old days before amalgamation had returned. 
This belief was strengthened by the fact that British firms, 
encouraged by the defeat of the National African Company’s 
monopoly and by the lowering of prices the Company had achieved, 
started reappearing on the Niger. There was a limit to the 
usefulness of the policy of amalgamation in order to restore a 
monopoly, although admittedly the policy had not yet been ex­
hausted. Therefore Goldie began to move towards applying the 
other part of his remedy, which he had prescribed in 1877: to
secure his position he would have to have political control.
Precisely when Goldie came up with the idea of 
securing a Royal Charter is not quite clear. Even before the 
formation of the United Africa Company rumours had been circu­
lating around the Niger that a “Company is contemplating to 
get a charter of the Niger trade to the exclusion of others 
entering.”'1' In l88l the grant of a charter to the British 
North Borneo Company may have provided Goldie with his incen­
tive, but certainly did not create his opportunity. Goldie did
2
not make any formal request for a charter until 1885 5 although
1. C.M.S., C.A^/O^Ca). Bishop Crowther to Hutchinson l6.10.79-
2. Not in l88l as stated by Dike, Crowe and others. Flint, 
Goldie „ p.b 2 can find no evidence for any such request then 
in any official F.O. or C .0. correspondence or private 
papers; nor can the present writer.
3 .^
he reorganised the Company in June 1882 as the National African 
Company, with power to acquire administrative amd political as 
well as commercial privileges. At the same time^ Goldie increased 
his influence in high places. Lord Aberdare, a ‘.Liberal ex- 
minister, was persuaded into the Company as chairman; Joseph 
Chamberlain, President of the Board of Trade, be?came a share­
holder. With an increase to £1,000,000 in the mominal capital 
held by the Company, and with negotiations for aim.algamation 
taking place in Paris with the French companies, Goldie was all 
set to move forward.
There were other disquieting signs of IFrench activity 
in the Bights, activity which seemed to emphasizce that any 
political position which the French won would be used against 
the general interests of British trade. In 18821, the French 
established a new colony in Gabon, south of the (Cameroon, pene­
tration from which seemed to threaten the oil markets of Old 
Calabar. The advent of Jules Ferry, a convinced imperialist, to 
power as French Prime Minister, heralded the swi:ft annexation of 
the Popos , Cotonou, Aghwey and Porto Novo, which cut off Lagos 
from the Gold Coast, during 1883. This, coupled with the 
success of French trade on the Niger, which seemeed to indicate 
a danger that the French government might give protection to 
their two companies, brought a British governmentt , opposed in 
theory to African expansion, to reconsider its pcolicy complete­
ly.
The governments response to Initial French moves 
was slow, a slowness born of reluctance to act and inter­
departmental bickering rather than of lack of knowledge as to 
what was required. Throughout 1882-1883, the French threat
to British trade was hammered home in a flood of letters from
1
consul and traders. Hewett urged the Foreign Office to
intervene in the Cameroons region and accept the offer of the
2
Cameroons princes, made originally in 1879 , but never answered,
3
and repeated in l88l , to accept the protectorate of their
country, otherwise "If we refuse their offer, they may seek
the protection of the French with disastrous results for our
k
trade in Southern Nigeria." Hewett wished to see a policy 
of protection extended not only to the Cameroons but to the 
whole coast as far as Benin. Villiers Lister, Assistant Under 
Secretary in charge of African affairs, agreed with Hewett and 
waxed sanguine on "the possibility of altering the whole 
system of British policy as regards the native chiefs on the 
West Coast of Africa, and the abolition of the monopolies 
which are destructive to trade and productive of endless
5
squabbles and wars."
1. Hewett was Consul for the Bights from 1880 until 1891.
2. F.O.C.P. 1+82^. Cameroons Princes to H.M.the Queen, 7.8.79*
3* Ibid. Bell & Acqua to Gladstone, 6,11.81.
I hid. Hewett to Granville, 11+.1.82.
5. P.R.O. 30/29/135. Memo by Lister, ^.1.82.
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The Colonial Office response, however, to Hewettfs 
proposals, when communicated to Kimberley by Granville, was icy.
They were “not prepared to recommend the occupation of any
part of the coast in question. The responsibilities of Her 
Majesty’s Government are already very heavy, and it is very 
indesirable to add to them.'1 The climate was "very pestilen­
tial", the demands on the taxpayer would be very heavy, and the 
question of slavery would of itself be "sufficient to deter
H.M.G. from undertaking such a responsibility as is proposed
1
if it can possibly be avoided." The Colonial Office was 
certainly not going to be hurried out of its policy of drifting, 
which until now had served Britain's interests in the tropics 
so well, nor into initiating a revolution, by a danger antici­
pated but not yet materialised. In the event the Colonial 
Office made a counter-proposal that the Foreign Office might 
attempt to negotiate a comprehensive agreement with France for 
demarcation of spheres of influence, using as a carrot the 
Gambia, for which concession France would stay out of the
o
N i g e r . T h i s  proposal! never got off the ground, however, as 
Lyons, Ambassador in Paris, advised against it in the current 
state of deterioration in amity between Britain and France over 
Egypt.
1. F.O.C.P. k82b-. Wingfield to Pauncefote, 15.*+.82.
2. C.O. 1^7/52. Colonial Office to Foreign Office, 6.1.83.
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With the advent of Jules Ferry and the consequent
/
sharpening of French pessure, it clearly became less possible 
for the Colonial Office to argue that no threat was posed to 
British trade. The incentive was provided for a forward move­
ment by the Foreign Office. Colonial Office hostility wrecked 
any idea of a colony; the French were not prepared to negoti­
ate a partition on the basis of spheres of influence. The only 
alternative was some form of protectorate. This conclusion was 
reached late in 1882 as a matter of policy in the Foreign 
Office, but for months the discussion was to continue, in the 
face of mounting activity by the French, as to what sort of 
protectorate was necessary. A plan for a complete paraphern­
alia of consuls and vice-consuls superintending the external 
affairs of the native states in detail, leaving the internal 
affairs of the Africans in their own hands, was coming to grief 
over Treasury refusal to sanction the necessary establishment.
At the other extreme it was clearly recognised that mere 
treaties with the local rulers, in which they undertook not to 
have any dealings with a foreign power without British sanction, 
were insufficient.^
In October 1883 Granville attempted to force the issue 
on to the Colonial Office by suggesting that the "time has come
1. F.O.C.P. ^825. Foreign Office to Colonial Office, 22.5.83*
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when it is desirable that H.M.G. should decide in what way
they can best protect British trade in those areas where there
is reason to believe that trade if properly developed would
render them a more valuable possession than the existing
British colonies on that C o a s t . T h e  Colonial Office was not
prepared to be caught, however. As early as July they had
suggested that before any decision was taken the matters at
issue would have to go before the Cabinet. This answer was
2
now returned to Granville, who agreed.
The whole question of Britain in West Africa went 
before the Cabinet's colonial committee in November. A battle 
of memoranda ensued between the departments. The Colonial 
Office argued on the one hand that government should not annex 
or protect any fresh territories in Africa, but that an attempt 
should be made to settle all West African questions with France 
by negotiation, and by the cession of the Gambia. The Foreign 
Office insisted, on the other hand, that only if the Protector­
ates were safely secured could Britain negotiate from a basis 
of strength and might obtain, not only Porto Novo and the other 
places between Lagos and the Gold Coast annexed by the French 
in 1883, in exchange for the Gambia, but also "an engagement to
1. F.O.C.P. ^869. Lister to Bramston, 5.10.83*
2. Ibid. Herbert to Pauncefote, 20.7.83; Colonial Office 
to Foreign Office, 5.10.83; Lister to Meade, 30*10*83*
abolish in all French Colonies or Settlements on the West Coast 
of Africa, whether existing or hereafter acquired, all differ- 
ential duties on British goods and ships, and to place British 
subjects in those places upon a perfect equality with French 
subjects.1,1
On the whole the colonial committee's report was 
favourable to the Foreign Office view, and its findings were 
accepted by the Cabinet. Consul Hewett was to be sent out to 
the Bights to make treaties of protection with the chiefs of the 
Niger Delta, Oil Rivers and Cameroons region. The process of 
creating the protectorate was not, however, to become a charge 
on the Imperial Treasury, and British authority must be main­
tained by periodic visits of gunboat and consul. Beyond this, 
the Cabinet made no attempt to formulate the methods by which 
authority could be asserted and maintained.
Moreover, it was to take a further six months after 
the Cabinet's decision before Hewett was ready to move. These 
months were mainly taken up with the question of how to pay for 
the new protectorate without approaching the Treasury for more 
money on the Foreign Office estimates. The sum involved was 
only some £5000 for running costs and £8000 for initial ex­
penditure, which two figures were, characteristically, cheese- 
pared down to £3625 and £5790 respectively, before they were
1. F.O.C.P. *+955. Memos, by Lister, 2*+.10.83 & l6.ll.83.
2. F.O.C.P. 500k. Lister to Lingen, 6.5.8k; Courtney to 
Fitzmaurice, 26.5.8k.
approved. In the face of the traders' refusal to be taxed to 
support the new establishment, and because of Treasury insis­
tence, the money had to be found by economies within the 
department.
At last, all was ready; on May l6 188*+, Hewett was 
given his instructions and a supply of treaty forms, and on 
May 30 he sailed for Bonny. He was to establish free trade 
throughout the area given to his charge for the citizens of all 
countries, and British protection from the Cameroons to Benin.
His task on both counts was not, however, to be quite so simple 
as the government anticipated.
* * * * *
Meanwhile, Goldie was playing a deep game. On the 
one hand he had to convince the British government of the dangers 
from France on the Niger, and urge that the only solution was 
some form of British protection; on the other hand he had to 
make sure that his was the sole influence or authority in the 
area under protection, in order to justify commercial monopoly.
A British colony would mean free trade and all the evils of the 
pre-l879 period.
1. F.O.C.P. 500^. Lister to Hewett, 16.5.8^.
*+1.
By the beginning of 1883 it was clear that negotia­
tions between the National African Company and the French 
companies were breaking down. Goldie therefore indulged in a 
price war, committing his personal fortune, and raised prices 
paid for produce in the areas where the French also traded by 
some 25 per cent. By June the Senegal Company had had
enough and sold out, and the following October the other French 
company did likewise. Thus, two weeks before the opening of 
the Berlin West Africa Conference, Goldie could report to the 
Foreign Office that French commercial competition had been 
eliminated from the Niger.^
To fulfil the second part of his aims was not quite 
so simple. When Hewett had suggested in 1882 that the Oil Rivers 
might be given over to a chartered company since Her Majesty's
Government would then "be relieved of all financial and adminis-
2
trative responsibility of governing the country" , the Colonial 
Office, it will be remembered, rejected all his proposals out 
of hand since they did not feel the French danger to be pressing. 
When it became clear that it was, the usefulness of a company 
like the National African Company became increasingly apparent.
1. F.O.C.P. 5033- Goldie to Anderson, 13*10.8*+.
2. F.O.C.P. k82k. Hewett to Granville, l1*. 1.82.
The fundamental reason for this was money, or rather lack of it, 
and it was this situation which was to be the principal cause of 
the renaissance of the chartered company as an instrument of 
imperial expansion in the last fifteen years of the nineteenth 
century. Goldie used the movement in his favour in a masterly 
way. "By systematically taking advantage of the Government's 
financial embarrassment Goldie was able gradually to attract to 
the National African Company an official status as an agent of 
the British government.1 ^  Thus, throughout the protracted dis­
cussions of l883-l88k between the Colonial Office and the 
Foreign Office, Goldie was the natural ally of the former. His 
motives were simple. He had no intention of providing the 
Foreign Office with a permanent source of revenue which would 
lessen the incentive of the government to transfer the adminis­
tration to the National African Company, if and when the time 
was ripe, particularly as the company itself would be the chief 
taxpayer. Anderson, at the Foreign Office, supported Goldie's 
objection, remarking "the proposal that the trade should pay 
is without precedent, and as regards the tax, our traders would 
be handicapped, for there seems to be no means short of annex­
ation by which we could tax foreigners." He also added
that if the traders paid for the consuls "the latter might
p
suffer in their independence."
1. Flint, Goldie., p. 55.
2. F.O.C.P. 500*+. Memo by Anderson, 27.2.8 +^.
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Goldie was, however, prepared to offer any help short 
of hard cash to establish British influence on the Niger. Thus, 
early in 1883, he had offered to provide at his own expense a 
British Vice-Consul for the Niger.^ The offer was refused, as 
the Foreign Office had no illusions about the motives behind it. 
A year later the attitude of the Foreign Office had altered, 
although not their beliefs about Goldie’s motives. They were 
now resigned to the fact that their "desires for Vice-Consuls” 
would have to be limited, and that money must be saved by all 
possible means/" On July 31 188h-, McIntosh, chief agent of 
the National African Company, was appointed British Vice- 
Consul with no salary and ”no claim on Her Majesty’s Government” 
when his services should cease.^ That Hewett’s assistant in 
negotiating treaties of protection on the Niger was also an 
employee of the National African Company put the latter in a 
position of unique advantage.
Goldie had been equally active with regard to expan­
ding his influence on the Lower Niger itself. Concentrating on 
the region behind the delta, since the delta, he believed, could 
be easily controlled by naval warships, he formed a fleet of 
twenty river gunboats in 188 -^, to protect company factories.
1. F.O.C.P. ^825. National African Company to Foreign Office,
28.2.83.
2. F.O.C.P. 500*+. Memo by Lister, 27.2.83.
3. F.O.C.P. 5021. Granville to Hewett, 31 *7* 8*+.
Flint, Goldie, p. 58.
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These gunboats proved useful in offering friendly rulers
assistance against rebels to the rulers* own authority. Far
more important than a judicious use of gunboat diplomacy were
the treaties he had concluded with native rulers. These
treaties conceded complete sovereignty to the Company, granted
1
land rights, and complete trading rights. When Hewett 
arrived on the Niger in August l88*f to conclude treaties in 
the name of the British government, he went upriver in a Company 
boat, was forced to rely on the Company's local staff for in­
formation and provisions, and was confronted into the bargain 
by a prior set of treaties concluded in the name of the National 
African Company, covering both banks of the Niger up to its con­
fluence with the Benue. These treaties, conferring as they 
did, monopolistic trading privileges, Hewett was unable to 
approve in toto. Nevertheless he recognised their force, and 
in the treaties he negotiated on the Niger he added an article 
which recognised that permission to trade should be regulated 
according to the prior agreement with the National African 
Company. Thus Hewett t|^ d been prevented from ensuring free 
trade throughout the whole of his area, and all Goldie lacked 
in terms of power was the instrument the Royal Charter 
itself.
1. Hertslet, Commercial Treaties XVII 15$ ff«
Neither was Consul Hewett to succeed fully in the 
other part of his task: to take uncler British protection the
whole of the area from the Cameroons to Benin. He arrived on 
the coast on June 21 188*+, armed with presents of cloth, liquor, 
bright baubles, and treaty forms which promised British pro­
tection, asked for British control of external relations, full 
consular jurisdiction over foreigners, and also promised pro­
gress, civilization, and freedom of religion and trade,1 Many 
of the Oil Rivers chiefs were suspicious of the free trade 
clause and would only consent to sign provisional treaties, 
with the offending clause removed. In the space of three 
weeks, however, Benin River, New Calabar, Bonny and Old Calabar 
were acquired. The Brassmen proved more intractable , refusing 
to sign a treaty for more than six months unless Hewett obtained.
’’exclusive use of the Ase market” from the National African 
2
Company. Nevertheless, as Hewett sailed for the Cameroons, 
he had reason to feel optimistic. The central core of British 
 ^ commercial interests had been made safe by his three weeks1 
work. The easiest part of his task lay ahead, since the 
j Cameroons chiefs had asked for protection. His surprise, there­
fore, was great when he sailed into the Cameroons River on July
19, to be confronted by the flag of Imperial Germany.
1   __________________________________
1. Ibid., 131-l5lh.
[2. F.O.C.P. 5021 Hewett to Granville 30.7 *8^.
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Whatever the German motives,1 their acquisition of
the Cameroons (Hewett had been forestalled by five days) had
revealed with startling effect the inadequacy of the gunboat-
and-consul type of diplomacy. Germany was a new colonial power,
and it was in her interest ^ against that of the old-established
colonial powers, to insist on a policy of effective occupation.
German intervention, therefore, caused Hewett to hurry on the
process of treaty-making, and by September, he could fairly
claim to have covered not only the coast between Lagos and the
Cameroons, but also up the Niger-Benue as far as Lokoja and Ibi.
The British were not, however, unduly worried by the
German moves, superficially irritating though they might be*
It was the French whom the British wished to keep out, because
the presence of the French usually meant difficulties for
English trade. As far as Gladstone was concerned)in Germany
2"we could have no better neighbours,"^ and the whole idea of 
any conflict over the Cameroons seemed senseless. By early 
1885, when the dust had settled, the two powers were able to 
come to an amicable agreement over spheres of influence.
Britain withdrew claims established by Hewett in the Cameroons 
area, and ceded the Baptist mission station at Ambas Bay,
1. Discussed in Taylor) Germany1s First Bid for Colonies (1938).
2. Eyck, Bismarck Vol.Ill, p.^97•
3. F.O.C.P. 5021 Meade to Lister 7*10.8H-.
whereupon the missionaries under diplomatic pressure sold out 
to a German mission society. Germany, in return, yielded a 
free hand to Britain on the Niger.
The free hand was not easily won. German interven­
tion in Africa initially directed against England, produced a 
limited co-operation between Bismarck and Ferry on the basis 
of like interests. The immediate upshot of this Franco-German 
co-operation was the Berlin West African Conference which met 
in November 188*+. The programme laid down for this conference, 
which was engineered by Ferry and Bismarck without reference to 
Britain,1 involved freedom of commerce in the Congo basing the 
application of the stipulations of the Vienna Congress of l8l5, 
respecting freedom of river navigation on the Danube, to the 
Congo and the Niger; and the determination of the formalities
under which new annexations on the coast of Africa were to be
2
considered effective. The motives behind the summoning of 
the conference were clear to the British government. Lister 
remarked that the "proposal for securing freedom of navigation 
on the Niger, where navigation is perfectly free, but where
British influence is paramount, clearly is not intended to be
2
favourable to England.11
1. Crowe, The Berlin West African Conference (19*+2)
2. F.O.C.P. 5023. Granville to Scott 7.10.8*+.
3. F.O.C.P. 5023. Minute by Lister, l h . l Q . 8 b ,
• X  *
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In the event Goldie had served Britain well. By the 
elimination of commercial opposition on the Niger, and by virtue 
of the protectorate treaties, it was clearly possible for Goldie 
and the British delegates to argue at the conference that 
Britain was the Niger power and was not prepared to give up
that position or withdraw the protectorate treaties “until....
satisfied as to the conditions on which £ s h e /  could consent to 
withdraw them.M~ If Britain alone traded on the Niger, the 
proposal for an international commission to control navigation 
was totally irrelevant.
Much to France’s dismay, Bismarck accepted this argu­
ment, thereby taking much of the steam out of the Franco-German 
entente. In exchange for a British promise to recognize 
Leopold’s position in the Congo, Bismarck supported a revised 
Niger Navigation Act drafted by the British delegation. This 
act, while supporting the principle of international free trade 
and navigation for the Niger, made Britain solely responsible 
for ensuring its observance. Internationally the Bights area 
was safe for Britain, and in June 1885 the government took the 
formal step of constituting the territories between Lagos and
the Cameroons, the banks of the Niger as far as Lokoja, and the
2
Benue to Ibi, into the Niger Protectorate.
Ibid. Memo by Anderson lh.10.8k.
2. F.O.C.P. 5l6l. Notification in London Gazette. 5•6.85•
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If Britain was able to argue that she was in effective 
occupation of the Niger because of Goldie’s work, the issue of 
a Charter to the National Africa Company was an eminently 
logical step, particularly as it constituted the cheapest and 
most effective way of discharging the obligations incurred at 
Berlin, and of administering the protectorate beyond the Delta. 
The Charter was duly issued in July 1886, but only after pro­
tracted negotiations which did not always run smoothly.
There were two reasons for this. In the first place, 
although there was no conflict in principle as to whether or 
not a Charter should be issued, there was some doubt as to the 
precise form which it should take. The Foreign Office officials, 
led by Pauncefote, sought to retain some measure of governmental 
supervision over the minutiae of the Company’s administration. 
Goldie, on the other hand, argued for as completely free a hand 
as possible, insisting that the Company’s rights derived from 
independent treaties with the indigenous rulers. In the end his 
point of view prevailed, owing to the fact that the Foreign 
Office was in no position to ask the Treasury for the money 
which imperial control would involve, and also because of the 
inability of the legal experts to write into a Charter the 
safeguards the Foreign Office wanted.^
1. See Flint, Goldie. pp.70-87 for the full story of the
negotiations.
In the second place there was delay because the 
government hoped that the National Africa Company would be 
able to come to terms with the Oil Rivers traders, so enabling 
the Charter to be extended over the whole Protectorate. This 
proved impossible, and it was in many ways unfortunate, not 
least in terms of future conflicts between administrations on 
the spot and the severing of traditional trade routes and 
cultural contacts, that, by the issue of the Charter in 1886, 
the protectorate was arbitrarily split into two parts.
Nevertheless, the main objectives had been secured. 
1886 had seen the clouds of uncertainty suddenly lift. British 
paramountcy in the Bights and on the Lower Niger had been accor­
ded international recognition. The National Africa Company, 
now the Royal Niger Company, was busy formalising its adminis­
tration on the lower Niger-Benue. An administration would in 
due course be extended to the Oil Rivers, but there was no 
hurry. Johnston, Acting Consul to the Bights, summarised the
nature of British rule at this time admirably: 11 our policy
may for the present chiefly assume a negative character. So
long as we keep other nations out, we need not be in a hurry to
* „1go m .
1. F.O. 8k/1750 Johnston to Anderson, 13*11.86.
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CHAPTER TOO 
MAJOR MACDONALD
The man who was to play such a decisive role at this
juncture in West African affairs was not unfitted to fill the
part. Slim, of medium height and stature, with a military
moustache and fair hair slightly balding, of upright carriage
and at thirty-six still a bachelor, Macdonald was at the height
of his powers.'1 While his career had not previously been one
of outstanding distinction, it had nevertheless been marked by
solid and steady progress - and his training and development
were to be of the utmost significance for his approach to West
African affairs.
Claude Macdonald was born on the twelfth of June 1852,
the eldest son of General James "Hamish1 Dawson Macdonald by his
wife Mary Ellen Dougan, who was of Irish blood, at the family
2
home in Stirling. General Macdonald had had a distinguished
career in the Bengal staff corps, and while Claude was playing
with toy soldiers, his father was taking part in the heroic
3
defence of Calcutta during the mutiny. In his early years the
1. There is a photograph of Macdonald in Mockler Ferryman,
Up the Niger. 1892.
2. Dictionary of National Biography , alphabetical entry under 
Macdonald.
3* Hart, Annual Army List 1865.
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young boy saw little of his father and soon developed an ability 
to look after himself. He learnt to shoot and thus prepare him­
self for the army career that was naturally cut out for the 
eldest (and as it turned out, the only) son of a distinguished 
officer.
At the age of thirteen began the indispensable pre­
liminary grooming of the Victorian officer-gentleman. In 
August 1865 he was sent to England to school at Uppingham, at 
this time under the headmaster ship of Edward Thring, a pioneer 
in the recognition of the value of the fine arts in education. 
Macdonald might have reaped the full benefit of Thring1s revolu- 
tion, as during the short period he was there, the School Chapel 
was opened, and the celebrated German musician, Paul David,
arrived - the man who was to be in the forefront of the develop-
2
ments in school musical activities during the next forty years. 
Unfortunately, however, circumstances dictated that Macdonald 
should leave Uppingham after only sixteen months - why is not
3
known.' Nevertheless he had acquired an interest in music 
unusual in an army man of the time, which he was never to lose. 
This interest was to flower during his mature years in Japan,
h
when he took up oriental music with a more than academic interest.
1. Scholes, The Oxford Companion to Music, p.317*
2. Scholes, op.cit., p.279*
3. For much of the information in this paragraph I am indebted 
to the Headmaster of Uppingham School.
J+. Sals. Private Papers Macdonald to McDonall 11.10.98 no 
vol. no.jfiled under Macdonald.
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After he left Uppingham in 1866, little is known of 
Macdonald until he entered SandhurstT at the start of his army 
career proper, in 1869. His education continued on a less formal 
basis under private tuition, and possibly suffered from his 
father’s insistence on the family accompanying him wherever his 
command took him. Certainly Macdonald had few companions of 
his own age and grew up in completely military surroundings.
This constant mixing with older men may have accounted for an 
early aloofness in his manner, and a complete lack of interest 
in women until he was nearly forty.^ At Sandhurst he made 
moderate academic progress on the standard fare, although his 
ability to shoot was noted, as was his '‘intense curiosity about
p
everything”. At the age of twenty h.e passed out as a sub­
lieutenant in the 7*+th Highland Light Infantry. Prospects were 
considerably brighter in the army for an intelligent but not 
over-rich young man like Macdonald than they had been some few 
years earlier; for this was the age of Cardwell's new model 
army, of short service enlistment, of the small efficient fight­
ing unit backed by an adequate reserve, and, above all, of pro­
motion by merit and not by purchase. Not all of these reforms 
were implemented at once, but Macdonald felt the impact of many 
of them. His promotion was assured, if it was still slow. Two
years after passing out, he became a lieutenant, at twenty-seven 
a captain.3
1. Personal information Captain Jordan.
Report on Sub-Lieutenant Macdonald, Sandhurst archives, 
18.6.72. 5
3• Hart’s New Army List, relevant volumes.
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Cardwell also attempted to streamline recruitment on a 
territorial basis by amalgamations, and under a localisation 
scheme of April 1873 the 7*+th Highlanders were linked for adminis 
trative and enlistment purposes with the 26th.Cameronians at 
their depot at Hamilton.'1' This brought Macdonald conveniently 
near the family seat at Stirling when the regiment was stationed, 
at home; not that he.was able to take much advantage of this, 
since from 1875 to 1876 the regiment was stationed in Malta, 
as the eastern question loomed yet again ominously on the hori­
zon. Macdonald was not, however, to be privileged to have a 
front row seat, as later that year* (1876)^as part of a general
move to keep the temperature down during the Constantinople
2
Conference, the regiment was shipped off to the Far East. This 
was to be Macdonald's only sojourn east of Cape Garde'fui before 
he took up his appointment as ambassador at Peking in 1896.
In November 1877 Macdonald found himself making the 
long sea journey home to take up an appointment as an instructor 
at the Institute of Musketry.^ Macdonald spent over three 
years at the Institute in Glasgow, improving not only the 
shooting of his cadets, but also his own. When his regiment re­
turned from the Far East in January 1880, it underwent another
1. Regimental Records of H.L.I., p.123.
Ibid, , pp,123-i+.
3. Hart, New Army List.
reorganisation, during which the 7*+th Highlanders became the
2nd Battalion Highland Light Infantry, with quarters at Aldershot.
Macdonald was transferred along with his regiment, and resumed
2
teaching musketry in the Staff College at Aldershot. Here he 
was to stay until the events took place which were to change his
whole career.
Before, however, we examine the Egyptian problem and 
the impact it had on Macdonald, it is important to note how 
events had already shaped his character. Emerging from the 
obscurity surrounding much of his early life we see an officer, 
a gentleman, the complete professional army man, dedicated to 
his career and with little or no private life. What little 
there was was spent in the company of fellow officers at the 
Junior United Service Club in London: a routine broken only by 
the annual visit to the family home in Scotland. He was a man 
who would take on any job because he had no commitments and no 
responsibilities; and who had made something of a name for him­
self in his own circle by his ability to shoot straight. The 
picture is not, however, complete; it is altogether too simple 
and crude. The compassion for human suffering has yet to be
1. Regimental Records of H.L.I., p.12^.
2. Hart, New Anrnny List.
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seen, but one can nevertheless pick out a certain sensitivity 
which gives point and individuality - the appreciation of 
music, that "intense curiosity" noted at Sandhurst, even a most 
unmilitary preoccupation with learning for learning’s sake, 
seen in an attempt to teach himself German during these years
(an asset, incidentally, of great value to him in his later
career). ^  Here obviously was a man dedicated to the public
weal but too intelligent to be a mere yes-man.
What prevented Macdonald from reaching the top in the 
army was the great crisis over Egypt and Suez which, beginning 
in 1876, ran through a succession of political disasters, cul­
minating in the invasion of that country and its subsequent 
occupation by Britain. The purchase of million-worth of 
shares in the Suez Canal from the Khedive Ismail by Disraeli
revealed not so much the latterJs political acumen as the
2
former’s impecuniosity. British interest in the area grew 
as Egypt slid deeper and deeper into financial difficulties.
The following year the Khedive suspended payment of his debts.
This caused intense international activity, and a four-power 
debt commission (the Caisse) was forced upon the Khedive in May 
1876. France, Italy and Austria-Hungary all nominated represen-
1. Sals. Private Papers Macdonald to Macdonell, op.cit.
2. This summary of the background to the Egyptian crisis is 
•based on Robinson Gallagher & Denny,Africa and the Victorians. 
196^. Tignoiff Gt.Britain and the Modernisation of Egypt,
New York 1965. Cromer Modern Egypt London 1908. For a. con­
temporary birds eye view F.O. l¥l7l5l.
tatives, a course from which Lord Derby shrank. This was
A
followed by an X gi° -French mission, semi-official on the 
British side, which resulted in a Dual Control of Egyptian 
finances, an Englishman and a Frenchman acting as controllers- 
general for the imposing of reforms on a reluctant Khedive.
When the Khedive reacted against these reforms, the powers 
induced the Sultan*of Turkey, Egypt’s nominal overlord, to 
depose Ismail in favour of his son Tewfik (April 1879)- Quite 
suddenly the Anglo-French policy of informal sway was developing 
into a total direction of Egypt’s internal affairs. The new 
Khedive made some sort of composition with his creditors by the 
Law of Liquidation in the following yeaP, but his authority was 
badly damaged in the process. On September 9 l88l the army 
under one Urabi surrounded the Khedive’s palace and demanded the 
dismissal of his ministry, the calling of the Chamber of Notables 
and the restoring of the army to its former strength before the 
Anglo-French economies. The Khedive had no choice but to yield, 
and the Anglo-French condominium was critically shaken. Urabi 
took advantage of the popular movement in his favour to force 
through a new constitution with himself as Minister of War. With 
Urabi in the ascendant, and the threat of a complete breakdown 
in Anglo-French influence, the time had passed for diplomatic 
action. In May the British and French fleets were sent to 
Alexandria to-protect foreigners, and in the hope of bluffing
Urabi into surrender. The Colonel’s answer was to begin forti­
fying Alexandria and to threaten to block the Suez canal. The 
crisis had arrived. French policy had changed with the fall of 
Garabetta in January 1882 and Freycinet, the new Prime Minister, 
believed that France's interests lay more in Europe than outside 
it. The new Chamber refused to countenance military intervention 
in Egypt, nor would they even go so far as the minimal con­
cession made by Freycinet to the British, that they would defend 
the canal. On July 29, Freycinet resigned, and France ceased to 
have any active interest in Egypt. Admiral Seymour, in command 
of the British fleet, in the meantime had pointed out on July 3? 
that Urabi ‘s new defences threatened his fleet. On July 9 he 
received permission to destroy them if they were persisted in; 
on the 11th. he did so after a ten and a half hour bombardment. 
During the first exchanges the French, under orders from Paris, 
steamed away.
The British bombardment of Alexandria, far from sup­
pressing it, strengthened Urabi’s hold on the country. Anti- 
foreign riots spread, a .jihad was declared against the British. 
Tewfik fled from Cairo in danger of his life and placed himself
under Seymour's protection. Urabi gave warning that he would
1
destroy the Canal in defence of Egypt , and Britain therefore 
decided to send an expedition under Sir Garnet Wolseley (July 20).
1. Beatty, Ferdinand de Lessees. 1956, p.276.
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It was of a size (l6,*f00 men), which expressed a determination
to pacify Egypt alone if need be. Four days later Parliament
voted £2,300,000 to pay for the expedition. The foundations
for formal intervention were laid.
When Macdonald received the news of hostilities in
Egypt, he was with his regiment at Aldershot, taking part in
manoeuvres.^ Under ordeii, he at once prepared for active
2
service, and on August 8 sailed from Portsmouth. As one of 
a body of thirty officers aboard the boat, he would have been 
well versed with the military objectives which had to be 
achieved in Egypt: a quick victory, followed by pacification
and the inauguration of a sound administration. No one expec­
ted this to take long; the occupation was to be temporary, 
for the actual administration was not a soldier’s job. Indeed, 
what had oiled the wheels of decision in the Cabinet, and had 
induced Parliament to be so free with its vote (275-19) was the 
fact that intervention was to be the instrument of a quick
settlement, with early withdrawal, leaving the Egyptians Mto
3
manage their own affairs”. When Macdonald arrived at Alexan­
dria on August 20, he expected his sojourn to be short.
1. Regimental Records, H.L.I., p.125.
2. Military History of the Campaign of 1882. p.l09»
3. Hansard, 3rd Series CCLXXII cols.1711-12.
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The campaign that followed was indeed short. After a
long and completely successful night march, Wolseley attacked 
at dawn on September 13, Urabi1 s entrenched position at Tel- 
el-Kebir. By daylight it was all over; a cavalry dash on 
Cairo had produced the surrender of Urabiy'and the remaining 
forces which had not scattered at the first onslaught. The 
total British casualties were relatively light: sixty-seven
killed and 382 wounded. ' But a regimental breakdown reveals 
that the Highland Infantry were in the thick of the fighting, 
losing 2k of those killed, more than any other regiment. 
Macdonald was thus in close proximity to the enemy, and from 
the evidence, in his first campaign acquitted himself so well
as to bring his name to the notice of his superiors. Wolseley
wrote home in)official report of the campaign that Captain 
Macdonald was an officer recommended 'as ’’specially deserving” ,
and as ’’deemed to be most worthy of consideration, and where
_ — 2
all did well to have distinguished ^himself/ most. On the
l8th of the same month he was promoted Brevet Major. He also
received, as did others in the campaign, the Khedive’s star 
and medal with clasp.
1. Military History of the Campaign of 1882 , p .198.
2. W.O. 33AO, Wolseley to War Office, 2k.9 .82.
The military solution proved easier to obtain than the 
political one. After Tel-el-Kebir, Egypt had collapsed com­
pletely. Law, order and internal administration had broken 
down, and there were no taxes coming in. Almost the easiest 
part of the problem of reconstruction was the return of the 
Khedive to Cairo and the appointment of a new ministry under 
Cherif Pasha. One of the first acts of the ministry, ably 
advised by Sir Edward Malet, who had been in Egypt as the 
British representative since l88l, and afterwards by Sir 
Evelyn Baring, who replaced Malet in September 1883, was to 
bring Urabi and the rebels for trial, In order to facilitate 
the work of the courts martial, a commission was appointed in 
Alexandria to enquire into charges against persons arrested 
and to take summary proceedings. As the net was thrown wider, 
Malet suggested to Cherif that in view of the volume of work 
and “possible injustice and hardship if the proceedings were 
protracted” , small commissions or sub-commissions should be 
appointed to assist the work of the main commission as necess­
ary. Malet also advised the presence of an English officer at 
the proceedings.^' Cherif agreed to this on November 21 and 
asked for the name of the proposed officer. This threw the
1. F.O. l k l/163 Malet to Cherif, 17.11.82.
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British agency into something of a turmoil. Most of Malet1 s
staff were occupied in collecting information for Dufferin,
who had been sent as Special Commissioner from Constantinople
to report on the best means of balancing Egypt’s budget. He
had nobody to spare. He therefore hurriedly consulted with
Sir Archibald Alison, an English officer in Cairo whom he knew
slightly. Alison, soon himself to be involved in building
Egypt’s new army, had commanded the Highland Brigade at Tel- 
1
el-Kebir. Could he recommend any able intelligent officers
who would be willing to undertake the job of watching over
the commissions? Alison had no hesitation: the young officer
who had distinguished himself under his command was the man.
To assist Macdonald and to act as interpreter, Malet lent a
2
Mr. Cameron from the agency. Macdonald was to be under the 
direct instruction of Sir Rivers Wilson, who was watching the 
proceedings of the main commission.
Macdonald swung into his task with an amazing zest and 
enthusiasm. During the first week of his appointment he 
visited 105 prisoners in the Zaptieh prison in Cairo, besides 
his commission duties, and expressed himself disgusted with 
the conditions in which they languished in the first of a 
sequence of forceful letters to Wilson:
1. Regimental Records, H.L.I., p.125.
2. F.O. lhl/l68. Dufferin to Granville, 22.11.82.
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’’...most of the prisoners in the Zaptieh, being of the 
poorer class and belonging to the lower grades of the 
late Egyptian army, are reduced to great straits to 
provide themselves with sustenance; several, though 
making no complaint of their treatment, state that 
having been so long in prison they have no money left ^ 
and are reduced to selling their clothes to buy food.11
The pitiful state of these men determined Macdonald that the
work of the sub-commission would at any rate be pushed on as
fast as possible. The work output of the investigators doubled
2
in the space of a week. By the second week in December the 
backlog of cases had been cleared off with regard to those 
confined in the Zaptieh, and Wilson considered releasing Mac- 
donald to his regimental duties.'"
The end was only the beginning, however. In the first 
place, fast as the sub-commission had worked, the great flood 
of arrests, investigations and complaints by European residents 
was only just beginning, as law and order were restored in 
Lower Egypt. On December 17, the Egyptian Government found it 
necessary to appoint two new commissions to investigate the 
complaints at Tantah and Alexandria against people accused of 
being implicated in felonious crime, who were therefore not to 
be released in the Khedive’s general amnesty for political 
prisoners issued in January 1883. Macdonald was an obvious
1. F.O.C.P. V 727. Malet to Granville, 5.12.82, enc.
Macdonald to Wilson.
2. F.O.C.P., loc. cit.
3. F.O. 1^1/170, Dufferin to Macdonald, 11.12.82.
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choice to sit on one of the commissions and accordingly left
1
for Tantah on December 30. Secondly, Macdonald was having his 
first painful experiences of Egyptian officialdom. The 
'’whirlwind” who had passed through the Zaptieh prison reported 
ruefully on his visit a fortnight later than the conditions of 
the prisoners seemed to have worsened rather than improved.
Many prisoners complained of waht of food. Wilson asked Malet 
to remonstrate with Ismail, the Minister of the Interior, which 
’’would have good effect”."- The British officers were beginning 
to see the enormity of the task which lay ahead, merely in 
punishing the offenders of the past year, let alone repairing 
the ravages of previous years.
While Macdonald was engaged at Tantah, circumstances 
were to change his whole position. On January 9? Malet in­
formed the Foreign Office that Major Chermside, military 
attache to the Cairo agency, had resigned to take up an 
appointment in the newly formed Egyptian army under Wood.^
The Foreign Office suggested to the War Office that the General 
Officer Commanding in Egypt, who, since Wolseley’s return home,
had been Alison, should select a new attache to serve under
14-
Male t • The War Office agreed. Hardly had the instruction
1. F.O. 1^1/170. Wilson to Malet and Dufferin, 1.1.83. Also, 
Parliamentary Papers 1883 LXXXIII, Correspondence on Egypt, 
Dufferin to Granville, 15*1.83.
2. F.O. 1^1/165. Wilson to Malet l6.12.82, including Macdonald
to Wilson verbatim.
3. F.O. l b l / 1 7 b  Malet to Granville, 9.1.83.
*+. F.O. 1 *+1/171 Pauncefote to Malet, 1.2.83.
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reached Alison when he received a letter from Malet. Wilson 
was to return to England, leaving the number of officers 
available to serve on the commissions pitifully small. If 
Macdonald returned home with his regiment on February 7, it 
would cause considerable inconvenience. When Malet added that 
he would be glad if Macdonald were to be permitted to under­
take the military business of the agency as well, the appoint-
1
ment was as good as made. Alison completely approved Malet’s 
suggestion; he had after all been the first to recommend the 
employment of Macdonald for special service. On February 13, 
Macdonald took up his first diplomatic appointment, as envoy 
for the agency to the Egyptian government on matters military.
At the beginning of March, most of the preliminary work
of the Tantah Commission being complete, Macdonald took
2
Wilson's place at the Alexandria court martial. Now at the 
centre of judicial proceedings, and overseer over the officers 
sitting at the other commissions (two more had been appointed 
in January, Damanhour and Mehallet-el-Kebir^ making four in all), 
Macdonald became far more aware of the intense pressure being 
exercised in favour of certain of the prisoners by the Egyptian 
Government, even to the extent of instructions being issued to 
the court to acquit certain highly favoured men. This caused
1. F.O. lkl/l88 Malet to Alison, 3*2.83.
2. F.O. lkl/l85 Macdonald to Malet, 5*3*83.
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the resignation of the only two European members of the court
martial on May 10. Activity on behalf of the prisoners was
not confined to the Egyptian Government. Lord Dufferin was
asked to intervene in the judicial proceedings on more than one
occasion by European counsel, but declined on the ground that if
he once began to interfere Mhe did not see when his interference 
1
might end11.
When Dufferin left Egypt on May 3? Macdonald lost an 
able defender on the spot; nevertheless the work of the commis­
sion and court martial was pushed on apace throughout May. His 
regular report to Malet on June 6 showed one or two signs of 
strain and was illustrative of the problems under which he 
laboured. At Tantah, he says, the number of cases has increased 
owing to the recent return of many Europeans who have only now 
been able to bring their cases before the commission. The 
statements of a number of these he found to be untrue, and 
therefore he had to intervene personally to see that the accused 
got every benefit of the doubt. The Mehallet-el-Kebir commis­
sion was running into difficulties owing to the opposition of 
the Sheikhs, who prevented even willing villagers from giving 
evidence for fear of being implicated in the massacres of last 
year, also from hatred of Christians. The Christians were un­
1. F.O.C.P. h859* Dufferin to Granville, 28.h.83.
willing to come forward for fear of losing Arab custom and of 
creating another disturbance. Another cause of delay was want 
of a proper prison, which allowed, stories to be concocted 
between defendants. Macdonald goes on to deplore the intro­
duction of European lawyers into the commissions, who produce 
"considerable delay for the purpose of benefitting themselves". 
It was a very gloomy report, altogether unlike his usual style. 
Even the suggestion with which it closes, that "as soon as the 
murder cases and the more serious pillage cases have been en­
quired into, the remainder be dismissed (trivial cases); the 
more so as the accused have already suffered three or four 
months’ imprisonment before being released on bail, and because 
the cost of maintaining the four commissions and the court 
martial is a considerable drain on the money resources of the 
country", seems prompted as much by desire for humanity to 
himself as to the prisoners.**"
Macdonald was soon to have an unwonted rest from 
commission work for two reasons: Ramadan and cholera. The
commissions were suspended by order of the Minister of the 
Interior during Ramadan on July 1, the court martial was ad­
journed on the 12th. This was only the recognition of an 
accomplished fact, since the clerks went on strike and the
1. F.O.C.P. h-859* Malet to Granville, 6.6.83, including
Macdonald to Malet.
witnesses disappeared. Far more serious was the outbreak of 
cholera at the beginning of June. This spread rapidly, and put 
an effective end for the moment to judicial proceedings. At 
Mehallet the eleven remaining cases were released on bail.'*’
On July 23, Macdonald went to Cairo to assist Malet in coping 
with the epidemic, which by then had assumed crisis proportions 
On August 9? Macdonald left Cairo as the official 
representative oh a mission led by the British army surgeon 
Hunter to advise the Egyptians in the towns on sanitation 
measures to be taken to prevent the epidemic spreading. The 
three day tour round Lower Egypt which he undertook at the 
Egyptian Government's expense enabled him to gain a wider know­
ledge of Egypt than had been possible through commission work. 
Even though the worst of the epidemic was over by the second
week in August, Macdonald retained a vivid impression of what
If
he saw in his report to Malet , which at the same time inured 
him to his later experiences in West Africa. While at Tantah, 
the streets had at least been swept and whitewashed, thanks to 
the activities of the Professor of Anatomy at Cairo University, 
Mehallet was far more typical. Nothing had been done "from a
F.O.C.P. b-877. Malet to Granville, 16.7*83, containing
reports by Macdonald.
2. F.O. 1^1/17*+. Malet to Granville, 30*7.83*
3. F.O. lb-l/176. Malet to Granville, '8.8.83.
b. F.O. lb-l/176. Malet to Granville, 13.8.83, enc. Macdonald
to Malet.
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sanitary point of view” 5 "the hospital so called was one of 
the dirtiest filthiest buildings I have visited in Egypt"; the 
town was without medicines and people in many instances died 
where they fell in the streets. In the cemetery at Mansourah 
the graves, through being hurriedly constructed had cracked in 
the sun "and the smell of dead cholera bodies was very un­
pleasant." Hygienic measures were everywhere obstructed by 
the notables on religious grounds. Because of this^where areas 
had been cordoned off to isolate the disease, it leapt the 
barriers. There was everywhere a shortage of doctors, and 
often a deadly smell of decaying bodies.
The mission did have its positive side, however. Mac­
donald reports with some humour how at Samanhoud, news of their 
probable arrival having been wired to the authorities, the 
streets through which the mission would most likely pass were 
undergoing a process of whitewashing, as also were the walls 
of the town, which could be seen from the railway. He also 
says that, bad though conditions we re in most of the towns 
which he had visited^ before, they were in fact cleaner or
becoming so. Nevertheless he regarded the subsidence of the
1
epidemic as in great measure due to the rise of the Nile.
1. F.O. 1 *+1/176. Malet to Granville, 13.8.83, enc. Macdonald
to Malet.
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The epidemic had subsided sufficiently by August 27
for the court martial to resume its sittings, followed by the
1
commissions two days later. Despite sanguine estimates by
Macdonald, that "little work of a serious nature remains to be 
2
done", their work was to drag on for another five months, 
this despite a general amnesty in October.' Macdonald’s im- 
patience for the trials to come to an end did not stem purely 
from self-interest; as he revealed to Malet, he felt that Min 
addition to the cost they /the commissions/ are to the country, 
they encourage the low class of Europeans to get up charges 
against the natives with a view of extorting money from them."
At last Baring was able to state, in response to an 
inquiry from Granville, ^ that Macdonald’s work in connection 
with the trials was over, coupling this reply with a plea that 
he might be allowed to retain his services. Given the
disaster of Hicks Pasha in November 1883* the loss of the Sudan 
which had brought on a political crisis in January with the
1. F.O.C.P. if877. Malet to Granville, 3.9.83.
2. Ibid.
3. F.O.C.P. *+877 
Macdonald.
Baring to Granville , 23.9.83, enc. by
k. F.O.C.P. -^877. 
Macdonald.
Malet to Granville, 3.9.83, enc. by
5. F.O. lVl/189. Granville to Baring, 29.1.8^.
6. F.O. 802/6^9. Baring to Granville, 9.2.8*+.
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resignation of the Cherif ministry, and the decision to send
General Gordon to evacuate the beleaguered garrisons in the
Sudan on January l8, the government were not prepared to demur
at any of Baring’s reasonable requests, least of all to deny
the necessity of the post of military attache.
The tale of disaster was not however complete. On
February *+, General Baker was routed with a new Egyptian army
by Osman Digna and the Dervishes in the Eastern Sudan. Sinkat
and Tokar fell, and a British force in the Red Sea port of
2
Suakin was besieged. Gordon was therefore virtually cut off in 
Khartoum. Baker himself barely escaped with his life.
With Baring’s permission, Macdonald volunteered to take 
part as an observer in an expedition under Sir Gerald Graham 
to relieve the British force besieged in Suakin. The force 
achieved little beyond its immediate objective, fighting two 
engagements at El Teb (February 29) and Tamai (March 13).
1. In l88l a native of Dongola^ proclaimed himself Mahdi and 
raised a revolt. In her own troubles, there was little 
Egypt could do to check it. An army sent under Hicks 
Pasha, an Englishman, was cut to pieces on November 1883* 
Therefore the British government, which had hitherto insis­
ted the Sudan was Egypt’s responsibility, faced facts and 
ordered the Egyptians to abandon the Sudan. This unpopular 
diktat brought on the political crisis, and made it certain 
that all hope of an immediate withdrawal from Egypt would 
have to be abandoned, although ministers continued to talk 
of it. For fuller accounts, see P.M.Holt, The Mahdist State 
in the Sudan 1881-1898 (1955); Robinson, Gallagher & Denny, 
Africa and the Victorians (19^3)•
2, W.O. 33/^+0• Wolseley to Hartington, 8 . 2 . 8 b .
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Macdonald, serving with the 1st Battalion of the Black Watch 
"distinguished" himself on the former occasion‘d, and managed
2
to get himself wounded on the latter, not however seriously.
He received as his souvenirs of the campaign, two additional 
clasps to go on the Khedive’s medal. When he returned to 
Cairo on March 20, Baring immediately sent him home on a well- 
earned leave.
When Macdonald returned to Egypt in September, he 
found the unsettled aspect and feverish activity of the 1883 
days had largely disappeared. Baring was now fully in control 
and Macdonald's remaining years at the agency in Cairo must 
have seemed by comparison with what had gone before excessively 
dull; yet they were important years for the development of his 
character. In them he learnt administrative routine, the rou­
tine of a busy agency, and there was no better schoolmaster in 
this art than Baring, and no more testing school than Cairo. 
Macdonald's task as military attache was basically to act as 
an envoy between the agency and the officer commanding the 
Egyptian army (in this case an English officer, General 
Stephenson); also to deal with routine military matters on
1. W.O. 33A 2 .  Graham to War Office, 26.3*8*+.
2. W.O. 25/3^73• Casualties Suakim-Tamafleb, 13-3»A.
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behalf of Baring. This could mean anything from arranging
indemnities due to the heirs of British officers who accompanied
Hicks to recouping travelling expenses for British
2
officers serving in the Egyptian army. Baring seemed however 
to treat Macdonald somewhat as the agency odd-job man. This at 
least had the virtue of widening his experience. Prison 
visiting was continued as a matter of course, since it was a 
field in which Macdonald had by now acquired a very special 
expertise. The erudite reports which were sent in to Baring 
were passed on to Crookshank, the Inspector General of Prisons
3for the Egyptian Government (l88h-6), and greatly appreciated.
In a widely different field, a lengthy report on the progress of 
the petroleum borings at Gebel Zeit near Suez earned both
h
Baring’s and Iddesleigh's appreciation in the Foreign Office.
Macdonald’s experience of commission work was utilised further
when he was appointed a member of a commission in March 1887 to 
try Egyptians concerned in personal attacks made on British 
officers. His suggestion that British officers should carry
1. F.O. lhl/20h. Baring to Nubar Pasha, 19.12.8h.
2. F.O. lhl/20h. Baring to Nubar Pasha, I7.10.8h.
3. e.g. F.O. lhl/2hl. Macdonald to Baring with inclusion 10.6.86
k. F.O.C.P. 5365. Baring to Iddesleigh, 9.12.86, F.O. lhl/23h 
Baring to Iddesleigh 27.12.86 with inclusion by Macdonald, 
F.O. lhl/2h2 Pauncefote to Baring 5*1.87.
5. P.P. hh/1887. XCII. Correspondence respecting attacks made
on two officers, etc.
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passes when out alone, and should be accompanied by an inter­
preter to avoid unnecessary incidents was in fact adopted.^”
Only the fall of Kassala to the Mahdists in 1885 prevented 
Macdonald being sent on a personal mission to the King of 
Abyssinia, whom the British government was trying to utilise
to effect the evacuation of the beleaguered garrisons in the
2
eastern Sudan after the death of Gordon at Khartoum. The 
Egyptian government appreciated Macdonald1s services enough to 
award him the *+th Class Osmanieh.
It was small wonder therefore that when Salisbury in­
formed Baring on April 1887 .that the War Office felt that the 
appointment of military attache was no longer necessary, as the 
native army was now officered by Englishmen and there was an 
intelligence department on the H.Q. staff at Cairo, Baring 
was somewhat alarmed. In his reply to Salisbury, Baring argued 
that Macdonald’s duties went far beyond those of military 
attache, indeed these were the smallest part of his work. 
Questions were constantly being raised between the Egyptian 
government and British military authorities, requiring "an 
officer of tact and discretion, whose opinion carries weight’1 • 
The task “of the agency would be rendered more difficult by 
losing so valuable a member of my staff as Major Macdonald."
1* Ibid.; see also F.O. l k l / 2 b $  for relevant correspondence.
2. F.O.C.P. 5l67. Further correspondence respecting affairs 
of Egypt, July-September 1887.
3. F.O. l h l / 2 b 2 . Pauncefote to Baring, 8. *+.87.
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Baring obviously saw the writing on the wall, but pleaded to
be allowed to retain his attache until February 1888, when he
1
would have completed five years’ work in the agency. In a
sense the logic of the argument escaped Baring. If Macdonald
was doing work other than that of a military attachd, why should
the War Office continue to pay him? The work could have been
done just as easily by a civilian. Thus, while the Foreign
Office was prepared to support Baring, the War Office returned
2
a flat negative, and Macdonald prepared to pack his bags for
home.
Again Chance was to intervene, this time to complete 
Macdonald’s conversion away from an army career. Sir John Kirk, 
after a long tenure of the agency in Zanzibar, had retired in 
1885 because of ill health. This left an awkward gap before 
Colonel Euan Smith, the succeeding Consul General, whose 
appointment was gazetted to begin from Kirk’s official retire­
ment in 1887, could take up his post. This gap was partially 
filled by the Vice-Consul on the spot, Holmwood, who by March 
1887 had made himself for various reasons persona non grata
with the German community. Berlin suggested that it would be
3
regarded as -a friendly act if he were recalled, and as a
1. F.O. l k l / 2 k 5 . Baring to Salisbury, 22.^.87.
2. F.O. 802A066. F.O. toW.O. V.5.87; W.O. to F.O. 26.5.87. 
3* Salisbury Private Papers A/6l. Scott to Salisbury, 29«*+.87.
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gesture of goodwill the Foreign Office agreed.1 The question 
was whom to send in his place, as Colonel Euan Smith was not 
expected to be ready to fill the post for anything up to an­
other ^six months. The Foreign Office, working on the basis 
that Cairo was more than halfway to Zanzibar, and therefore 
a replacement could be sent quickly, also that from the great 
number of British officers in Egypt one should surely be avail­
able, wired to Baring for suggestions. Colonel Kitchener, in
the process of reorganizing the Egyptian defences on Wadi Haifa,
2
expressed himself as "not anxious to go", when asked. Baring 
therefore, anticipating Macdonald's recall, strongly recommen­
ded him for the post: lfHe has great tact and judgement, speaks
3
German well and gets on particularly well with Germans.”
After digesting this for nearly three weeks, the Foreign Office
h
agreed to his suggestion on June 13, and Macdonald left Cairo
5
for Zanzibar on June 21.
Despite the urgency of settling the question of who was 
to go to Zanzibar, one could understand the Foreign Office's 
initial hesitation. Here was an officer who had had little or
!• Ibid. A/61. Scott to Salisbury, 3•5•87•
Ibid. A/52. Baring to Salisbury, 26.5*87.
3* Ibid.
. F.O. 1lM / 21+7. Salisbury to Clarke, 13*6.87.
5* F.O. 1 *+1/21+7. Clarke to Salisbury, 25.6.87*
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no experience of international diplomacy, and the Zanzibar 
agency at this period was assuredly no sinecure. British 
interests in East Africa were largely a nineteenth-century 
development, connected with the suppression of the slave trade. 
To the extent that suppression was a sea-borne activity, ex­
ploration of the mainland had been slow. A stimulus had been 
given, however, by the writings and travels of David Living­
stone who had revealed the existence of an internal East African 
slave trade to a horrified public in the l850’s and i8601 s. The 
cure was the same as that applied to West Africa: the interior
must be penetrated by missionaries, settlers and traders. 
Throughout the i860 1s and 18701s intense efforts were made by 
missionaries of all denominations to establish stations near 
the lakes. Although the prospects for trade did not appear 
good, a few traders began to appear on the coast, and in 1872 
William Mackinnon, a self-made Glasgow businessman, began run­
ning a regular steamship service between Britain and Zanzibar.
Meanwhile the efforts of the Royal Navy were beginning 
to bear some fruit. Their attack on the slave trade was made 
somewhat easier by the small number of political authorities 
with whom it was found necessary to do business. Since the 
seventeenth century the most important of these authorities, 
the Omani dynasty, centred on Muscat, had been extending its 
suzerainty further and further down the East coast of Africa,
78-
pushing the Portuguese back on Mozambique. In 18^ 40 the then 
ruler, Seyyid Said, moved his capital to Zanzibar, and proceeded 
to make it the commercial entrepot for the whole of the East 
African trade. By 1870 the hegemony of Zanzibar on the east 
coast extended from Samu and Kismayu in the north to Cape Del­
gado in the south. This hegemony not only presented possi­
bilities for the British to deal in the east coast trade, but 
also provided the opportunity to build up the paramountcy of 
British influence in the region through the Sultan. Thus in 
1873? under threat of naval bombardment, SultanBarghash was 
persuaded to sign a decree outlawing the slave trade through­
out his dominions, and Sir John Kirk was appointed the first 
British consul for Zanzibar.
For the next ten years the personality of Sir John 
Kirk, and his friendship with the Sultan, ensured a steady 
growth in British influence. In 1875 the Sultan himself visited 
England and no effort was spared to make sure that he was suit­
ably impressed with her might. Under the influence of Kirk, 
the Sultan built up an efficient army with a British naval
officer as General, began to modernize his government, and to
- r ■/, ", ”'4'
rebuild Zanzibar town with a water supply and well-lit streets.
1. For a fuller account of the growth of British influence in 
East Africa see Oxford History of East Africa. Vol. 1, eds. 
R.Oliver & G. Mathew; R.Oliver, The Missionary Factor in 
East Africa. 1952; R.Coupland, The Exploitation of East 
Africa 1855-1890, 1939.
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This pleasant family party was disturbed from two
directions. From the south, Portugal, conscious that her
territory in Africa might be worth something in the partition
which was now taking place, proceeded to put forward claims to
great areas of central Africa, based on titles which, as Lord
1
Salisbury said, "were archaeological'1. One of these claims 
involved Cape Delgado, part of the Sultan*s territory. More 
serious from the British point of view was the intervention of 
Germany. As part of the general process of putting pressure 
on Britain during 1884-, Bismarck encouraged the aspirations of 
a group of traders and explorers led by Carl Peters, whose 
manifesto stressed the urgent need for direct:**** action before 
other powers swallowed the whole of Africa. After a brief 
three-week expedition in East Africa, Peters arrived in Zanzi­
bar on December 17 with a fistful of treaties which allegedly 
placed Usagara, Ungulu, Uzigua and Ukami, all in territory 
claimed by the Sultan, under German protection. At the same 
time, colleagues of Peters, the brothers Denhardt, were ne­
gotiating with Witu to the north. Returning to Berlin, on 
February 17, Peters succeeded in obtaining an Imperial charter
of protection to administer the territories which he had gained 
2
by treaty. Following this up, Germany bludgeoned the Sultan
1. R.C.K. Ensor, England 1870-1914-, p.192.
2. Oxford History of East Africa, p. 3^9; Hertslet, Map of 
Africa by Treaty, II pp.682 ff.
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into accepting the fait accompli by an ultimatum that he should 
withdraw his troops and agents from territory under German pro­
tection (August 11 1885)1 , and concluded by obtaining a treaty
which provided for most favoured nation standing for Germany
2
and for the establishment of consuls.
With the British position in ruins, negotiation was the 
only road by which something at least could be salvaged. The 
result was the Anglo-German agreement, ratified by an exchange 
of notes on November 1 1886. By it, the Sultan of Zanzibar was 
left with a minimal sovereignty over a coastal belt ten miles 
deep, stretching from the Minengani river to Kipini, plus 
immediate sovereignty over the islands of Zanzibar and Pemba. 
All the rest of his territory on the mainland was partitioned; 
Witu and the area south of the Wanga river was to be under 
German influence, and an area extending roughly to modern 
Kenya under British. This agreement was forced on the 
Sultan.~>
The Anglo-German partition undertaken largely at the 
prompting and in the interests of Mackinnon, Hutton and the 
Manchester merchants, was an attempt to achieve a settlement 
within the limits of traditional policy. Action must not in­
volve the government in any expense or direct responsibility.
1. Hertslet, loc.cit.
2. Hertslet, op.cit. I pp.320-322.
3. F.O.C.P. 629*+. Memo by Hertslet, January 1893*
The obvious way to fulfil these requirements was to hand over
the British sphere to private concessionaires to administer.
In May 1887, Mackinnon negotiated a concession with the Sultan
1
to develop and administer his territories on the mainland. 
Eighteen months later he received a royal charter for his 
British East Africa Association, which then became the Imperial 
British East Africa Company.
2
Thus when Macdonald arrived in Zanzibar on July 12, 
affairs were still in a state of flux. The Mackinnon conces­
sion was hardly dry on the paper, the Sultan was still trying 
to adjust to a radically smaller domain, and both the Portuguese 
and the Germans were busily intriguing to make it even smaller. 
To meet problems such as he had never met before, Macdonald 
had only his tact and discretion, his activity (he was just 
•thirty-five) and his knowledge of German. It was small wonder 
that an associate of Mackinnon’s asked that Holmwood be allowed 
to remain Mas new man will complicate dealing with Sultan”.
After being presented to the Sultan on July 15, Mac- 
donald duly took over the agency on the following day. The 
largest file which awaited attention on his desk was the one
1. Hertslet, op.cit. I pp.339-3^5*
2. F.O.C.P. 5536. Holmwood to Salisbury, 1^4-. 7.87.
3. F.O.C.P. 5536. G.S.Mackenzie to Foreign Office, 1^.7.87.
*+. F.O.C.P. 5536. Holmwood to Salisbury, 1^.7.87; Macdonald
to Salisbury, 16.7.83.
conderning the dispute with Portugal. Delusions of grandeur 
had prompted Portugal not only to take a leaf out of the German 
book but to go one better. When the Sultan rejected the 
Portuguese claim to Tungi Bay and Minengani, the Governor of 
Mozambique on instructions from Lisbon seized it with his 
fleet, after a day-long bombardment, in which the property of 
number of British Indian subjects was damaged (February 1887) • 
For this reason and by virtue of the agreement with Germany, 
which had recognised the Sultan’s sovereignty south of the
p
Rovuma river, Britain was not disposed to accept the Portu­
guese claim. Macdonald was fortunate in that he could count 
on the support on this issue of his German colleague, Dr. 
Michahelles, who arrived on July 20. Germany, having got what 
she wanted out of Britain in East Africa, was committed to a 
policy of good neighbourliness; moreover in view of the fact
b
that Peters was attempting to get from the Sultan what Mack­
innon had achieved in May in the way of concessions in the ten-
mile strip, the Portuguese claim did affect, albeit marginally,
the German sphere of influence. The Sultan, not being com­
pletely unaware of the relative strengths of the European powers, 
refused to accept the Portuguese fait accompli as he had been 
forced to accept the German.
1. F.O.C.P. 5536. Macdonald to Salisbury, 1.8.87.
2. F.O.C.P. Memo by Hertslet, January 1893*
3. F.O.C.P. 5536. Macdonald to Salisbury, 21.7.87.
*+. Ibid.
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Unable to get recognition of force ma.ieure, Portugal 
tried diplomacy. She agreed to direct negotiations with the 
Sultan so that her claims might be recognized, and appealed to 
the good offices of Britain and Germany to assist in bringing 
about a settlement. The delimitation commission to draw the 
boundary between Portugal and Zanzibar held its first meeting 
at Zanzibar on July 21, five days after Macdonald had taken 
over the agency. The Portuguese Commissioner claimed all 
territory south of Cape Delgado, including Tungfi and Minengani, 
on the basis of history and possession before 185*+.^ By the 
Anglo-German agreement Macdonald and his German colleague could 
do nothing but oppose this move.
Macdonald's first steps in international diplomacy were 
understandably tentative and betrayed, signs of nervousness. To
an army man, schooled to carrying out orders to the letter, the
delicate manoeuvring between alternatives, and the sometimes 
necessary seizure of initiative by the man on the spot within 
the context of broad instructions from London, constituted a 
new experience. This may have accounted for the unwonted 
activity of the Zanzibar wire during the early days, which 
prompted the dry comment from Anderson that "Macdonald is
p
spending a lot of money in telegrams." Nevertheless, no one
1. F.O.C.P. 5536. Macdonald to Salisbury, 22.7*87.
2. F.O.C.P. 5536. Macdonald to Salisbury, 31-7.87, minute by
H.P. A . , 1.8.87.
could claim that the Foreign Office was not, as a result, ex­
ceptionally well-informed. As far as the Portuguese dispute 
was concerned, it proved unamenable to settlement in Zanzibar.
On August 6 the commissioners reached deadlock*^" Portugal re-
2
fused arbitration, but consented to direct negotiations between 
Britain, Germany and herself in Lisbon, agreeing that she should 
abstain from hostilities in the meantime. ^  This reduced Mac­
donald to the role of supplier of information, and put the 
conduct of negotiations in more experienced hands. In this role 
Macdonald performed excellent service, and was evidently more 
at ease. The dry note of humour began to creep back into his 
correspondence, and a certain fluency compared with the stiff­
ness and uncertainty of a few weeks before. Thus he wrote in 
answer to Salisbury’s instruction to ascertain whether there
were any terms of arrangement or compromise, short of an absolute
14-
surrender by Portugal, which would be acceptable to the Sultan:
’’Had audience with Sultan. Although placing himself 
in our hands he was quite of the opinion he could 
sweep Portugal from the coast by preaching a .jihad.
I pointed out to the Sultan the inconvenience of 
this proceeding ”5
1. F.O.C.P. 5536. Petre to Salisbury, 6.8.87.
2. F.O.CP. 5536. Macdonald to Salisbury, 20.8.87.
3. F.O.C.P. 5536. Petre to Salisbury, 17.9*87.
i^-. F.O.C.P. 5536* F.O. to Macdonald, 12.9.87.
5. F.O.C.P. 5536. Macdonald to Salisbury, 26.9 .87.
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Macdonald reported that the Sultan would feel very
keenly the loss of both Minengani and Tungi,^ not so much on
account of the actual loss of territory as because of the loss
2
of prestige in the eyes of his Arab subjects. This did never­
theless suggest a possible compromise to Salisbury: one of the
3two places named to either side." On November 7, in agreement 
Ll
with Germany , he suggested officially to Portugal that she 
should retain Minengani and restore Tungi, linking this with a 
claim for compensation for those rendered destitute by the bom­
bardment of Minengani, "without which no settlement can be con­
sidered satisfactory by Her Majesty’s Government", and for a 
3 per cent, fixed transit duty through Mozambique for the 
settlements in the neighbourhood of Nyassa. Petre, ambassador 
at Lisbon, was instructed to suggest also that if Portugal
could not accept the proposed division of territory, an equit-
5
able solution might be found in money. To all this, on 
December 12, Portugal said no: latitude 10 degrees *+0 minutes
was her irreducible minimum; all she would undertake to do
I' 6was to apply the Zanzibar tariff for ten years.
1. F.O.C.P. 5536. Macdonald to Salisbury, 13.9*87.
2. F.O.C.P. 5536. Macdonald to Salisbury, 2*+. 10. 87.
3- F.O.C.P. 5536. Macdonald to Salisbury, 13*9.87, minute by
Salisbury.
k. F.O.C.P. 5565. Salisbury to Malet, 2*+. 10. 87.
5. F.O.C.P. 5565. Salisbury to Petre, 7.11.87.
6. F.O.C.P. 5565. Petre to Salisbury, 12.12.87.
Meanwhile Macdonald, hunting through the agency 
archives, had come up with an interesting piece of information. 
In 1862 the Portuguese Governor of Mozambique had come to Zanzi­
bar to negotiate a commercial treaty with the late Sultan.
After terms had been agreed, the Governor proposed an additional 
article, suggesting an alteration of Zanzibar's southern 
boundary northward to Cape Delgado - a proposal identical to 
that of the Portuguese commissioners on July 21 1887. The 
Sultan had then refused, and the Portuguese Governor had signed 
the treaty without the boundary article. The importance of 
this information could not be gainsaid. It showed that the 
Portuguese in 1862 had asked for Turir%i Bay as a concession 
and did not claim it as a right.^
Why, therefore, was Macdonald’s information never used? 
More particularly, why was the case against Portugal first 
allowed to hang fire and then to be quietly dropped during the 
early months of 1888? It is true that the British government 
attempted to obtain compensation for the British Indian traders 
at Minengani, but the attempt was half-hearted. It was a far 
cry from the instruction to Petre on November 7? that he was to 
obtain compensation as a sine qua non for a settlement , to 
Salisbury's note of June 5 1888 to the Chief Clerk at the
1. F.O.C.P. Macdonald to Salisbury, 21.11.87.
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Foreign Office to draft a representation to Lisbon making the
case as strong as possible, but admitting that according to the
rigid interpretation it was not a matter of absolute claim.
2
Cosseted in this way, Portugal was bound to refuse. Moreover,
Macdonald’s information, so important in December , was allowed
to moulder in the Foreign Office for six months before the
3
drafts to Lisbon were cancelled.'
The reason for the government's sudden lack of interest 
was obvious. The Portuguese-Zanzibar dispute was on the fringe 
of Britain's main quarrel with Portugal over Central Africa, 
with which Salisbury was increasingly occupied. Cape Delgado 
was swallowed up by Mashonaland and was largely forgotten in 
the events leading to the Anglo-Portuguese settlement of 1890. 
Having squeezed Portugal hard over Central Africa, the few 
square miles round Cape Delgado were insignificant, but never­
theless had concession value to make the rest of the agreement 
more palatable to Portugal. Moreover, by virtue of the Anglo- 
German package deal of 1890, which placed Zanzibar under 
British protectorate, Britain could force any settlement on the 
Sultan. Accordingly the Portuguese-Zanzibar dispute was closed 
by a treaty between Britain and Portugal of June 11 1891, which 
gave the latter 10 degrees Ho minutes south as her boundary.1"1'
1. F.O.8^/1922. Law Officers to Foreign Office, 2.6.88: minute 
by Salisbury 5*6.88,
2. As she did, F.O.C.P. 5770. Petre to Salisbury, 6.11.88.
3* F.O. 8V1922, 9.5.88. No.182 cancelled.
Hertslet, op.cit. Ill, p. 1017. The wider context of the 
Portuguese dispute with Britain in East Africa may be 
studied in E.Asce]son.Portugal & the Scramble for Africa 
,1 fry5-91 W i + V a 1967 cf particularly cap.5T
Macdonald, throughout the Portuguese period of pressure 
on the Sultan, had had the support of his German colleague, who 
was content, in consonance with German policy, to leave the 
initiative with Macdonald. Although their relations with each 
other were therefore generally cordial, they were sometimes 
punctuated by short sharp disputes, particularly over the ill- 
defined boundary between the German and the British spheres of 
influence. Both consuls were hampered by the presence of erst­
while empire-builders on the spot, Peters on the German side 
and Mackinnon on the British. Concessions which were gained 
from the Sultan by the one, in the new amity of Anglo-German 
relations, the other had to have too. The position was further 
complicated by the fact that both Mackinnon and Peters doubted 
the ability of the new consuls, and therefore did not always 
pass on the fullest information about their negotiations. 
Macdonald seems to have had more control over Mackinnon than 
Michahelles over Peters. Macdonald reports, for instance, that 
Michahelles seemed surprised to hear of the concession granted 
to the British East Africa Company by the Sultan on May 2*+, 
and even more surprised that the Sultan had granted a similar 
concession to Peters, at which Lister in the Foreign Office 
commented, "Michahelles had evidently not mastered his brief.""**
1. F.O.C.P. 5536. Macdonald to Salisbury, 21.7.87; also 
31.7.87, minute by T.V.L.
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What Peters did not tell Michahelles, which earned him a sharp
reprimand from Berlin, was that his concession extended to
Minengani, that is to the land in dispute between Zanzibar and 
1
Portugal.
Given the characters of the two entrepreneurs and their
associates, it was perhaps in the nature of things that friction
should continue. Mackenzie accused the Witu Company of viola-’
2
ting the agreed boundary between the two spheres of influence ;
3
the latter retaliated with a similar counter-accusation. 
Inevitably the two governments were drawn in, Salisbury ex­
pressing apprehension about the Sultan’s financial rights in
k
the coastal areas, and Bismarck stating that if anybody’s
boundary had been violated, it was the Sultan’s and not the 
5
British. Since neither government was concerned to provoke 
conflict through this medley of claims and counter-claims , 
efforts were made both in London and Berlin to take some of
the heat out of the questions at issue. By the end of 1887
broad agreement had been reached on most issues. Direct
1. F.O.C.P. 5536. Scott to Salisbury, 29.8.87.
2. F.O.C.P. 5536. Mackenzie to F.O. , l*+,7.87.
3. F.O.C.P. 5536. Macdonald to Salisbury, 27.8.87.
*+• F.O.C.P. 5565. Note Verbale by Plessen, 18.9 .87.
5. F.O.C.P. 5536. Malet to Salisbury, 21.9.87.
67— Eref* p.------ etrbove.
negotiations were to be encouraged for the settlement of dis­
putes on the spot both between German and British companies^-
2
and also between consuls. As far as the boundaries between 
spheres were concerned, the Anglo-German agreement was re- 
affirmed.
Macdonald had played his small part to the full in
keeping Anglo-German relations in this part of Africa on an
even keel. Not only were his personal relations with
h
Michahelles eminently cordial, but his support of the German
consul, a man not renowned for his tact, in his frequent dis-
15
putes with the German company, won the approval of Berlin.
At one time the relations between Peters1 Company and Michahelle 
were so strained that the Company claimed the right to transact 
their affairs regardless of the consul general’s interference, 
and to have direct communication with the Sultan and the 
English consul general. Macdonald, declining to intrigue, in­
formed the Company that Michahelles was the ’’only person with
whom I could hold official correspondence on any subject re-
£lating to German affairs”.’" His knowledge of German, also,
1. F.O.C.P. 5565. Salisbury to Malet, 28.11.87.
2. F.O.C.P. 5560. Malet to Salisbury, 9.1*88.
3. F.O.C.P. 5565. F.O. to Macdonald, 31*10.87 et alia.
*+. F.O.C.P. 5565. Macdonald to Salisbury, 29.8.87; 5560,
Macdonald to Salisbury, 13*2.87.
5. F.O. 8V1915. Malet to Salisbury, 9.2.88.
6. F.O.C.P. 5565. Macdonald to Salisbury, 21.11.87*
91.
had lessened the risk of misunderstanding from the employment 
of interpreters. Most of Macdonald's contact with Michahelles 
was direct and personal. The only cause of complaint which the 
Sultan had against both agencies was that he could no longer 
play off one against the other, because they were on such good 
terms.^
It had been originally intended that Euan-Smith would
2
be ready to go out to take up his post in November. His de­
layed arrival in March was largely due to the fact that he was 
in Paris, attempting as Lytton's assistant to negotiate in 
concert with the German representative an agreement with France 
to bring the French tariffs affecting Zanzibar into line with 
the German and British.'- Since the French were in no hurry to 
conclude a commercial treaty with Zanzibar, and serious news
had by now arrived from East Africa, Euan Smith left Paris on
L|_
February lV with little achieved beyond cordial exchanges.
1. Michahelles to Macdonald, inclusion In F.O.C.P. 5560, 
Macdonald to Salisbury, 19.1.88.
2. F.O. 8V1859. F.O. to War Office, 19.9.87*
3. F.O.C.P. 5565 & 5560 contain the correspondence over these
abortive negotiations, which were never concluded - not 
surprisingly, as the French gained a commercial advantage 
by not doing so.
h. F.O.C.P. 5560. Lytton to Salisbury, 15.2.88.
The serious news which had arrived from East Africa was
the illness of Sultan Barghash,resulting in his death on March 
. 1
26, Macdonald had informed London of the Sultan's bad health*
in December, and his increasing incapacity to perform any 
2
business* Although the Sultan took a rest cure with his 
brother sovereign in Muscat in February, it became increasingly 
clear that he could not last much longer." This raised pro­
blems of a possible successor, and rendered Euan Smith's 
presence in Zanzibar imperative. With the inevitable intrigue 
amongst the four claimants to the throne, and the possible dis­
turbances they could create, as well as the intrigues of the 
three interested European powers (Lytton had already reported
on February 2 that two ships of the French navy had been dis-
1+
patched to Zanzibar), Zanzibar was no place for a relatively 
inexperienced diplomat acting on a temporary basis. Neverthe­
less, until Euan Smith's arrival, Macdonald did an excellent
holding job. Both Britain and Germany agreed on the succession
6
of the Sultan's brother Khalifa against the preference of the
1. F.O.C.P. 5560. Macdonald to Salisbury, 19*12.87.
2. F.O.C.P. 5565. Macdonald to Salisbury, 25.12*87. The Sultan
had elephantiasis.
3. F.O.C.P. 5560. Macdonald to Salisbury, 11.2.88.
b. F.O.C.P. 5560. Lytton to Salisbury, 2.2.88.
5. F.O.C.P. 5580. Kirk to F.O., 16*2.88.
6. F.O.C.P. 5560. Salisbury to Macdonald, 15*2.88.
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Sultan for his infant son. When he received his instructions,
Macdonald sounded out Mathews, the Sultan’s Commander in Chief
(and in the realities of Zanzibar politics his right-hand man),
and made sure of his support, and therefore that of the native
army. He also consulted with Michahelles and arranged that
there should always be a man-of-war in the Town harbour.
Mathews,meanwhile, had consulted with the principal men of the
Sultanate, who had stated that they would act in accordance
1
with the wishes of Her Majesty’s Government. Thanks to the 
fact that Macdonald was prepared to take the lead amongst his 
colleagues and had made his arrangements in good time, Khalifa
was peacefully installed, with general consent, on March 27,
2the morning after Barghash's death.
At the final curtain, however, Macdonald was no longer 
in charge, Euan Smith having formally taken over on March 21. 
The latter's appreciation of Macdonald went beyond the mere 
thanks which courtesy required. Everything at the agency was 
found "correct and in order." There were no cases left requir­
ing settlement that were "of a difficult or embarrassing
q
character and British prestige has suffered no diminution."
1. F.O.C.P. 5673* Macdonald to Salisbury, 12.3*88.
2. F.O.C.P. 5560. Euan Smith to Salisbury, 27.3*88.
3. F.O.C.P. 5673* Euan Smith to Salisbury, 22.3*88.
As Macdonald made his way home he may have reflected on the 
future. For upwards of five years now he had. been employed on 
special service and he must have viewed the prospect of return­
ing to his regiment with mixed feelings. On the one hand the 
army was in his blood and it would be like going home again to 
experience the thrilling feeling of marching in tune to the 
pipes once again. On the other hand, he had been away from 
his regiment so long, that many of his colleagues would have 
gone, and there were many chances of promotion that would have 
been missed. Nevertheless a holiday in his homeland, only the 
second in eight years, would give him a chance to readjust 
himself.
CHAPTER 3 
COMPANY, CONSUL, COLONY......
That portion of the Niger Districts Protectorate not 
governed by the Royal Niger Company we may for convenience 
designate the Oil Rivers Protectorate, the name officially 
adopted in 1891. It was not a clearly defined area, its 
boundaries were deliberately left amorphous reflecting the 
government's uncertainty as to the future of the area. To the 
west lay the Colony and Protectorate of Lagos whose boundary,by 
a proclamation issued by Governor Griffiths in February 1886, 
extended to the right bank of the Benin River. No Lagos 
official, however, though it worth his while either to visit 
the Benin River and prolaim the fact or to inform any British 
official in the neighbouring area. Consular officers, therefore 
continued to operate on the Benin.
There was equal confusion at the eastern extremity of 
the Protectorate. Here the neighbouring protectorate of the 
Cameroons was under foreign rule - that of Germany. In May 
1885 both powers agreed to abstain from interfering in the 
other's sphere of influence, the demarcation line to run along 
the right bank of the Rio del Rey from its mouth to its source 
"thence striking direct to the left river of the Old Calabar or
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Cross River, and terminating after crossing that river at the 
point about 9° 8 1 of longitude east of G r e e n w i c h . F e w  people, 
however, knew exactly where the Rio del Rey was, much less had 
it ever been accurately surveyed. Moreover it became clear, 
after surveys by the Admiralty had eventually been made, that 
the Rio del Rey was not a river at all, but a vast estuary into 
which many small rivers emptied. Which one of these effluents 
was the actual boundary was to be a continual source of academic 
bickering between the two powers for the next few years,
Germany claiming the Akpayafe River as the best customs bound­
ary, Britain the Ndian River as the natural ethnographical 
boundary. In 1887 Vice Consul Johnston was sent to explore 
the estuary in an attempt to achieve agreement. He recommen­
ded the Ndian river not only on grounds of ethnography but also
2
as a natural trading frontier. The Germans refused to 
accept this and the matter was still unsettled in 1890.
If the Oil Rivers’ boundaries with Lagos and the 
Cameroons were uncertain, those with the Niger Company were 
non-existent. Despite the pleas of the Liverpool merchants
1. F.O.C.P. 5l6l, Granville to Munster 29.^-.85 & Munster to
Granville 7*5.85.
2. F.O.C.P. 5502., Report by Acting Consul Johnston of his
Survey of the Rio del Rey lLt-.7.87.
that the Niger Company should be restricted in its activities
1
to the region north of Onitsha, the Foreign Office refused to 
consider any steps for dividing the Protectorate while there 
was any prospects of amalgamation between the merchants. This 
created continued problems in the delta region; supposedly the 
whole of the delta was covered by the Charter. This on a 
correct geographical interpretation would have given the Oil 
Rivers to the Niger Company. Logic, however, failed to enter 
the situation. The Oil Rivers were left outside the Company’s 
sphere and so lost a greater part of their hinterland. The 
Company ruled an area extending from the left bank of the Nun 
mouth of the Niger to the left bank of the Forcados, effect­
ively splitting into two the area under Consular administration 
The medley of creeks criss-crossing the delta invited smuggling 
by the middlemen of the Oil Rivers, and the lack of any firm 
Foreign Office line invited conflict between the European 
merchants as to trading rights. Two particular pressure 
points were at Idu, a main oil collecting centre for New Cala­
bar and Bonny; and in the Forcados, where the Company was 
accused of encroaching beyond its chartered rights.
At every river mouth in the area thus delimited, in 
response to the stimulus of trade with the European, a city
1. F.0.8k/l88o Lawrence M.P. to Fergusson enc. letter from
African Association 3-3-87*
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state had developed, with its own mechanism for maintaining 
law and order, and for providing the necessary security for 
commercial intercourse. The inhabitants of these states be­
longed to three distinct groups. To the west lay Benin, once 
the proud possessor of an empire extending from Lagos to Bonny; 
with its offshoot the Itsekiri state of Warri. In the centre 
were the Oil Rivers proper, astride which lay the I jo states of 
Nembe (Brass), New Calabar and Bonny. To the east, and out­
side the Delta proper, but connected -with it by inland creeks, 
lay the Efik kingdoms of Creek Town, Duke Town and Henshaw 
Town, known collectively as Old Calabar (Kalahari). These 
states had, before the coming of the European, been small, eking 
out a precarious existence by fishing. There was little land to 
support an agricultural economy based on cash crops. The fish 
was dried and exchanged for the products of the forest with the 
hinterland Ibo and Ibibio peoples, A. remarkable revolution 
took place with the European requirement for, first, slaves, 
then palm oil. The states leapt in size from a few hundred 
to upwards of 5,000 inhabitants. With the aid of European 
firearms, the city states built up spheres of influence in the 
interior, seizing slaves to man their newly built trading 
canoes which carried the goods of the European to the markets 
and brought, after the abolition of the slave trade, the palm
99.
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oil products to the ships waiting off the coast. ' As the
economy of these states changed, so did their social and
political structures, and no description of coastal politics
would be sound without beginning with a few words on the social
2
structure known as the ’House1.
The House consisted of the extended family group, plus 
the slaves who had been captured to man the canoes, bound to­
gether in one large trading association under the head of the 
house, usually elected, who was known as the ’father’. As be­
fitted an organisation devoted to commerce, it had a fluid 
social structure. An ambitious slave could, and often did, if 
he found favour with his father by his success in negotiating 
trading agreements with the European agents, make enough money 
to buy his own canoe, and could then rise to become sub-chief 
or even father of his own house. Sometimes subordinate houses 
were formed by traders providing their sons with their own 
canoes or by successful slaves. Each city state had many 
houses and sub-houses, and a man’s wealth and political influ­
ence was judged by the number of canoes he controlled. The 
house had its own religious deities, full responsibility for 
looking after its members in sickness and old age, and
1. See Dike op.cit. also G.I.Jones *The Trading States of the
Oil Rivers* 19*63 for detailed accounts of the interaction
of economy and politics in this area.
2. For the origins of the house systems and their subsequent
history see Jones op. cit.
equally disciplined and punished its own stock. Social mobil­
ity increasingly produced a class structure based on wealth.
The heads of houses acted as an advisory council to the king, 
who was himself a wealthy trader and head of a house. The Court 
of Equity which existed in every river to adjust trade disputes 
with the European was formed of the most powerful of these heads 
of houses sitting alongside the white agents.
In so far as the house functioned as it ought, it was 
an admirable institution for the British merchants. It provided 
the necessary security for trading operations, and the equally 
necessary sanctions against trading offenders. The agent could 
deal with one man acting on behalf of his house instead of 
having to negotiate different rates with several. This limited 
the time which had to be spent on the deadly fever ridden coast. 
The British were quite prepared under these conditions to leave 
politics to the Africans, and to concern themselves with trade.
Even before 1885, however, there were signs that the 
times were changing. The strength of the house system, "the 
career open to talents,1' was in a sense also its weakness. In 
a power structure based solely on wealth the way was always 
open to the overmighty subject. New wealth had thrown to the 
surface new men, feared and envied by their rivals in the older 
houses. Competition to supply the needs of the white man
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became increasingly bitter as the new men trespassed in the 
markets of the old in their avid search for greater riches.
The weaker houses lost their prosperity, and sometimes even 
their independence, to the larger houses. In Bonny a disas­
trous situation arose when two houses, those of Anna Pepple 
and Manilla Pepple, accumulated more wealth than the royal 
house. A series of civil wars, which the king was powerless 
to prevent, rocked the state^ending in the withdrawal in 1869 
of the Anna Pepple group under their vigorous leader Ja Ja to 
found a new state at Opobo. Ja Jafs geographical position 
enabled him to control the Bonny markets, and the resulting 
trade disputes caused continual unrest. In New Calabar a 
similar situation arose with an endemic feud between the Barboy 
and Amakiri groups.^
This breakdown in political authority represented a 
threat to trade prosperity which government could not ignore, 
but to which it had not yet evolved any coherent policy. No 
one in the Foreign Office had bothered to examine the practical 
implications of what the assumption of a protectorate over the 
Oil Rivers might mean. The only certainty lay in the fact 
that, whatever it did mean should involve the minimum cost
1. Dike op.cit. cX.
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combined with the maximum security to trade - hence the policy 
of using the chartered company as an instrument of government. 
Beyond this, past policy seemed to provide no precedent on which 
to base the future government of the Rivers. The term "protec­
torate" itself seemed incapable of close definition, having 
"different meanings in different circumstances and in the 
mouths of different persons."1 To a European trader it meant 
protection against the African; to the African protection 
against the trader; to government protection of both against 
the foreigner.
With this confusion of aims, and faced with internal 
political instability on the coast, it was not surprising that 
the government’s approach to this part of West Africa in 1886, 
was often inconsistent in theory and savoured of the expedient 
in practice. Like an Imperial Micawber waiting for something 
to turn up, the Foreign Office meddled and muddled and put off 
decision, until at last a succession of crises forced a radical 
re-thinking of West' African policy during the last decade of 
the century.
Initially, however, all had progressed quite smoothly.
In accordance with Article 3*+ of the VIth Chapter of the Final 
Act of the Berlin Conference, the Foreign Office had published
1. Hall *A Treatise on the Foreign Powers and Jurisdiction of
the British Crown* p. 20 k (Oxford 189k ). ~
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the notification of the Protectorate on the 5th June 1885, at 
the same time indicating that "measures for the administration 
of justice and the maintenance of peace and good order in the 
Niger Districts"1 were being prepared. Saddled with what the 
Niger Company had not taken under its charter, these measures 
had now to be considered. There were too existing factors 
which had to be taken into account. One was the protection 
treaties signed by the various rulers of the Oil Rivers states, 
the other was the existing powers already possessed by the 
Consular officers through Orders in Council, notably those of 
1872 and 1885.
The treaties, made for the moat part by Consul Hewett, 
differed from those of the Niger Company in that they did not 
purport to transfer complete sovereignty. Most, however, 
conformed to a standard pattern. There were usually nine 
articles in the treaty - articles I , II and VI being of primary 
importance to the British as conceding protection, control of 
external relations and free trading for all countries.
Naturally article VI aroused the most contention amongst the 
Oil Rivers’ rulers, and in some treaties it had to be left out, 
notably those with the Brass men and Ja Ja. The government, 
at first, had not been unduly worried about the absence of the
1. London Gazette 5*8.85.
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free trade article in these treaties; the main concern in l88*f 
had been to preserve the rivers from European interference, and 
this was achieved by articles I and II. The commitment under­
taken by the powers at Berlin to ensure free and fair trading 
to each other's nationals in newly acquired territories on the 
African littoral put the problem in a new light. A treaty 
without article VI was clearly incompatible with international 
commitments.
Articles III, IV and V elaborated the nature and extent
of British jurisdiction, and the commitment of rulers to the 
same. Full jurisdiction was |reserved to the protecting power 
over British and foreign subjects (III), and Britain was em­
powered to decide all disputes between the kings and chiefs 
themselves, between them and foreign traders, and inter-tribal 
conflicts which could not be settled amicably between the two 
parties. In return the chiefs bound themselves to assist the 
British officers in the execution of their duties, and to act 
upon their advice "in matters relating to the administration of 
justice, the development of the resources of the country, the 
interests of commerce, or in any other matter in relation to 
peace, order, and good government, and the general progress of 
civilisation." The treaty concluded with three 'minor' 
articles - VII freedom of religion, VIII the special treatment
io5.
and protection to be accorded to wrecks, and IX the date of
operation of the treaty. Usually the date was taken "so far
as may be practicable," from the date of its signature, and no
time limit was given to its operation, although initially Brass,
1
to quote one example, refused to sign for more than six months.
A study of the treaties as they are worded reveals that 
Britain had certain legal rights of interference in the internal 
affairs of the native rulers which could have provided prece­
dents for Crown Colony administration. Of particular importance 
here is article IV of the standard treaty which must be quoted 
in full:-
All disputes between the Kings and Chiefs of .... or 
between them and British and foreign traders, or be­
tween the aforesaid Kings and Chiefs and neighbouring 
tribes which cannot be settled amicably between the 
two parties, shall be submitted to the British Con­
sular or other officers appointed by Her Britannic
Majesty to exercise jurisdiction i n  ^territories,
for arbitration and decision /my emphasis/ or for 
arrangement.
The two words ’and decision1 virtually eliminated the legal 
distinction between a Crown Colony and a Protectorate. Arbi­
tration itself bore no more force in international law than the 
willingness of the parties in dispute to submit that dispute to 
a third party for his opinion which when given none of the dis­
puting parties were legally bound to accept. In a protectorate
1. The treaties are to be found in Hertslet *Map of Africa by 
Treaty^ vol.I pp.131-15^. Also F.O. 93/10, ll, l6.
government committed to non interference in native affairs, 
arbitration would be the maximum permissible intervention in 
internal affairs by the protecting power, whatever the legal 
position was vis-a-vis foreigh affairs. Article IV clearly 
went beyond this. Unlike arbitration, "decision" is a juri­
dical term capable of jurisdictional interpretation.^' Prac­
tically it implied the requisite force and the necessary 
bureaucracy to enforce the decision of a supreme court. By 
this clause the British government was the legal and final 
court of appeal in disputes bet ween two parties both of which 
could be non-British. If Britain was empowered to intervene 
at the highest level, there was no logical stopping place be­
tween protectorate and colony. Other clauses on the treaty 
form pointed to more than mere protection. Clauses VI and VII 
presupposed such radical alterations in the existing structure 
of the Oil Rivers, as certainly to require some supervision 
from the protecting power. The treaties, therefore, were 
sufficiently ill-defined in their articles to allow of the 
establishment of a Crown colony without breaking those articles 
What induced the chiefs to sign away their rights for 
apparently such a small return? Presents and ignorance are too 
facile an answer - we are not dealing with a primitive ignorant
1.:T. Hodge* Consular Jurisdiction in the Niger Coast 
Protectorate, (1895).
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savage only too ready to be duped by the European. Schooled 
by centuries of contact, the Oil Rivers man was well aware of 
the realities of life on the coast, and was as shrewd in trade 
matters, if not shrewder, than his opposite number the European 
agent. Of course, the chief did not expect to lose completely 
his independence and to become poorer into the bargain when he 
signed the treaty; on the contrary he sold some of his sover­
eignty because, in many cases, he expected to become rich by 
so doing. The white man’s armed ships would provide security 
and protection in which trade could flourish more than ever be­
fore, and the Queen’s government would control the excesses of 
the white agents. Again it was a small price to pay if they 
had to open their own markets, when they could trade in any­
body else’s. Certain of the chiefs signed away the political 
independence of their communities in order to strengthen their 
position against internal opponents. It has been mentioned 
above how the indigenous political structure was starting to 
break up; and the establishment of friendly relations with 
the greatest power on the coast could rehabilitate an ailing 
ruler. Finally the chiefs may have felt the writing was on the 
wall and they should make the best deal possible with the white 
man while they still had some shattered remnants of authority 
left: so used to aggression and counter aggression amongst
10 8.
themselves, and the chastening influence of the gunboat on uhe 
coast, they would envisage a situation where this great power 
would do what any one of them would have done given the re­
quisite power, that was to expand and create an empire. ThCff^ 
is little evidence to suggest that the African saw the European 
in any different terms from the other successive conquering 
races who had moved through West Africa down the ages."
Clearly a treaty was one way out of a relationship which had 
become intolerable for both European and indigenous inhabitant. 
The realities of power politics we re no less apparent to the 
African than the European> which in the general uncertainty as 
to the economic future of the rivers (the price of oil on the 
European market during l88h-5 reached rock bottom; even the 
well organised Niger Company sustained a loss of £ h 0 ,000 on
the year’s trading and could not pay any dividend to its 
2
shareholders), may have accounted for the request for more 
Queen's government. The fact that the uncertainty reached 
crisis proportions between 1885-9 was largely owing to the in­
ability of the British government to accept their responsibili-
ties and meet that request.
1. There is an interesting discussion of this point in 
Crowder^*West Africa under Colonial Rule* 1968 particularly
part I passim.
2. Flint pp.325-6.
3. For a different interpretation of the treaty question see
Anene op.cit. cap.3*
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If the treaties imposed certain responsibilities on
the British government, so too did the various Orders in Council
under which the Consuls operated. The two relevant to our dis-
1
cussion, one of 1872 the other of 1885 , revealed the con­
fusion surrounding the establishment of the Protectorate, for 
the later document conferred few new powers on the Consul. He 
was to hold consular court as before, with direct jurisdiction 
over British subjects. The Order specifically empowered the 
consul to act "in so far as is necessary for securing the 
observance of the treaties" - a phrase which could mean every­
thing or nothing. The Consul was also empowered to make regu­
lations for securing "the peace and good government of British 
subjects or British protected persons." If regulations were 
made presumably the requisite power ab juridicio_ to enforce 
them was implied; a legal view which could hardly be squared, 
with or without treaty, with the continued independence of the 
native power. Given the treaty, however, the 1885 Order logi­
cally followed, as the chiefs had already signed away their 
political independence, and were probably not unaware that they 
had done so. They had been used to Consular Courts, set up 
under the 1872 Order, exercising an unofficial jurisdiction
1. For texts see F.0.8V1356 Livingstone to Granville 
29*i+.72 & London Gazette 5*6.85.
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over internal affairs before 1885, when Britain had no legal
standing in the Rivers. The formal protectorate administration
was marked, therefore, by no decisive change in practice.
Hewett renamed his existing courts, notified the inhabitants
that Britain was now the protecting power, which he trusted
1
would "be considered sufficient for the purposes" of the new
Order, and continued to interfere in internal politics on the
coast as he had done before - this time, however, with a locus
standi, the treaty.
That the British government envisaged no decisive
change was revealed in the instructions given to Hewett in
November 1885, before he returned to his post after a prolonged
leave. He was to restore "order, good administration and
government" in an area larger than Great Britain! To achieve
this small task he was to have no army, and no revenue, although
if he was fortunate he might find himself with an occasional
2
gunboat to supply the necessary moral pressure. It was not 
surprising that Hewett soon ran into difficulties. The task 
set was far beyond the capacities of one man or even two, as
V.
Hewett now had a Vice-Consul in the person of Johnson. Further 
difficulties were created by the failure of the two men to pull
1. F.O. 8Vl7^9 Hewett to F.O. 15^.86.
2. F.O. 8V1701 F.O. to Hewett 30.12.85
1 1 1 .
together. It was not that their personal relationship was bad,
but Hewett1s inability to delegate, combined with Johnston*s
unwillingness to accept the passive role which the older man
had mapped out for him, was not exactly a mixture making for
success. Finally the Foreign Office, in pursuit of its long
term objective of passing the Rivers off under company rule,
was often completely oblivious to the advice and recommendations
of its men on the spot. When Hewett pressed to be allowed to
create a consular police force, and suggested that there was
enough revenue to be gleaned from trade to erect a colonial
administration and make it pay, Anderson minuted " t h i s ....
sudden activity against the Co. at th§ present moment is very
unfortunate I suspect Hewett thinks we are going to make the
Oil Rivers a Colony and is playing for the Governorship.11^
Johnston likewise wanted the area to be made into a colony and
2
was just as patently ignored.
Given the lack of precision in the wording of the 
treaties, it was not surprising that Hewett1s difficulties 
began over a treaty. The treaty signed with Ja Ja in 188H- was 
on a standard form, except for the omission of clause VI. This 
was an important omission, in that In the midst of an avowedly
1. F.O. 8h/l88l Hewett to F.O. 5.11.88 min. by H.P.A. 9.11.88.
2. F.O. 8h/l882 Johnston to Salisbury 26.7.88.
3. Text given in Anene Appendix C PP-333-335.
free trade area (under the terras of the Berlin Act) there ex­
isted a dominion built up by an enterprising ex-slave on the
basis of protection, and the possession of the inland markets
2
as a peculiar form of private property. Hence, in the ab­
sence of extraordinary forebearance on the part of the white 
trader, there was bound to be trouble which could not but affect 
the whole stability of the middleman system on the coast.
It is not intended here to go into considerable detail 
over the events leading up to the deportation of Ja Ja by 
Johnston in September 1887. The story which non the one hand 
raised the whole question of British control in the Oil Rivers 
Protectorate, and on the other touched the deepest animosities 
existing between the British commercial interests in the
n If
region”J has been well enough told elsewhere. It is important, 
however, for a discussion of the political implications arising 
from the dispute to touch on the background. When Hewett re­
turned to the Oil Rivers in 1885, Ja Ja was already involved in 
the most serious of his periodic trade disputes with the Liver­
pool merchants. To meet the world depression in oil prices, 
the merchants had banded together as the African Association to
1. General Act of the West African Conference 26.2.85, Caps.V
& VI.
2. Ja Ja’s rise to power is described in Dike1 *Trade and Poli­
tics in the Niger Delta 1830-1885* Oxford 1 9 %  cap.X pp.
?' 2-202.
3* Oliver, Sir Harry Johnston and the Scramble for Africa 1957 
p.107.
k. Oliver op.cit. pp.107-123: Anene op.cit. pp.6l-97: Geary.
W.N.M.j^Nigeria under British Rule$ 1927 App.I.
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form a buying ring to force down prices: paid to the. African 
middlemen. Ja Ja had reacted by stopping their trade and ship­
ping his produce direct to England. One of the European firms, 
Miller Brothers and Co., broke with the rest and traded on 
Ja Ja ’s terms at a handsome profit.
To Johnston, who became acting Consul on Hewett1 s 
annual return to England in 1886, the situation was intolerable.
When he visited Opobo five sixths of the European boats were ly-
1
ing idle, and trade seemed at a standstill. Johnston was quite 
prepared to listen to the complaints of the Liverpool merchants, 
since they accorded so well with his own prejudices that the 
middlemen were "the curse of Western A f r i c a  /they are/ res­
olved to prevent any inter-communication between the white
traders on the coast and the industrious thrifty tribes of the
2 3
interior.” After stopping Ja Ja's trade, Johnston was con-
b  •
vinced that the only solution was to deport him; accordingly
5
without waiting for final authority from the Foreign Office, 
he invited him on board H.M.S. Goshawk to palaver and then 
sailed off with the unhappy king to the Gold Coast (September
1. F.O. 8*4-/1828 Johnston to Salisbury 1.8.87.
2. F.O.C.P. 5312 Johnston to Salisbury 20.2.86.
3. F.O. 8*4-/1828 Johnston to Salisbury 20.8,87.
*4-. Johnston had come to this conclusion as early as January 
1886. F.O . 8*4-/1750 to Salisbury 15*1.86.
5. All the correspondence is in F.O.C.P. 5588.
lib.
1
19th 1887). There the king was detained by an ordinance 
which was rushed with indecent haste through the Gold Coast 
Legislative Council, and subjected to a hurried trial before
p
being exiled to the West Indies. ' Although he was allowed to 
return from exile three years later after Macdonald had settled 
in the Rivers, he died before reaching Opobo.
Throughout the whole episode the Foreign Office 
officials had supported Johnston with little sense of equity. 
Lister thought Ja Ja a 'false and cruel chief' whose 'cup of 
iniquity is now full1 and whose deportation was just reward for 
his ingratitude. Anderson and Hewett (still in London) agreed." 
In one sense they can hardly be blamed for taking this attitude - 
the issue from a distance seemed simple. Here was a chief who 
was obstructing the development of British trade and who, 
therefore, had to be removed, treaty or no treaty. On the 
other hand there was little logic in their approach. As we 
have seen, when it suited long term objectives, the officials 
often totally disregarded the advice of the men on the spot. 
Johnston was fortunate in that what he did was in consonance 
with a general policy of trade development - the days of the 
middlemen monopolists, European as well as African* were nearly
1. Opobo Political Prisoners Detention Ordinance 6.10.87.
2. F.O.C.P. 5686. Johnston to Salisbury 2.12.87*
3. F.O.Conf. Print 5588 Hewett to Salisbury 20.8 .87. min. 
by Lister 22.8.8-7.
115.
over. This was the lesson that the African Association was to 
learn in a rather less painful fashion than Ja Ja over the next 
decade. Johnston's part was merely to force the hand of the 
government as to method and timing, but not intention, in their 
dealings with any coast chief who had the temerity to imagine he 
was independent.
One man who throughout had remained unimpressed by the 
arguments was Lord Salisbury himself. The news of Ja Ja's 
arrest could hardly have come at a worse moment. Ja Ja, hard 
pressed by Johnston, had, in the previous August, sent a depu­
tation to England which had been introduced at the Foreign 
Office by a director of Miller Brother & Co. Fergusson, the 
Parliamentary Under Secretary, had promised them a full inves­
tigation at Opobo by a Senior Naval Officer.^" The arrest meant
certain parliamentary agitation and awkward questions. As far
2
as Salisbury was concerned the whole affair was "a mess." More­
over he felt a personal repugnance to the whole manner of Ja
Ja's deportation, referring to it privately as "kidnapping.
No one was more aware than Salisbury, however, that once the
event had taken place, more harm would be done to the government
If
by dropping than by supporting Johnston. On Johnston1 s
1. F.O. 8b/l828 memo, by Fergusson 13*9.87. This paper had 
conveniently disappeared when the papers were laid before 
parliament.
2. F.O. Conf. Print 5588 min. by Salisbury 23.9*87*
3* F.O.C.P. 5588 memo, by Salisbury 29.8.87.
b, F.O. 8b/l828 Johnston to Salisbury b-.lQ.87 min. by S.
116.
official report he wrote a frosty minute; "Simply approve his 
conduct. We need not discuss the principles developed in this 
dispatch. They amount to this, that when a merchant differs 
from a native chief as to their respective rights, the native 
chief is to be deported."^
The consequences of the Ja Ja affair were manifold.
It was noli/ evident how far the traditional bases on which 
trading relations in the delta had rested lay shattered.
Hitherto African rulers had been able to guarantee a reason­
able measure of internal stability amongst the coastal states 
which had enabled trade to flow freely from clearly demarcated 
markets in the interior. On the European side there was 
acquiescence in the thesis that not only could the African chief
keep the peace and protect trade for which he was paid a 
2
"comey," but that also penetration into the interior was im­
possible anyway, or at least not worth the economic effort in 
both money and lives. The arrest of Ja Ja drew attention in 
the most dramatic fashion to the fact that the indigenous 
middlemen were no longer a vital part of the trading system.
The Niger Company had shown the way to the interior, and where 
they went others could follow. The Incentive was provided by 
the middlemen disputes, the developments in hygiene and tropi-
1. F.O. 8b/l828 Johnston to Salisbury 2b.9.87 min. by S. 
Jones op.cit. pp.9b-6.
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cal medicine*** which enabled the European to spend longer on 
the coast, and the world depression in oil prices during the 
middle eighties. During the crisis Ja Ja himself shipped oil 
direct to England, just as the European traders were attempting 
to deal direct with his markets - clear evidence not only of 
the changing trade pattern but also of the ability of African 
rulers themselves to adapt to the future given the opportunity.
On the political level it was all very well to support 
an action taken on the broad grounds that Ja J a ’s vested 
interests, not to say treaty rights, were irreconciliable with 
international commitments, and that he had forfeited his 
privileges by abusing them. She fact was that those privileges 
had been exercised from time out of mind and any attack on them 
contributed ipso facto to the prevailing political instability. 
Again, to tell European traders they had a right to push into 
the interior was one thing, to protect them was quite another.
The British government could hardly expect the cowed African 
princes to resume their old function as if nothing had happened. 
The whole question of Oil Rivers government came to the fore in 
a manner which was decisive. Even before the first furore had 
died down, Pauncefote had come to the conclusion (December 1887) 
that Mthe first step to be decided is as to our political status
2
in these territories.... the whole position must be investigated.11
1. The most revolutionary in its implications being the regular 
daily dose of quinine in conjunction with the mosquito net.
2. F.O. 8V1839 Johnston to F.O. 21.10.87. Min. by J.P. 12-87.
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An investigation was indeed long overdue , for the 
officers on the spot had further complicated matters by their 
endeavours to settle the form of government for themselves. In 
view of the vagueness of the wording in the protectorate trea­
ties, and the consistently unhelpful instructions from the 
Foreign Office it was a natural proceeding. In 1886 Hewett 
had intervened in Bonny to put a stop to threatened civil war
between Oko Jumbo and Warribo Manilla Pepple, two over*-mighty
1chiefs against whom the king, George Pepple, was powerless.
He appointed five neutral chiefs to form a legislative and
executive council for the country, reserving to himself the
right to veto any law which the new local authority might enact.
The only reaction from the Foreign Office was a comment by
Anderson that "Hewett is trying to settle many large questions
P
under his system of benevolent despotism.” Similarly Johnston 
with or without authority, was determined to establish law and 
order in place of the systems which had been or were being over­
thrown. To do this he believed that It was not only necessary 
to extend the treaties of protection to the inland markets, but 
also to establish a system of local authorities on a clearly 
recognisable (that is, European) pattern which would underpin
1. For an account of this dispute see Anene p. 76-7*
2. F.0.8^/17^9 Hewett to F.O. 12.7.86. Min. by H.P.A. *+.9.86.
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the authority of the consul. Johnston’s justification was that
"the native chiefs do not seem competent to administer the
1
affairs of their country in a wise and just manner."
or n o t
Whether^Johnston was right in his assumption, his system 
of Governing Councils certainly shifted the balance of native 
jurisdiction from African to European. At Opobo there were 
only three Africans out of a total body of ten on the council 
and these were nominated by the consul; Brass did rather better 
with six out of fifteen, although one of the six, Archdeacon 
CrowthervWas not a chief at all, and had so many other commit­
ments that his full time participation was doubtful. The new 
Governing Council met weekly, and its powers were limited "to 
the carrying out of Consular orders, the preservation of peace, 
the maintenance of highways and means of communication, and the 
hearing in court of minor civil actions and criminal charges."
The maximum punishment which the Council could inflict was £5,
1 week’s imprisonment, or 12 lashes, although in individual
p
cases this could be increased with the sanction of the consul. 
Appeals from the decision of the Governing Council were per­
mitted to the Consular Court at Old Calabar but were discouraged. 
Verdicts of the Council were by a majority of votes and a quorum 
was fixed at three. This not only meant that the African members
1. F.0.8k/l828 Johnston to F.O. 2k.9*87*
2. F.0.8k/l828 Johnston to F.O. 2k.9 .87.
could be consistently outvoted but that the council could
flourish in their absence. Comey - the tax which African chiefs
regarded as their legitimate revenue - was placed under the
Council’s control. Half was to be expended by the Council "in
the interests of the country" and the rest was to go to the
indigenous rulers. Lastly the Council was to execute an order
banning the importation and sale "of machine guns, cannon,
1
breech loading guns, bullet cartridges, etc." The native 
government, entirely under alienj control, bore little resemb­
lance to the old Courts of Equity. Johnston was pointing the 
way forwards towards Colonial administration, not backwards to 
the pre~l885 period.
All this was going too fast for the Foreign Office, 
which demanded to know by what right a mere acting consul had 
taken upon himself to decide matters of high policy and "estab­
lish a totally different regime politically and legally to that
2
which is now in force." Johnston's answer was an elaborate 
self justification in which he tried to maintain that the 
Governing Council was a reconstitution of the Court of Equity, 
with the difference that all interests were represented instead 
of just those of the white traders in the old court. ^  Johnston
1. F.0.8k/l839 Johnston to F.O. 21.10.87.
2. F.O.C.P. 5686 F.O. to Johnston 10.2.88.
3. F.O.C.P. 5686 Johnston to Salisbury l8.k.88.
must have known that the statement concerning representation 
in the courts was untrue. Certainly the records of the Old 
Calabar court which he had to hand would have told him other­
wise. Justification was not, however, Johnston's main concern; 
a permanent administration in the Oil Rivers with, perhaps, 
himself as governor, was far more to his taste. Johnston was 
nothing if not an opportunist, and the power vacuum created by 
Ja Ja's removal had given him the chance to place the dilemma 
of governing the Rivers squarely before officialdom.
Keenly aware like Johnston of the dilemma in which they 
were placed, officials could neither bring themselves to approve 
tor disapprove of Johnston's measures. Hewett was allowed to 
return to the Oil Rivers on 8th May 188-8 without definite in­
structions as to whether he should encourage or discourage the
Council^| from functioning, although he was asked to report on
1
the situation. In the event, Hewett's pique at Johnston's 
achievements in the short time in which he had been in charge
merely worsened the political confusion in the Rivers. In 
December Anderson received a plaintive letter from the African 
Association stating that Hewett had informed the Governing Co w l * 
that they "will be held responsible for any use made of their 
governing powers, which powers are now suspended" and asking 
what the legal responsibility of their agents was and the pre-
1. F.O.C.P. 5686. F.O. to Hewett May 88.
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1
else validity of Johnston's orders. The necessity for an 
impartial investigation so that a fresh start could be made, 
began to assume an overwhelming importance.
Of themselves events in the Oil Rivers might not have
forced such an investigation on the Foreign Office. The
emphasis must now, therefore, shift to the European scene and 
the second direction from which opposition emanated to the easy 
assumptions of the Foreign Office - Liverpool.
The attitude of Liverpool to the Charter held by the 
Niger Company and the plan for its extension to the Oil Rivers 
was often confused and hesitating and was never consistent.
There were several reasons for this. In the first place Liver­
pool was a collection of elements whose interests rarely 
coalesced. Two groups are of especial concern to us - the 
shipowners and the merchants trading on the west coast. The 
shipowners, dominated by the Elder Dempster combine, were con­
cerned that any amalgamation of the merchants in the Oil Rivers
with the Niger Company should not give exclusive bargaining 
power to an enlarged organisation to reduce freight rates to 
and from the West Coast. More particularly the shipowners 
feared that a monopoly cartel might start its own independent 
shipping line effectively excluding the older companies from 
the lucrative African trade. The traders could rarely bring 
themselves to work with the steamship companies when they were 
at the same time bickering about freight rates.
1. F.O. 8k/1935 African Association to F.O. 2k.12.88.
123.
In the second place the opposition of the traders 
themselves to Charter extension was equivocal. They suffered 
from the handicap of rarely being able to speak with a united 
voice, despite the grandiose claims of the African Association 
to dominate the Liverpool Chamber of Commerce when it came to 
discussing matters African. There were a number of firms both 
great and small who traded outside the combine, the most im­
portant being Miller, Brother & Co., which had connections in 
Glasgow as well as Liverpool, and which had feet in both the 
Niger Company and the Delta trade. On the one hand, therefore, 
the merchants bitterly resented the commercial activities of 
the newly chartered company. This was a predictable response. 
Goldie’s exclusion of the African brokers of the Oil Rivers 
from the hinterland markets struck at the heart of the Liverpool 
oil trade, whose operations were still largely confined to the 
coast, and whose prosperity therefore depended on the prosperity 
of the coastal middlemen. In broad economic terms, Liverpool 
was having to pay more for its oil on the coast, when selling 
prices in Europe throughout the eighties were steadily dropping. 
On the other hand, recognising with grudging admiration the 
source of the Company’s success, Liverpool nurtured ambitions 
of its own either to join Goldie as an ally in a new enlarged 
sphere of operations under an extended Charter which would in­
clude the Rivers, or to obtain a separate charter for its own
I2*f.
African Association. It could not therefore oppose the 
principle of Chartered Company Administration. All the traders 
complaints took on ’’the appearance of petty grievances and 
quibbles.”
This lack of purposeful argument was reflected in
action. At the same time as the African Association was open-
2
ing its campaign against the Company, it began to make over­
tures in secret to Goldie, encouraged, of course, by the Foreign 
Office. Goldie himself was anxious for his sphere of operations
p
to be extended to include the Rivers, since it would immeasur­
ably strengthen his hand in dealing with the opposition to 
chartered company administration, and a richer company would 
be able to conduct the government, on a less ad hoc basis. The 
negotiations bristled with difficulties. Not only did they have 
to be kept secret, particularly from the shipowners, but the 
African Association in order to keep itself financially off 
the rocks had also to keep up pressure against the Company in 
the Rivers.
The amount of pressure they did exert, therefore, 
varied according to the state of their trade in the Rivers, and 
the state of their negotiations with Goldie. During the first 
half of 1887 attacks on the Company reached a crescendo. This 
was the period of greatest difficulty for the Association.
1. Flint op.cit. p.99*
2. F.O.3^+/l88o African Association to Iddesleigh 29.11.86.
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The price of palm oil reached a new low in Europe in April,
the commercial regulations of the Company were beginning to
bite, and the Association found itself in the paradoxical
position of supporting the middlemen of New Calabar and Brass
against the Company at the same time as it was hammering away
at Ja Ja. In March it mobilised the Liverpool Members of
Parliament, ever sensitive to the trading interests of the
great city, and presented a monster petition to parliament
complaining against the Company's tariffs and proposing that
the Company’s sphere of operations should be restricted to the
1
region north of Onitsha, a proposal which would have effec­
tively bankrupted the Chartered administration, since ninety 
per cent of the oil belt lay to the south.
During the latter half of 1887 complaints against the
Company by the Association ceased. Palm oil prices picked up
2
during the summer, and Johnston’s breaking of Ja Ja, in which 
affair the African Association had the support of the Foreign
Office, somewhat eased their situation. More particularly the 
traders at last began to grasp the facts of life. Learning 
from their success against Ja Ja, they ceased indulging in cut
1. I VO. 8h/l88o African Association to Lawrence M.P. , Dillwyn 
M.P. to Fergusson 21.3.87; Williamson M.P. to F.O. ^OA.87-
2* The dimes passim for 1887 enables oil prices to be followed.
1 2 6 .
throat competition against each other and co-operated to control
prices; again, having traded inland during Ja J a ’s prohibition
of commerce in the Opobo', there was no reason why they could not
continue to do so when the obstacle to their ambitions had been
removed. Finally and most important of all, if the combination
of Goldie and the Foreign Office could not be beaten down, the
incentive was all the greater to join it. To the delight of the
Foreign Office, negotiations between Goldie and the Association
began in earnest, and by February 1888 it looked as though
agreement was in sight. If this were so, then ’’the whole coast
1
will go under the Niger Company." Two months later, Rogerson,
the Chairman of the African Association, informed a delighted
Fergusson that he was ’’pretty confident of making a fair
arrangement with the Niger Company ....  if it is understood
2
that the Charter is to be extended to the Oil Rivers.”
It was too good to be true. The success of the negoti­
ations depended upon absolute secrecy. Unfortunately for both 
Goldie and the Association, the shipping companies possessed a 
particularly good intelligence service. Not only were they aware 
that talks were taking place between the two commercial concerns,
1. F.O. 8^/1828 Johnston to Salisbury 13-1.88 min. by H.P.A. 
15.1.88.
2. Sals. Papers (Fergusson) Fergusson to Salisbury 18A . 88.
127.
they also knew that in February agreement was near.^ This
sparked off a fierce campaign of opposition. A deputation
waited on Fergusson at the Foreign Office, expressing aversion
to Company rule in the Rivers, and insisting that they should
have an opportunity to represent their case before any final
2
decision as to administration was made.
The threat posed by the shippers was no light one.
Elder Dempster had links with Peninsular and Orient and the 
Pacific Steam Navigation Company, the two largest merchant 
shipping companies in the world. There was no more powerful 
commercial lobby in parliament than the shipowners, who had 
friends on all sides of the House. Fergusson, alarmed by the 
strength of the deputation, stalled for time by asking them to
3
submit their case in writing* The resulting document was a 
formidable and savage indictment of Company rule based on first 
principles. A government could have no control over a char­
tered company which traded for its own benefit, because it 
could never prevent the manipulation of administrative regula­
tions in favour of the company and against its rivals. A com­
pany with administrative powers was a natural monopoly, since 
it only had to transfer customs duties from one account to 
another, whereas its rivals had to pay in cash. If the Niger
1. The man who served the shippers so well was Alfred Jones, 
managing director of the West African steamship lines.
See Milne A.H.^Sir Alfred Lewis Jones* Liverpool 191*+.
-'.0. 8F/1916 Memo by Fergusson 23.2.88.
3. Ibid.
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and the Oil Rivers were amalgamated under the Company, they 
would establish a shipping line against which no one could
i
compete."' The Foreign Office, however, refused to be drawn
into an academic discussion from which they could gain nothing.
Instead Bond, the Chairman of the African Steamship Company,
was asked for a '‘specific statement of the dangers to be pro-
2
vided against in the administration of the Oil Rivers."
Foreign Office incomprehension of the nature of the shippers1 
fears was revealed by the simultaneous facile assurance to Bond 
that "regarding his preference for a colonial rather than a 
company administration in the Niger district there are the 
fullest guarantees against high duties or differential treat­
ment. The Company is bound by stricter rules than exist in any
British Colony, the violation of which might involve forfeiture
3
of their Charter."
Clearly worried, however, by the opposition, the Foreign
Office attempted to take some heat out of the discussion by
transmitting the complaints of the shippers in private to 
L|_
Goldie. ‘ If they hoped that Goldie, seeing the strength of the 
opposition, would endeavour to conciliate it, they mistook their
1. F.O.C.P. 5686 African Steamship Company and British and
Africa Steam Navigation Company to Salisbury 27.2.88. 
F.O.C.P. 5686 F.O. to Bond 15.3*88.
3* F.O.C.P. 5686 F.O. to Bond 15.3*88.
h. F.O. 8k/19l8 Lister to Goldie 29.3*88.
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man. Goldie replied with a violent attack on the shipping
companies in which he alleged that the real motives behind their
dislike of Company rule was the fear that ’extension of the
Charter would lead to a great diminution of the spirit traffic
1
on which....the ocean freights depend.” At the same time he 
terminated all the Company’s freight contracts with the West
African lines as from the 1st August 1888, and threatened to
establish in concert with the Rivers’ interest, a rival shipping 
•2
line.
In the long run Goldie might have done better for him­
self if he had endeavoured to conciliate the shipping interests. 
As it was his attitude could not fail to bring the whole quest­
ion of charter extension before the public eye and prejudice 
its chances of success. The Foreign Office was horrified.
Even the sanguine Anderson was constrained to comment that
o
Goldie ’’does not help us much.” For the first time the Foreign
Office was forced to consider the establishment of direct con­
trol over the workings of a chartered company. The opposition 
the shippers could arouse both in the country and in parliament
could not be brushed off without some solid assurances that if 
amalgamation took place monopoly would not follow. A formidable
1. F.O. 8Vl9l8 Goldie to Lister k.k.88.
F.O. ok/1919 Br. & Africa Steamship Co. and African Steam
Navigation Co. to F.O. 17.k.88.
3* F.O. 8k/19l8 Min. by H.P.A. 5.k.88 on Goldie to Lister
k.k.88.
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deputation of owners, representing a total tonnage of 1,097 >000
waited on the Prime Minister and extracted an undertaking that
the scheme for amalgamation would be fully investigated before
1
it was passed and no monopoly would be tolerated. When 
Salisbury, however, inquired of his officials "the rules and 
conditions by which in case of the whole Protectorate being 
placed under the Royal Niger Company, the Company might be res­
trained from acting unfairly in their own interest towards
2
rival traders or shipping companies,” Anderson was forced to
admit that however complete “the protection on paper a
great Company which appoints its own executives and judicial
staff will work indirectly for its own interests and crowd out
rivals and it cannot be denied that the complaint may be justi. - 
3
ftable.” The only way out would be to appoint the Agent 
General and the Chief Justice as Crown Commissions, which, 
since it meant the acceptance of Government responsibility, 
knocked the whole raison d ’etre out of Chartered Company admini 
stration. Anderson doubted whether Goldie would accept any 
real control over the Company’s agents by the Crown. Paunce- 
fote went still further in advocating Crown appointment of a 
High Commissioner and a Director General of Customs, and in 
suggesting that the whole of the judicial administration should
1. F.O. 8Vl9l8 Liverpool Steamship Owners Association to
Salisbury 9*^«88.
2. F.O. 8V1918 Memo, by S. 9^.88.
3. F.O. 8k/19l8 Min. by H.P.A. 11.^.88.
be taken from the Company’s control if the Charter were exten­
ded. J- The Permanent Secretary seemed entirely oblivious of the 
ill-conceived anomaly of his argument, which, if forced on the 
Company, would have broken their administration in two, at the 
same time as the widening of its scope to produce greater 
efficiency was under consideration. If the government’s 
original policy had been no responsibility and no control, 
pressure of circumstances was forcing them in the opposite dir­
ection.
The nature of the Liverpool opposition, and the fact 
that the African Association failed to draw all trade interests 
into its orbit induced a much more cautious approach on the part 
of the Foreign Office towards the plan for charter extension to 
the Delta. Rival interests would have to be satisfied before 
amalgamation as a basis for administration was accepted. This 
meant of necessity more control by government over the Company, 
the nature of which would have to be investigated by a special 
commissioner on the spot. From September 1888 action on the 
charter hung fire, although the proposal continued to be dis­
cussed in the Foreign Office. Salisbury was adamant; nothing 
should be done pending an investigation of the political situ­
ation on the Niger*
1. F.O. 8V1918 Min. by J.P. ll.k.88.
2. F.O. 8V1928 Mins, by S. and T.7.L. 17.9.88.
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If the supporters of the Charter had only had domestic 
critics to overcome, they might yet have won,over a foreign 
Office still opposed to spending money on imperial adventures. 
Caution was, however, being forced on the officials from a 
third direction - the German Government, whose influence was to 
prove decisive in the long run.
German hostility to the Company was not without some 
justification. Goldie had spent a fair proportion of his time 
since 1886 in devising ways and means of evading both the 
Berlin Act and the Anglo-German Agreement. As custodian of 
the former and partner in the latter, the German Government was 
bound to insist that their provisions be upheld. Goldie’s 
interpretation of the Berlin Act differed radically from that 
advanced by the Germans. The clauses dealing with the Niger 
referred only to its navigation, which was free to all nations. 
There was no mention of trade. Therefore, Goldie argued, a 
ship could move freely on the water, but let it once touch the 
bank, it became a trader and subject to the Company's juris­
diction.^ As Goldie well knew, it was impossible to navigate 
the length of the Company’s territories without stopping to 
obtain food and water. Practically there was no such thing as 
transit trade on the Niger. Since Goldie’s argument was in
1. F.O. 3k/l7h2 Goldie to Anderson 18.9.86.
accord with the literal interpretation of the wording of the
Act, the German Government was forced to attack on a broader
front. The claims of the Company turned free transit into a
farce. Moreover jurisdiction on the banks of the Niger, to be
recognised, should be backed by effective occupation; where
this was not the case, trade was free to pass unhampered.
Obstruction by the Company amounted to a monopoly which was
exercised in flagrant violation of the Berlin Act.^
The German Government also based their last point on the
1886 agreement. There were several relevant clauses here which
they accused Goldie of violating; the equal treatment of
foreigners and foreign goods, the stipulation that taxes should
be levied “solely for the purpose of meeting the expenses
necessary... to carry out the obligations imposed....by the
protectorates” and that duties should be ”as moderate as 
2
possible.” Goldie exploited the difficulty of separating the 
Company's administrative costs from commercial costs to evade 
any Foreign Office demand for a proper balance sheet. There 
was no way of checking his claims for administrative expenditure,
or of proving the German charge that taxation was too high.
1. F.O. Pjb/lQyb Hatzfeldt to Salisbury 10.3.88.
2. F.O.C.P. 5l6l Granville to Munster 16.5.85.
13*+.
The diplomatic wrangling was given point by the entry
into the Niger of a German trader, Hoenigsberg, in June 1887.
Whether Hoenigsberg was an agent provocateur or not,^ his
actions were certainly questionable. After obtaining clearance
for a cargo of salt at Akassa, the German proceeded to invite
arrest by transferring his cargo into separate bottoms. When
stopped by the Company's officials and ordered to obtain fresh
clearance, Hoenigsberg abandoned his voyage, complaining that
it would be useless to obtain more papers, and avowed his in-
2
tention of "bursting up" the Company's charter.
This he proceeded to do by travelling to Nupe in Novem­
ber 1887 and provoking a quarrel between the Emir and the 
Company. Hoenigsberg told the Emir that the Company claimed 
both a monopoly of trade in his territory and absolute rights 
of sovereignty. The Emir was thoroughly annoyed at these 
'pretentions' and not only gave Hoenigsberg a signed statement 
to the effect that the Company's claims were untrue but forced 
the agent general to buy off his wrath by raising the annual 
subsidy that Nupe received by virtue of the treaty with the 
Company from £*+00 to £2000.J
1. The point is discussed in Flint Goldie p.11*+ ff.
2. Macdonald Report Cap IV.
3* Ibid.
135.
The myth of the effectiveness of the Company’s rule 
seemingly exploded, the German Government claimed that since 
the Emir was apparently independent, all trade to Nupe was 
transit trade, the Company had therefore no right to levy 
duties or obstruct traders going there and should refund all 
money paid by German subjects.^ Goldie’s answer was to claim 
sovereignty over Nupe by virtue of a treaty signed with 
Gwandu, Nupe’s overlord, in 1886 which had ceded to the Com­
pany the land on both banks of the Niger and Benue above
2 '
Lokoja, and to have the German arrested on the charge of
“promoting and attempting to promote strife and disorder”. 
Hoenigsberg was duly tried at Asaba, found guilty, and sentenced 
to deportation. If he returned, he faced three months’ im­
prisonment.
This precipitate action of Goldie not only predictably 
annoyed the Germans; it unquestionably annoyed the Foreign 
Office. Despite Goldie’s protests, the Foreign 0 ffice agreed 
to a German request that Hoenigsberg should be allowed to re­
turn to the Niger on condition that he abstained from intrigues
1. F.O. 8^/189*+ Hatzfeldt to Salisbury 27.1*88.
2. F.O. 81+/l9l6 Goldie to Currie 21.2.88. The Emir of Gwandu
was the junior of the two heads (the other being the Sultan 
of Sokoto) of the Fulani Empire set up as a result of the 
Fulani jihad in the early nineteenth century. The Empire 
was split into semi-independent emirates of which Nupe was 
one. The best study of the Empire is H.A.S. Johnston
The Fulani Empire of Sokoto (1967).
3. F.O. 8V 189V Memo, by Hatzfeldt 5.3.88.
1 3 6 .
in Nupe. The doctrine that government could delegate its 
powers to a chartered company and escape responsibility for 
its acts was beginning to ar a little thin. Goldie’s re­
action was logical enough; "as Her Majesty’s Government have 
taken the responsibility of his ^Hoenigsberg1 s/ return, which
s
cannot be regarded by the Emir Moleki otherwise than as a 
defeat of the Niger Administration, they will not refuse the 
assistance of Great Britain in the event of any serious inci­
dents occurring.11 ^
As far as the German Government was concerned the de­
portation of Hoenigsberg had been the last straw. They procee­
ded to attack on the broad principle that the source of the 
trouble was an administration run by a trading concern. There 
ought, argued Berlin, to be some kind of government control over 
the company - the British government should undertake to
appoint customs officials Mwho would be responsible for the
2
strict observance of international engagements.11
Confused opposition from Liverpool was one thing; the 
full diplomatic weight of Germany quite another. The Foreign 
Office for the first time became painfully aware of the fact 
that no official representative of the Crown had been up the
1. F.O. 8^/193^ F.O. to R.N.C. 1.12.88 reply 8.12.88; 1935 to
R.N.C. 20.12.88 reply 22.12.88.
2. F.O.8^/1892 Malet to Salisbury 7.3*88; 189^ Hatzfeldt to 
Salisbury 10.3.88, Leyden to Barrington 19.5.88.
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Niger since 1885, and that they had no information of conditions 
in the Company’s domain other than that which Goldie chose to 
supply. As Salisbury remarked concerning the German allega­
tions, "Any denial from us as we have not got any representa­
tive of our own in the country would be, so to speak, mere hear­
say evidence and would carry little weight.’1'*'
In the event the Government was spared the necessity of 
a denialffor Germany determined to force the issue. If the 
Company would not protect German traders, then Berlin would.
In July Bismarck announced that a Consul was to be appointed as 
the official representative of Germany on the spot. This, it 
was explained, would ease friction, as he would have the power 
to settle disputes as they arose. It was expected, of course, 
that Her Majesty's Government would also appoint an official 
with whom the German representative could deal, and who would, 
at the same time, investigate the reasonable complaints of the 
Imperial Government against the Niger Company and ensure res­
pect for the Berlin Act. The mention of the Berlin Act was an
implicit threat that, if Britain did not co-operate, Germany
2
might reconvene the Berlin Conference.
1. F.O. 8k/l895+ Min. by S. on Hatzfeldt to Salisbury 
10.3.88.
2. F.O. 8k/l892 Malet to Salisbury l1!-.7.88.
/
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To Salisbury, however, the request was something of a
relief. For months the need for an investigation into the
situation on the Niger had been manifest. Company was at odds
with merchants, consul differed from consul, African rulers
bickered with each other and with the European factors, ship
owners quarrelled with traders, and now government disputed
with government. The result in the word of Anderson was 
1
"chaos". With an inquiry, not only could government answer
critics from a basis of strength, but at the same time the 
portion of the Protectorate not under the Company could, on 
the basis of impartial evidence, be settled under an adminis­
tration satisfactory to all. The German request was accepted 
at once. Although the Niger was too low for an investigation 
to be conducted in 1888, a Special Commissioner would be sent 
out at the earliest possible moment during the following year.
All complaints would be passed over to him for investigation,
2
likewise all suggestions for future government.
1. F.0.8b/l88l Min. by H.P.A. on Hewett to Salisbury 20.6.88.
2. F.O.8b/l890 Salisbury to Scott 28.8.88.
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CHiiPTER POUR 
THE REPORTS.
The immediate problem after Salisbury had 
agreed to an investigation, was to find aomeone to 
conduct it. None of the men on the spot was considered 
suitable. Hewett was ageing, his health was breaking 
down, v and his personality v/as not such as to command 
confidence from the Germans;1 moreover he was too in­
volved in the disputes of the Oil Rivers himself to be 
impartial. The same could be said of Johnston, whose 
continual denigration of German rule in the Cameroons
and opposition to the cession of Victoria caused the
2
German administration no small amount of trouble. 
Anderson was equally adamant that he could spare no one 
from the Africa Department. The enquiry would be "long 
and arduous", undertaken in "an adverse climate", and 
besides there was "too much on the books elsewhere"."
1. One of the German complaints against Hewett was that 
he left correspondence unanswered because he could 
not speak German,
2. E.g. P.O. 84/1882 Johnston to Salisbury 12.12.88.
Por the German side, Verisaltungssachen 33c No. 1, 
Acten betreffend die Differenzen mit dem englishchen 
Vice Konsul Johnston in Victoria. 1 Vol. Tiie German 
attitude was obviously instrumental in deciding the 
appointment to the post of Commissioner and Consul 
General in 1890, which Johnston felt he had strong 
claims to. His failure to get it he rather absurdly 
ascribed to the killer faction. See Hohnston, Stor^ 
of my Life 1923.
3. e.O. 366/749 Anderson to Pauncefote. n.d.
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The return of Macdonald from Zanzibar could not 
therefore have been better timed as far as Anderson was 
concerned. Here was a man of proven energy, who had 
held a key consular post not without some distinction.
His health was good, his G-erman was better, his tact and 
discretion had made him acceptable to Berlin, his in­
volvement in West African disputes was nil, and his 
experience of Islamic peoples during eight years? service 
in Bast and North Africa would provide him with a basis 
for understanding the peculiarly sensitive situation in 
Nupe. Anderson was not long in turning thought into 
action, and when Macdonald arrived in London he was told 
to take his leave and report back to the Foreign Office 
by the beginning of October.'^ By then preliminaries had 
been agreed with the War Office and Macdonald was in­
formed of his impending appointment and given the 
relevant material for study.
On December 15 1888, Macdonald received his 
royal commission. His instructions followed on 
January 17th, 1889. Herein the dual character of his 
mission lay revealed. He was to investigate the Royal 
Niger Company^ administration and report v/hether there 
were "any grounds for the complaints against the mode 
in which the Company has exercised its powers, and
1. F.O. 366/749. Memon by H.P.A minutes by F.B.A. & J.P., 
n.d.
141
whether any modifications of those powers, or any appeal 
go the aeoisidns of Her Majesty’s Consuls is necessary in 
order to guard against abuses;, if you detect any." 
in the second place he was to "Report upon the expediency 
of the proposal that the Oil Rivers should be included 
in the Charter of the Company.” If the answer was yes, 
he was to indicate "whether any conditions should be 
imposed in order to give more ample security for the 
rights of traders, of whatever nationality, who are not 
connected with the Company." If he thought the opposite, 
he was to indicate whether he thought the Oil Rivers should 
be annexed to Lagos, be endowed with a separate colonial 
administration, or remain under the existing Consular 
system. In connection with his second task, he was 
io visit Benimand get information as to the extent to 
which the "various Proclamations and Treaties are con­
sistent or inconsistent with one another, as to the 
manner in which they are interpreted by the native 
population; as to the validity of the title on which 
they rest, and as to the expediency of leaving them, 
with or without modification, to their present operation."'1'
It is important to note that nowhere in the 
instructions is any indication given as to how Macdonald 
should conduct his investigations or as to what he should
1. P.O. 84/1940. P.O. to Macdonald, 17.1.89.
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give first place. It was simply assumed that, hearing 
in mind that imperial interests demanded that the Niger 
Company should not be shown in too unfavourable a light, 
lie should investigate the alleged abuses, and if, as 
was hopedjhe found the complaints largely unfounded, 
plans for the extension of the charter might go ahead, 
presuming he considered it feasible. This was certainly 
the view of Anderson when he commented on the first- 
draft of the instructions: "I would observe that /Eis7
instructions have been addressed to points of detail 
rather than questions of policy as to the re-organisation 
of the executive and judicial system under closer 
government control, as it seemed that the latter were 
already fully understood by us as far as any local 
material could assist .us, and would have to be dealt 
with after the reception of the Commissioner^ report 
if it is decided to grant a new and amended Charter.
In other word^ the lynch-pin of the whole investigation 
was to be the Niger Company, around which the rest of 
the Niger Territories would revolve.
These assumptions never seemed to occur to 
Macdonald. In the first place, he reversed the emphasis 
of his instructions not only by visiting the Oil Rivers
1. P.O. 84/1940. Minute by H.P.A. 7.1.89.
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first, but also, in his preliminary report, before he 
had ascended the Niger, by coming out so strongly against 
the Company’s rule in the Rivers. In so doing he pre­
judiced the whole basis of '.his investigations on the 
Niger, wiiich assumed the character of a highly instructive 
picture of the workings of a chartered administration, 
but in no sense formed a foundation on which that 
administration could be extended. Indeed MacdonaldTs 
recommendations in the Niger report were all in the 
direction of diminishing the Company’s powers, par­
ticularly in its trading policy, rather than of extending 
them.
Secondly, Macdonald’s interpretation of 
imperial interests in the Oil Rivers was highly novel.
He simply assumed that these were adequately .represented 
by the wishes of the African, and he proceeded to find 
out, in the most thorough fashion open to him, precisely 
what these wishes as to future government were, and then 
put them forward as his own recommendations. More 
surprising is the fact that the Foreign Office did not 
seem to take exception to this mode of procedure. 
Naturally, in the event, when the plans for the charter 
extension fell through, it was highly convenient to be 
able to appeal to native interests over the heads of 
Goldie and the traders, 'This still does not explain
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the original negative response of the Foreign Office.
After all, it was less than eighteen months later 
that Salisbury himself was to resist a similar request 
from the Queen that the inhabitants of Heligoland should 
be consulted hefore their transfer to Germany, on the 
grounds that "Anything like a plebiscite would be very 
dangerous, as admitting the right of inhabitants of an 
imperial post to decide for themselves as to the political 
depositions of that post."1 If in this context 
Macdonald’s mode of procedure was convenient, it was 
a dangerous precedent elsewhere.
Macdonald left Liverpool on February 6th, 
arriving at Bonny on March 1st. He visited the Opobo,
New Calabar, Sombrero, Old Calabar, Brass, Forcados 
and Benin rivers, in that order. By May 3rd. he was 
back in Lagos, having finished his Oil Rivers inves­
tigation. Since he could not visit the Niger until 
it rose in July, he asked for and obtained permission 
to return home, arriving in London on June 3rd. He had 
been away barely four months.
His method of conducting the inquiry is best 
told in his own words:
1. Salisbury Private Papers A/46. Salisbury to the Queen, 
10.6.90.
"In all of these rivers I stayed several days - 
in the Bonny River upwards of three weeks and 
endeavoured to make myself thoroughly acquainted 
with the wishes, feelings and ideas of all classes 
of the community with regard to the special question 
on which I had been sent out. To this end I had 
separate palavers with the Kings and native Chiefs.
I explained to them tlieimature of my mission, and 
pointed out clearly to them that what I  required 
to know was their own ideas and wishes with regard 
to the form of government most suited to their 
country in the future. These ideas and wishes I  
would hold as confidential should they so desire 
it. I also pointed out that Her Majesty!s Govern­
ment would naturally not bind themselves in any way 
to accept the views and ideas they set forth, but 
would be guided to a great extent by the wishes of 
the community generally. I had numerous oppor­
tunities of speaking to the agents of the various 
firms, both German and English-, trading in the rivers 
My interviews were private and by this means I  
was able to arrive at their real views on the subject 
which we re in the majority, and most reliable of 
cases quite unbiassed by orders received from home.
Jith the missionaries, both English and native, in 1 
various rivers, I also had private interviews.”
Thus, by talking to as many people as possible, Macdonald 
built up a mass of material on which to base his report.
In all his discussions with the kings and chiefs he 
brought forward, prominently the question of Company 
or Colony - and their replies and preferences he meti­
culously preserved.
An analysis of the replies which Macdonald 
received is interesting. The Chiefs of Bonny expressed 
a desire to become a British Colony, with reservations
1. F.O. 84/1940. Macdonald to Salisbury, 12.6.89. All 
quotations in the following section are taken from 
this dispatch unless otherwise indicated.
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concerning the possession of their land and slaves.
If these were taken away without compensation, they 
would be ruined. The suggestion of money indicated 
to Macdonald that these problems were not insuperable.
Whilst at Bonny Macdonald resided with 
Captain Boler, the agent of Messrs. Harrison and Co. 
in the Rivers for over thirty yeqrs. This nmost 
trusted agent” of Rogerson, the Chairman of the African 
Association, told the Commissioner confidentially that 
though he had received private instructions to further 
in every possible manner the extension of the Niger 
CompanyTs Charter, or of a chartered company of Oil 
River merchants, he was quite convinced that the Bonny 
Chiefs would never submit to being governed in any way 
by a trading association; their knowledge of the 
Niger Company was only hearsay, but their knowledge 
of their fellow traders was derived from daily and 
personal contact with them.
Also at Bonnyj , where Macdonald stayed 
upwards of three weeks, was the headquarters of the 
Church Missionary Society, and here he had frequent 
opportunities of conversation with Archdeacon Crowti-er 
and the other native missionaries stationed there.
These he took to represent "the wishes and sentiments 
of the bulk of the poorer classes of slaves and freemen."
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I
It would perhaps be truer to say that they represented 
the Christian and detribalised elements of the largely 
inarticulate "lower classes1!. The Archdeacon left him 
in no doubt about his opinions as to whatAhe made of 
the Oil Rivers. In the casecof annexation and colonial 
government, "trade will increase, the Christian religion 
will be embraced and extended into the interior places, 
barbarous acts will be stopped, lives of men, women and 
children will be saved, and the people on the whole will 
be bettered in every way."
Macdonald next visited the Opobo river where, 
owing to the blockade of the river by Her MajestyTs 
gunboats, he had some difficulty in bringing together 
all the Opobo chiefs. At length, he managed an interview 
with some four or five, with Cookie Gam to act as 
spokesman. Not surprisingly, the answer of a community 
that was virtually leaderless since the removal of the 
strong personality of Ja Ja, and was at present under 
punishment by the strong arm of the most powerful navy 
in the world, was suitably chastened. They would wish 
to become a British colony if the choice lay with them 
alone, but they could not of themselves choose to be 
separated from their mother country Bonny and the other 
Oil Rivers, for "our country is only an infant country, 
and cannot choose separately from the oldest councries•"
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The Opobo chiefs* reference to Bonny indicated that 
the civil war waged by Ja Ja had done little to alter 
or upset the prevailing social fabric or kinship ties 
of the Rivers. The ’child’ Opobo could never become 
the spiritual equal of the ’mother* Bonny, however in­
dependent commercially and politically it became.
Macdonald was fortunate enough to find on 
tour in the Opobo River two of the most experienced 
agents on the coast, Mitchell of Taylor Laughland and Co., 
and Zeller of Stuart & Douglas, botiof whom had more 
than fifteen years* experience. Like Boler, they 
expressed confidentially an opinion in opposition tow 
orders received from home, that the Chiefs would never 
sign treaties if they knew that they were to be handed 
over to a trading administration, and that a Crown 
Colony would answer very well. When Macdonald taxed them 
with the problem of slavery, both felt that its abolition 
would benefit the country, ”as the slaves who now, as a 
class, are lazy and indolent which, as whatever they 
earn goes to thejr masters, is not altogether to be won­
dered at, would trade on their own account, and thus 
assist in the much desired object of opening up the 
interior*”
One agent, BruOe of Killer Brothers, dissented 
from the others. Although he agreed that the Chiefs
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generally would not listen to an extension of the Niger 
Company’s Charter, they would not mind being under a 
special chartered organisation, but the abolition of 
slavery would be attended with grave disturbances.
Macdonald dismissed Brucefs arguments as being too much 
influenced by orders from home, although he does not 
give his reasons for this judgement. Clearly, however, 
the Commissioner was already beginnigg to form his 
conclusions.
These conclusions were strengthened in New 
Calabar, where the feeling against the Niger Company 
was very bitter. Macdonald held several meetings in an 
endeavour to calm the chiefs, but it needed all his 
tact to make them, as he put it , ’’see matters in a 
more reasonable light", and accept a compromise on the 
question of markets. The Qpmmissioner1s promise to 
investigate, settled the chiefs sufficiently to enable 
the future government of the country to be discussed.
Not surprisingly, they expressed an overwhelming desire 
for a more direct form of government by Her Majesty, 
but again the question of slavery came very much to 
the fore. King G-eorge was particularly concerned that 
"Her Gracious Majesty should not permit them to starve", 
an event hardly likely asvihe was reputed to have capital 
assets of more than £30,000. The Commissioner expressed 
himself much impressed with the intelligence and
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sensibility of the Rivers Chiefs during the eight days 
he spent in New Calabar; this was a theme to which he 
was to recur time and time again, in marked contrast 
to the views of Johnston, and to a lesser degree of 
Hewett.
At Brass, where Macdonald spent three days, he 
found the feeling against the Niger Company just as 
bitter as at New Calabar, not only amongst the natives 
but also among the white traders. He was presented 
with a long petition which, he informed the chiefs, 
would be considered (as would the New Calabar complaints) 
when he had visited the Niger. Their wishes with
regard to future government, which they communicated 
on April 20th., were hardly surprising: a plea for
colonial government, with relief from their ’’unbearable 
burdens” and retention of domestic slavery,
At the C.M.S. Mission House Macdonald had 
an unexpected piece of good fortune in finding Bishop 
Crowther, who had just returned from the Niger.
Crowther was equally sure that an extension of the 
Charter would be utterly distasteful to the majority 
of chiefs, who would strongly object to giving the white 
traders any form of hold over them whatsoever. Asked 
by Macdonald what in his iopinion would be the reaction 
to the establishment of a colony he answered that
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’’some of the chiefs might object at first, fearing 
the future of their slaves, and they would so object 
in public, but in private they would one and all be 
for annexation and Consular government. " Some of the 
Bonny chiefs, he concluded, already used paid Kroo boy 
labour on their plantations as being in every way more 
satisfactory than slave labour.1
Two features struck the Commissioner on his 
arrival at Old Calabar on April 12th. One was what 
he termed "the advanced state of the native chiefs", 
the other was their complete indifference toward the 
Niger Company. Old Calabar was not without its prob­
lems, however, as Macdonald discovered in a large 
meeting of all the Kings and the leading chiefs held 
on April 15th. The meeting lasted from eleven in the 
morning to six in the evening, and was certainly the 
most searching and exhausting which the Commissioner 
undertook. High on the agenda wereethe alleged en­
croachments of the Germans/ from the Cameroons into 
Old Calabar markets. Unfortunately there was little 
comfort that Macdonald could offer to the traders, 
beyond a recommendation to Salisbury that a frontier 
line between the Oil Rivers Protectorate and the 
Cameroons ought to be llaid down as soon as was con­
venient. As he waa to discover, however, the frontier was
1. C.M.S. G3/A3/05, Crov/ther to Lang, 11.4.88.
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not a matter which could be settled either easily or 
quickly.
Another problem which exercised the chiefs 
was that of the Ekpe*^ secret society under any future 
administration. Macdonald gives a not inaccurate 
description of its functions as a nsemi-religious, 
semi-administrative custom", which permeated the poli­
tical system of Old Calabar. He noted its usefulness, 
in cases of riot or public disturbance, in compelling 
the rioters, Who would mostly be of the lower orders, 
to return to their houses. On the other hand, it was 
often used for oppressing the weak; a man whose house 
v/as visited by ekpe could not stir until ekpe was 
lifted, and in former days, any slave was punished 
with death if seen by ekpe. Under the hammer blows 
of European ^commerce and slave revolts, however, the 
influence of the society had declined; and several of 
the Chiefs went to the Commissionef offering "to do 
away with it from that day, should I wish it", although 
the more conservative chiefs like Acqua and Henshaw 
wished for its retention.
It was, however, one of the most powerful of 
the conservatives, King Duke, who put the Commissioner
1. Macdonald calls it egbo, the name by which it was known 
to the traders and missionaries. For an analysis, see 
Dike, op. cit. & Jones, op. cit. Ekpe means "leopard".
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right on the spot by wanting to know why there should 
be any change in the form of government. His people 
"were quite content to femain as they were and had 
always done what the Consul had told them, and were 
quite capable of governing themselves subject to Ithe 
protection of Great Britain.” Although Macdonald was 
surprised that this question had not been asked before, 
it still seemed to catch him off balance, for his answer 
was a totally inconsequential remark that ”only a year 
ago, one of their number present had ordered a woman to 
be flogged to death, that he had been found guilty and 
condemned to death by his fellow Chiefs, but that nobody 
had dared to put the sentence into execution.” If this 
one example was Macdonald*s evidence that there would 
be anarchy unless there was a change in the administration, 
it could hardly have been less satisfactory. The Chiefs 
however let the subject of self-government drop.
Macdonald on reflection would probably have done better 
justice to his case; what is implicit in his remark is 
his condemnation of the existing consular regime.
Although the replies of the chiefs reflected 
differences in detail, all were agreed, even King Duke,in 
their preference for a British colony. Duke*s reply indi­
cated that his sole motive in enquiring whether any change 
in the form of government was necessary was not to
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undermine the British position, hut to protect his own. 
All his dislike of change was poured into the reply of 
himself and his chiefs. It was unjust to abolish 
domestic slavery, domestic and family relations should 
not he interfered with, they should have liberty to 
marry as many wives as they thought proper, and all 
other customs which were not barbarous should not be 
disturbed; finally, they should be allowed to retain 
their land. Henshaw and Acqua followed the Duke line 
on lands and slaves, with an additional plea for ekpe, 
the retention of comey, the recovery of lands taken by 
the G-ermans and polygamy, although A c q u a ^  made the 
peculiar admission that "in many instates polygamy 
does not give strength to aay who is on it, but we 
hope through the G-ospel light our country will soon 
be freed.” Cobham V. opted for a quiet retirement in 
requesting the retention of his people and lands during 
his lifetime and that of his heirs; similarly Eyo 
Honesty contented himself with the moderate desire 
that ”no changes be made in the customs of the country 
without the people being gradually prepared for them” , 
in the nature of tilings a sensible request from a man 
nearing the end of his life. The replies were com­
pleted by two of the lesser lights of Calabar, the 
Chiefs of Ikoneto, a little further up the Cross River.
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and Adiabo, who both plumped fox a British colony, 
probably without realising what it entailed.
The formidable missionary influence, in the 
person of the Rev. H. Goldie, naturally made its 
presence felt during the Commissioner1 s nine day stay 
in the Cross River. Goldie had been working in the 
river for over forty years; a scholar, a man of 
great presence, he was not averse to speaking his mind 
now the great project of evangelisation on which he 
had set his heart was likely, at long last, to receive 
the support of the state. He was quite emphatic that 
rule by a trading company was not in the best interests 
of the JjJfik people, and that to fltake us up as a Colony 
would be, I think the best thing that could be done for 
the country, especially as we live with our strong-handed 
German neighbours, against -whoae inroads the British 
Protectorate does not afford much security." Por the 
present regime he had nothing but contempt. "This 
Protectorate, 1 may notice, is not known, at least is 
not recognised by Old Calabar. The people up the river 
carry on their tribal wars as they were wont to do, 
and keep their customs of blood - sacrificing human 
victims for the dead, infanticide and cannibalism during 
war". Duke and one or two others would offer opposition 
to a colony, but the influence of the British government
156
would overcome this if "strongly asserted".
Macdonald aid not apparently hold individual 
consultations with the white tracers while he was at 
Calabar, although among them he "found some of the most 
intelligent and straightforward in the whole Delta".
He remarks that they v/ere entirely unanimous as to the 
benefits of a Consular administration over any other 
form of government in the Oil Divers. The word "con-
9)
suiar creates some difficulty here, owing to Macdonaldfs 
rather loose use throughout his report of the words 
"consular" and "colonial", which he seems to regard as 
interchangeable. Whether the traders really wanted a 
colonial government with all its trappings, or whether 
they were satisfied with the present regime of consuls, 
albeit perhaps amended, was not absolutely clear.
There was no doubt however about their rejection of 
any form of chartered company administration.
After a short interlude in the Cameroons, 
Macdonald continued his investigations west of the 
Niger Delta on May 3rd with an interview with Nana, 
Governor of the Benin River, and its leading trader. 
Nana's position had been recognized by the British 
government ina letter written by the late Vice Consul 
Blair on May 6th, 1885, in which he was appointed
"the executive power through which the decrees of Her 
Majesty's Government and of the Consular Court are to 
he exercised or enforced." At the same time he was 
given a silver stick of office engraved with the royal 
arras. Why the consul had conceived this com&dy to be 
necessary in the case of Nana and not of the other chiefs 
in the Rivers who exercised de jure authority is not quit 
clear. Undoubtedly, however, the act of the Protectorate 
administration was contradicted by the proclamation 
delivered by Governor Griffith in February 1886, in 
which the Colony of Lagos was stated to extend up to and 
to include the right tank of the Benin River. Since Nana 
town was on the right bank, it was technically in Lagos 
territory, but as the colonial government had done 
nothing to exercise its jurisdiction in the direction 
of the Benin River since 1886, Nana was quite unaware 
of the fact. Beyond pointing out the contradiction, 
Macdonald made no attempt at this stage to resolve it.
Nana himself, would hardly have been unduly concerned 
as long as his position continued to be recognised.
His relations with the Consular authority had always 
been cordial; Johnston had regarded him as "de jure 
and de facto ruler of the country between Mahin and 
Ramos", and had "often called on him to support ray 
authority and to use his power for the settlement of
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disputes. Macdonald himself was suitably impressed, 
regarding Nana’s town as "one of the model ones in the 
Niger Delta" and recognising that he was "undoubtedly 
the paramount authority in the Zekri district which 
extends beyond the Borcados River up as far as the 
V/arri creek.", although he was to modify his opinion 
as to the extend of Nana!s authority after he had 
visited the Niger. So, when the Commissioner faced 
Nana with t&e choice of Queen’s rule or company ruhe 
his answer was predictable. A trading company could 
not but diminish his own power, which was based com­
pletely on trade. His acceptance of a British colony 
was, however, qualified by his wish that the question 
of slavery should not "be dealt with rashly" and that 
there should be no disturbance of polygamy and domestic 
laws.
Macdonald could not have left the Oil Rivers 
v/ith any doubt in his own mind about the form of govern­
ment desired by the inhabitants. He had found that 
opinion on the Niger Company or any other form of 
chartered administration varied from rank indifference 
to downright hostility. He was not himself unaware 
of the advantages of the extension of the Charter.
1. P.O. 84/1882, Memo by Johnston on Nana, 6.12.88.
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The auministration of the Niger Company had without 
doubt been carried out with "great energy” , and an 
"immense amount of country” had been opened up where law 
and order now existed, "where a few years ago anarchy and 
confusion prevailed." Moreover, he felt that the 
present condition of the West African colonies did not 
"show that a great amount of energy had been displayed 
in the past." Doubtless, also extension of the Charter 
would so enrich the Company that it would be able to 
afford a better class of official, and carry on its 
administration more cheaply. Nevertheless, he was 
firmly of opinion that "the opposition that extension 
would meet, both in public and secretly, from all the 
Chiefs and native traders, the number of quarrels 
and disturbances which would ensue, would more than 
counterbalance any advantages to be derived." In 
addition to the opposition of the misLdleman chiefs, 
opposition could be expected from the G-ermans. During 
his visit to the Cameroons, Macdonald had interviewed 
the Governor , Baron von Soden, wno had expressed his 
opinion "that the government of Africa by chartered 
companies was a great mistake.” The "independent 
carrying trade" would oppose an extension in every 
possible way. It should not therefore be attempted 
in the face of such unanimous opinion in favour of a
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colonial government. Despite his jaundiced view of 
the other West African colonies, he was convinced that 
a colonial government was best for the Rivers. He was 
in no uoubt, unless the statistics furnished by the 
merchants and consuls were utterly fallacious, that 
a colony would be self-supporting financially. Nor 
did the (questions of slavery and polygamy offer any 
impediment if managed with tact and deliberation.
Lastly he ^suggested that if a colony was adopted, 
the boundary between the Niger Companyfs territories 
and Lagos should be drawn at the Porcados, and the Oil 
Rivers should be separate, bounded on the west by the 
Company's territories and on the east by the Cameroons. 
Had this suggestion been adopted, many of the later 
quarrels between the Protectorate and the Company might 
have been prevented.
Such was Macdonald's report on the Oil Rivers. 
Lister was for accepting it at once, maintaining that 
the investigation of the Niger Company!s position and 
administration was quite distinct from the question 
of the government1 of the Oil Rivers, Salisbury, 
however refused to accept what he regarded as the 
fiction of two distinct inquiries. He was not yet 
convinced that it was impossible to bring the whole
1 6 1
Niger Protectorate under one form of government, 
be it Company, Consul or Colony, or some peculiar 
mixture of all three. Moreover, he thought that 
Macdonald had possibly underestimated the ease with 
which the question of the abolition of slavery could 
be dealt with: "Queen’s government, with continuance
of slavery11 being of course "impossible". No decision 
could therefore be taken until the whole of his report 
was received.1
During Macdonald’s short visit to London there 
was much to be done in connection with his forthcoming 
trip up the Niger. Complex negotiations were conducted 
withfc G-oldie and the Treasury as to the type of presents 
to be given to the Muslim emirs - the amount, their 
shipment, and who was to pay the bill. The Commissioner’s 
request for a private secretary in case his health 
broke down was granted, and Captam Mockler, Perryman, 
Oxfordshire Light Infantry, an old friend from 
Macdonald’s musketry school days, was appointed at a 
salary of £300 a year. On June 28th, all was ready, 
and the two men left Liverpool to begin the second part 
of the enquiry. This, like his visit to the Oil Rivers, 
was conducted with commendable energy. By nugust 2nd.
1. P.O. 84/1940 Mins, by f.V.L. anti Salsibury, 1889.
See also mins. by T.V.L., 26.6.89.
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he liad reached Lokoja, up the main stream of the Niger.
On September 5th. he was back there again, having 
ascended and descended the Benue. The journey up the 
Niger to Nupe and Iloriny (the latter undertaken at 
the instance of the Colonial Office) took five weeks; 
the investigations in the Lower Niger, including the 
Warri, took another three. He reached Akassa on October 
31st., where he had to wait, pending a decision by the 
Boreigh Office, to proceed to the Cameroons on a mission 
to reach agreement on the Rio del Aey boundary. Owing 
to delays in the completion of the survey, the mission 
was called off, and hacdonald returned to Lngland, 
arriving on Lecember 2nd, and having travelled over 10,000 
miles in five months. He spent Christmas at Margate, 
recovering from fever, before sending in his report 
early in January.
This document, which ran to 102 pages, was 
in fact the official report of the whole mission, olt 
was far longer than hacdonaIdfs important memorandum 
of June 12 1889, and if it omitted the evidence of the 
Oil Rivers chiefs, it embodied the main conclusions 
of the Commissioner with regard to the Oil Rivers.
Nothing could obscure the fundamental importance of 
the earlier memorandum which was equal to that of the
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report, but the iunity of the enquiry in the eyes of 
the government was maintained. In no technical sense, 
therefore, was it or is it correct to speak of two 
reports.
If hacdonald1 s method of conducting this part of 
his enquiry was not as original as„it had been in the 
Oil Rivers, this was hardly surprising. The adminis­
trative details of his visit were of necessity organised 
by the Company, he used the Company steamers and its 
hospitality, and its point of view, as Dr. Flint re-
i
marks, 11 was constantly before him.'1 Even if the
Commissioner insisted on conducting his interviews in
private, the people could not fail to be impressed by
the fact that he had arrived in a Company steamer.
This was hardly Macdonald!s fault; in part, it was
because of the absence of European facilities other
than those of the Company on the Niger, in part because
of the parsimony of a Treasury which refused to advance
sufficient money to reduce the dependence of the
2enquiry on the Company’s goodwill. In the circum­
stances, the Commissioner’s independence of judgement 
was remarkable.
1, Flint, G-oldie, p. 136
2. F.O. 84/2096 for corresp., and Tl/8541 a/18873, mins. 
by G-.L.R. & R.W., 26.12,90 30.12.90.
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It is important, however, to emphasise again 
that Macdonald ascended the Niger with his mind already 
half set against the extension of the Charter into the 
Oil Rivers. His report was therefore carefully
constructed; in the main he defended the Company’s 
rights of jurisdiction against Germany and within the 
British Protectorate, while/- (although' he phrased his 
case with studied moderation and dismissed the grosser 
charges against the Company) he was severely critical 
of the Company’s mode of exercising its jurisdiction, 
and his recommendations, if a&ppted,would have ruined 
Goldie’s carefully constructed monopoly. The drift
of the Commissioner’s argument was clear; the govern­
ment of the Niger territories, including the Oil Rivers, 
was an internal matter. That established, the govern­
ment of both parts of the Protectorate had heretofore 
left much to be desired. Since Goldie’s monopoly was 
the indispensable basis of his government, and his 
administrative system was built up entirdf on his com­
mercial regulations, the Commissioner’s criticism 
carefully removed any question of Charter extension, 
by stipulating conditions of government impossible 
for the Company to accept.
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The first three chapters of the report were 
devoted to the general question of the treaty rights by 
which the Company governed. In the Lower Niger 
(Chapter I), the Company had some 209 t r e a t i espaying 
an aggregate of £1284 7s. in subsidies. They were all 
sovereign rights treaties, which were, the Commissioner 
found with one or two exceptions, understood and upheld 
by the native signatories. On the Benue the position 
was far different (Chapter 2). Here the Company had 
forty treaties, paying out £293 4s. 3d. in subsidies, 
scattered over some 1240 miles of river bap,k. Their 
jurisdiction was minimal, their ability to enforce it 
negligible, except on the river itself. Macdonald 
chastised the Company for not defending the pagan tribes 
against the incursions of the Eulani Emirs * slave raids - 
a little unfairly perhaps, in view of the vast increase 
in administrative expenditure that this would have en­
tailed. The Commissioner, in addition, found it not at 
all probable that powerful Mohammedan Emirs would sign 
away their rights to the infidel for so little return. 
His particular investigation into the Company*s rights 
in the Emirate of Nupe was given point by the German
1. Text in E.O. 84/2109. Where sources are not referred
to in the following pages they are taken from this
Report, handed in 9.1.90.
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complaints. His main conclusion was that the treaty 
made in 1885 which had given the Company "entire charge 
of all trading interests in the country" held good, and 
that the Company had every right to exercise jurisdiction 
over foreigners. He further concluded that the Company 
exercised sovereign rights in Nupe on the strength of 
the G-wandu treaty of 1885, whereby the Emir of Gwandu 
(Nupe’s spiritual overlord) had ceded to the national 
Africa Company both banks of the Niger/Benue within 
the Empire. Here Macdonald was on less certain ground. 
Whether G-wandu could cede the rights of a vassal in 
this way was open to question, as the Emir of Nupe 
himself protested. Secondly, Macdonald’s failure to
visit either Sokoto or Gwandu - an omission which in 
the circumstances of the inquiry constituted a breach 
of courtesy, and if his opinion as to the centralised 
state of the Fulani Empire was correct, was quite un­
justifiable - rendered his judgement on the validity of 
these treaties somewhat suspect. Having reqched his 
conclusion, however, it was natural that he should re­
ject the claims of Hoenigsberg. (Chapter 4.)
Macdonald’s conclusions about the Company!s 
treaties must obviously be treated with reservations.
He was well aware of the political inconvenience of a 
wholesale repudiation of the Company’s treaties. When 
he rejected a treaty, therefore, he was obviously certain
of M s  grounds for doing so. That he found so little 
that was fraudulent in the making of these treaties was 
remarkable, but predictable. This is not to question 
the Commissioner’s integrity, merely to draw attention 
to his blind spots. Undoubtedly, as the Commissioner 
claimed, most of the chiefs did uphold what they had 
signed. Their motives for signing were various: 
protection against a more powerful neighbour, the wish
for trade, and so on. The Attah of Idah "had hoped to
become fat", but now he had "shrunk up and become dry".
But the Commissioner did not visit any disturbed areas 
on the Niger above the Delta and the Benue, whose 
inhabitants might have been the very people to question 
the validity of their treaties.
It was in the area of the Delta, where merchant 
vied.with..merchant and consul marched with agent, that 
the company’s rights were most questioned. Bearing in 
mind Macdonald’s attitude to the treaties, it is necessary
to examine these rights a little more deeply, in view of
the conflicts which were to take place over them in the 
Oil Rivers.
It will be remembered that when the Commissioner
had visited New Calabar, he had only been able to pacify 
the chiefs by a promise to investigate the question of 
markets. The redemption of that promise formed the basis
of Chapter 5, on the "idu Question". The background to
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the conflict between the hew Calabar middlemen and the 
Company lay in the conclusion by the latter, on March 
23 1885 and October 15th, and 16th. 1886, of treaties 
containing sovereign rights clauses with the Chiefs of 
Oguta, Omogo and Idu. At the time there was no doubt 
that at all three of these oil markets the hew Calabar 
men traded in considerable numbers. Even when Macdonald 
visited the Idu on October 27th. 1889, he found upwards 
of 100 of the Calabar canoes anchored opposite the town. 
The change of sovereignty was not however noticed until 
the Company began to put into force its customs regu- 
iations and started levying duties wnich, understandably, 
the native traders resented and refused to pay. The 
Company replied by a proclamation of September 24th,1887, 
informing the hew Calabar chiefs that it would no longer 
tolerate the infringementof its customs; that no canoes 
would be allowed to cross the frontier without having 
previously cleared inward at Akassa and outward again 
at some port of entry; that the penalty for infringement 
would be confiscation, and lastly, that within six days 
all canoes must leave Oguta lake or they would be seized 
and confiscated.
The Liverpool traders who depended on the hew 
Calabar middlemen, were not disposed to take this lying 
down. On November 16th. 1887 Messrs. Holt &  Cotterell
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protested at the Foreign Office against the "high-handed 
and arbitrary action of the Royal Niger Company in driving 
the hew Calabar people from the markets of Oguta, Omogo 
and Idu", and the familiar round of accusations and 
denials began. Johnston took up the cudgels on behalf 
of the native middlemen and gave it as his opinion that 
the "Royal higer Company has as much right to be there
as at Bonny or Benin". As Johnstonfs complaints 
were echoed by Hewett, the Foreign Office told the 
Company that, pending a decision as to the administration 
of the Oil Rivers, a customs house should not be established.
The African Association, of which Holt and 
Cotterell were members, were not content to sit back and 
allow their markets to be seized while the Foreign Office 
remonstrated with G-oldie. As part of the general 
negotiations between the Association and the Company 
towards Charter extension, Rogerson insisted on a settle­
ment of the Idu dispute. After an acrimonious corres­
pondence, some sort of agreement on a customs boundary 
was reached, without prejudice to political rights, 
and on September 13th., the African Association informed 
their agents that the Higer Company boundary would be
2
five miles,'below Ndomi. Creek, Calabar retaining Omogo.
1. F.O. 84/1882, .'Johnston to Salisbury, 11.9.88.
2. F.O. 84/1930, R.N.C. to F.O. 26.10.88.
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This agreement, based on faulty geography, raised more 
problems than it solved. In the first place, Omogo 
was well within the five mile limit; in the second, 
the native middlemen told Hewett that they had given 
no authority to the African Association to treat for them 
with the Company regarding markets.'*'
This last factor determined Hewett to go up 
to Idu and investigate the situation for himself. He 
informed the Niger Company of his intention, and asked 
them to send a representative to make a temporary 
delimitation of the frontier. The first hint that 
the Foreign Office had as to Hewett’s intention was*, a 
request from the Niger Company that Hewett might wait 
until Agent General Flint returned from leave, with 
the expressed desire to know the Consul’s instructions 
on the matter. This sudden unwonted activity on the 
part of Hewett exasperated the Foreign Office the more 
when it was followed by a telegram on November 9th.
This, without giving any explanations, stated that 
the Company’s right to impose duties at Idu was doubt­
ful, and asked that the Foreign Office should order 
their abolition, since hostilities threatened. Anderson 
felt that, with an enquiry impendhg, "Hewett’s sudden 
activity against the Company at the present moment is
1. F.O.C.P. 5945, Hewett to Salisbury, 26.12.88.
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very unfortunate ,/he/ should he told to hold his
hand”. The instructions sent to Hewett, however,
were completely contradictory. On the one hand he
was not to move until he heard further; on the other
Y
he was to senu a report. Not surprisingly, Hewett 
interpreted the Foreign Office message to mean implied
sanction for his visit, and on November 22, accompanied
by the New Calabar chiefs, he went up to Idu., At a 
meeting in the town, the headmen of Idu agreed that they 
had signed a paper with the Company, but did not know 
what it contained. They denied absolutely, according 
to Hewett, that they had ceded their country to the 
Company. Having found out the contents of the treaty, 
they had wished to nullify it, but the Company had re­
fused. "They wanted to continue established trade with
9
New Calabar". Thus prompted, the Foreign Office
wrote to the African Association and the Niger Company, 
suggesting that it v/ould be desirable if they came to 
some understanding as to the interpretation and validity 
of their agreement regarding Idu, in order that a clear 
statement of affairs could be furnished to Macdonald.
1. ibid., F.O. to Hewett, 9.11, tels.
2. F.O.C.P. 5945, Hewett to Salisbury, 26.12.88.
p. F.O.C.P. 5945, F.O. to African Association, Niger
Company, 5*3.89.
The whole affair would have to he inquired into by 
the Special Commissioner.
Macdonald felt that the question had "assumed 
dimensions considerably larger than it ever should have 
done" (a . phrase he v/as to remember in his future dis­
putes with Goldie over this "wretched little village"); 
for this he blamed "a lamentable want of tact1! on the 
part of the Company, in issuing the notice of September 
1887. This "most arbitrary and injudicious" act, "cal-; 
culated to stir up a vast amount of bad feeling", 
aroused the Commissioner’s wrath for two reasons. In 
the first place he held that it was quite impossible 
to expect the New Calabar traders to take their goods
for Idu and Oguta via Akassa, a four day return journey
by canoe from Bukama and an addition to the round trip 
of 150 miles. The Commissioner maintained that the 
least the Company could have done was to place a customs 
post on the direct route from New Calabar to Oguta, 
where the traders could have paid duties. Secondly 
the limit of six days was also unjust; at least four 
months1 notice should have been given under the Anglo- 
German agreement of 1885. This act had resulted in a 
considerable loss to the New Calabar traders during 
tie peak trading montn of September since they had been
unable to gather in their trust.
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With regard to the political rights of Idu, 
the Commissioner’s inquiry was inconclusive. The argument 
put forward by the Calabar and Idu traders, that the 
latter did not know what they welldoing when they signed 
the treaties, got short shrift. He "could not take as an 
excuse the mere statement of an African chief that he 
did not understand what he was doing when he signed a 
Treaty as being sufficient rto render that Treaty null 
and void; for how was 1 to know / h e  asked the New 
Calabar chiefs on April 2nd 1889~/J that they them­
selves might not, to suit their convenience, at some 
future time, say that they did not understand what 
they were doing when they signed the Protection Treaty 
with Great Britain?"
On the other hand, when Macdonald visited Idu, 
on October 27th., he was left in little doubt as to 
the influence of New Calabar. The chiefs in private 
interview repudiated the rule of the Company, and 
protested that they hadmot ceded their country to any­
body. Macdonald’s suspicion of New Calabar pressure 
was given further impetus when at this moment the 
interview was interrupted by a number of New Calabar 
"boys", who refused to leave or to allow the Chiefs of 
Idu to accept the present Macdonald offered, and "alto­
gether behaved in a very arbitrary manner, plainly
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showing that though they were the friends of the Idus, 
they certainly were pro tem. their masters. ”
In this situation, Macdonald put the blame 
fairly and squarely on the Company. Had the Niger 
Company at once established a factory at Idu the people 
would have been quite willing to acknowledge the treaties, 
file Company’s failure to establish a factory forewarned 
the Calabar men that their markets were threatened, 
and they did what they ./could to make their authority 
paramount at Idu, in which, Macdonald concluded, they 
had succeeded. In the circumstances, the Company 
had lost its claim to Idu and would do well to with­
draw its frontier to the 0ratShi end of the Ndoni River, 
and there establish a customs house at which traders 
from the New Calabar River could pay duties. In doing 
this the Company would only lose a small amount of trade 
done at C-regani and Omogo,"*' and the New Calabar traders 
would have no further grounds for complaint. As for 
the geographical question, the Oratshi and Oguta lake 
were clearly within the basin of the Niger (the latter 
being only fourteen miles from the main river); these 
the Company would retain.
1. G-oldie testified himself tnat the Company had hitherto 
spent much without any return. R.O.C.P. 5945. R.N.C. 
to P.O. 29.1.89.
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In Chapter VI, Macdonald considered the com­
plaints of the Br^ss men as represented by the long 
petition he had received from them whilst in the Riivers, 
and by a statement of A.A.Whitehouse, Chief Agent for 
Harrison1 s, for the European traders, Macdonaldfs diag­
nosis was sound enough. Amidst all the verbiage of 
the Brass men, the question at the heart of the dispute 
was that of markets. There was no doubt that the Brass 
traders drew their oil supply from places which were 
now closed to them, since the granting of the Charter.
If they now wished to trade they had to go to one parti­
cular place, called a port of entry, pay licence and 
duty fees, and then they could only trade after clearing 
inwards at nkassa. To Macdonald this was wrong. 
According to his interpretation of Article XXVII of 
the Company’s Regulations, all the Oil Rivers natives 
were "natives11 of the M g e r ,  and therefore not only need 
not pay licences, but could trade internally where they 
wished. This claim of Macdonald’s was of fundamental 
importance, for, if established, it would have ruined 
Goldie’s carefully constructed monopoly, which was geared 
to the exclusion of the middlemen from the Niger. It 
also pinned the Company down. Hitherto they had claimed 
the best of both worlds, by treating the Erass men as 
foreigners commercially but as natives jurisdictionally,
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so that they could punish them in their own courts.
At Macdonald’s instigation, Moore, the Chief Justice, 
communicated with the Company as to their interpretation 
of Regulation XXVII. There is no record of G-oldie!s 
precise reaction, beyond a statement by the Commissioner 
in Chapter XII (p.78) that his own opinion differed from 
the Council’s. Macdonald’s contention was perfectly 
logical, and in tune with government policy. Only one 
British Protectorate had been established In 1885, the 
administration of part of which had.been turned over to 
the Company. This part was not defined as to boundaries, 
and could be extended by treaty as the Protectorate was 
opened up. It could even include the whole Protectorate 
if circumstances permitted the extension of the Charter.
The legal existence of a separate protectorate, of two 
distinct areas of jurisdiction, was not in fact recog­
nised until 1893. Until then, a Brass man and a Nupe. 
were natives of the Niger territories, and failure either 
on the part of G-oldie to recognise this, or more parti­
cularly on the part of the British Government to insist 
on one government for both the Niger and the Oil Rivers, 
before and after that date, was at the root of all 
subsequent troubles in the area.
Bailing Charter extension, which he rejected, 
Macdonald could have no illusions about the acceptance
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of his doctrine by the Company. In the circumstances, 
he confined himself to suggestions for the immediate 
easing of the Brass men’s grievances. The closing of 
their sources of oil supply was a complaint which, 
beyond recommending the case to the Company for recti­
fication, Macdonald did not feel able to handle. The 
grievance represented by the Brassmen’s being forced to 
clear at Akassa, a twelve hour journey often in rough 
seas, could be remedied by the establishment of a customs 
house at Ekole • If the Commissioner was little more than 
sympathetic, it was because he witnessed in Brass little 
evidence of actual hardship)which was to follow the 
collapse in oil prices of 1894. His general impression 
was that the majority of the middlemen, Kings and Chiefs, 
were well-to-do and 11could easily trade in the Niger and 
make a profit, paying thee duties now In force.’1 The 
commercial complaints of Whitehouse, echoing the com­
plaints of the African Association, generally therefore 
merited little attention from the Commissioner.
If the Brass question seemed to Macdonald 
relatively straightforward, the question of the Company’s 
jurisdiction in the Borcados (Chapter YI) was anything 
but simple. Here Company, Consul and Colony all con­
tested jurisdiction. It was, however, a Manchester firm
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Messrs. Blackstock and Go., who had close links with 
Hutton and Osborne of the African Association^who in 
February 1888 first raised the question of the Forcados 
with the Foreign Office, by posing the seemingly innocent 
question whether the Forcados had in fact been included 
in the Charter granted to the Niger Company.^ The 
Foreign Office, instead of referring to the Niger 
Company or Consul Hewett, still in Idu, for observations 
as to the geographical position of the river, delivered 
an armchair reply to the effect that the Forcados was
not included in the territories under the jurisdiction
2
of the Company." Armed with the Foreign Office reply, 
Messrs. Blackstock proceeded to collect evidence from 
the Coast, and on July 30th. protested against the 
Royal Niger Companyrs encroachment in the Forcados River, 
which was independent territory, enclosing as their 
evidence agreements by the Company annexing the Forcados. 
These (unfortunately for Goldie) contained the monopoly 
clauses of pre-Char ter days. Blackstock’s connections
in Lagos bore fruit in a protest by the Governor which 
reached the Foreign Office via the Colonial Office on
1. F.O. 84/1917. Messrs. Blackstock to F.O., 27.2.88.
2. ibid. F.O. to Messrs. Blackstock, 7.3.88.
3. F.O. 84/1925. Blackstock & Co. to F.O., 30.7.88.
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September 6th. Moloney wished to know by what right the 
Company could extend their jurisdiction over part of the 
British Protectorate, and outside their sphere of in­
fluence or rule, and reiterated the importance of the 
forcados as a port for Lagos.1 The Company’s reply to 
Blackstock1s letter was extremely evasive, confining 
itself to dismissing the latter1s interpretation of the 
agreements as erroneous:.: for the monopoly clauses
were only "inserted for political reasons into the 
earliest treaties made by the Company and the monopoly 
of trade therein contained was always intended to be 
surrendered so soon as Her Majesty’s protection Had 
been extended to the respective territories." This
protection had now been extended and therefore forcados
2
fell "within Clause 14 of the Charter". Anderson’s
suspicions were not unnaturally aroused by G-oldie’s
failure to send copies of the treaties, and he brushed
aside his arguments by pointing out that the agreements
complained of were said to have been made during the
present year, and that anyway any claim that the natives
should only have intercourse with foreigners through the
3
Company was clearly improper and must be abrogated.
tO/f .0.
1. f.O. 84/1927. C.0./6.9.88. Moloney to C.O., 11.7.88.
2. f.O. 84/1925. R.N.C. to f.O., 9.8.88.
3. f.O. 84/1926. f.O. to R.N.C. 17.8.88.
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If Anderson was critical of the Niger Company’s 
proceedings, this did not mean he was prepared to admit 
the claims of Lagos. Lven if geography had not confirmed 
what foreign Office had not been prepared to admit six 
months before, viz. that the forcados was within ,the 
basin of the Niger and a natural outlet, the forcados 
was nothing to do with Lagos. Their £raae, in using 
it for access, would always have the full advantage of 
the fr^e transit and navigation clauses of the Act of 
Berlin.1 On October 27th. therefore, the foreign 
Office informed the Company that their treaties in the 
forcados would be sanctioned on the understanding that 
the Company hau no right to any monopoly under them, 
that any clauses which provided that the Company should 
be an exclusive medium between natives and foreigners 
should be dropped as inconsistent with the Anglo-G-erman 
agreement and with the Charter, and that transit trade 
to Lagos should have the full benefit of the Berlin
p
Act.^" This the Company accepted, November 1st. 1888.
The whole affair might have ended there had 
not Consul Hewett suddenly awakened from his customary 
torpor and visited the forcados River. That he should 
protest against the Niger Company’s treaties was
1. f.O. 84/1927. C .0. to f.O., 6.9.88. Mins by Ii.P.A.
2. f.O. 84/1930. f.O. to R.N.C. 27.10.88. The C.O. 
agreed to the f.O. proposal, 10.10., f.O. 84/1929#
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predictable, his grounds being that the 1884 treaty made
by him with Nana covered the whole area.1 His next act
was not. For he proceeded to take possession of the
treaties which offended him most, those with G-oolah and
Burutu, and gave leave to Nana to punish his "rebellious
subjects", which that merry monarch was not backward
in doing. His message also reported news of a telegram
from Akassa, "England confirms our treaty concluded with
Forcados" and ended with a plea to the bewildered Foreign
2
Office for instructions. Anderson was thoroughly annoyed; 
here was another example of Hewett!s sudden inconvenient 
activity against the Company, in cancelling treaties 
without authority. On the other hand the Niger Company 
was no better, having "lied about sanctions". There 
was now no alternative but to suspend assent to the 
treaties and refer the matter to the Commissioner.1
When Macdonald interviewed Nana on May 3rd,
1889? the latter not unnaturally claimed the patrimony 
presented to him by Hewett, and asserted that the 
Forcados and the territory as far as Ramos wps under 
his jurisdiction. Since there were no cniefs from the 
Forcados present at the meeting there was no one to
1. F.O. 84/1881. Hewett to Salisbury, 3.11.38.
2. ibid. Hewett to Salisbury, 5.11.88.
3. ibid.Min, by H.P.A., 1.12.
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deny his claim. On October 29th,, the Chiefs of Burutu 
and G-oolah asserted the opposite to the Commissioner: 
they were not subjects of Nana, they had signed a treaty 
with the Niger Company which they understood, and they 
looked upon the Company as their protector and master.
The apparently contradictory replies threw into relief 
the whole problem of attempting to judge questions of 
African jurisdiction by European standards. As the 
chiefs of Burutu admitted: "Nana’s mother was a G-oolah
woman and they were and always had been very good friends
of his........ they could not, of course, fight Nana....
/but7 they were quite an independent town, and had 
never made treaties with anybody else except the Niger 
Company." That Nana’s patrimony rested on influence, 
trade and above all kinship ties, and that these extended 
as far as the Ramos, or even coincided with the spread 
of the Itsekiri people, was doubtless true, but in 
European terms Nana "ruled" little more than his own 
slaves. The chiefs were equally right in stating that 
they had signed no other treaty than with the Company; 
their relations with Nana had never needed such forma­
lisation. Macdonald, therefore, could not see that 
Nana had made out a case with regard to Burutu and 
Coolah.
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In the light of modern knowledge it is easy 
to fault Macdonald, but hardly realistic to expect him 
to have stepped outside his own environment. Having 
conceded to the Company the two towns at the mouth of 
the Porcados, it was logical for him to concede their 
claims on the rest of the left bank. What was unsatis­
factory was his failure to investigate those claims in 
detail, a failure for which he gives no reason. As 
Plint points out, some of the treaties were deliberate 
forgeries. The Chiefs alleged to have signed them were 
illiterate, yet the crosses on the originals were all 
identical, neat and unsmudged, undoubtedly the work of 
a literate hand.^ Nooone regretted more than the 
Commissioner and Consul G-eneral of the Oil Rivers 
Protectorate the easy concessions of the Company claims 
on the Porcados that he had made in his Report.
Again Macdonald put his finger on the question
most likely to lead to disputes in the future - that of
2
markets. A number of European merchants had estab­
lished themselves at Warri, drawing oil from the Urhobo 
markets as well as from some in the Warri branch. They 
all complained of encroachments by the Company into the 
markets, and the Commissioner admitted that a good many 
of their sources of supply lay within the Company!s
1. Plint, op. cit ., p. 188
2. Messrs. Hutton & Osborne, Miller Brothers, J. Pinnock, 
Bey & Zimmer.
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recently acquired territories. He made no attempt to 
make any recommendations as to delimitation, evading 
the issue by remarking that some arrangement would have 
to be made, the form of which he was unable to say until 
the nature of the future government of the Oil Rivers 
was settled.
Macdonald1s treatment of the forcados question,
even allowing for its complexity, was most unsatisfactory.
‘The nature of his investigations v/as rudimentary by his
own standard, and in allowing the Niger Company!s claims,
he not only justified a fraud which he would have spotted
on examination of the treaties, but contradicted his
early sounder judgement that "Nana is undoubtedly
the paramount authority in the Jekri District, which
extends beyond the Porcados River up as far as the 
s ]
Warri Creek. Lastly, by failing to examine completely 
conflicting claims over markets and political jurisdiction, 
he still left grounds for dispute, which his recommen­
dation that the Oil Rivers west of the Porcados might 
be annexed by Lagos could not, in the absence of 
geographical definition, resolve.
Lagos and Colonial Office concern extended 
beyond the Porcados to the administration of the oil 
Rivers and Niger generally, and whilst in Lagos,
L. P.O. 84/1940. Macdonald to Salisbury, 12.6.89.
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Macdonald hao. received a petition from a large number 
of Lagos merchants, members of the Council, and others, 
condemning the policy of the Company from first to last.1 
This petition was by no means isolated. On May 11th.
1888 a large meeting had been convened in Lagos of 
traders small and large, to protest against the handing
p
over of the Oil Rivers to a private trading company.
An anxious question from Anderson as to whether the 
Governor agreed with the memorialists about the interests 
of Lagos, and whether the meeting was really represen-
3
tative, provoked a Colonial Office response which laid 
bare the conflicting motives and inner tensions which 
characterised its whole attitude towards expansion into 
the Delta and the future of the Oil Rivers. According 
to Antrobus, Moloney agreed with the memorialists and 
recommended that the Rivers to the (tfest of the Niger 
Company!s territories should anyway be annexed to Lagos, 
both in the interests of the small traders and in order 
to secure the fine harbour of the Porcados. Antrobus 
himself was at a loss to understand why "it is desired 
to put the whole of the Oil Rivers under the Niger 
Company.’’ He felt sure that the result would be
1. See Report, also C.O. 147/70, Moloney to C.O. 12.3.89.
2. Lagos Observer, 26.5.88
3. P.O. 84/1924, C.O. to P.O. 8.7. Min. by H.P.A., 19.7.88.
greatly to impoverish Lagos, and if the territories 
could not be left as they were ,fthe best course would 
perhaps be to form the western rivers at any rate into 
a separate colony under the Governor of Lagos, just 
as Zululand is under the Governor of Natal, or British 
Bechuanaland under the Governor of the Cape.1 Meade, 
however, was "not at all ambitious of taking over even 
the Western Rivers. Mr. Moloney is not a safe guide 
in a thing of this kind. He sees the aggrandisement 
of the Colony and consequently that of Mr. Moloney.
We had better not encourage this scheme. We may be 
driven into it but as long as these districts can
govern themselves so let them remain.......In future
the district may become ripe for Colonial Government.
The lack of any unified policy on the ;part 
of Colonial Office officialdom, and of support for the 
man on the spot, went far, in the long run, to perpetu^ate 
those abuses of which Antrobus so bitterly complained.
In the short term, by this negative policy, Lagos was 
prevented from exercising the influence which she might 
have done on the decisions of 1889 and 1890 about the 
future of the Oil Rivers. Macdonald, instead of being 
confronted with a coherent and sustained body of protest 
based on principle, with the support of the whole com­
munity, was presented with a niggling, partisan account
1. 1. C.O. 147/68. F.O. to C.O., 28.7.88. Mins, by R.L.A
13.8. <1 R.M. 20.8.88.
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of petty abuses from the trading concerns, which he 
had no difficulty in dismissing. The petition of 
1889, as representing the whole Lagos case, made an 
abysmal showing. Twelve of its signatories were ex­
employees of the Company, who had been dismissed for 
various offences which ranged from drunkenness to 
fraud,.pnd ona. was an ex-convict, who had been sentenced 
by the Consular authorities in the Livers for slave- 
trading. The other signatories were agents of the 
various Lagos firms. In one point only did Macdonald 
concede (Chapter VIII) that they had a case. This was 
on the question of the small trader’s who dealt in cloth, 
calabashes etc., in the Mger, on whom he agreed the 
20?c> duty and the £50 licence fee charged by the Company 
bore too harshly. His recommendation that the former 
should be reduced to 5£/^ or abolished altogether, and 
that the latter should be reduced to a hawker1s licence 
o f r<5 ro. ight have done much, if adopted, to remove the 
genuine grievances of the native traders against the 
Company.
The first eight chapters of the Commissioner1s 
report were primarily devoted to the Companyrs treaty 
rights in its own territories and its claims to rule 
in the Oil Rivers. The next eight give a unique picture 
of the workings of a chartered company administration 
in tropical Africa. Much of this material is not
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relevant to the Oil Rivers, or to the question of
charter extension.*^" Macdonald did point, however*,
to a number of reforms and defects which ought to be
remedied if Company rule was to be extended. His
severest censure was reserved for the administration
of justice (Chapter XII). Macdonald was of the opinion
that the judicial powers possessed by the officers of
the Company should be curtailed, particularly those of
the District Agents, who should not have the power of
passing sentence of death on a native. Macdonald
was well aware that he was touching the weakest spot in
the Company*s armour, for the administration had been
2racked by a series of judicial scandals.
The Commissioner was, however most impressed 
by the constabulary (Chapter XI). This consisted 
of 424 men^about 250 of whom were from the Gold Coast,
100 vrere Hausa, and the rest were Yoxuba. The
men were mostly armed Jwith Snider rifles, in addition 
to which the forces possessed excellent artillery 
with plentiful supplies of ammunition. The total
cost of the force amounted to £10,000 per annum. On 
July 51st. at Lokoja, Macdonald inspected the troops, 
which were put through several manoeuvres for his
1. An adequate treatment of these aspects of the
Macdonald report is given by Flint, GoIdie, pp. 142-152.
2. Ibid.
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benefit, and lie was "exceedingly struck with the 
steadiness and general excellence in drill shown by 
both infantry and artillery, the latter being especially 
smart". During the twelve months to June 1889 there 
had been only eight court5 martial^ (none of them for 
serious offences) and only four bad characters dis­
charged. There was no desertions. The Commissioner 
had only one criticism-the force v/as under-strength; 
and one doubt - whether the Hausas would fight against 
their co-religionists. The establishment of the West 
Africa Frontier Force disposed of the first, and the 
Nupe campaign disposed of the second.
The Commissioner * 3 examination of the Companyfs 
stations (Chapter X) and steamers (Chapter IX) revealed 
what might have been expected. The stations were 
most elaborate, the resources in men and boats most 
concentrated, in the palm-oil belt south of Onitsha, 
whence the Company drew 8 of its revenue. Above 
Lokoja, on both the Niger and the Benue, effective 
occupation consisted of little more than a clerk and 
a warehouse. In all the 500 miles of the Benue there 
were but seven stations, of which only Ibi justified 
the name. The Commissioner’s call for more stations 
revealed the implicit train of his thought. The Com­
pany’s resources were obviously stretched to the limit,
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the task of developing what they had would need all 
their eneryy over the next few years. It was to he 
doubted, even assuming the superhuman political 
difficulties could be solved, whether their resources) 
increased by joining .with the African Association, 
could cope with and govern a territory stretching 
along 500 miles of seaboard, the extent of whose in­
terior could only be estimated, and which already did 
a trade twice as big as that of the Niger Company’s 
territory, unless the Company was so drastically re­
formed as completely to alter its character*
as might have been expected, the Commissioner 
v/as critical of the Company’s trading policy (Chapters 
XIV to XV). His meaning was clear; there could be 
no Charter extension unless the interests of the native 
trader were safeguarded. Reform must come first, the 
native trader must be admitted to the Niger, if not 
free, then, as a native outside the Rivers, on the £5 
licence fee (unless of course he was engaging in the 
large export trade). Similarly Macdonald took excep­
tion to the regulation that insisted on traders con­
ducting their negotiations for land for commercial use 
through the Company. This was a breach of Article 14 
of the Charter and would have to stop. The system of 
ports entry was likewise attacked, in that traders v/ere 
forced to trade where the Company v/as established;
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moreover, although the system protected revenue, it 
limited the amount of trade which could be done, since 
the negro "will not go far from his home to trade,"
The complaints of the Oil Rivers merchants about having 
to enter through Akassa he thought justified, and 
recommended customs houses should be established at 
hkole and Warri. Whilst Macdonald generally accepted 
the Company’s contention that the money raised through 
revenue did not exceed the money spent, and that there­
fore there was no breach of the Anglo-German agreement, 
he thought the incidence*of some duties was unfair.
The export duty of Is. 6d. per hundredweight on palm 
kernels, or nearly 25 ^  was much too high and should be 
reduced. Profits on kernels were running at a third 
of that on oil. Therefore, the difference could be 
made up by raising the duty on oil and placing a small 
import duty on Manchester goods. With regard to
import duties, that of 2s. per gallon on spirits he 
thought high but justified. He argued, however, that 
there was little relation between the duty and the 
incidence of drunkenness, and that.the duty could be 
altered without any perceptible effect on the people.
In the Oil Rivers, for instance, which were "flooded 
with gin and rum", he saw but little drunkenness;, 
the greater part of the gin imported (over 1-d- million
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gallons per annum) finding its way to the interior.
The auty on trade guns he thought prohibitive, and if 
lowered would produce a larger revenue.
Though Macdonald judged the G-erman accusations 
that the Company’s revenue exceeded its administrative 
expenditure to be wrong, he turned his own argument 
into a criticism of the Company’s trading policy.
The amounts raised from duties were judged to be fair, 
but the Company needed to spend more on building new 
stations, particularly when the Benue was.,.further onened 
up. There was only one way in which it could increase 
its revenue without raising its duties and that was by 
encouraging more trade. More trade would come with 
more traders; hence the suggestions for reform to make 
trade easier. The logic of the argument -escaped
Goldie. In 1895 be was still arguing that the only 
way to raise revenue was to increase duties.^
If there was §jci obstacle to the establishment 
of a colony, and a circumstance favouring the extension 
of the Charter, it was the question of slavery, and 
Macdonald devoted his penultimate chapter to a careful 
analysis of this problem. His argument centred around 
the mildness of slavery in the Rivers, where it existed
1. R.N.C. Papers I The public revenue of the Niger 
Company^ by Goldie 9•12.95.
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in the form of domestic servitude, as compared with the 
area north of Lokoja, where slave-trading was still 
prevalent. He maintained that in its form in the 
divers, it still existed sub rosa in Lagos and in the 
other West African colonies - obviously a key point in 
his argument- for colonial rule. Domestic slavery 
was in no way burdensome to the slaves, who could 
acquire property and were themselves frequently the 
owners of slaves. They had their rights and privileges, 
which protected them against ill-treatment, and those 
that rose to be rich traders became a great power in 
the land. Most of the leading men in the Rivers were 
ex-slaves, such as Yellow Duke, Ja Ja, Waribo, Oko Jumbo 
and William Kia. Human sacrifice did exist in the 
lower Rivers, but the victims were-usually prisoners 
of war, not domestic slaves. With judicious tact and 
prudence, the question of the abolition of domestic 
servitude really presented no great difficulties.
To stop the slave raiding by the Emirs in the Companyfs 
territories would necessitate an appeal to arms, and 
this, Macdonald felt, should be done as soon as the 
Company’s constabulary was strengthened, and certainly 
before the raiders established themselves south of the 
Benue. By posing two distinct problems on the slayery 
issue, the second of which would require all the
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Company’s energy, while the first was of no great 
moment hut anyway required different handling, the 
Commissioner directed the Company’s attention politely 
hut firmly away from the Rivers.
If Macdonald dismissed the graver charges 
of atrocity against the Company, the general tenor of 
his report amounted to a severe criticism of the way 
in which the Company conducted its affairs. The defects 
in the administration, the Commissioner argued)arose 
from the fundamental fault of employing commercial agents 
on administrative work. Thex*e could be more
talk of government by traders in the Oil Rivers. A 
colonial administration was in accordance with the wish 
of the people of the country; it would remove all fear 
of monopoly; relations with foreign powers would be 
rendered easier; and, lastly, the G-overnment of a 
Colony could be nnch more easily instituted and enforced 
than that of a Chartered Company. The country was
large and rich, totally unexplored or worked beyond 
the coastal strip, and "if the administration were 
carried out in an energetic yet prudent manner, and
the attention of the Executive devoted, at any rate at 
first, to opening and civilising the country and esta­
blishing it on a firm financial basis, rather than to 
outward forms, the Colony of the Oil Rivers would 
in every way be a success.!t To prepare the way for a
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Colony, a strong Consular administration should be 
established, with a consul in each river, having a 
sufficient force of constabulary and armed launches 
to open up the country, and using the power and in­
fluence of the middleman chiefs.
Whilst Macdonald had been engaged on his 
enquiry, the British government had been able to post­
pone any action on the Niger question. This had not 
prevented complaints from continuing to come in, or 
the traders from pursuing their policy of Charter ex­
tension in an endeavour to force the government fs hand. 
Herinany duly appointed her own investigator, Herr 
von Puttkamer, Acting Consul G-eneral at Lagos and a 
nephew of Bismarck.'1" He visited the Niger during the 
first three months' of 1889, and his report was as might 
have been expected.” The Hermans committed- a tactical 
blunder by publishing ■ffe/'report^ which enabled the
Poreign Office to treat Puttkamer as a hostile witness
before the Commissioner.^ Much of the steam was taken 
out of the Herman complaints by the assurance, given as
1. Described to Lister as Ma drunken brawling brute whose 
chief passion after drink is hatred of England and 
everything English.11. P.O. 84/1881, R.N.C. to P.O. 
21.3.89., T.V.L. to Salisbury 23.3.89.
2. Communicated to P.O. by Leyden, P.O.C.P. 5945 7.10.89
3. Despite pressure, the Macdonald report was never pub-? 
lished, and access to it remained closed until 1952.
4. P.O. 84/1991. Min. by H.P.A. 23.3.
part of the 1890 Agreement, that a fresh start should 
be made with regard to the M g e r ,  and that a chartered 
company should not have the administration of the Oil 
Rivers/ This assurance involved no great hardship, 
since by then the Government had made up its mind.
It was ironic that just when the traders 
achieved their greatest triumph., the agreement to 
amalgamate between the Royal Niger Company and the 
African .Association, the government should have sus­
pended action on the Niger question. .The fact of 
amalgamation did however provoke a discussion as to 
the grounds on which an extension of the Charter might 
be recommended. The conditions were stringent.
Pauncefote was quite adamant that all rival trading 
interests should be satisfied first, and that then it would 
be necessary to obtain the consent of the Oil Rivers 
chiefs by written agreement which must contain mention 
of the Niger Company. No move aauld be made until the 
shipping interests had been satisfied; Rogerson must 
not be in such a hurry. The most that could be done
1. P.O.C.P. 6146, Malet to Salisburym 21.6.90. Enc. H.P.A. 
21.6.90. Iioenigsberg* s death in 1891 enabled the
German Government quietly to drop his case. P.O. 84/2174,
P.O. to R.N.C. 5.9.91.
2. P.O. 84/1929. Afr. Assoc, to P.O. 6.10.88. This 
agreement was conditional on Charter extension.
3. P.O. 84/1930.R.N.C. to P.O. 12.10.88. M n s .  by J.P. 
13.10.88. on joint memo. Rogerson Goldie, adducing 
reasons in favour of amalgamation and extension of the 
Charter.
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was to authorize Wright, the Treasury solicitor, to 
suggest a procedure for extending the Charter;1 but 
even for this there was no haste, as the question of 
whether fusion was to be accepted could not be decided 
until Macdonald had reported.
Faced with these conditions and difficulties, 
in particular the superhuman task of trying to persuade 
the Rivers chiefs to accept Niger Company rule, the 
alliance began to drift apart. Rumours began to leak 
out of an amalgamation, and the shipowners, whose op­
position had always been implacable, began to mobilise 
once more. Letters to the Press demanded to know why 
Her Majesty(s Government had appointed a Special Com­
missioner when at the same time they were planning to 
hand over the Rivers to G-oldie, By one of these letters 
Goldie was provoked into a swingeing attack on the Crown 
Colony system, and into a most injudicious statement
that 7/8 of the merchants trading in the Oil Rivers
2
desired the extension of the Company1s Charter.^ This 
leak of the agreement spelt its end. In the uproar 
which followed, J. Holt and a number of other firms 
party to the agreement changed sides. They were well 
aware of the impact such a public announcement would
1. F.O. 84/1932. Wright to F.O., 9.11.88. Min. by H.P.A. 
26.11.88.
2. The Times, 3.1.89.
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have in the Rivers, and that the people would "never 
consent to the Royal Niger Company having sovereign or 
other rights over their territory.1,1 The only chance
now of avoiding the rule of the ubiquitous Crown 
Colony official was for Liverpool to break with G-oldie 
and <go on alone. .On February 5th,1889 Rogerson in­
formed Hewett that ,fthe Association would ratiier have
2
a distinct and separate Company with a separate Charter". 
But the Liverpool interest had entirely disintegrated. 
Holt, Stuart and Douglas, and Miller Brother would now 
have nothing more to do with any form of chartered 
government. When Rogerson came to draft his articles 
of amalgamation for the Liverpool firms only, he found 
four companies left. Nevertheless, he pressed on with 
his scheme, and although amalgamation with the Niger 
Company was not excluded, the main aim of the new 
compa&y was a separate charter of its own. In the 
event of future disagreements with the Niger Company, 
the government was to fix the line of demarcation be- 
tween the two concerns. By June the amalgamation 
was complete, and a new company, the African Association 
Ltd., was b o m .  It was too late.
1. F.O.C.P. 5945. Holt to P.O. 29.1.89. p.
2. F.O. 84/1940, Macdonald to Salisbury, 12.6.89.
5. F.O. 84/1992, papers communicated by Rogerson, 3.4.89.
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In the first place, the Foreign Office 
refused to accept that a smaller concern could succeed 
where a larger one had failed. Anderson -/expressed 
the official line quite firmly: "Macdonald has ins­
tructions to report on the expediency of extending 
the existing Charter, for which Rogersonfs association 
petitioned, hut he has not any instruction as to the 
administration of the Oil Rivers by another Company; 
consequently the question put is not one that can be 
entertained."^" In the second place, the opposition 
to the charter swelled by the defecting Liverpool firms, 
had assumed truly formidable proportions. The Foreign 
Office was inundated with protests from shipping
companies, firms doing trade in the Rivers, and chambers
2
of commerce up and down the country. During the 
summer, the shipowners won over two formidable allies: 
the Liverpool Chamber of Commerce, which produced a 
monster petition signed by twenty-one West African 
Compliesj and Lord Hartington the Liberal Unionist
leader, who threatened to reinforce the agitation of 
the Liverpool h.P.!s in the Commons with a debate in 
the Lords. In the midst of all this, Macdonald!s
1. ibid. Kin. by II.P.A., 3.4.89, on interview with 
Rogerson.
2. See F.O.C.P., 5945, passim.
3. F.O. 84/1998, Liverpool Chambef to F.O., 28.6.89.
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memorandum arrived, and on the basis of this new 
information Salisbury informed Hartington that the 
Oil Rivers would not be included in the Company!s 
Charter without the giving of such notice as would 
enable the objectors to bring the matter before 
Parliament, In this tortuous way Salisbury let it be 
known that he had "pretty well" made up his mind against 
the extension of the Niger Company!s Charter.^ If 
the foreign Office failed to still the agitation, 
they were now clearly dissociated from any of its 
ambit # i o n s . Individual protests continued to pour
in throughout the.remainder of the year, and the in­
creasingly desperate intriguew of the African Association
reached a climax in a formal petition sent in on
2
Januafy 8th 1890. Speculation about the Charter 
continued throughout the early part of 1890 and it 
was not until August, when the foreign Office stated 
in straightforward language to the Liverpool Chamber 
of Commerce that "Her ha,iesty!s Government have no 
intention of handing over-the country in question to 
a Chartered Company", tnat it was in large measure 
stilled.^ As for G-oldie, he had long $ u m e d  his
1. f.O. 84/1999. Hartington to ferguson, 18.7.89. iJln.
by S.
2. f.O. 84/2072. African Assoc, to Salisbury, 8.1.90.
3. f.O.C.P. 6098, f.O. to Liverpool Chamber, 15.8.90.
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back on his ineffective Liverpool colleagues. He 
had much else to think about. The french were be­
ginning to move again in the north, a minor internal 
crisis haibeen created by the resignation of Pinnock, 
one of the founder directors of 1879, and any .moment 
there would be renewed pressure from the government as 
a result of the Macdonald report. In July 1889, he 
told his shareholders "It has been repeatedly stated 
that the Royal Niger Company has sought for the ex­
tension of its jurisdiction over the adjacent maritime 
regions generally known as the Oil Rivers I wish
i
to give a positive denial to these statements."
Goldie's concern to have what he held was 
based on a shrewd assessment of what the Macdonald 
report might contain. That the government had not 
abandoned Charter extension solely because of the op­
position of shippers and traders in Rngland was obvious; 
they had never shown such susceptibility before. The 
appointment of a Special Commissioner and his report, 
condemning Charter extension, represented a real set­
back to Goldie. Whatever form the future administration 
of the Oil Rivers would take, it would not fail to 
provide a basis for comparison with the government of
I.R.N.C. Papers, Vol. I. Proc. at 9th. Ord. Gen. Meeting, 
26.7.89.
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the Company's sphere. Moreover, the implicit 
rejection of his arguments concerning the superiority 
of chartered government, as against the more cjh;hodox 
colonial form, seemed to him peculiarly significant. 
Henceforward the Niger Company was on trial, and on 
the defensive, and G-oldie rapidly developed a policy 
of resistance to everything. His relations with the 
future Qil.havers administration were for this reason 
never to be easy.
The Macdonald report, however, had implications 
beyond those that touched the Niger Company. In the 
partition of Africa, the device of the Chartered Com­
pany had been regarded as a way by which government 
could obtain and administer territory on the cheap, 
whilst escaping responsibility for acts of jurisdiction. 
Nor the first time this method had been tested and found 
wanting; more especially, it was found impossible for 
use as a means of delegating authority, when a decision 
had been made to do so. This was of fundamental im­
portance. The doctrine that a government could not 
escape responsibility for the powers it delegated had 
come hone to roost. The Macdonald report marks a 
turning-point in the history of late Pictorial expansion. 
The faults of a chartered company were laid bare.
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These faults were confirmed by the collapse of the 
East Africa Company, and the antics of the South Africa 
company on the Transvaal border. For the first time 
the doctrine that imperial rule was the only fit rule 
was forcibly asserted. There were to be no more 
charters for Africa; the new instrument was to be 
the Foreign Office protectorate, until the area was 
ready for Crown Colony rule.
Lastly, Macdonaldfs advocacy of a flexible 
colonial system in the Report was completely new.
His concern to consult the African and use his influence, 
combined, with his vigorous belief in direct rule, 
dedicated to stamping out "barbaric1 abuses and fos­
tering free trade and social welfare, was a new mixture, 
not entirely uninfluenced by his experiences in Egypt.
In laying down a policy of social development in Africa, 
Macdonald anticipated Chamberlain by five years. It 
was a unique and just honour for the government to 
ask him to implement his own proposals, but faced with 
the report of January 1890 they had little other choice.
CHAPTER FIVE
GENESIS OF AN ADMINISTRATION
The governments decision to act on the Macdonald 
report did not come before time, for, administratively, 
matters in the Oil Rivers had gone from bad to worse. Hewett 
finally left the coast in September 1889, a sick and broken 
man, but it was not until November that he bothered to inform 
the Foreign Office that he had left no one in charge.^* The 
consular officer for the Congo, Annesley, returning to his 
post, was immediately ordered to take charge. For the first 
time the government recognised that the task was beyond the 
capacity of one man, and authorised, on Macdonald's recom­
mendation, the appointment of unpaid consular agents from
2  ........
among the traders. Four men accepted appointment in this
capacity* Gillies and Wright at Old Calabar, Munro at
Bonny, and Gierl at Opobo. Their powers were ill-defined,
although they probably presided over what was left of
1. F.O. 8Vl9*KL. Hewett to F.O. 25.11.
ibid. Min. by H.P.A., 1 6 .7 .8 9 . Macdonald impressed on 
Anderson the likelihood of fresh trouble if this was not 
done, owing to Hewett's long periods of absence from
H.Q. and to "his haphazard method of dealing with his 
correspondence."
3. Gillies died on May 19th, 1890.
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Johnston’s Governing Councils when Hewett had finished
emasculating them. Their appointment made little impact,
however. The senior naval officer at Bonny, Captain Stopford,
felt that the administration had got beyond the Consul and
gunboat stage. He refused to have anything to do with the
consul's plans to use his men as a police force to chastise
the inhabitants and seize their arms.*3" The Admiralty agreed,
and Wells, the Admiral, suggested that the consul should form
2
his own police force* The Admiralty was not the only
department of government to complain. The Board of Customs
experienced difficulties in obtaining consular certificates
of landing of goods exported from the United Kingdom, and
wanted to know if all action stopped when the Consul was 
3
absent. The Colonial Office expressed annoyance at being 
kept in the dark about future arrangements for government.
's caustic comment about the Foreign Office habit of 
sending "us things we do not want" and omitting "those we 
should like to see", was no more than just in the case of 
Macdonald's memorandum on the Oil Rivers, which was communi­
cated to the Colonial Office on January 26th, 1891, eighteen 
months after it was written!
1. F.O. 8V2020. Annesley, to F.O., 27.2.90.
2. F.O. 8^ +/200^ -. Admiralty to F.O., lH-.lO.89 with incl.
3* F.O.G.P. 59^5* Customs to F.O. ^.6 .8 9 .
lf* F,°- to 13.5.90. Min. by A.W.L.H.,2o.1.91•
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The Foreign Office policy, or lack of it, came under 
fire on the coast as well. Annesley, overwhelmed by the 
burdens of endeavouring to administer a country the size of 
Burma, had, with Foreign Office approval, raised a police 
force, forty strong, of Kroomen, to be paid for out of the 
fines collected by the Native Court at Old Calabar. This 
force, lacking strong and regular discipline, quickly consti­
tuted itself an alternative source of authority to the 
chiefs, the merchant community dubbing it 11 the forty thieves". 
With these, and by inciting friendly chiefs to make war on 
those who defied consular rule, Annesley endeavoured to keep 
order.
To Annesley this situation was intolerable. There was 
no law, properly speaking, in the Protectorate; the 
missionaries preferred the Bible to the sword; the traders 
were complaining bitterly about the insecurity of trade; 
comey had not been collected; the resuscitation of the 
governing council had created more confusion than order, and 
even the policy of using natives to chastise natives came 
apart when Annesley*s "forty thieves" were repulsed with 
heavy losses in an attempt to punish the people of Akwette, 
for alleged trade offences. The sooner the administration 
of the Oil Rivers was settled, the better.^*
1. P.O. Sk/2020, Annesley to F.O. 21.5.90, 19.6.90, 13.8.90.
The action of the government however, was neither hasty 
nor certain. In April 1890 Macdonald anxiously inquired of 
Anderson whether Lord Salisbury would wish to see him with 
reference to his reports, only to be informed that he 11 had 
better take his three weeks run to Scotland first11 At the
end of June he was still awaiting further instructions when 
Mockler Ferryman's leave ran out. During August the Foreign 
Office obtained leave for Macdonald only to the end of June 
1891, should his services be required for so long.^ Only in 
October, after Macdonald returned from Berlin, was he 
officially informed of his appointment, and the practical 
planning of the administration could begin.
For this planning, Macdonald drew on a number of sources. 
First and most important was his own report, and the material 
he had Collected in the Oil Rivers. Secondly, there were 
the opinions of men who had had practical experience of the 
Rivers, traders, missionaries and the consuls, particularly 
Johnston and Annesley. Lastly, there were the views of the
1. F.O. 8V2080, mins. by H.P.A. and Salisbury, 22.**-.90.
2. F.O. 8V2019, Macdonald to F.O., 25.6.90.
3. ibid. F.O. to Macdonald, 25.8.90.
b. Macdonald*s appointment dates from 1.1.91, his commission 
from 1 5 *1 2.9 0 .
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Foreign and Colonial Office officials, particularly Lister 
and Anderson. At the planning stage Macdonald was given a 
remarkable freedom, usually only modifying his ideas in res­
ponse to criticism better informed than his own. Rarely did 
the Foreign Office impose a direct veto on any aspect of the 
Commissioner^ scheme, although it emerged much modified, 
particularly in response to Treasury pressure. The scheme 
was in essence his own.
Even Anderson, however, got a shock when he received 
Macdonald's basic scheme for the administration of the Oil 
Rivers on December 15th. The expenditure of £66,398 was more 
than twice what Anderson himself had estimated, and he 
thought it much too high. Macdonald was not in the least 
apologetic, maintaining that "if the thing is to be done it 
should be done well" - and "if the revenue is there why not 
spend it" He proposed to spend it as follows:
High Commissioner^ Dept.
District Commissioners 
Treasury 
Customs 
Public Works 
Marine 
Medical 
Constabulary
Subsidies to native chiefs 
Buildings 
Steamers
Armament, ammuhition etc.
1. F.O. 8V2020. Macdonald to H.P.A., 19.12.90. P.
-91»+
9*+9 
3^00
7b 05
180 0. 2. 6 
11821 15. o 
6000 
12500 
6900 
3000
£66398. 1 7 . 6
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Of these amounts all except the last three were annual items 
At the head of the administration was the High Commis­
sioner, at a salary of £2500, with an office allowance of 
£2?0 and consular powers over the Cameroons. Under him were 
six District Commissioners at £600, with allowances of £100, 
to be stationed at Brass, New Calabar, Bonny, Opobo, Quo Ibo 
and Old Calabar. With the exception of the High Commissioner, 
the salaries were somewhat higher than for the equivalent 
posts in the other West African colonies. Macdonald advoca­
ted this on the grounds that the districts were larger than 
in the colonies, that, apart from the seaboard the area was 
completely unexplored, and the climate onerous, and lastly, 
that it was important to attract men of intelligence and cul­
ture .
The Treasury and Public Works departments he thought 
could be undertaken by the District Commissioners until the 
administration was more complete and the revenue secure; 
although he felt an early organisation of the latter under a 
Foreman of Works salaried at £*K)0 desirable in view of the 
rapid deterioration of plant in the colonies. Similarly, the 
Medical Department could be kept going for the present by an 
annual payment of £100 to each of the doctors in the Rivers.
1. F.O. 8^/2019* Oil Rivers Administration Scheme, by
Macdonald, 15*12.90. Where no other reference is given, 
source is this document.
The Customs were susceptible of no such solution, and for the 
protection of revenue had to be organised straight away. The 
Marine Department was the most important in the administra­
tion. Eventually a sea-going steamer would be a necessity. 
This, however, would cost from £12,000 to £18,000 to build, 
and £1,000 a year to run. For the present, therefore, the 
goverhment should have three armed steam launches at a cost 
of £2,000 each*
It was, however, on the constabulary that Macdonald 
focussed his greatest attention, and on which, like Goldie, 
he was able to bring his considerable military experience to 
bear. He argued that a force such as was maintained by the 
Company was none too large for the Oil Rivers. Even with the 
advantage given to them by the Niger, the Company was unable 
to mount anything in the nature of a major land expedition.
It would be that much more difficult, he felt, to maintain 
order in the Oil Rivers, owing to the difficult nature of 
the hinterland. If it was only a question of policing the 
European settlements at the mouths of the Rivers, then 50 
men would suffice,
"but the policy of the future government of the 
territories should be to open up the Interior, a 
work which though undertaken with the utmost 
patience and forebearance will require an efficient 
force to carry it out with any hope of success."
As a start therefore a force of 300 men should be organised
under an Inspector General. These men would receive the 
same pay and conditions as their Niger Constabulary counter­
parts, and would be armed in a similar fashion. This would 
facilitate a future amalgamation of forces in the event of 
an emergency. The total cost of the force, allowing for the 
extra equipment needed to operate equally on land and river 
expeditions, worked out to little more per head than that of 
the Company Constabulary. Until this force was organised, 
100 Hausas should be recruited with three officers. Fairly 
good fighting material, he thought, might be obtained from 
some of the tribes in the Rivers, but Krooboys were useless 
as soldiers. Therefore, until research could be done, 
recruits had to come from tribes whose qualities were known.
Macdonald concluded his estimate of establishment with 
a warning - too much cheeseparing and the position would be 
as bad as before. Annesley*s suggestion that the President 
of the Governing Council could act as Collector of Customs, 
Harbourmaster, Postmaster, etc. would not do:
"the disorganised and discreditable state of affairs 
which prevails in the Oil Rivers is largely due to 
the fact that one man has hitherto attempted to do 
an amount of work which would give ample occupation 
for twenty."
How was all this to be paid for? Despite his hard 
hitting, Macdonald was as aware as anybody that the Treasury 
were not going to spend £66,000 without the prospect of
adequate return. He had two alternative answers to this - 
the first to prove that the prospective revenue would stand 
such a loan, the second, to get what was possible out of the 
Treasury and meet the rest of the establishment as and when 
the revenue permitted.
In his arguments as to the prospective size of the 
revenue, Macdonald had the important backing of the Assistant 
Under Secretary, Lister. Lister had long argued the via­
bility of the Oil Rivers as a colony, arguing that a Is. duty 
on the liquor traffic alone would soon yield £1 30,000, which 
"is nearly double the expenditure of Lagos in 1888.
Macdonald was not prepared to be quite so sanguine, estimating 
an annual import of 2£ million gallons of spirits and pro­
posing initially a duty of 6d., he calculated that this would 
yield £62,500. The extra revenue could be obtained by an 
import duty of 2d. per pound on tobacco. This would bring 
the total revenue to £7 8 ,500, excluding other possible 
sources of revenue such as duties on salt, gunpowder, guns 
and an export duty on palm-oil and kernels. There was more 
than ample to cover the £66,000 from the Treasury, at the 
lowest computation. Even this loan might not be necessary. 
Here Macdonald advanced his second line of argument. Initial 
expenses until the Protectorate was organised would be much 
lower. He had indicated in his analysis which departments
1. F.O.C.P. 6011. Memo by T.V.L., 1.7.9 0.
needed organising first; the others might wait. Therefore 
£50,000 or even £30,000 would suffice at the beginning, and 
would leave a balance for current expenditure, until the 
customs revenue came in. The preliminary estimate for plant 
and government he put at £*+5 *000.
Although Macdonald's estimate was high, Anderson was 
forced to admit the force of his contentions. Indeed, after 
consulting both Goldie and Mackinnon, he had actually sugges­
ted to Macdonald that at least £15,000 for steamers would be 
needed. While not denying that this would be the case, the 
Commissioner felt that initially the three government 
steamers at £6,000 total would suffice.1 Lister, like 
Anderson, was disposed to allow Macdonald a free hand: "...
his personal knowledge of the country, its features and 
resources, justify reliance on his calculations.11 On 
December 22nd, therefore, Macdonald's memorandum was trans­
mitted to the Treasury, and the Lords Commissioners were 
formally apprised of the need to establish a strong consular 
administration in the Oil Rivers. Political considerations 
had ruled out any other solution, and they were required to 
advance £50,000,
"on such terms as to interest and repayment as may 
seem to their lordships proper to adopt under the 
circumstances."
1. F.O. 8*f/2119* O.R. Admin, scheme, 15*12.90
A prompt decision was urged, since delay in organising the 
administration
"would increasingly disturb the relations with 
traders and natives who are anxiously waiting a 
definitive settlement." 1
The Treasury refused to be rushed however. Informal
consultations were held with the Colonial Office before
Macdonald's memorandum was officially referred to them on 
2January 6th. Meade, writing privately to Heath,-5 on the
1st, had been severely critical (although it was difficult
to follow his logic in arguing that the expenditure was
underestimated while the estimate was excessive): there was
"no provision fof a Government or Court House - or 
Hospitals - Harbour Masters etc. and other neces­
saries - no provision for leave ... On the other 
hand the salaries are somewhat high ... The 
Estimate of Revenue seems to be a mere shot - It is 
furnished by the merchants who when they made it 
were most anxious to permuade Her Majesty's Govern­
ment it would be ample ... I doubt the Estimate for 
the working of three steam launches being sufficient 
especially regarding coal ... There are many more 
services which will soon have to be provided for 
which I doubt the sufficiency of the revenue."
Although Macdonald "had got his head screwed on the right
1
way", there was every reason "for proceeding very tentatively."
1. F.O. 8V2097* F.O. to Treasury, 22.12.90. Draft by Lister.
2, C.O. l*+7/82. Treasury to C.O. 6.1.91*
3* Under Secretary to the Board.
*+. C.O. l*+7/82. Meade to Heath, 1.1.91. Private.
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This was manna to the Treasury, Anderson, however, had not 
been idle in the interval, and realising the importance of 
Colonial Office support, had ordered Macdonald to go over 
and consult with Herbert, This resulted in a modification 
of Meade's jaundiced view in the official reply to the 
Treasury delivered on January l^th. Now, while suggesting 
modifications of detail, the Colonial Office felt that 
Macdonald's calculations, "based upon the best information 
procurable", might properly be accepted by the Treasury, and 
were so far more helpful as to offer the services of the 
Crown Agents to supply the material needs of the administra­
tion.^ But the damage had been done. On January 26th the 
Treasury informed the Foreign Office that, although there 
was much to recommend the scheme, there were financial 
reasons for not undertaking it at once in the absence of
some very urgent cause, and therefore would it be possible to 
2
postpone it? In the circumstances there was no alternative 
but to pursue the second alternative, that is to get what 
was possible out of the Treasury and meet the rest of the 
establishment as and when the revenue permitted.
Accordingly, Anderson asked Macdonald to prepare an
1, C.O. 1*4-7/8 2, C.O, to Treasury, l*f,1.91.
2. F.O. 8*t/2l55* Treasury to F,0,, 26.1.91, The Treasury 
thought the area under discussion was on the East Coast 
of Africa.
alternative scheme, which he duly submitted on the 29th.
It was a barebones proposal to scrap all hope of getting the 
plant from the Treasury and concentrate on personnel. The 
total to be asked from the Treasury was £8000, to be split 
as follows:
High Commissioner £ 2500
Private Secretary 300
Deputy High Commissioner 700
Treasurer 700
2 native chiefs, £50 each 100
5 Directors of Customs 2500
5 Native Supervisors 500
5 Supervisors of Customs 375
Doctors1 Expenses in the 325
Various Rivers
£ 8000
With this reorganised staff Macdonald proposed to have 
the headquarters at Old Calabar for the present, and to 
station a Director of Customs with two native assistants at 
Benin, Brass, Bonny, Opobo and Old Calabar. The Directors 
of Customs would have the rank of Vice Consul and have judi­
cial powers similar to those at present possessed by the 
Consuls. The Treasury would constitute a separate department, 
although the Treasurer would in case of necessity act as 
Director of Customs or indeed fill any post he was called 
upon to fill. The High Commissioner and his deputy would 
have general charge of all the Rivers, but would take parti­
cular charge of any one River during the illness of its
Director of Customs. Macdonald demanded as a sine qua non 
for this scheme that the telegraph should be carried on from 
Bonny to Old Calabar. If this were accepted, the nature and 
amount of duties could be decided and a notification sent 
out to the Rivers that from such and such a date those duties 
would come into force. As part and parcel of this, all comey 
would be abolished, and subsidies to native chiefs be made a 
first charge on the revenue. The revenue, he added, would 
probably fall considerably short of the estimates, owing to 
the now inadequate provisions for collecting the customs 
duties, and the total lack of means for preventing smuggling.'*’ 
It was clear that Macdonald had drawn the obvious con­
clusions since his meticulous memorandum of December. There 
was little to be got out of the Imperial Treasury, and the 
embryonic administration would have to row its own boat. So 
be it: the important thing now was to get on with the £b.
Macdonald expressed his new sentiments privately to the sym­
pathetic Anderson.
"I do not know whether the Treasury will run to 
£8000 for the first year; unless we are quite out 
of it with regard to our revenue, we ought to be 
free of their help by then ... But I do not think 
we could possibly make the staff smaller without 
risk of complete failure.11
Macdonald was equally adamant about the salaries.
1. F.O. 8*4-/2110. Macdonald to Anderson, 29.1.91*
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"I donft know whether my salary seems out of pro­
portion to the others but I have latterly been 
enquiring with regard to my staff* I find that 
good men, I mean fellows who don't drink and are 
not utter idiots, won't take service on the coast 
unless they are financially cornered. Now as far 
as I am concerned this is not quite the case for, 
apart from other considerations, I could look 
forward to commanding my regiment in India in a 
few years which is £1500 a year and allowances so 
that if the Treasury wish to cut my salary I 
should, with very great sorrow be it said, have to 
leave my present agreeable and considerate masters 
and once more polish up the Highland Claymore. I 
know some excellent men in my service who have no 
faults but impecuniosity & have tried to entice 
them, but as they rightly say, in India we could 
get £500 a year and command white troops, so it is 
not worth our while." 1
It was the intervention of Lord Salisbury, who, being 
Prime Minister as well as Foreign Secretary, was in a unique 
position to put pressure on the Treasury, which proved 
decisive. On the strength of a private conversation with 
Goschen, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Salisbury produced 
a compromise proposal for submission to the Treasury. The 
latter would provide the salary of the Consul General at 
£2500, with an office allowance of £700, as a permanent 
charge on the estimates. Macdonald therefore lost his 
assistant but gained a higher effective rate of pay. Six 
deputy commissioners were to be appointed at £600 apiece 
plus office allowances of £100. This was to be a charge for
1. F.O. 8H/2110. Macdonald to Anderson, 30.1.91*
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one year on Imperial Revenue. Macdonald's point about
salaries w$s taken, and the original proposed rate of pay
was restored. Lastly the Treasury were to put up a loan of
£10,000 which would eventually be repaid to the Treasury out
of the revenues of the Protectorate*^ Goschen carped a
little at first at this suggestion, offering instead a
straight loan of £10,000 and suggesting that the government
might borrow the rest from private enterprise - a proposal
2
which Lister described as a "bad joke"* Eventually, however, 
his consent was obtained to Salisbury's proposal, subject to 
two modifications. The Commissioner's salary was to be a 
charge for three years only, instead of being permanent, and 
instead of separate provision being made for the salaries of 
the Deputy Commissioners £**,000 was to be added to loan of 
£10,000. The total of £1**,000 was to bear interest at 3% 
and be repayable by annual instalments of not less than 
£2 ,000, commencing with the year l893/**> "so as to give the 
Protectorate a fair start of two years" • Realising that the 
limits of Treasury generosity had been reached, the Foreign 
Office agreed.^ Macdonald was past the first obstacle.
1. ibid. P.C. to H.P.A., 31.1.41 F.O. 8**/2l56, F.O. to 
Treasury, j.2.91.
2. F.O. 8V2110. T.V.L. to H.P.A., no date.
3. F.O. 8*4/2157. Treasury to F.O. 20.2.91. F.O. to Treasury, 
2.3*
While these long negotiations with the Treasury had been 
taking place, Macdonald had not been idle. There was the 
very real problem of interviewing and selecting people who 
were willing to go out to the West Coast. Few were attrac­
ted to an area of the coast which was notorious for its 
death rate, many felt that they could get the pay with 
superior conditions elsewhere. Moreover, service in the Oil 
Rivers did not count towards pension in the imperial service. 
On these terms Macdonald found it impossible to get officers 
on the Acting List of the Army, the usual source for obtain­
ing seconded officers. Nevertheless, the War Office was 
not unhelpful, and when, rather surprisingly, two regular 
officers of the line volunteered, they were sanctioned 
without any query. These were Captain R. F. Synge of the 
Highland Light Infantry, the Commissioner's own regiment, and 
Captain H. L. Gallwey, East Lancashire Regiment. A third 
man, a distant cousin of the Commissioner in the Argyll and 
Bute Artillery Militia, Captain A. C. Burns Macdonald, was 
also given permission by the War Office to join the Oil 
Rivers service.^
Another source which Macdonald tapped with profit was 
the Colonial Office. Men with colonial experience in the
1. F.O. 8**/2l58. F.O. to W.O. IO/35 2159, W.O. to F.O.
22.3.91.
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tropics were of obvious value. From the Colonial service 
was recruited the Director of Customs, Thomas Wall. Wall 
had started his career as acting clerk of police, British 
Sherbro, in 1870, rising to become acting Inspector General 
of Police, Sierra Leone, in 1879* where he also acted as 
collector of customs. In 1889 he was appointed supervisor 
of the Gold Coast customs, in which year he also became a 
District Commissioner. To change a post worth £3?0 for one 
worth £700 was no great hardship to Wall, particularly as he 
had for some reason been under a cloud at the Colonial Office. 
Major General Hammdll, Macdonald's second recruit, also 
relieved the Colonial Office of a problem. He was a dis­
tinguished officer, whose "small11 appointment as a District 
Officer at Paplo in Cyprus was 11 ridiculously" disproportionate 
to his merits, but for whom "nothing better" had hitherto 
turned up. His appointment relieved the Colonial Office of
the necessity of pensioning him off, at the same time
1
releasing his post for a young and "simpler" man.
Three outsiders completed the establishment. Macdonald 
persuaded his impecunious brother-in-law to be, W. C. Cairns 
Armstrong, to join him. The second recruit was Roberts, an 
accountant with a bent for travel, whom Macdonald appointed
1. C.O. 1^7/82. F.O. to C.O. 13.3. Mins, by R.L.A., E.F.,
W.A.B.H., R.M., 12/1*4-.3.91.
as Treasurer. The other man was an altogether more interest­
ing character. Ralph Moor was born in i860 at Buntingford, 
Herts., the son of a surgeon, William Henry Moor. His 
father had been able to afford the services of a private 
tutor, and the sickly youth led a rather sheltered early 
existence. In 1880 his father pushed him into business as 
an apprentice in the tea trade, a job which Ralph detested.
On the death of his father in October 1882, Moor threw up his 
job and entered the Royal Irish Constabulary. This act 
marked a complete break with the past. There were few 
tougher schools than the R.I.C. in the l88o's - an alien 
minority attempting to keep some sort of order amongst a 
hostile majority - but by a combination of hard work and 
undoubted talent Moor rose at an early age to be a district 
inspector. He resigned however on February 9th, 1891, to 
seek an outlet for his talents for organisation elsewhere.1 
This outlet took the form of an offer to the new Consul- 
General for the Oil Rivers to go out at his own expense, and
use his experience to organise the constabulary. Macdonald
2
was not more surprised than delighted.
The problem of providing continuity in the administration
1. Dictionary of National Biography: MOOR.
2. F.O.C.P. 6351, Macdonald to F.O. 22.5.91.
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exercised the Commissioner very much, and he solved it by 
inventing a new type of officer called a Consular assistant. 
Unlike the old Consular agents, these were paid officers who 
would act for the Vice Consul in case of illness. Macdonald 
envisaged a greater flexibility in their use than this, 
however. The early holders of the office would have to be 
prepared to work in the constabulary, treasury, survey, 
customs, or any other department as and where the need arose. 
Gradually, as the administration developed, these gentlemen 
became a permanent feature of it. As a beginning, Macdonald 
engaged four young men, Steains, Harrison, Wilding and 
Quilter, to go out with the Vice Consuls at pay roughly 
equivalent to that of a Gold Coast District Commissioner 
(£350). Already the Commissioner was looking beyond the 
limits imposed by the Treasury.^
Pay and conditions were obviously vital factors to be 
considered for both sides in the matter of employment, and 
Macdonald forwarded to the Foreign Office his “Rules and 
Regulations for Leave of Absence and Pensions11 on May 13th. 
These Regulations were identical to those in force in the 
Gold Coast and Lagos, apart from the fact that the minimum 
term of service to qualify for pension was lowered from 
seven years to six. This concession Macdonald Justified on
1. F.O.C.P. 6351. Macdonald to F.O., 12.6.91.
the grounds that the pioneers of the Administration would
have harder work “and undergo more exposure than the offi-
1
cials who would succeed them“ . Since the Treasury had 
sombrely informed the Foreign Office that they could not 
legally impose any liability on Imperial revenues for pen­
sions, and that it would
“rest with the authorities administering the 
Protectorate to make the requisite arrangements 
for securing the charge11 2
they were hardly in any position to raise any objection to 
Macdonald*s scheme. Anderson, beyond insisting on the 
importance of some form of provision, was not disposed to 
interfere with the details, and the scheme was approved 
within the fortnight. The only anomaly was Macdonald*s own 
position. As he was to be paid for the first three years 
out of Imperial funds, he would have to conform to the regu­
lations governing the Consular service.
The question of finance, of key importance to the 
success of the administration, had two main aspects - the 
managing of money and the raising of revenue. By April 22nd, 
the Treasury was pressing to know what arrangements had been 
made for accounting and auditing the revenues of the
1. Ibid. Macdonald to F.O. 13.5.91.
2. F.O. 8V2159. Treasury to F.O., 12.3.91.
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Protectorate, but it was not until May 9th that Macdonald 
forwarded his scheme. It had been drawn up with the assis­
tance of Roberts, and bore the stamp of a Company accountant 
rather than a Treasury official. All financial and account­
ing operations in the Protectorate were to be under the 
supervision of the Treasurer, who was responsible to the 
Consul General for seeing that a proper system of accounts 
was kept at Old Calabar and the various Vice Consulates, and 
for the safe custody of all moneys received from them. An 
account for the Protectorate would be opened at the Bank of 
England, and audit would be undertaken by the Audit Office. 
Noticeably missing was all the paraphernalia connected with a 
Crown Colony Treasury, the multiplicity of clerks and papers 
and the overcentralisation which required two extra officials 
to check the work of one. The scheme was accepted without 
opposition.^
With regard to the raising of revenue, Macdonald got
off to a good start by persuading the Treasury to hand over
fines to the amount of £1,650 collected in the Oil Rivers
2
under the previous consular regime. But his main source of 
revenue was obviously going to be customs duties. In deciding
1. F.O. 8V2111 Macdonald to F.O. 9.5.91. Mins, by H.P.A. 
and E.B.N. 9/12.5.91.
2. F.O. 8V2165 & 2161, F.O. to Treasury, 10.91 & 20.5.91. 
8^ /2163, Treasury to F.O. 22.^ .91.
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on their nature and amount, Macdonald had to bear in mind 
three factors. First, he was bound by the agreement with 
Germany that revenue should not exceed expenditure. Secondly, 
he had to frame his duties with reference to the Brussels 
Act, even though the Act had not as yet been ratified. Lastly, 
in order to obviate smuggling, it would be as well that his 
duties should bear some relation to the tariffs of the neigh­
bouring territories. Macdonald therefore produced the 
following for the approval of the Foreign Office (neighbour­
ing territories show the comparison)
Items Lagos Niger Cameroons O.R.P.
l)Wine,ale,porter beer, 
per 1 doz. old wine 
bottles 9d. 6d • 6d.
2)Brandy,gin,rum & all 
other spirits, by 
Sykes Hydrometer not 
exceeding proof, old 
wine gallon
6d 
gin,rum 
Is .brandy
2s. 6d.
below proof 
Is. above
isirw
per above
3)Unmanufac tured 
tobacco per lb. 2d. 6d. Id. 2d.
b)Gunpowder per lb. id. - Id. 3d.
5)Trade guns, known 
as Danes, each 2s • - Is. Is.
6)Lead other than for 
building purposes
b% ad val. 
(all lead)
■- - Id. 
per lb.
7)Salt per ton 5s. 20s. H-s. *fs.
1. F.O. 8*4/2111. Macdonald to F.O.
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With regard to the duty on spirits, Macdonald felt that 
it would have been more desirable if a uniform duty could 
have been arrived at in all four administrations. This would 
have obviated many difficulties over smuggling. The question, 
he suggested, could perhaps be discussed with the implementa­
tion of the Brussels Act; meanwhile there was no point in 
waiting. It is interesting to note that Goldie at this 
period was of the same opinion, offering to lower the Company*s 
duties to Is. 6d. per gallon, or even Is., provided the Lagos 
administration would raise theirs to a like amount.
The Commissioner justified the high tax on gunpowder on 
the grounds that it was desirable to check the high import 
of I889/I890 into the Protectorate,^ on account of the 
expense and risk incurred by storing such large quantities 
of dangerous material in the manner laid down in Article IX 
of the Brussels Act. Lister criticised this on the grounds 
that the high duty would only create smuggling, and would 
prevent Macdonald from having a knowledge of the amount con­
sumed and from being able to control the trade with proper 
regulations. It would be much better, he contended, to make 
the duty the same as in the Cameroons, and induce Lagos to 
raise theirs. While Lister was no doubt right that gunpowder 
would be smuggled, it was a questionable assumption that the
1. 3,579,520 lbs.
amount smuggled in would exceed the amount admitted legiti­
mately under a lower duty.
One of the Commissioner's biggest worries was indeed the 
control of the arms traffic. To this end he had only reluc­
tantly settled for the lower duty on trade guns (Is. instead 
of 2s. as in Lagos), believing that even these unrifled 
flintlocks were not to be despised in the hands of an enemy 
in ambush. Rifles were, of course, forbidden imports. 
Macdonald looked to the adequate enforcement of the Brussels 
Act to check the indiscriminate use of firearms. His duty 
on lead was framed with a similar aim in mind. Lead was 
imported chiefly to make bullets and slugs,1 therefore it 
should be charged duty, lead brought in for building pur­
poses should come in free. Lister thought the proposal un­
realistic:
111 don't see what is to prevent people from turning 
pipes and roofs into bullets. The result of the 
tax would probably be that all lead would come in 
free. A single duty of £d. per lb. would be simpler 
to levy and more profitable."
1. Macdonald was no alarmist. The high imports of both gun­
powder and lead (over three times as much as at Lagos) 
pointed to an unusual ability on the part of the inhabi­
tants to supply the needs of their own weaponry. Nana 
himself employed three armourers who could certainly 
repair weapons. In their first assault on Ebrohemi in 
the British abandoned a field piece which had 
broken down. In their final assault it was captured 
from Nana in working order. The making of slugs for un­
rifled pieces was certainly not as difficult. Macdonald 
did however reduce the duty on gunpowder to 2d. before 
he sailed.
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It was, however, the ^s. per ton on salt that Lister 
thought most objectionable. He brushed aside Macdonald's 
arguments of parity with the Cameroons. Two or three 
shillings would be quite enough; it would be better to make 
it free. As to smuggling, this would continue anyway in the 
Lower Delta:
"As the Niger Company impose the exorbitant rate 
of £1 per ton, no reasonable tax would be effec- 
tive."
To all these criticisms Salisbury returned a flat no.
Macdonald was to run the show, therefore, "Let him have it
his own way11 . In this, the first Foreign Office Protectorate
2over a 'backward' people, Salisbury never failed to re­
iterate what was in the early years to be a consistent 
principle: having chosen the best man for the job there was
to be no petty interference in the details of the administra­
tion on the part of the home officials. Macdonald was to be 
ridden with a loose rein, even looser than Johnston (the 
organiser of the second Foreign Office Protectorate in Central 
Africa), in that he was financially independent as Johnston 
was not.
1. F.O. 8V2111, Macdonald to F.O., *f.?.91. Mins, by T.V.L.,
40 & Salisbury, n.d.
2. Zanzibar was considered to be "civilised".
It was heartening to Macdonald to have his administra­
tive policy approved so quickly and with so little opposition. 
Hereafter, after hanging fire for eighteen months, things 
moved fast. On May l*fth Macdonald submitted an initial list 
of expenditure to be covered by advances from the Treasury 
payable on or before June 30th. As in everything else he 
had done, his attention to detail was meticulous. £2,^50 
was wqnted for the purchase of customs hulks and consular 
buildings, and £150 for the passages of native clerks, these 
to be payable at Sierra Leone. At the Bank of England,
£1,75)0 was required for outfit allowances and passages, 
another £3?0 for ledgers and stationery and a further £350 as
a contingency fund. On June 1st, an account was duly opened
2
at the Bank of England in the name of the Protectorate. 
Meanwhile Macdonald had paid a visit to the Post Office. The 
result was a proposal to establish Post Offices at the six 
Vice Consulates, the business to be handled by the Vice 
Consuls with clerical assistance. He even found time to 
argue with the Post Office over the proposed postal charge of 
6d. per i oz. for letters, as against 2-J-d. at Lagos and 14d.
1. F.O. 8^/216^. Macdonald to F.O., l*f.5*91*
2. F.O. 8V2165. F.O. to Bank of England, 1.6.91.
3. F.O. 8V2111. Macdonald to F.O., 29.5*91*
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for the Cameroons. His energy was extraordinary; Anderson's 
faith in his capacity as an organiser was not misplaced*
If good organisation was vital to the success of the 
Protectorate, so too were the administrative and political 
dispositions, and Macdonald lavished no less careful atten­
tion on them. The first task for the government, however, 
was to define his powers. He had formally received his 
instructions on April 18th. He was to be termed the Com­
missioner and Consul General, under whom would be Deputy 
Commissioners and Vice Consuls. They would all hold Consular 
commissions to enable them legally to perform acts "as to 
which powers are conferred on Consular officers by Acts of 
Parliament". Justice would be administered over Europeans 
and other non-natives by the provisions of the 1889 Order in 
Council. The district over which they were to exercise 
these powers was as defined in the proclamation of 188?, with 
the exception of those territories which were administered by 
the Royal Niger Company. With his neighbours and Her 
Majesty's naval officers, the Consul General was to endeavour 
to work in harmony and keep on friendly terms. With the 
Cameroons he was to co-operate in putting down smuggling, and
1. ibid. Macdonald to F.O. 1.7#91•
2. F.O. 8V2110 F.O. to Macdonald 18.1+.91.
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he should endeavour to settle, by negotiation "whenever an 
opportunity may offer"9 the basis of a boundary agreement for 
submission to the British and German governments. He was to 
make himself master of the international obligations affect­
ing his territory, the Berlin Act, the Anglo-German Agree­
ments and the Brussels Acts.
In his relations with the natives, the Commissioner was 
to ascertain that the treaties were thoroughly understood 
and aarried out by the Chiefs. He was to take steps to 
amend these treaties and make new ones, so as to open up the 
Protectorate and "gradually bring all the territories ... 
under a uniform system of administration". His object in all 
this was
"by developing British trade, by promoting civilisa­
tion, by inducing the natives to relinquish inhuman 
and barbarous customs, and by gradually abolishing 
slavery, to pave the way for placing the territories 
over which Her Majesty's Protection is and may be 
extended directly under British rule" .
Quite how he was to induce the natives to change their ways
without "interfering unduly with tribal government" and
whilst allowing the Chiefs to administer justice to their
subjects was not certain. But in the event of misgovernment
he was to insist on the Chiefs' judicial and administrative
powers being delegated to himself, although he should be
careful not to arouse discontent by too abrupt reform.
The government was in no doubt as to priorities. "The 
question of raising revenue", Macdonald was informed,
"requires your immediate attention". Comey must be abolished 
and revenue organised on a regular basis. Compensation could 
be paid to the Chiefs out of the revenue. All other expen­
diture, including repayments to the Treasury, had also to be 
covered by Protectorate funds.
Lastly all his reports and proposals were to be addressed 
to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs for sanction, 
and in his conduct he was to be guided by the General Consular 
Instructions issued to Her Majesty's officers. With this 
conclusion the unique nature of the new administration was 
revealed. Here was a flexible amalgam, intended to furnish 
a viable alternative to the Crown Colony method of ruling 
backward races.
There was one more problem to be tackled before the 
Commissioner could leave for the Rivers. How was the new 
administration to be introduced to the Chiefs of the Coast 
states? Here Macdonald justified all the trust which had 
been placed in his tact and judgement. The Consul General 
was not going to arrive unannounced in a gun-boat and arbi­
trarily declare his task of governing the country to the 
affronted dignity of the Chiefs. He proposed instead sending
out two of the Vice Consuls, Synge and D. Macdonald, on a 
special mission to the Protectorate to inform the Chiefs of 
the impending arrival of the Commissioner and Consul General, 
who, acting under the orders of Her Majesty's Government, 
would administer the government of the Rivers. To this end, 
and to pay for the expenses of the government, customs 
duties would be imposed in all the Rivers in the same manner 
as in adjacent countries. The Vice Consuls were then to 
read a proclamation imposing customs duties within the Protec­
torate as from August 10th, 1891* carefully abstaining from 
any discussion of its contents. This procedure was to be 
carried out in all the Rivers, and a copy of the proclamation 
was to be left posted in a conspicuous place. The Vice 
Consuls were enjoined to recall to the Chiefs that Queen's 
government was what they had requested in 1889, and state 
that the Commissioner was returning to redeem that promise.
For this purpose a Vice Consul would be stationed in each of 
the main Rivers. On his arrival the Commissioner himself 
would convene a meeting in each of the Rivers, explain the 
nature of the new administration in detail, and endeavour to 
obtain in writing the consent of the Chiefs to this arrange­
ment. Anderson thought this an excellent proposal. If the 
Vice Consuls left on the next boat on June 10th, they would 
arrive in the Rivers on July 2nd. This would allow a full
month's notice to he given of the imposition of duties,1 but 
no time to import dutiable goods to any great extent.
Therefore a proclamation should be drafted which, while it 
asserted the necessity to levy duties, did not claim a legal 
right to do so, pending the written assent of the Chiefs. In
this way, the Liverpool traders would not have the opportu-
2nity to get in with their tricks and evade duties.
Macdonald left Liverpool on July 1st, 1891. In barely
two and a half months from receiving his instructions, he
had organised his administration. The time had come to take
it off the drawing board. He sailed with the good will of
most of the community. The shipping interests expressed
themselves "eminently satisfied" and were "encouraged by the
interest the government is taking in this territory" 5 Jones
of Elder Dempster thought Major Macdonald "a particularly
3
suitable choice" to run the new administration. The 
Aborigines Protection Society were pleased at government 
action "long overdue". Likewise the independent traders, who
1. It is bbrange that the British Government ignored the Anglo- 
German agreement of 188?, which stipulated four months' 
notice. More surprisingly, Germany did not complain.
2. F.O. 8V 2167. Mins, by Macdonald, H.P.A., 5.6. F.O.C.P. 
6351, Macdonald to F.O., inc. proclamation and instruc­
tions to Synge.
3. F.O. 8V2167. Elder Dempster to F.O. 6.6.91. Anderson's 
comment: "This is a kind letter."
had long opposed any form of charter extension, were, even
if apprehensive about the new duties, pleased that the govern-
1
ment had at last made up its mind. The one sour note was 
introduced by the African Association, which whined about 
having been misled by the Foreign Office, claiming that now 
their property was left without protection and their position
2was one of "great perplexity", causing them "serious losses".
Anderson thought its tone "disgraceful" in view of the fact
that the "Chambers of Commerce, the shippers, and the new
traders were united against the policy of the Association".
Salisbury's memory was conveniently short however*
"I think they should be asked by Mr. Whitley to 
indicate more precisely 'the limits' of whose 
duplicity they speak. Such an idea as giving 
them a charter never crossed my brain." 3
1. F.O.C.P. 6351? passim, has correspondence of various 
bodies, all favourable to the new government.
2. F.O. 8V2172 Whitley M.P. to F.O. 10.8.91 Fnc memorial by 
African Association.
3. Ibid. Mins, by H.P.A. & S. 1^.8.91.
CHAPTER SIX
THE ADMINISTRATION
If the planning of the administration bore the stamp of 
the Commissioner's personality, still more did the execution 
of it. As long as the Protectorate was solvent, and as long 
as complaints at home and abroad were non-existent or trivial, 
the Foreign Office could not have cared less how the adminis­
tration was run. Indeed, refuge was often taken behind a 
somewhat spurious doctrine of non-responsibility. Thus 
Hervey, the Chief Clerk, stated in January 1893 that
"/we7 do not audit the accounts of the Oil Rivers 
Protectorate and I am not aware that we interfere 
with the administration of the Revenue"•
Lister went still further, doubting
"how far we have the power to sanction or dis­
allow any charges he /Macdonald/ may think right 
to make on his Oil Rivers Revenue." 1
Discretion could hardly have been wider, and it is signifi­
cant that a change in the official attitude only occurred 
when the Protectorate first ran into serious disturbances 
during 189*K But for three years the opinions and personal 
inclinations of the Consul General were central to the forrnu-
1 . F.O. 2/51. Macdonald to Rosebery, 10.1.93* Mins, by
H.H., T.V.L. Macdonald was proposing to grant an annual 
allowance to the daughters of Governor Beecroft.
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lation of policy within the Protectorate.
The spirit of his policy Macdonald summed up in a speech
at a dinner given in his honour by the Africa Trade Section
of the Liverpool Chamber of Commerce when on leave in 1892:
"The nature of the natives, the climate, everything 
is against precipitate and hasty action. To advance 
slowly, leaving no bad or unfinished work behind, to 
gain the respect and liking of the natives, and only 
to use force when compelled as a last resource to do 
so, are the means which in my humble opinion lead to 
success in West Africa." 1
Commerce, Christianity and civilisation were to be achieved 
therefore as far as possible by consultation.
This evolutionary policy did not represent to the Com­
missioner any excuse for inaction or an acceptance of the 
existing situation. The task of the administration was one 
of pioneer development: of education in the processes of
self-government until the area was fit for sound Crown 
Colony rule. Macdonald dismissed with contempt the idea that 
consultation meant abdication of responsibility by the central 
government or that the administration should interfere as 
little as possible in the affairs of the native states. The 
practices of human sacrifice and the killing of twins were
native institutions which would require an "interference,
2
more or less despotic, to put an end to"• Coercion was
1 . C.O. Nigerian Pamphlets, No.5. Proceedings at a banquet 
2 .1 1 .9 2.
2. F.O. 8^/2083. Memo, by Macdonald, 1.7.90.
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however a last resort, a policy which the Commissioner en­
forced on his subordinates, and it was significant that the 
first major conflict in the Protectorate took place when 
Macdonald was away on leave.
The key to effective government was the push into the 
interior. Macdonald saw the present troubles of the Oil 
Rivers as stemming from a lack of willingness on the part of 
government to provide sufficient men and materials to enable 
the former consular officers to move away from the coast, to 
which they clung on the sufferance of the native chiefs. The 
prosperous future, he argued, could only be secured by 
developing the resources of the interior, which were, at 
present,
"very inadequately utilised, and by improving the 
means of communication between it and the coast."
Eventually even the seat of government could be established
in the interior.^
One of the prime requirements of Macdonald's policy was
men. Of the original thirteen of the "little band of Pilgrim
Fathers" as they called themselves, who went out in 1891,
four succumbed to the climate before the administration was
well under way, while four others
1 . ibid.
2. Mockler Ferryman, Imperial Africa, p.2 8 7.
“were discreet enough to abandon the job after
the first year and return home to serener climes.11 1
Recruiting, however, for a long time remained on a haphazard
basis. When Macdonald left home for the Coast, he handed
over the job of recruitment to an army colleague, Major
Verner. The task during the next four years passed through
various hands: Macdonald himself, Moor, and the various
officers from time to time in charge at the London Agency.
It was only in 1896, when the Crown Agents took over the
business of the Protectorate, that an organised system of
vetting and appointing officers was established. Macdonald^
own contribution to the haphazard nature of recruitment was
exemplified in his instructions to Verner.
“You know the sort of man I ... want. Should be 
between 2b and 3*+ tut of course we can stretch a 
point both ways, medically sound guaranteed not to 
liquor to excess otherwise a hole six feet by two 
will be their reward as sure as eggs is eggs.
Should be able to shoot and rough it a bit though 
I donft hold to roughing it too much in this 
climate. Must have grit and be able to keep his 
temper and tongue to himself. Any ex-Army or 
Militia to have preference. 2
The bonhomie of the Commissioner was echoed by Sir 
Alfred Jephson, in charge of the London Agency from February 
I89I+ to October 1895. One future District Commissioner,
1. Galway, H.L., “Nigeria in the Nineties11, Journ.Afr.Soc., 
XXIX, 1930.
2. Macdonald P.P. Macdonald to Verner, 31*7«91*
2kl.
Douglas, a neifphew of Sir Alfred, left his account of an 
interview at the Agency which could hardly be exceeded for 
its brevity:
“Here you are, my boy ... here is a billet for you, 
if you like to take it . Sail next Saturday 1
That on this basis there was some indifferent material sent 
out to the Coast went without saying. What was remarkable 
was that there were so many men who in due course rose to 
high office. Only two men out of the many chosen did 
Macdonald find totally unsatisfactory, Dunn, a Consular 
Agent, whose dismissal involved the Protectorate in a pro­
tracted lawsuit, and Captain Scaife, whose dismissal from the 
Protectorate force for brawling in 1895 was amicably settled 
on a payment of nine months1 salary.
That Macdonald had so little trouble with his personnel, 
and that he made much out of seemingly indifferent material
was a remarkable tribute to his conduct of human relation­
ships. Gallway later recalled that the Commissioner
“was both Chief and Friend, a most lovable man 
and who was held in the greatest affection and 
esteem by all who had the good fortune and privi­
lege to serve under him.” 2
Lugard on his way to the coast in 189^ remarked that he
“never knew a man so universally liked as he is by everyone11
1. “Nemo“, Niger Memories, ^xeter 1927.
2. Galway, art. cit.
3. Lugard Diary Vol.H, Ed. Perham & Bull, p.6 6.
2^2.
The source ofMacdonald's popularity w^s not far to seek.
In a Protectorate where all worked hard, none worked harder 
than the Consul General. His concern for his men's health 
caused him to bend the rules in their favour and he consis­
tently defended himself against suggestions by officialdom 
at home that the salaries he paid were too high, the last
occasion being as he was on the point of departing for 
2
China. Macdonald's humanity to his staff was amply repaid
by their loyalty. The task of driving a team composed of so
many disparate elements was accomplished with the minimum 
of friction. Even such a delicate problem as the substitu­
tion of Moor for Wall, the senior Vice Consul, in the 
succession, was accomplished without any resignations, Wall 
contenting himself with a good-natured grumble and a rise in 
salary.^ It was important for the Consul General to be able 
to trust his subordinates, in that, given the rudimentary 
communications in the Rivers, the Vice Consul was at the 
beginning often left to his own devices. He was expected to 
act as a Jack of all trades - postmaster, customs officer,
1. F.O. 8H-/2111. Macdonald to Anderson, 17.12.91.
2. F.O. 2/99. Macdonald to Anderson, 25.2.96.
3. As Director General of Customs &  P.M.G., Wall was restric­
ted to Old Calabar, the political post of C.G. requiring 
greater mobility. Correspondence, 1895. F.O. 2/o*+.
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local magistrate, treasury official, diplomatic agent - until 
the relevant departments were organised. It was not surpri­
sing therefore that the initial strain took a heavy toll of 
the personnel.
Macdonald arrived in the Rivers on July 28th, 1891, and 
began immediately to organise his political dispositions. A 
fresh round of meetings with the chiefs was held, and the 
Commissioner discovered that Synge and Captain Macdonald had 
done their work well. Most of the chiefs stated that they 
thoroughly understood the customs duties, consented to their 
imposition and would abide by them. The chiefs of Bonny 
wanted to be informed in advance of any proposed alterations 
in the tariff, and Nana of Benin, flourishing his own copy 
of the proclamation, informed the Commissioner that he would 
now be able to see that his European friends did not charge 
more than was laid down in the schedules. At Brass the 
temper was at first militant, the Chiefs refusing to agree 
to the duties until the Commissioner gave them a written 
promise to get back their markets for them from the Niger 
Company. With a mixture of firmness and conciliation, 
Macdonald secured their submission on a promise that he would 
take up their case.
It is not quite clear why the chiefs accepted the
imposition of the duties so easily.1 Anene argues that the
significance was lost on them, because the new duties were
levied on imports and not on exports, with which the traders
2 m
were mostly concerned. This is hardly tenable in view of 
the fact that the duty raised the price of liquor, an 
important article of barter with the hinterland traders.
More attractive were the subsidies given in place of the 
comey, at best a tax of uncertain amount. Most important of 
all, however, the duties indicated the fair price which 
should be charged by the European for his goods.
At the conclusion of each meeting the Commissioner 
introduced the Vice Consuls to the European traders and to 
the Chiefs in whose rivers the political posts were to be 
established. Gallw^y and Synge were placed west of the
j2-ii;ejf
Delta at Beninj^and Warri; D. Macdonald, Hammill and Cairns 
Armstrong occupied the three central posts of Brass, Bonny 
and Opobo. The Commissioner himself looked after the 
interests of Old Calabar. The spare Vice Consul, Wall, in 
view of his official experience, was set to organise the 
customs department at headquarters. The consular assistants 
were distributed, and more were appointed, so that by March
1. F.O. 8V2111. Macdonald to Salisbury, 1.9.91.
2. Anene, op.cit.. p.137.
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1892 each post had its own relief. The Vice Consuls were to
be permanently resident in each of the Rivers, and in general
their continual presence was welcomed by the Chiefs. Indeed
the New Calabar Chiefs expressed great disappointment that
they were not to have a "Queen's man11 of their own; they
considered themselves quite as important as Bonny, and were
going to pay duties like the rest.^ It was the duty of each
Vice Consul 11 to make himself thoroughly acquainted’1 with his
district, and with the
"wants and wishes of Her Majesty's subjects, both 
white and coloured, and to carry out the provi­
sions of the Protectorate Treaties which the Chiefs 
had made from time to time with Her Majesty; he 
was especially charged to encourage and foster law­
ful trade,' though he himself was independent of it, 
and in no sense a trader, and generally to uphold 
justice, peace and civilisation throughout the 
Protectorate.11 2
The mushroom growth of Consular Assistants worried Hill 
at the Foreign Office. In April 1892 he wrote to Macdonald 
intimating that out of the ten consular agents appointed, 
only one had been approved; and that it was 11 not desirable 
to multiply the number of Consular appointments indefinitely11 ♦ 
Macdonald, however, stoutly defended the appointments on the
1. F.O. 8^/2111. Macdonald to F.O., 8.8.91.
2. ibid. Macdonald to Salisbury, 1.9.91.
3. F.O. 8V2193. Hill to Macdonald, 7.^.92.
2k6.
grounds that it was desirable, in view of the climate, to 
ensure continuity by always having a government official on 
the spot, and that the appointments, being probationary, did 
not need approval. The officers were simply subordinate 
officials in the employ of the government of the Oil Rivers,1 
If Macdonald was aware of Hillfs susceptibilities, he 
showed himself completely indifferent to them, 1893 saw 
the establishment of new out-stations at Sapele, Akvette and 
Degema, and a new principle of having three officers per 
consulate - one on leave, one travelling, and one holding a 
judicial warrant at the main post, to act under the Africa
p
Order in Council of 1889. In January 1895 Degema was raised 
to consulate rank,^ and Sapele became the headquarters of the 
Benin River consulate. The system of the "three men in a
if
boat" as Hill called it, raised the number of political staff
in 189^ to twenty-two out of a total personnel of ?0 Euro- 
*
peans, at a total cost to the Protectorate of between
6
£11,000 and £12,000 per year.
1. F.O. 8V2191*. Macdonald to Salisbury, 20.5.92.
2. F.O. 2/63. Jephson to F.O. 22.3 .9^ -.
3. F.O. 2/6*+. Macdonald to F.O., 27*11.9^* 2/82, F.O. to
Macdonald, 19.1.95*
k. F.O. 2/6 3 . As above, Min. by C.L.H.
5 . ibid.
6 . F.O.C.P. 6783. N.C.P. Agency to F.O., k.7.95, & 2/8*+,
Agency to F.O., 15.7.95«
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Having laid down the principle that each Vice Consul 
should reside in his river, the immediate practical problem 
was where. The government owned no buildings in the Rivers 
apart from the residence at Old Calabar, about which 
Macdonald was scarcely polite. He described it as a dilapi­
dated wooden house with a tin roof which leaked, with 
windows falling and surrounded by thick jungle up to the 
front door, - ,!a truly dismal abode11 Outside the Rivers 
was Johnston1s former residence on Mandole Island, now under 
the German flag. In addition to this Hewett had prepared a 
site at the mouth of the Bonny River for £107, but, pending
a decision on the administration, no building had been
2
erected there. Macdonald had been aware of the accommoda­
tion problem before he left England and had opened negotia­
tions with the trading firms to rent or buy property in the 
Rivers. This was not easy. The prices asked by the African 
Association were exorbitant, and they were in any case un­
willing to rent property. Miller Brother proved to be more 
willing to let a number of buildings and warehouses to the 
Commissioner at a reasonable rental. Miller Brother however
1. Geog. Journ. Sept. 1914, also F.O. 84/2111, Macdonald to 
F.O. 8.8.91.
2. F.O.C.P. 6351. Memo, by Mr. Ball re. property, H.M.G.,
O.R.P.
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had no property at Brass, and here Macdonald had to use the 
resources of a small firm outside the big combines, Messrs, 
Brotherton, who sold him a dwelling house, wharf and ware­
houses for £1110, some £1300 cheaper than the lowest African 
Association price.^
The renting of property was at best a short term solu­
tion, and so, after his arrival on the Coast, he began to put 
the question on a more satisfactory footing. At Old Calabar 
the consulate wqs in a worse state than even Macdonald had 
anticipated, but in twelve months the place had been com­
pletely rebuilt and a new roof put on. Two other buildings 
were erected at the same time at a cost of £1000, one for 
the Treasury and customs, the other as a Headquarters and 
mess house for the Constabulary. Fort Stuart was purchased 
in December 1892 from the African Association, as a bonded 
warehouse and offices for clerks, for £3000. The consulate 
buildings were situated on a hill about 100 feet above the
level of the river, and on the river bank Macdonald began to
2construct a wharf. This brought him into sharp conflict with 
the African Association, who claimed ownership of the beach. 
The dispute was not settled until January 1893? after threat
1. F.O. 8V2111. Macdonald to F.O. 10.^.91.
2. F.O. 8V2191*-. Macdonald to Rosebery, 10.12.92.
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of legal proceedings, when the Association agreed to be 
bought off for £100
At Opobo and Warri, the Commissioner approached the 
native chiefs direct for grants of land, and soon large and 
commodious buildings were being erected to serve as Consulate, 
Customs House, Court of Justice and prison. At Bonny, the 
government possessed the land prepared by Hewett. Since 
nothing had been done to it since 1887, it had nearly dis­
appeared because of the action of the tide . The land was 
reclaimed by means of a breakwater, but the Commissioner 
still considered it fit only for stores and warehouses. To 
house the Consulate, a hulk, the "George Shotton", was pur­
chased in August 1891 for just under £1800 and anchored off 
the European factories.
It was not until August 1892 that the government was able 
to acquire a house in the Benin Biver. Until then the Vice 
Consul had to rely on the hospitality of traders. The house 
when purchased had the advantage of a large storehouse, but 
cost some £200 to repair. Macdonald already had plans for 
moving the Consulate away from the unhealthy river mouth, and
to this end he purchased a hulk for £3600 and towed it some
2
seventy miles up river to Sapele.
1. F.O. 2/51. Macdonald to Rosebery, V.1.93* Macdonald 
paid another £100 for the Association^ rights to a 
similar beach at Opobo.
2. F.O. Qk/219k, Macdonald to Rosebery, 10.12.92.
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With so much water in the Protectorate, boats were
obviously a vital part of the establishment. The marine
account always remained one of the heaviest charges on the
revenue.^- From the previous regime Macdonald took over
two six-oared gigs, and one of these was badly holed above
2
the water line. During the first year of the administra­
tion, Macdonald acquired twenty-two more rowing boats of 
assorted sizes for local use in each river. These were the 
real sinews of the administration, used for customs and 
postal work as well as for carrying orders and messages. The* 
purchase of larger boats was a bigger problem. In the first 
place, for communication between rivers, each consulate would 
require a steam launch, which would obviously have to be 
bought in England. During his perambulation of the rivers 
in August 1891, Macdonald had renewed his acquaintance with 
Captain Boler. As the latter was due to go on leave, and
moreover knew precisely what was required, the Commissioner
3
asked him to oversee the purchase of the boats in England.
In addition to the steam launches, boats capable of 
navigating the coastal waters were needed. The hire of the
1. See Table 2.
2. F.O.C.P. 6351* Memo by Mr. Ball re. Property H.M.G.,
O.R.P., 20.5.91.
3. Macdonald P.P. Macdonald to Boler, 15.10.91; F.O. 
8V2180, Min. by H.P.A., 10.12.
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African Steamship Companyfs MWhydahn, which the Commissioner 
had used in August, was scarcely a long term solution.^- On 
August 2*+th, therefore, he wrote home, asking if the 
Admiralty could be approached to effect the purchase of a 
second-hand sea-going steam yacht for which he was prepared
p
to pay £8,000 to £10,000. He followed this with a request 
for three sternwheelers, for which he enclosed exacting 
specifications, and for which he was prepared to pay £6000
3
apiece.
Boler served the Commissioner well. He inspected a
number of sea-going yachts put forward by the Admiralty, and
condemned them all as unsuitable. He advised Macdonald that
it would be better to have a new boat built to specification
If
in the long run. Macdonald however took fright at the
effect on the revenue of the cost of a new vessel and decided
5
to try to manage without a yacht altogether, and rely on the
g
Admiralty for a periodic gunboat patrol. It was scarcely a
1. F.0. 8V2111, to F.O., 2^.8.91.
2. F.0. 8^/2111 Macdonald to F.0. 2^.8.91.
3. F.O.C.P. 6351* Macdonald to F.0., 10.10.91*
*f. F.0. 8^/2180. Boler to F.0., 1^.12.91.
5. F.O.C.P. 6351. Boler to F.0., ^.2.92.
6* ibid. F.0. to Admiralty, 9.12.92.
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wise decision. His whim for economy lasted barely twelve
months in the face of reality. In March 1893, faced with a
mounting need, Macdonald was still undecided as to whether to
buy or not. His compromise decision to charter the steam
packet fEvangelinef from Messrs. Atkey of Cowes at a cost of
£1500 per year gave him the worst of both worlds. The
Evangeline was a small pleasure yacht of 13*+ tons, with no
accommodation for troops, and a maximum accommodation for
six passengers with a crew of twelve. Even Macdonald
admitted she was too small and was 11 not well suited for a
2
tropical climate11. Moreover, without an adequately large 
vessel, Macdonald was still in pawn to the Admiralty for his 
day to day needs. Reluctantly, the Commissioner decided that 
a vessel tailored to the needs of the Protectorate would have 
to be built. Accordingly an order was laid with Earles of 
Hull, through the London agency, for a suitable vessel to 
carry 250 troops.^ By the time the vessel became operative 
as the steam-yacht 'Ivy1 in September 1895, the cost had 
spiralled to £53,000 (Boler's estimate in 1891 had been 
£30,000). The 'Evangeline' in the two years of its hire had
1. F.0. 2/51. Macdonald to Lister, 25*3*93; 2/50, F.0. to
Macdonald, 2.5*93*
2. F.0. 2/63* Macdonald to Kimberley, 19*8.9*+*
3. ibid.
mulcted the Protectorate of over £5000 including running 
costs, and a claim by the owners for £1500 "^ for repairs was
p
submitted to arbitration early in 1896. The whole transac­
tion brought the Protectorate dangerously near deficit. 
Macdonald was forced to rely on a doubling of the spirit 
duties in November 1895 and a short-term bridging loan of 
£20,000 from the African Association to stay in the black.
A suitably chastened Commissioner was busy explaining to the 
Foreign Office why they had not been informed of the deci­
sion to spend so much out of revenue in view of the fact that 
the Treasury might have had to be faced on a deficit. The
t
resignation of Jephson tn October as a result of a rift 
between himself and Macdonald over the transaction provided 
a suitable occasion to bring the Protectorate under a firmer 
financial control.
With regard to the sternwheelers and launches, the out­
come wqs happier. Boler had shot holes in the Admiralty
building estimates and had recommended putting contracts out
bto private firms. By the beginning of 1892, he had made 
contracts for a sternwheeler and five steam launches at a
1. F.0. 83/1380. Exchequer of Audit to F.0. 15.7*9?*
2. F.0. 83/1^1. Crown Agents to F.0. 17.12.9 6.
3. F.0. 2/51* Mins, by C.L.H. & H.P.A., 2.11.9?.
b. F.0 . 8V 2180. Boler to F.0 ., 15.12.91.
25b.
price some £3000 below Admiralty estimates . The work pro­
ceeded rapidly, and by June the boats were ready for shipping 
to the Hivers. The sternwheeler was named 'Beecroft *"*" and was 
fitted out with a six pounder quick-firer, and two three- 
barrelled Maxims. Each of the launches had a Maxim.
Expensive new equipment required much care and mainten­
ance, but it was not until the appointment of Commander 
Dundas, R.N. (retired), as Marine Superintendent in June 1893* 
that the marine department really got under way. By July 
1895 the Protectorate owned six steam launches, one steam 
pinnace and 61 other boats scattered among the consulates, of 
assorted shapes, varying from a large six-oared 38-foot 
mahogany gig to a flat-bottomed Maxim gun punt. Only Bonny 
and Sapele Consulate did not possess steam vessels at all. 
Pride of place went to the new steam vessel •Ivy1 delivered 
in September 1895* Expensive though she was, she was 
tailored to the needs of the Protectorate. At 337 tons, 
length 237 feet and breadth 3^ feet, she was by far the 
largest boat in the Protectorate service. Her troop deck was 
capable of accommodating 100 men with deck space for 150 
more. This could be expanded to accommodate 300 native 
troops. Equipped with a searchlight, a 28 foot steam cutter,
1. The. fBeecroftf foundered in a tornado in the Cross River, 
early in 1895.
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a seven pounder Armstrong, a six pounder quick firer breech 
loader, and Maxim guns, the 1Ivy1 was the most formidable 
boat in the Delta, far more akin to a gunboat than anything 
the Niger Company possessed.
The marine department was a large employer of labour. 
Under the superintendent (salary £600) were four assistant 
superintendents, a beachmaster, and a number of engineers, 
quartermasters, boatswains etc. The European staff rose 
from nine at the end of 189^ to fifteen a year later. The 
native staff over the same period (cooks, carpenters, store­
keepers, clerks, blacksmiths, engineers, firemen) rose from 
seven to forty-seven. In addition to these were some 360 men 
who made up the crews, mostly Kroo boys. These were paid 
25s. per month, a rate similar to that at Lagos.
The main establishment of the marine department was at 
Old Calabar and consisted in-1895-of boat sheds, repairing 
slip and gridiron, with store houses and a machine shop.
The problem at headquarters was shortage of space. The 
entire dockyard was crammed into 1000 square yards of Queen's 
beach on the left bank of the river, and plans were afoot to 
extend this when Macdonald left the Protectorate in 1895*
Each one of the consulates by this time had its own slipway 
and boat house built either by labour provided by the chiefs
256.
or by prison labour.'*'
The land arm of the Protectorate was the constabulary,
or as it was originally known, the Oil Rivers Irregular
Force. This was the completely new body which Moor had gone
out to organise in May 1891, and it owed nothing to Annesley's
soldiers and police. With the departure of the Consul in the
spring of 1891 went what discipline this force had ever had,
and complaints came in to Macdonald of
"numerous acts of lawlessness and pillage ... 
assaulting the natives, beating them and breaking 
into their houses, interfering with their women, 
all of which they did saying they were the 
'Consul's men' and could not be touched."
Macdonald quickly demonstrated that they could be touched by
handing out summary sentences of hard labour and the cat to
the worst offenders and making a clean sweep of the rest by
2
disbanding the whole force. It was a decision which went a 
long way towards developing mutual trust between the govern­
ment and the chiefs.
The history of the new Protectorate force began with the 
loan for one year of ten trained men from the Gold Coast 
Constabulary as a nucleus and for training recruits. The
1. Sources for this account of the marine departments F.0. 
2/63, Macdonald to Kimberley, 19.8.9^5 Report of the 
Marine Department of the N.C.p. 1895, Private; F.0. 
83/I38O, Exchequer & Audit Dept, to F.0. 15.7.95•
2. F.0. 8*4/2111. Macdonald to F.0. 8.8.91.
3. F.O.C.P. 6351. Macdonald to F.O., 10.9.91.
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Gold Coast refused to allow recruiting within the colony, 
however, since their own forces were under-strength. Moor 
rejected the inhabitants of the Rivers as soldiers on the 
curious grounds that they were not "known to be fit to be 
trained", and, more reasonably, that it would be inadvisable 
to employ them anyway. At Lagos, however, he received every 
possible assistance from the government, and by the end of 
the first year had raised a force totalling 165, consisting 
of himself and a European adjutant, 10 native staff and 153 
non-commissioned officers and men. About fifty of the men 
were Hausas, the rest Yoruba.
At first the men were housed in rebuilt native huts, but 
in 1893 a barracks sufficient for 300 men was built at Old 
Calabar. On a similar temporary basis the men were armed 
with Snider weapons, which Moor considered out of date and 
suitable for training only. He wanted Martini weapons with 
sword bayonets. A school for teaching the men English and a 
canteen were also established at Old Calabar.
To supplement the work of the soldiers, Moor raised a 
second body of men trained to the use of arms, who performed 
the duties of a military police, carried out the orders of 
the Consular Courts, arrested and escorted prisoners, and 
afforded armed protection to the Vice Consuls when required. 
These were the later notorious Court Messengers. They were
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provided with a uniform of khaki and blue serge and armed 
with Snider rifles. The officer commanding the irregulars 
had overall responsibility for their internal economy, and 
for those stationed at Old Calabar, but at the other consu­
lates they were under the immediate direction and control of 
the Vice Consuls. The force numbered 26 in December 1892 .^  
With the passing of ordinances providing for punishment 
by imprisonment for various offences, a new function was 
added to the task of the Court Messengers, and it became 
necessary to establish them on a more independent footing.
An officer in charge of Prison discipline, Hill, was appoin­
ted, and prisons established at Old Calabar, Degema, and 
Sapele. Opobo, Bonny, Brass, Warri, Benin and Quo Ibo each 
had one room lock-ups. Staffing was provided by an expanded 
i  force of 77 Court Messengers, who continued to provide their
old services alongside the new. In line with their more 
specialised functions, Court Messengers were possessed of 
better pay and conditions than men in the irregular force.
In fact the best of the irregulars, or those who retired 
after a term, were generally drafted into the civilian force. 
A keeper of prison got £7#10s.0d per month, a private Is.3d. 
a day.
It was the Court Messengers' task to supervise the 
prisoners. Those having an aptitude for overseeing work were
1. F.O.C.P. 6351. Moor to Rosebery, 8.12.92. Inc. by Moor.
I ' '
\ ' ■
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put in charge of gangs of half a dozen men employed either 
on hard labour, which included the making and repairing of, 
roads, cleaning latrines, cutting bush and firewood and 
carrying water, or light labour such as cleaning the prison 
yard, whitewashing and drying earth for latrines, Fosbery, 
the Acting Vice Consulaat New Calabar, estimated the value 
of the prisoners* labour at £150 for the year 189V 5 * from 
the twenty or so prisoners held in the Degama prison - a 
substantial amount in terms of labourer's wages of 6d, per 
diem,^~
The position of the Irregular Force was regularised by 
the passing of a Constabulary Ordinance in 189^. Macdonald 
regarded it as essential that the force in the Protectorate 
should be under proper military discipline and control, A 
full range of offences were provided for with their punish­
ments (28-33) > 4 ncW i ng that of desertion (33)» but court 
martial was replaced by trial by the Commandant with 
assessors (37)* In the event of war, the ordinance provided 
for the full application of the Army Act, V+ & ^5 Victoria, 
whilst the emergency lasted (56), The civil nature of the 
ordinance did not touch the discipline of the new force; it 
figured prominently instead in its powers and duties. Thus,
1. F.0. Fosbery to Macdonald, in Macdonald to Salisbury
25«7.95. The Prisons Department cost the Protectorate 
£1*4-52 in 189V 5 and £2902 in 1895/6 - the increase resulted 
from the Brass troubles. Estimates, F.0. 83/1380,
Exchequer Audit to F,0., 15.7.95*
every officer was a justice of the peace in the Protectorate, 
and every member of the force a constable (2?). This gave 
them powers of arrest over civilians (26, 27) as well as 
making them amenable to the ordinary course of justice (*fl, 
*f2) in the Consular Courts. Control of the force was vested 
firmly in the Commissioner. The Commandant was responsible 
to the Commissioner for the direction and general superinten­
dence of the force (6).1
Armed with the Ordinance, Moor*s little army was taken 
in hand by the new Commandant, Boisragon, appointed in March 
189*+.2 The force was rapidly raised to a total of V 50 non­
commissioned officers and men, split into eight companies, 
with provision for further expansion. The European officers 
in July 1895 numbered 16, the Commandant receiving the same 
pay as a Vice Consul, and 15 Wing Officers with pay varying 
from £350 to £500. Native officers when appointed got 5s.0d 
a day, sergeant majors 3s.0d., sergeants Is.6d., corporals 
Is.3d., lance corporals Is.Id. and privates Is.Od. Enlist­
ment was for three years in the first ihstanee, but re­
enlistment was permitted for a total period of eighteen 
years, when a gratuity was payable. The men*s rations were
1. F,0. 2/62. ConstabulaiyOrdinance N.C.P.
2. The following account of the Protectorate force, except 
where stated, is taken from F,0. 83/1 38 0, Exchequer Audit 
to F.0., 15.7*95, F.0. 2/65, Macdonald to Kimberley 
19.8.9*+, Annual Report, 1895. Also-personal information 
from Captain Jordan, I960,
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provided, except at the permanent stations where 3d day 
subsistence allowance was paid. The force was equipped with 
the latest Martini-Henry carbine Mark 1, 1893, with matching 
sword bayonets; two Maxims; a battery of four 7-pounder
H.M.L. light field guns, and a war rocket apparatus. Each 
recruit on enlistment went through a course in musketry and 
a refresher course each year.
Besides the main barracks at Old Calabar with its space 
for six companies, there were barracks of a similar pattern 
for one company at Sapele and Degema. Military posts were 
also established at Itu on the Cross, Ekanem Essien on the 
Akpayafe, and Uwet on the Old Calabar River, as part of the 
policy of hinterland penetration. Since February 1895, to 
soothe the susceptibilities of the Niger Company, a detach­
ment had been stationed at Brass.
Not surprisingly, in view of his own interests, Macdonald 
was proud of his little force. Morale was high; sickness 
was little more than 1 per cent per annum; drunkenness was 
rare despite the close proximity of the native towns to the 
barracks; military offences of a serious nature were unknown; 
there were only two desertions after the passing of the 
Ordinance, and eight bad characters discharged; and the 
men's developing discipline and standards of gunnery paid 
dividends in steadiness under fire during 189V 5 *
x X
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From the beginning the Foreign Office had told the 
Commissioner that what he could have in terms of men, plant 
and armaments depended on the money he could raise. Since 
the success of the government depended on the size of the 
revenue, fiscal matters obtruded into all departments and 
were never far from the Commissioner's mind.
Owing to difficulties of communication within the 
Protectorate, which led to delay in the rendering of accounts, 
Macdonald decided in June 1893 to transfer the Protectorate 
Treasury to London and appoint a local Treasurer at Old 
Calabar, as in the other Vice Consulates. Such a transfer, 
he predicted, would result in the saving of several hundred 
pounds each year in salaries, and a more satisfactory system
■i
of obtaining and paying for supplies. By April 189^ the
transfer was complete. The new treasurer was Clive Bayley, 
late of the Audit Department, whose handsome salary of £500 
indicated the importance Macdonald attached to his task.
The new Treasury system followed the Colonial Regula­
tions, with some adaptation to the needs of the Protectorate, 
and included the preparation of yearly budgets and estimates 
for the approval of the Secretary of State. The main modi­
fication of the old system was that the classification and
1 . F.0. 2/51. Macdonald to Rosebery, 2^.6 .93*
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rendition of the accounts for audit were carried out in
London. This had the twin advantages of speed and consistency
of classification through constant supervision by the same
officer. More important to Macdonald a priceless burden of
work was taken off the shoulders of his political officers.
Much of the local checking work was thrown on to the
shoulders of the Local Auditor, who submitted an independent
report to the audit office. Audit cost the Protectorate
about £8^0, half of which was the salary of the Local
Auditor, Phelips, appointed by Ryan in 189^. The arrangement
disposed of the biggest complaint of the Audit office, that
hitherto they had had to accept the figures submitted by
the Vice Consuls since there was no means of checking their
1
revenue figures. The effects of the new system were soon
felt. In September 189^ on the return of Bayley from
organising the system in the Protectorate, the accounts for
1892/3 were at last submitted. But the accounts for 189V5
2
were only three months late. Estimates took a little 
longer to organise. The first to be submitted, for the year 
1895/6 , did not arrive at the Foreign Office until the finan­
cial year was four months old. This was partly the fault of
1. F.O.C.P. 6572. Exchequer & Audit Dept, to F.O.,'22.9.9^*
2. ibid.. & 6873, N.C.P. Agency to F.O., **.7.95.
the Foreign Office, whose instructions were not received in
the Protectorate until December 189^.^ The estimates for the
following year duly arrived at the appointed time, on
2
January 1st, 1896.
The first two Treasurers of the Protectorate, Roberts 
and Bayley, served the Commissioner well* Between them they 
had produced through practical experience a system which 
defended the revenue at the same time as it was easy to 
operate, and had rendered collection efficient. Careful 
husbandry had produced by March 189^ a emulative asset of 
over £59*000, an amount, in the event, more than sufficient 
to cover the deficit of the following year caused by trade 
depression and the injudicious purchase of the yacht fIvy'.
If there ever was a threat of a financial crisis, it quickly 
passed with the resumption of a normal pattern of surplus in 
the following year.
The debt to the Treasury was paid off in the summer of 
1893* As the Treasury had revealed the full extent of its 
generosity by insisting that the loan of £1^,000 should be
1. F.0. 2/8^* Jephson to F.0*, 15.7*95. Moor to F.0.,
11.8.95*
2. F.0. 2/100. Macdonald to F.0., 1.1.96*
3. See Table 1.
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allowed to accrue interest at a quarterly compound rate of
3$ (that is, considerably more than the original 3$ per
annum), this was an event greeted with great applause by both
the Foreign Office and Macdonald, even if the interest was
not yet paid.'1' Moreover the viability of the embryo colony
was triumphantly vindicated. Roseberyfs lf0 si sic omnesu on
2
the provisional accounts to August 1892 adequately expressed
the views of officialdom. As long as the Commissioner
3
produced such stunning surpluses there was really no reason 
to interfere in the administration.
Macdonald's capacity to keep out of financial trouble 
depended almost entirely on the revenue from customs, which 
always exceeded 92$ of the total government income. The 
Foreign Office recognised this, and it was with some relief 
that they heard that the Chiefs had accepted the proclamation
1 . F.0. 8V2193. F.0 . to Macdonald, 25.3.92. 219 f^, Macdonald
to Salisbury, 23.*+.92. Lister's remark, "Shylock would 
hardly have done this11 was equalled by Salisbury's charac­
teristic comment "I wonder they do not require him 
^Macdonald7 to take half of it in old Blue Books11.
2. F.0. 8^/219^* Macdonald to Rosebery, 10.12.92.
3* See Table 1.
b 9 The rest of the revenue came from licenses, fees of 
court, postal revenue and petty cash. These sometimes 
amounted to little more than 2$, see Table 1. Included 
in the balance was some income from investments.
imposing duties* The position was now at any rate legally 
clear. The fiction of delegation of powers by the Chiefs 
was maintained, although it was not until 189** that the 
Customs Ordinance giving full effect to this consent was 
passed.
The customs department was organised by Thomas Wall, the 
oldest and most experienced official of the original pioneers. 
He was not the most popular man in the European community, 
and for this reason Macdonald eased him tactfully from the 
succession, maintaining that the Customs Department (with the 
Post Office) was a full-time job. As a Director General of 
Customs, however, he excelled, bringing just the right amount 
of professional stiffening into the administration; he was 
given a freedom in the supervision of the customs which 
Macdonald allowed no other head of department. He was, for 
instance, allowed to engage as well as train his own per­
sonnel.
On his way out to the Coast in July I89I Wall had broken
1. F.0. 8V2111. Macdonald to F.0. 8 .8 . & 1.9.91 Mins, by
H.P.A. What the F.0. would have done had the. chiefs not
concurred is not clear. Anderson was more concerned to
forestall 11 intrigues on the part of discontented Liverpool 
traders11. Ihis was not entirely a matter of his imagina­
tion. Macdonald had reported that the African Association 
and others had been pouring in articles before the duties 
were leviable, doing "their best to starve" him. Never­
theless the receipts for August touched £11,000.
2. F.0. 8H-/2111. Macdonald to Anderson, 17.12.91.
his journey at Sierra Leone and Cape Coast to recruit staff, 
and consequently he did not arrive in the Protectorate until 
August 27th. The proclamation imposing duties had already 
been in force for nearly three weeks and Roberts had tempora­
rily supervised collection, but there were a number of 
matters requiring adjustment. This was particularly the 
case at Brass and Warri. The difficulty of getting the 
Customs books and forms to those stations meant that there 
was no return of imports for the month of August at Warri.
At Brass the imports for the month were all free goods.
During September Wall made a lightning tour of all the 
stations to instruct the Vice Consuls in the method of eheck- 
ing the books and forms kept, and to install the native 
customs officers under their control. Each Vice Consul was 
the local Director General of Customs, responsible for this 
part of his work to Wall, and was paid an acting allowance 
of £50# The nature of communications within the Protectorate 
demanded this measure of decentralisation. Only Wall, 
however, on consultation with the Commissioner, could dismiss 
a native customs officer.
Duties were payable half in cash and half in bills drawn 
in England, but latitude was given to the Vice Consul of the 
district to vary the proportions in order to meet the exigen­
cies of the public service. Duties in the other West African
1 ' Wail' 8h/ZL9k’ Macdonald t0 Salisbury, 9 A . 92. Inc. by
colonies had to be paid in specie, and only the Commissioner's 
desire to reconcile the merchants to the new system made him 
willing to incur the inconvenience and expense of the bill 
system. The bills were collected by the Bank of England at 
charges ranging from 6d. to 5s.; they were sometimes lost, 
ran the risk of being protested, and always depreciated owing 
to loss of interest on the passage home. The total loss to 
the Protectorate Treasury varied between three and five 
thousand pounds a year.^
The problem of the shortage of specie nevertheless had 
to be faced. A number of the agents had not been supplied 
with sufficient by their employers to meet even half the 
duty, and it was necessary that the administration should be 
provided with coin to pay the wages of the native employees,
which up to the middle of 1892 were mostly paid in powder,
 2 ....................................
cloth, gin and brass rods. Macdonald first tried purchasing
silver from Lagos, but found their charge of 2%% prohibitive.
The Master of the Mint in London proved a better proposition.
He agreed to extend to the Oil Rivers the arrangement with
the West African colonies, whereby, in consideration of being
paid in gold in London, the Mint sent out new silver at par,
1. F.0. 8V2191*. Macdonald to F.O., 18.5.92.
2* ibid. Macdonald to F.O., 21.3.92.
charging themselves freight and insurance. Soon Macdonald
was transmitting regular orders to London, and by 1896 there
was an estimated £60,000 in circulation in the Protectorate.
Since the threepenny bit was the smallest silver coin, the
brass rod at 2|-d., the manilla at lid, and copper wires at
id. remained the standard small change in the Protectorate.
0
There was no paper money. Silver seems to have been readily 
accepted by the native traders, who showed however an un­
willingness to accept gold, although according to Macdonald, 
they were well aware of the difference in value of the two 
metals.
The budget of the Customs Department was a modest 3 
of the total revenue in 1895 and consisted almost entirely of 
salaries. Besides the Vice Consuls, Wall had under him one 
assistant collector, a chief clerk and H-8 native staff, 
principally from Sierra Leone and the Gold Coast, employed
If
at the out-stations. Their salaries ranged from £10 to £50. 
The number of officers employed at the out-stations varied in 
accordance with the size and importance of the station and
1 . ibid.
2. C.0. **6Vl. N.C.P. Blue Book, 1896/7*
3 . F.0 . 8V2191*. Macdonald to F.0. 21.3*92*
F.0. 83/1380. Exchequer & Audit Dept, to F.0., 15*7*95*
the number of vessels entering the ports. Bonny, for 
instance, never had less than eight, New Calabar had seven, 
while Brass, Warri, Benin and Opobo never required more 
than four or five. In addition to the main stations, protec­
tive posts, employing two staff each, were organised on the
German frontier on the east and at Sapele on the west,**" and
2
at Idu and Bakana near the Niger Company's frontier on the 
eastern side of the Delta. The greatest number of staff was 
naturally employed at Old Calabar where all the out-station 
returns had to be incorporated for compilation of the annual 
statistics. At headquarters probationers were also trained 
by Wall for duties at the out-stations, in order to relieve 
the older officers who had completed their three-year contract.
The regulations proposed by Wall were given legal 
sanction in the Customs Ordinance of April 189^*^ This 
ordinance represented in great measure the recognition of a 
fait accompli, since it was considered unwise to draw atten­
tion to the doubtful legality of the Protectorate's actions
if
by untoward amendment of existing regulations. Where,
1. F.0. 2/63* Macdonald to Kimberley, 19*8.93* Beport on 
Customs•
2. F.0. 8V2191*, Moor to F.0. 12.10.92. Inc. by Casement.
Both Macdonald and Wall were on leave.
3* F.0. 2/62. Customs Ordinance (adapted from Gold Coast
Regulations).
k . F.0. 83/121*. F.0. to Gray 19*12.93*
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however, it provided the administration with teeth, and with 
powers hitherto unexercised, was in the prevention and detec­
tion of smuggling. Up to then the Customs officers had had 
to rely on vigilance alone to prevent smuggling. This 
reliance took the form of stationing two outdoor officers on 
board all ships entering Protectorate ports, who remained 
there until the ship cleared outward bound and left the 
anchorage. Action against offenders was usually limited to 
seizing the offending goods, more rarely to prosecution on 
a general charge of obstructing the Vice Consul in the execu­
tion of his duty. The Ordinance provided specific penalties 
for smuggling of imprisonment for up to three months, a fine 
not exceeding £?0, or both (sec. ibh). In addition to the 
penalties laid down, the Commissioner was permitted to make
11 all needful regulations for the better carrying
into effect the provisions of the Protectorate
Customs Ordinance11 (sec.27).
Under this clause extensive powers were conferred on the 
Customs officers of the Protectorate, permitting them free 
access to all parts of ships, coming within their jurisdic­
tion, and which authorized them to search ships from 11 stem 
to stern11.^ On land surprise surveys were to be held periodi­
cally by officers in charge of districts upon the stores of
1. F.0. 2/62. Customs Ordinance, 1891*.
importers, and examination made of any packages that 11 may he 
selected by the officer in question”. At least two surprise 
surveys were to be held per quarter and every factory visited 
once in six months. Periodic checks were to be made on the 
work of the native staff and a certificate sent in at the end 
of every quarter saying this had been done."*’ The Commissioner 
was determined to protect his revenue.
Having laid the foundations of sound administration, 
Macdonald proceeded to build thereon. To this end, recruit­
ment proceeded apace for the new departments he intended to 
organise - departments 11 for the spreading of civilisation11, 
like the Post Office, Botanical, Medical, Sanitary, Intelli­
gence and Public Works Departments.
 2
At first the Post Office was seen by Wall as an adjunct
to the Customs Department, an officer being detailed at each
station to undertake postal duties. This had weakened the
customs staff, and with the passing of the Post Office Ordinance
1. F.0. 2/8h. Customs Report for 1895.
2. The following account of the P.O., except where stated, 
is based on F.0. 2/62, the P.O. Ordinance 189*+, and on 
the Annual Reports for 189^ and 1895 in F.0. 2/63 and 
2/83.
of 189^ it was decided to set the department up on an inde­
pendent basis. Wall remained Postmaster General, with a total 
staff in 1895 of twenty, three each at Old and New Calabar, 
two at Bonny, and one each at Opobo, Warri, Forcados, Brass, 
Benin, Quo Ibo, and Sapele. There were in addition three 
itinerant postmen, an Assistant Postmaster (a European) and 
a Chief Clerk. The department was grossly under-staffed, the 
officers (Wall described them as "native coast Africans11) 
performing the work of local postmasters, sorters and stamp- 
sellers, often single-handed. By force of circumstance the 
supervision of the Vice Consuls was often of a desultory 
nature. It was not surprising that visitors to the Rivers 
failed to be struck by the impressive institution of Her 
Majesty*s Mails. One of these early visitors left a typical 
description of the Post Office at Forcados:
"It was not an imposing edifice, - only a little 
square hut, built either of cotton wood logs or 
frame boarding ... I found the interior reeking 
with damp, and dimly lit by a highly odoriferous 
paraffin-lamp. The room contained little besides 
one or two vermilion-painted barrels •• • and 
various kinds of creeping things; but there was 
moisture everywhere, standing in beads upon the 
match-board, trickling down the walls and filling 
the shadowy apartment with steamy discomfort."
This particular Post Office also did duty as some kind of
hotel, where Europeans who wished to catch the boat home spent
2?b.
an uncomfortable night in a trestle cot.
If the Post Office was not impressive, it was at least 
effective. The local post from river to river, which was 
taken through the connecting creeks by means of boats and 
canoes, had a near hundred per cent success record, according 
to Wall, only one miscarriage of mail occurring in 189V ?  
owing to the capsizing of a canoe; the mail was subsequently 
recovered, though damaged. To overcome the problem of cap­
sizing canoes, the mail was carried in vermilion-painted 
barrels, with the letters V.R. painted in yellow across one 
end. Macdonald was more concerned with the cost of the 
service, which reduced the profit of the Post Office to 
vanishing point. He proposed therefore, in 1895, to suppress 
the use of canoes and to carry on the service by means of the 
'Ivy1, the saving in expenditure to go towards the upkeep of 
the yacht. His hopes of saving £1,000 a year on this account 
were over-sanguine. Small boats were still needed for the 
creeks and in the event the saving did not exceed £2?0 to the
Postal service, which the yacht more than consumed in main- 
2
tenance.
Nearer headquarters the postal service was better
1. Bindloss, op.cit.. p.l3^«
2. C.O. k6b/l. N.C.P. Blue Book, 1896/7 #
organised. By 1895 pillar boxes had been erected at Creek 
Town, Duke Town and on the Mission and Consulate hills.
Degema also had its red "pillar of the s t a t e " A  penny post 
was established in Duke Town with a daily collection and 
delivery. Up to 189*+ the Protectorate used imperial stamps 
with an overprint; in February however the General Post 
Office approved designs submitted for the administration's 
own stamps. These stamps provided an unexpected bonus in 
revenue, for the administration was immediately besieged by 
requests from stamp collectors. Well over half the £3,000 
raised from the sale of stamps and cards during 189V 5 came 
from this source, but the amount dropped dramatically the 
following year to £1 ,365, as stocks were accumulated by 
dealers.1*
A reduction in the ocean postage to and from the United 
Kingdom in October 1891 from 6d. and 4-d. to 2^ -d. per half- 
ounce, acted as a stimulus to general correspondence. During
1. Goldie H. Calabar & its Mission. p.351.
2 . ibid.
3. F.O. 83/1309. P.O. to F.O., 22.2.9^.
4-. C.O. ^6**/l. N.C.P. Blue Book, 1896/7 .
5. The reduction was a consequence of the admission of the 
Protectorate to the Postal Union.
189V 5 over tf0,000 items (letters, postcards, newspapers, 
parcels) were transmitted, of which nearly 6,000 were regis­
tered. No pre-1891 figures exist, but obviously there were 
then no registered items. The number of bags interchanged 
with British and foreign countries amounted to l,*f00 forwarded 
and 1,570 received. Old Calabar and Bonny together handled
three-quarters of the mail.
^  ^  ^  ^
"It is hardly necessary for me to dilate on the
importance of maintaining the efficiency of a 
department which in this West African climate
daily and hourly battles with disease and death." 1
Macdonald had witnessed too much disease in Egypt to under­
rate the importance of the medical and sanitary department in 
his new environment. Expenditure in this field rose from 
£5,308 in I893 to £7,550 in 1895, a rise of nearly 4-0$, and
the third highest growth rate after Marine and Customs. If
such items as the upkeep of cemeteries and the building of 
drains and latrines, which came under the Public Works Depart­
ment, were included, the expenditure on sanitary matters 
would be even higher.
The Medical Department consisted in 1895 of a Principal 
Medical Officer, Dr. Allman, who drew a salary of £1,000 per 
annum, an amount in no way inferior to that given for other
1. F.0. 2/63* Macdonald to Kimberley, 19• 8.9*+*
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medical officers, fully qualified practitioners under the
medical acts then in force in England, drawing between £350 
and £500.1 The rest of the European staff consisted of an 
analyst and three hospital nurses. The total of nineteen 
European staff was second only to the number of whites em­
ployed in the political department. The native staff consis­
ted of a dispenser, with assistant, two hospital assistants, 
three hospital servants, one keeper of the smallpox hospital 
at Old Calabar, and a cook. Subordinate to the medical 
officers were the native sanitary officers and the seven 
sanitary inspectors.^
The Medical Officers were given sweeping powers. Allman 
and two of the senior D.M.0.!s were given judicial authority 
under the Africa Order in Council. What this implied was 
laid down in the Medical and Sanitary Regulations of 189^.** 
These were passed as Queen1 s Regulations under Article 99 of
the 1889 Order,
<
since Macdonald could not find any colonial
1 . The Medical 
practice•
Officers were also allowed to take private
2 , F.O. 2/8*+. Jephson to F.O.,15.7.95*
3. F.O. 2/63. Jephson to F.O., 22.3 .91***
F.O. 2/62. Medical & Sanitary Regulations, April 189^.
5* P.C. 2/3*tO. Art.995 Consifl has power to make Queen!s 
Regulations for "the peace, order and good government11 etc 
.... and 11 for securing the observance of any Treaty*1.
ordinance suitable for adaptation. The Principal M.O. was 
given the supervision, direction and general superintendence 
of all D.M.O.*s and their subordinates, and of all prisons, 
hospitals and quarantine stations; and of all medical arrange 
ments and sanitary duties in the Protectorate (56). He could 
suspend any subordinate below the rank of D.M.O., pending the 
decision of the Commissioner (57)* He himself was only remov­
able by the Commissioner (53). His powers of search were as 
sweeping as those of the Customs officers, for he could board 
any vessel within the Protectorate at any time he considered 
necessary for the discharge of his duty (58). That the 
D.M.0.*s were under the sole control of the Principal Medical 
Officer in all matters relating to the Medical and Sanitary 
Departments had the effect of excluding the influence of the 
Vice Consuls in these fields, and establishing a chain of 
hierarchy direct to the Commissioner (59)*
Section 11 dealt with the provisions to be applied in 
the event of an outbreak of smallpox or other infectious or 
contagious disease. Wilful failure to report such an out­
break, or concealment thereof, was met with a fine of up to 
£10, or imprisonment for a maximum of fourteen days. On a 
case being reported, the District Officer was at once to give 
instructions for the isolation of the infected persons and
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report the circumstances to the Vice Consul. Infected prop­
erty was to be disinfected and whitewashed if permanent, or 
burnt if a native hut. Persons known to have been in contact 
with smallpox could be compulsorily vaccinated and quarantined 
in premises for up to forty-eight hours.
Section 12 dealt with the important question of the dis­
posal of the dead. Every public burial ground was placed 
under the supervision of a D.M.O. who was to see that it was 
kept in a thorough state of repair. Burial was to take place 
within twenty-four hours of death, except in the case of 
disease, when it was to take place as soon as possible.
Deaths were supposed to be reported within twelve hours to the 
D.M.O., although Macdonald was aware of the difficulties of 
enforcing this provision in the rudimentary state of the 
country's communications.
The Sanitary Inspectors, in addition to supervising 
burials and acting as executive officers of the M.O.'s, had 
extensive powers of search of all premises, to enable them to 
examine their sanitary condition. If dissatisfied with any 
premises, a report was made to the M.O. who himself made an 
inspection, and could order the owners to clean up the drains, 
privies and surroundings or other offensive matter within a 
specified time; failure to carry out these orders incurred a
maximum fine of £10 or imprisonment with hard labour (55* 13- 
17).
Sections 18 to 21*, the last group of regulations, dealt 
with the powers of the M.O.'s at the ports. Their powers to 
search ships were the same as on land. If a vessel was infec­
ted with cholera, yellow fever or smallpox, etc., the master 
was supposed to signify the fact before dropping anchor. He 
was then visited by the M.O., who placed the vessel in quaran­
tine until it was clear - and this was for the M.O. to decide. 
Any neglect, obstruction or concealment on the part of a 
master could lead to a fine of £100 or three months' imprison­
ment. When clear of any infection, a vessel was granted a 
bill of health at its first port of call, which was valid 
throughout the Protectorate, but had to be endorsed at each 
subsequent port of call. Pratique was not granted to any 
vessel whose papers were not in order and when granted did 
not exempt a vessel from complying with the sanitary regula­
tions then in force.
These regulations have been quoted at length not only 
because they constituted the basis on which a vital section of 
the administration was built, but also because of their in­
trinsic importance in revealing the Commissioner's turn of 
mind. Macdonald had acquired an interest in hygiene, and a
heightened sense of its Importance, after inspecting prisons 
in Egypt and serving on Hunterfs mission, and this never left 
him. He was to carry his cleansing operations into China.
His official reports on the Oil Rivers are a mine of information 
on sanitary operations - an extraordinary pre-occupation when 
he was at the same time so busy with his political corres­
pondence. The powers he gave his M.O.'s and the "strictest 
orders about looking after their health"*1' which he gave his 
personnel, were all part of the same picture.
But Macdonald did not wait until l89*f before commencing
his cleaning-up operations: neither was he backward in ex­
horting others, who quickly became infected with his enthusi­
asm. The first station, to merit attention was Old Calabar.
Here Macdonald described the European cemetery as a "blot on
p
the Settlement". This was cleared of undergrowth and scrub, 
walks made, and "a living fence, which was soon replaced by 
an iron railing", placed around it. The ground was formally 
handed over by the Presbyterian Mission Society to the 
Sanitary Department, who apportioned out the ground and had a 
plan made. The necessity of doing this was revealed in a
1. F.O. 8^/2111. Macdonald to Anderson, 17.12.91.
2. F.O. 2/63. Macdonald to Kimberley, 19.8.9^.
3. Goldie, Calabar and its Mission. p.3!?l«
rather bizarre fashion when the Assistant Treasurer Wilding 
became the first victim of the new regime* When his grave 
was dug, the ends of two coffins came into view.
The question of native burial was more difficult to 
deal with. The prevailing practice in Efik society was that 
all Chiefs and their wives, and any titled person, could claim 
burial in the houses where they lived, whereas the bodies of 
slaves, paupers and children were thrown into the bush or 
river. One of the favourite depositories was Consulate Hill 
where, in the clearing of the bush, numberless skulls and 
bones were found. A native cemetery was at once marked out 
on the lines of the European cemetery, and any Chief failing 
to bury the body of his servant or slave in the place appor­
tioned to him was subject to a fine. That by 189^ there were 
little more than 1?0 graves in the cemetery indicated the * 
Herculean task Macdonald had set himself. A second cemetery 
was however opened in June in Henshaw Town. With regard to the 
Chiefs, the Commissioner deemed it impossible to interfere 
with the ancient custom of domestic burial, although with much 
tact he persuaded them to report burials and allow the presence
of a Sanitary Officer to see that the grave was the regulation
2six to ten feet deep.
1. F.O. 8V2111. Macdonald to F.O., 13*9»91«
2. F.O. 2/61. Macdonald to Kimberley, 19.8.9^.
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The situation of the native towns at Old Calabar, lying 
at the foot of the Consulate Hill, and in the immediate 
vicinity of the trading factories, rendered strict sanitary 
measures imperative. Public latrines were built, the bush 
encroaching on the town cleared, and regulations made for the 
daily cleansing of the streets which would have done credit to 
an English township of the period. Two of the native Sanitary 
Inspectors were employed as a mobile patrol unit, whose acti­
vities the Chiefs quickly came to comprehend. The tour de 
force was the construction of the marina, thus doing away with 
the foreshore, 11 the dustbin and latrine11.'1' The quayside was 
carried out to low water level (six feet below high tide) and 
planted with trees. Sewage disposal was effected through open 
brick conduits emptying into the rivers - a crude but effec­
tive way of channelling pollution away from the towns. Many 
of the worst •slum* dwellings were pulled down and new roads
made with brick drains - these proved a heavy expense during
2
the rainy season, although the drainage was materially 
improved.
The government buildings were fortunate in their siting, 
well above the swamp level, on Consulate Hill. The hill was,
1. F.O. 2/51. Macdonald to Rosebery, 12.1.93*
2. F.O. 2/8^. Macdonald to Salisbury, 26.7.95.
however, very overgrown with scrub and bush, and this was 
cleared, leaving only a few of the larger trees. During 1893, 
accommodation was built for the medical staff and a European 
hospital erected. The latter, owing to delays in the arrival 
of materials, was not fully operative until July 1 8 9 5. There 
was accommodation for six patients in single-bedded wards, 
and for six in a general ward. The United Presbyterian Mission 
volunteered to supply the nursing staff, if the government 
provided the doctor and the drugs. In addition to the European 
hospital, a large general native hospital and a dispensary 
were constructed during the course of 1895, at a cost of
*1
£1,686, and smallpox hospitals were established at Duke,
2
Creek and Henshaw Towns.
At Opobo the native town was some distance from the fac­
tories and the Vice Consulate, which rendered continuous 
supervision of the sanitary regulations somewhat difficult. 
Macdonald insisted, however, that the European community 
should govern itself in a sanitary fashion, and to this end 
the swamp near the Vice Consulate was filled in and storage 
tanks installed to provide a pure water supply. During 189*+ 
a smallpox hospital was erected, and a native burial ground
1. F.O. 83/1380. Exchequer & Audit to F.O., 15.7*95.
2. F.O. 2/85. Macdonald to Salisbury.
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laid out.
When the administration was inaugurated, Bonny had one 
of the worst reputations for dirt on the Coast. The problem 
was attacked with vigour. The bush and undergrowth between 
the river and the town was cut away. A greater part of the 
town was condemned, and the Chiefs ordered to pull down the 
huts overhanging the streets. River latrines were erected 
and a smallpox hospital established. A combined native and 
European cemetery was laid out, surrounded by an iron fence 
*K)0 yards long. The town's water supply was improved by the 
construction of a brick embankment round the rainwater 
reservoir, which allowed the people to draw water without 
wading in it, and by the digging of new wells. The close 
proximity of the European factories to the native town in­
volved the former very much in the success of the new regula­
tions, and with much grumbling the agents were ordered to 
clean their factories. There were no hospital facilities for 
Europeans at Bonny as such, but as a temporary measure the 
hulk 'George Shotton', on the completion of the new Consular 
buildings at Degema, was towed to Breaker Island in the mouth 
of the Bonny River to act as a sanatorium. The towns of New 
Calabar, like Bonny, suffered from a surfeit of scrub and 
bush which took some time to clear, but there the Chiefs
showed more willingness and themselves undertook the replann­
ing of the wards with wider streets, good drainage, and public 
latrines.
&oer
The Delta stations of Warri, Brass and Beninj^  suffered 
somewhat from shortage of money and the subordination of 
social to political considerations, with the close proximity 
of the Niger Company's territories. Thus, although two wells 
were sunk at Twon to improve the water supply, and latrines 
were erected, these fell into disrepair when the town became 
depopulated during the Brass troubles. At Warri the European 
settlement was said to be reasonably sanitary after the bush 
had been cleared, but nothing was done to the native town, 
beyond the burning of an infected village about a quarter of 
a mile behind the European settlement. The development of the 
Benin area was temporarily halted by the campaign against 
Nana, whose town of Ebrohemi Gallwey described as
"always kept most scrupulously clean, and is, in
its way, qdite a model native town." 1
In the absence of statistics before 1895 it is difficult 
to assess the impact of the sanitary and health policy of the 
administration. Money was obviously a limiting factor, as was 
the climate itself. Disease continued to remain a major
1. F.O. 2/63* Macdonald to Rosebery 12.1.93 Bic.
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problem. The European weakness was malaria. Outbreaks of 
smallpox occurred at every station during 189^, although no­
where did it reach epidemic proportions. Guinea worm was 
prevalent among the natives at Brass, nephritis at Warri, 
diarrhoea and beri beri at Sapele. If there was still a long 
way to go, clearly some improvement was made after December 
1890, when three-quarters of the European population died in 
one epidemic. During the outbreaks of smallpox in 189V ?  
there were only four recorded deaths from the disease, al­
though 168 cases were dealt with in Old Calabar alone. That 
a major contributing factor was the vaccination of all 
coloured employees of the government and of the commercial 
houses by the end of 189^ could not be gainsaid.^
At first sight a Botanical Department seemed a strange 
luxury to include in a pioneer administration. Macdonald, 
however, thought it vital that he should find ways and means 
of promoting the economic development of the country through 
its actual products; in particular, it was necessary to wean 
the Protectorate away from its complete dependence on the 
success or failure of the palm oil trade. In an endeavour to 
achieve this Macdonald, in February 1893> appointed Horace 
Billington, late of the Royal Gardens at Kew, as Curator of a
1. F.O. 2/8^. Macdonald to Salisbury 2?.7.95*
botanic garden to be established at Old Calabar.^
From the start, the project was a success. In seven 
months a piece of ground twelve acres in extent had been 
cleared by a small army of Kroos some seven hundred yards 
from the Consulate General, and over 200 varieties of plants 
were growing. By July 1895 the garden had expanded to **6 
acres and 300 varieties, and Billington was granted a European 
assistant. The Curator was painstaking in his attempts to 
reproduce Kew at Old Calabar. The garden was laid out with 
paths, bordered with grass, and ornamental plants; in the 
centre lay the Curator*s house with attached potting and tool 
sheds. Along the roads connecting the Consulate with the 
gardens avenues of mango trees were laid.*
The main object was of course to propagate economic 
plants. Two of the most successful were coffee and cocoa. 
About 22 acres of the gardens were occupied by the 2100 
coffee trees which were mostly raised from seeds in April 
1893 and planted out in August 189 .^ After only twenty seven 
months, the trees averaged over six feet in height and had 
seeded. Bulk orders for seeds were immediately laid, and by 
the middle of 1896 100,000 plants had been produced. These 
were given out as free gifts to the chiefs, who, in return for
1. F.O. 2/6 3 . Macdonald to Kimberley Enc by Billington 
19.8.9*.
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clearing the ground and planting them, were given a small 
subsidy by the administration for eqch plant alive and healthy 
at the end of the third year. When the plant began to bear 
fruit at the end of the fourth year, it became the property of 
the planter and began to pay for itself. A similar system on 
a smaller scale was worked with cocoa. On Macdonaldfs instruc­
tions, Billington drew up a pamphlet which was translated into 
Efik and distributed free to the growers, giving useful rules 
and hints respecting the growing of coffee and cocoa. En­
couragement was given to protect and care for the existing 
trees growing wild in the Protectorate, and instruction given 
on the best methods of collecting the beans. The results were 
spectacular. The export of coffee jumped from 2,798 lbs. in 
1893 to 28,099 lbs. in 189*K ^ocoa rose from 21,760 lbs. to 
51,299 lbs. in the same period.^
The rest of the gardens were split equally between a 
large orchard containing 500 tropical fruit trees (orange, 
lime, banana, avocado pear, papaw and pineapple, of which the 
pineapple did particularly well) and the main garden containing 
a variety of plants from embryo mahogany trees, and sisal 
hemp plants to attractive ornamentals. Arrow-root, Kola-nut, 
Ficus Elastica and Ceara Rubber, Amatto dye, Henna, cinnamon,
1. F.O. 2/81*. Macdonald to Salisbury 25.7*95 Inc. by 
Billington 22.7.95*
capsicums, castor oil, coconuts, all the tropical fruits, log­
wood and various medicinal plants such as digitalis were 
amongst the varieties giving the best economic yields. Rice 
also did well in the swamp below the consulate. The least 
successful plants were the black pepper, the grape vine, and 
the ginger which only gave a small yield with much attention.
As might have been expected, English vegetables and grasses 
generally did not thrive. Moderate yields were gleaned of 
cucumbers, turnips, carrots, dwarf beans, radishes, mustard 
and cress, vegetable marrow and endive. Tomatoes grew to a 
large size, but would not ripen well. Peas, potatoes, lettuce, 
cabbage and onions would not grow*at all.
Apart from the nature of his experiments the greatest
problems Billington had to face were the periodic tornadoes
and the seasonal nature of the rainfall. There was not much
he could do about the former but the latter he solved by means
of water storage tanks let into the ground. This enabled him
to water by hand during the Harmattan period. (December/
January), and again during the dry season (April/May). Soil
erosion and replenishment were met by the conservation of the
larger trees already existing in the garden, and by the sedu-
1
lous cultivation of humus from dying plants and leaves.
1. Annual Reports 189*+ and 5* F.O. 2/63 and F.O. 2/8*+.
The Surveyor General's department might more fairly 
have been termed the odd job section of the administration, 
since everything which could not be fitted into a neat pigeon 
hole ended up there. The Surveyor General, Ross, was paid a 
salary of £500, under him was another of Macdonald's country­
men McAllister as assistant, and a travelling officer res­
ponsible for intelligence, Casement. Casement retired from 
the Protectorate in 1895 and his post was not filled up. Up 
till then he had performed useful service in exploring the 
hinterland of the Cross River, an area never before visited 
by a European. This was part of an ambitious project 
Macdonald had in mind for constructing a map of the whole 
Protectorate. The present surveys he had quickly found to be 
"useless on account of their incorrectness"but when 
Casement retired little had been done towards the realisation 
of the project.
Under the Surveyor General came the vast Public Works 
department. This consisted in 1895 of four European carpen­
ters who acted as foreman/supervisors and a large army of 
Kroo boys. The Kroo labourers were paid fifteen shillings a 
year plus their passages, clothing and keep. In 1893 the 
public works budget amounted to 29% of the total expenditure,
1. F.O. 8*+/219^. Macdonald to Rosebery 21.12.92.
2§2
the biggest single item. Thereafter it dropped in 189^ to 
20% and 1895 to 1%}" The drop was largely due to a decrease 
in extraordinary expenditure consequent upon the administra­
tion^ initial requirements for plant being fulfilled. The
t *
expenditure under the head public works does not tell the 
complete story, however. Costs were concealed under the 
heading •transport1 which, apart from the passages to and from 
England for personnel, consisted almostly exclusively of heavy 
freight costs incurred by the department; and •Krooboys1 - the 
labour force constituting some 50% of this heading. In 1893, 
therefore, the expenditure on public works was more like b0% 
of the total. In 1895 the transport and Krooboy costs also 
fell radically along with the public works - the Krooboys less 
since a sizeable labour force was still needed for maintenance 
purposes.
It was the task of the public works department to look 
after existing Government property, to submit plans and speci­
fications for future needs, to acquire the materials and then 
to execute those needs* It had to work in close conjunction
1
not only with the Commissioner and Consul Generals department, 
but also with the Vice Consuls and the Medical Department.
The amounts of government property varied from river to river.
1. See Table 2.
New Calabar, for instance, had a hospital, barracks, latrines,
fowl house, machine shed, strong room (prison),covered wells,
a custom house and a further office at Idu. Brass, very much
the “poorest of the rivers11, only possessed a consular build-
1
ing, a court house, and a warehouse. Nevertheless, even 
where the establishment was small, the cost and amount of work 
connected with upkeep remained heavy for this small and under­
staffed department.
The activities of all departments were collated and co­
herence given to the administration by the London Agency. 
Macdonald had early recognised the necessity of having a 
representative in London for recruiting purposes, for the 
ordering of supplies, and for the payment of accounts, salaries 
etc. It was not until February 189*+, however, that permanent 
arrangements were made and Macdonald appointed Captain Sir 
Alfred Jephson R.N. (retired) to be the first (and as it 
turned out the last) full time Agent General of the Niger Coast 
Protectorate. Jephson had no administrative^executive or 
judicial duties to perform but was in full charge of supply,
2keeping records, correspondence and the selection of staff.
1. F.O. 2/8*+. Jephson to Foreign Office 15.7.95.
2. F.O. 2/63. Macdonald to Foreign Office 19.2.9W
2 9 * f .
His salary was £500 and to assist him he had a chief clerk,
an assistant and a messenger. Provision was made in a total
budget of little more than £1,000 for extra clerical assistance,
as well as running expenses.'1’ Bayley*s office was also in the
agency, and in the absence of Jephson, he took charge of the
general business as well as his own.
The judicial functions of the administration devolved
on the Vice Consuls, who were the mainsprings of the political
department. The Consular officers exercised power in the Oil
Rivers under the provisions of the Africa Order in Council of
I889. Under article seven provision was made for the power of
constituting altering or abolishing local jurisdictions for
the purposes of this Order
“with reference to the whole or any part of parts 
of any of the districts or territories for the 
time being included in Her Majesty!s Protectorate 
of the Niger districts.11 2
The net was flung wide in so far as the government had hot yet
at this time made up its mind between consul, company and
colony.
As so often in the early years, law lagged behind prac­
tice and it was not until 1893 that the Oil Rivers were
1. F.O. 2/81*. Jephson to Foreign Office 15.7.95*
2. P.C. 2/3^0. Africa Order in Council 1 8 8 9.
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formally erected into a local jurisdiction. The definition 
of the local jurisdiction bristled with difficulties * The 
governments failure to resolve the dispute over boundaries 
between the two portions of the Protectorate resulted in the 
somewhat negative pronouncement that the new entity consisted 
of that
" Portion of the Protectorate under the adminis­
tration of H.M.'s commissioner and Consul General.
This would now form a separate protectorate under 
the name of Niger Coast Protectorate." 1
The lack of geographical definition in Davidson1 s eyes meant 
that the notice "conveyed nothing whatever to the public" and 
was bound to lead to future disputes as to whether a particu­
lar offence was or was not committed within Macdonald *s sphere 
of jurisdiction. Furthermore he contended,
"we must know over what territories we are pro­
claiming this Protectorate assuming we are to 
proclaim it at all."
A protectorate within a protectorate was "extremely awkward"
2and the notice was "a mess from a legal point of view". 
Davidson*s protests were ignored. Indeed Rosebery with un­
wonted levity seemed to be more interested in the name of the 
new administration
1. London Gazette 13*5.93*
2. F.O. 2/50. Min. by W.E.D. 1.3.93.
"Oleomargarine or Codliveria would be preferable 
to a designation that suggests greasy floods 
oozing out to sea." 1
Niger Coast was adopted after Goldie had protested that 
"Niger Provinces"^ the alternative suggested^ might be held to 
apply to Sokoto and Gwandu. The Proclamation of 1893 did 
nothing beyond indicating the obvious - an effective British 
administration was functioning in the Niger Delta.
The powers conferred by the order within the local juris­
diction were held under Article X to extend to British subjects 
and their property, personal and proprietary rights and obli­
gations; foreigners who submitted themselves to a consular 
court; and foreigners
"with respect to whom any state, King, Chief or 
Government whose subjects, or under whose protec­
tion they are has by any Treaty ... or otherwise 
agreed with Her Majesty for, or consented to the 
exercise of power or authority by Her Majesty." 2
This part of the order was given statutory force by the enact­
ment of the Foreign Jurisdiction Act in the following year.
This act allowed the Crown to enjoy as full jurisdiction over 
foreign countries acquired by "treaty, capitulation, sufferance 
and other lawful means" as by "cession or conquest",^ and
1. F.O. 2/51. Macdonald to Rosebery 21.^.93* Min. by R.
2 . P.C. 2/3^0 . Africa 0 . in C . 1889 Art.X 'Foreigner1 meaning 
any person whether a native or subject of Africa or not, 
who is not a British subject.
3 . S3 & S*+ Viet Cap 37 Preamble & Art 1.
practically annihilated the distinction between a Protectorate
and a colony. Moreover by defining jurisdiction to include
exercise of power (art XVI), the act enabled the crown to
advance from consular jurisdiction to the full power of legis-
1
lation within the protectorate. After the chiefs in the Oil 
Rivers had ceded their powers by treaty there was therefore 
no logical stopping place until full colonial rule was reached. 
The procedure in legislation for Protectorates was defined in 
article 15 (adaptation of Colonial ordinances) and article 99 
(passing of Queen’s Regulations) . It may be added that there 
was nothing exceptional in the Order or the Act. Germany had 
since 1887 claimed similar powers in her own African Protector­
ates •
Macdonald, therefore, was provided with extremely wide 
if ill defined powers. The term by which he was called was in 
itself significant of the new order of things provided by the 
act. To have borne the title Consul alone as Hewett and his 
predecessors had done would have implied a renunciation of the 
district as a British possession, for a consul could only 
properly be appointed to a foreign state; he could not levy 
taxes; nor could he exercise any well defined authority over
1. Madden A. Imperial & Constitutional Documents p.90. See 
also F.O. 97/562 Memo, by Halsbury 2 8 .3 .9 0 .
natives and foreigners . This would have opened the way to
German or French intrigues.'*' Macdonald's consular functions,
practically only extended to the Cameroons and Fernando Po.
Within the Oil Bivers he was Commissioner - a term which had
2
executive connotations, and was sufficiently vague to obviate 
the difficulties attached to a position of well defined rank 
and limited powers. For convenience, however, the courts of 
the Oil Rivers were termed consular courts - consuls having a 
proper judicial rank by which the fiction of a protectorate in 
the Oil Bivers could be maintained. But the double rank 
covered all contingencies, and was extended logically enough 
in their commissions to Macdonald's subordinates, who became 
Deputy Commissioners and Vice Consuls. As no particular geo­
graphical area within the local jurisdiction was assigned to 
these officers, Macdonald could switch them around between 
rivers in any way he liked.
Consular Courts were quickly established at Old Calabar, 
Opobo, Bonny, Warri, Benin and Brass, with appeal to the 
Consul Generalfs court. That at Brass ceased to function after 
D. Macdonald's resignation in lS^jbut a new one appeared at 
Degema. These courts exercised under the African Order effec­
1. F.O.C.P. 6011. Memo by T.V.L. 1.7.90.
2. F.O. 83/12^1. Gray to F.O. 11.7.93.
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tive powers over all who came within their territorial Juris­
diction, the Consul General's court exercising in addition 
extra territorial Jurisdiction. Appeals to the Old Calabar 
Court were rare - there were none in 189^-5.^"
The cost of administration of Justice was difficult to 
gauge accurately, since the burden was split between a 
number of departments, but it was obviously heavy. The Court 
messengers alone cost over £2,000 in 1895, additional clerks
p
and interpreters another £750. As a set off against this, 
the Treasury allowed Macdonald to keep the fees and fines
which would normally have gone into the Imperial Treasury.
But these, though they increased from£26o.9s. in 1893^ ^  to
A
nearly £2,000^ for 1895, never covered the costs.
The new native courts at Old Calabar revealed the
spectacular increase in the government’s authority since 1 8 9 1. 
Native courts were not new in the sense of being without 
precedent. The precedent lay in the old Courts of Equity 
succeeded by Johnston's Governing Councils. A native council
1. F.O. 2/8*f. Macdonald to F.O. 12.7.85.
2. F.O. 2/8*f. Jephson to F.O. 15.7.95. The Clerk of the
Consul General’s Court was paid £120 p.a.
3. F.O. 83/12lf0. Treasury to F.O. 18.5.93.
b. F.O. 2/8b9 Jephson to F.O. 15.7*95.
of Old Calabar was instituted by Johnston and included Euro­
pean traders as well as Chiefs. It had a chequered career, 
being declared illegal by Hewett, but was reconstituted by 
Annesley. When Macdonald arrived in 1891, it had not sat for 
more than a year. Like the other remnants of authority in 
the rivers, it was effectively swept aside, and a new start 
was made.
orqCrfiiSGLfae* oJ""*
The new gggani.3ffi=o£ Old Calabar was known as the High 
Court of the Native Councils of Old Calabar. Its President was 
ex officio the senior Consular authority (the Commissioner 
himself, when not on leave). It had a Vice President elected 
for three months by the 37 members (all the important chiefs 
of Old Calabar) and he acted for the Commissioner in his 
absence. The important fact to note here is the removal of 
botja the white trader and white missionary elements. The 
court was held every Thursday at 11.00 a.m. in the Court 
House of the Consulate General and there was nearly always an 
average attendance of three-quarters of the members, the 
quorum being five. Regular and punctual attendance was en­
joined and a fine of up to £5 was imposed on any member not 
putting in at least four attendances per quarter.
The powers of the High Court were limited to the 
carrying out of Consular orders and the hearing of civil
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actions and criminal charges wherein natives or native 
interests alone were concerned. The verdicts of the Court 
were to go by a majority of votes, the Vice President having 
a casting vote. The maximum penalties which could be inflic­
ted by the Court were £100 fine, thirty lashes, or twelve 
months imprisonment with hard labour, although these penalties 
could be increased with the Commissioner*s consent.
The situation respecting appeals was interesting. The 
High Court was a Court of Appeal for the Minor Courts of
Duke Town, Creek Town, Henshaw Town and Cobham Town, but for
any minor court outside of these the court of appeal was the 
consular court. On the other hand any Efik of any minor 
court could elect to be tried primarily in the High Court. 
Obviously Macdonald hoped that the Efik people would develop 
sufficient sense of uhity to enable the appellate jurisdic­
tion of the High Court to be extended to all Efik minor 
courts. Appeals from the decisions of the High Court were 
made to the Consular Court at Old Calabar.
The minor courts were governed by similar regulations.
They met twice a month with a quorum of three. Their powers
were limited to the carrying out of Consular orders, the 
preservation of peace, the maintenance of highways and means
of communications 1 or any similar improvements tending to 
benefit the community at large", and the hearing in court of 
any ordinary palavers and criminal charges. In criminal 
cases they could not inflict a fine of more than £2?, corporal 
punishment above thirty lashes or imprisonment for more than 
six months except with the sanction of the Vice Consul.
Appeals had to be made to Old Calabar within a fortnight of 
sentence. The senior member of the Court was to take the 
chair in the consular officer's absence (which was nearly 
always). The members of the Court were left in no doubt as 
to their own responsibilities for exercising jurisdiction.
They were warned that any concealment of twin murder, or the 
killing of innocent people, would render them liable to be 
punished as accessories and that anyone found guilty of taking
such life would probably incur a capital sentence. The cus-
 »
toms which came under the Commissioners disapproval were human
sacrifice, the killing of people for witchcraft, the adminis­
tering of the bean or sasswood, the killing of twins, and the 
banishment of their mothers, trial by ordeal and the
"compelling of widows to remain in their houses in 
filth and wretchedness after the death of their 
husbands until the funeral obsequies are over"
(future mourning was to be limited to one month).1
1. F.O. 2/8b. Macdonald to Salisbury 12.7.95*
By the time Macdonald had left the Protectorate minor 
courts had been set up on the Akpayafe at Tom Shots, Ekpa, 
Uwet, Okoyong, Adiabo and at Itu. One factor mitigating 
against the speedy expansion of the system was the shortage 
of white officers. Often non-government officials were used. 
Okoyong was unique in having a white woman as president - 
Mary Slessor. Outside the Gross River basin, however, the 
Consular courts continued to handle all the cases which came 
before them. Offenders who were not dealt with by the 
village community, without the cognizance of the British, were 
sent to be tried by the consular courts, usually consisting of 
the Vice Consul, or judicial officer as sole judge. A reveal­
ing account of the justice administered by the overworked 
Vice Consuls was written by a shrewd if prejudiced observer 
of Major Crawford's methods fc£Warri.
"A big Yoruba sentry stood on guard beneath the 
verandah and when he informed us "This be justice 
palaver day, sah$ Consul live inside," we entered 
the courtroom.
The great square hall was partly darkened by 
green lattices, and every foot of space was occupied 
by a perspiring oily crowd. They were all big river 
men, splendid specimens of animal physique .. • All 
were either accusers or prisoners taken red handed by 
the Yoruba patrol, or sent down by the bush headmen 
to be tried according to the justice of the white men. 
Behind a big desk at one end of the room a stalwart 
soldierly Englishman of middle age, whose face was 
wrinkled with lines of thought and anxiety, and prob­
ably suffering too, leaned wearily back in a chair,
30*+.
two big Yoruba soldiers with rifles in their hands 
standing like ebony statues beside him ...
A big negro, charged with stealing his neigh­
bours wives and afterwards shooting the injured man 
in the back with a flintlock gun ... stood sullenly 
erect, scowling at his Judge, while a black inter­
preter translated the testimony of a native witness 
into fantastic English ... The witness was evidently 
lying boldly but unsystematically for he contradic­
ted his own assertions himself, a second heathen who 
had apparently learned a little English from the 
Krooboys, informed the court that uThis man be, sah 
- all one low bush tief11, ere he proceeded to locate 
the occurrence in quite another place. Then the 
harassed official whose duty it was to try to sift 
the one grain of truth from such a tissue of false­
hood, had them both arrested and adjourned the case.
There were other charges of slave stealing, attempts 
to murder, firing on trade canoes, adulteration of 
palm kernels with shells and the like, to be investi­
gated; ... and so is order maintained and Justice 
done .!t 1
The majesty and dignity of British rule were apparent if not 
its effectiveness.
There is little doubt that if Macdonald had remained 
longer as Commissioner he would have extended the system of 
native courts and consuls inaugurated at Old Calabar through­
out the Protectorate and so relieved his own officers of some 
of their burdens. By 1896 there were certainly rudimentary 
nnative councils11 functioning at Benin, Bonny, Warri and
2Degema but these hardly exercised distinct Judicial functions.
1. Bindloss op.cit.. pp.1^5-7•
*2. Southern Nigeria Govt. Gazette No.8 30.3*1905* pp.192-5. 
This gives a full list of the early native courts, but 
nothing of their Judicial functions. I have not found any 
other reference which gives any elucidation of the term 
!nativef council at this period. The amount expended on
them by the Protectorate Government in 189^-5 was only
£12b as compared with the £2272 which wenjp in subsidies 
to Chiefs.
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The standard way in which a British official enunciated his 
policy to the natives was still by means of the palaver or 
meeting of chiefs. These were summoned as and when necessary 
and had no constitutional basis. It was left to Moor to 
channel the Vice Consuls1 initiatives and formalize the pro­
cess of establishing native courts.
The question of the legality of the native courts was 
never settled before the area was transferred to the 
Colonial Office. Macdonald was “unaware whether these 
native Courts are illegal11, but convinced his superiors of 
their efficacy as a
“very excellent and useful means towards doing away 
with barbarous and oppressive customs, and enabling 
the people of the country, over which we have assumed 
the responsibility of protection, to piirsue their 
avocations, whether of trade or agriculture, in 
peace and security.11 1
As long as this was the case it was agreed, the point might
 2   ' ' ............................................................................................stand over since it was hardly worth worrying about.
It is claimed by Anene that these courts and councils
3
“were the beginnings of what came to be called 1 indirect rule1.11 
This is, perhaps, an oversimplification. In the first place 
no effort was made to establish these courts along tradi­
tional lines in their respective areas. The example of Old 
Calabar is the prime case in point. Its President was Euro­
1. P.O. 2/8*f. Macdonald to Salisbury 12.7#95*
2. F.O• 2/8*4-. Min. by H.P.A. 17.9.95.
3* Anene o^jDj^ cft^  p. 1*4-6
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pean, its procedure with the written summons was European, its 
mode of punishment was European. Even the law it administered 
had become most un-african with its attack on funeral customs, 
treatment of widows and twin mothers, leaving aside the more 
obvious attacks which Macdonald was committed to on such things 
as human sacrifice. Secondly Macdonald's mind personally re­
volted at the thought of a widow spending several years 
mourning her dead husband, but he could hardly maintain that 
the abolition of this custom was essential to the progress of 
British rule. But it was essential he felt to the progress of 
British civilization and would require interference "more or 
less despotic1'1 to put an end to. Herein lay the key to his 
policy. In essence it was one of direct rule. Thus the native 
courts were not to be a separate inferior parallel stream of 
authority with the consular courts. They were inferior it is 
true, but only in the judicial sense that appeal lay to the 
Consular Court. They were part of an integrated system of 
administration of justice - theoretically there was a direct 
line from the native of Old Calabar to the Commissioner in his 
own court. The task of promoting civilization was to proceed
along western lines towards the eventual government of Africans
2
by themselves. This was, indeed, "the work of humanity."
1. 8^/2003* Memo by Macdonald 1.7*90.
2. Anene op.cit.. p.252.
CHAPTER SEVEN
COMMERCE
Life and death in the Oil Rivers revolved around the 
oil palm, the staple export of West Africa, whose oil was 
used in soap, margarine and as a lubricant. Despite 
Macdonald's efforts to diversify the economy, little impact 
had been made on the dominant position of this product in the 
market.1 The fruit of the oil palm was in appearance some­
thing between a pineapple and a gigantic fir cone "with the 
interstices filled in"; and this outer cover contained many 
"nuts", each resembling "a yellow plum". The skin of these 
nuts was "soft and silky, tinted gamboge and vermilion" and
beneath it lay a mass of fibre and yellow grease. Inside
2
this lay an inner shell "something like a walnut", which was 
cracked to reveal the two or three black kernels. The whole 
fruit was pulped, then boiled, and the grease which floated 
to the top was skimmed off and shipped as palm oil, which 
fetched from £15 to £25 per ton according to the market. Two- 
thirds of the palm oil produced in the Rivers went to the 
United Kingdom, another quarter to France. The kernels were
1. See Table 5*
2. Bindloss, op.cit.. pp.151-152.
shipped as they were to Europe, one half to Germany, a third
to the United Kingdom (although the proportion taken by the
latter was rising), to be pressed for the inferior oil used
in margarine. Kernels fetched from £9 to £15 per ton.
Trade was conducted along distinct channels. The
markets lay in the interior, up to 150 miles from the Coast
in the Eastern Delta. To these markets went the middleman
traders to bring down the produce gathered by such peoples as
the Urhobo and Ibo to the European factories. The trading
scene at Warri, described by two visitors in 1896, might have
been anywhere in the Delta.
"We entered the receiving shed of the factory 
(sic) and here two young white clerks presided 
over a big tub measure into which the river men 
poured bushel after bushel of greasy palm kernels, 
or threw down calabashes of odoriferous yellow oil 
beside it. All of the latter were carefully probed 
lest the wily savage should have filled the lower 
half with clods. The place was full of steam and 
the sickening odours of oil and rubber, while the 
awful clammy heat checked the perspiration and made 
breathing a work of difficulty. One day of this 
kind has occasionally killed a stout full-blooded 
man. These two youths had stood there since six 
o'clock that morning, and they would be busy until 
darkness closed down ... When each black trader 
had seen his oil and kernels duly measured, he 
received a brass tally as a voucher for the amount 
and ... next proceeded to the storeshed or 'shop1.
The shop was crowded with gorgeously and wonderfully 
attired negroes who were only prevented from looting 
the place whole-sale by the high counter. Flinging 
down their tallies any way, and at once, some 
received an order on the gin shed for so many cases, 
while others caught up all the cloth they could lay 
hands upon, or, vaulting over the counter, seized
whatever article took their fancy, regardless of 
value. All were shouting at the same time, fighting 
for first place, or wrenching a coveted article from 
a neighbour's grasp, while the harassed agent and 
his assistant did what they could to prevent the un­
sophisticated savage seizing twice as much as he was 
entitled to get. The place was stiflingly hot, 
beads of moisture ran down the wainscoted walls, and 
the ceiling sweated globules upon our heads• The 
atmosphere must have been almost as bad as the Black 
Hole of Calcutta and yet the two white men worked 
there twelve hours most days." 1
Not surprisingly, as one trader remarked to Macdonald, change
o
were "lightsome in this malarial climate" . Funerals were 
common, often mixing the pathetic with the grotesque when, 
after a trader, probably himself suffering from fever, had 
read the last office, the coffin with its poor remains of 
humanity wasted to skeleton lightness was lowered into the 
mire and refused to sink.
Imports into the rivers were diffused by the same 
channels as exports, working in reverse. It was from imports 
that the government derived its revenue. Two aspects of the 
import trade aroused controversy - the liquor trade and that 
in firearms.
That liquor represented a staple commodity for barter 
when the administration was set up in 1891 was undeniable,
1. Blackwood's Magazine. April 1898. Anon., "Life and Death 
in the Niger Delta", p M 5 5  •
2. F.O. 8*4/2111. Macdonald to Anderson, 17.12.91.
3. Bindloss, loc cit. & Blackwood's, loc.cit.
although a proper perspective must be maintained. The customs 
figures for the first years of the administration were 
revealing in this respect. Imports of all alcohols, inclu­
ding the relatively innocuous ale, beer and porter, were far-
below the import of cotton goods, and never at any time ex-
*1
ceeded 20$ of the total import in value. Since the Protec­
torate always had a favourable trade balance, the percentage 
represented by alcohol was something under 9$ - a figure 
which hardly indicated the flooding of the Protectorate with 
algohol to the exclusion of 11 legitimate" trade. A distortion 
of emphasis was produced by the administration's heavy 
reliance on drink for its revenue. Three of the four chief 
imports into the Protectorate were not taxed, drink was, and 
by 1895 represented more than 75$ of the revenue derived from 
customs. The only other significant money-spinners were 
tobacco and, far behind, gunpowder. It would have been un­
realistic of the Commissioner not to tax the liquor trade,
2
indeed under the Brussels Act he was bound to; at the same 
time, the dependence on it for his revenue brought him under 
heavy attack from its opponents.
1 . See Table b m
2. The conference of the powers at Brussels in 1890 agreed, 
inter alia, that spirit drinking "n'excite pas ou ne s'est 
pas developp^" and that elsewhere it should be heqvilv 
taxed within the Free Zone of Africa. Text in F.O. 84/2011.
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These opponents were a powerful lobby in British poli­
tics, consisting of teetotallers, missionaries, politicians, 
administrators and influential people from all walks of life, 
who combined a wide range of views from crankiness, preju­
dice and hypocrisy to noble humanitarianism. Inside 
Parliament, the attack came from the Liberal back bench,
"the non-conformist conscience", and the radical left. Even 
before the administration was established, Sir George Campbell 
wanted to know if the government was going to continue to 
permit the traffic on the West Coast of Africa, and if there 
was any foundation for the complaint of the Niger Company 
that, while they levied heavy duties on drink, in the Oil 
Rivers the importation was free or much more lightly taxed.
The government however refused to be drawn into anticipating 
the Brussels Act or into the sententious argument provided for 
Campbell's benefit by Goldie. The anti-liquor lobby were
hardly likely to be satisfied by an assurance that duties
1
would be levied for the future. The running was taken up 
during 1893 by Dilke, who switched the point of emphasis to 
the reliance of the Oil Rivers administration on gin and 
German rum for their revenue. Ammunition was presented to 
the agitation by the sudden rise in palm oil prices during 
1893* with a consequent increase of some 25$ in the import of
1. F.O. 84/2171. Question asked in Commons, 16.7.91*
liquor into the Protectorate.1 The agitation was sufficiently 
strong to prompt the government into doubling the duty from 
Is. to 2s. during 1895, when, the price of palm oil having 
fallen, the import of spirits did likewise. In general, 
however, the government provided an effective barrier between 
the administration and its critics in Parliament.
If the parliamentary campaign consisted of a few well- 
aimed salvoes, without much ability to cut through the 
governments stone-walling tactics, the liquor question out­
side parliament took on a different appearance. Here the 
issue was not so much based on the whys and wherefores of the 
Protectorate revenue but on the moral and degrading effects on 
the native races. Here The Times of March 9th, 1895 wrote in 
typical veins
11 There is no doubt left in the minds of intelligent, 
experience and practical men, that the supply of 
intoxicating liquor to the native races is equival­
ent to the demoralisation and degradation of the 
races concerned ... It is not a temperance fad nor 
a mere philanthropic counsel of perfection. It is 
the sober decision of unromantic men of business 
from one of Africa to the other, that an essential 
preliminary to successful administration is to pre­
vent the sale or supply of spirits to the natives.u
1. F.O. 83/12^. Questions by D^lke, 8.12.93; 83/1382,
13.8.95. (
2. F.O. 2/86, F.O. to Moor, 1*4-.10.95 Guns were raised from
Is. to 2s.6d., gunpowder from 2d. to 6d. per lb. Lagos
raised its spirit duties at the same time as part of a
general move to bring the whole of the West Coast into 
line. Correspondence to be found in F.O. 2/8*4-, 2/86,
83/1383, 83/138 .^
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Hanged behind the Times were the Niger Company, the
Manchester Guardian and most of the mission societies. To
co-ordinate policy, the Native Races and Liquor Traffic
United Committee had been formed in 1887 under the Presidency
of the Duke of Westminster and the Chairmanship of the Bishop
of London, with such members, in 1893? as Goldie, Dilke,
Lugard, Sir J. Kennaway M.P., Campbell, Baylis of the C.M.S.,
and Fox Bourne, secretary of the Aborigines Protection Society.
Opposed to the anti-liquor groups were, of course, the
Liverpool traders. They had early protested against the
11 exorbitant11 nature of the liquor duty, calculated to bring
in soma £200,000, a sum altogether out of proportion to the
total trade. It was neither just nor politic, the official
organ of the Chamber of Commerce argued,
"for a Government to attempt to disorganise the 
whole trade of such a large and populous district 
as the Oil Rivers in order to pander to the whims 
and fads of professional agitators and old women, 
who know nothing whatever of the conditions of the 
people over whom they profess to shed so many 
tears."
The whole trade had been built up on the principle of free 
importation,
"and the sudden rise in value of 100$ on what is 
practically the currency of the land will have much 
the same effect as a reduction in the value of a 
sovereign from 20/- to 10/- would have in this 
country . " 1
1. Liverpool Journal of Commerce. 21.8.91.
In the face of so much controversy, both Foreign Office 
and Macdonald had endeavoured to pursue a via media. It was 
recognised in the Foreign Office that most of the revenue 
would come from gin, but, as Anderson remarked, "we need not 
proclaim this".^ The agitators on both sides were played off 
against one another. Thus the Liverpool traders were told 
that
"the public are more likely to think that our 
spirit duties are not high enough than to 
sympathise ..." 2
In face of the stronger anti-liquor lobby, the approach was 
more subtle. The necessity of a revenue was pleaded; if 
absolute prohibition was impossible the next best thing was to 
tax the trade, and anyway there were worse evils to be eradi­
cated first, like human sacrifice. If the arguments employed 
by the government in this respect were questionable, in 
respect of trade they were not. There was no evidence to 
suggest that liquor had an adverse effect on trade. Indeed, 
the import of liquor was itself dictated by the export trade 
in palm oil. This suffered badly during the slump of 189^,
and so consequently did the liquor traffic and the administra-
k
tion*s revenue.
1. F.O. 8V2111. Min. by H.P.A., 5.10.91.
2. F.O. 8V2172. Min. by H.P.A., 25.8.91.
3. See Table I.
For government arguments and stonewalling tactics, see 
F.O. 83/1382. Question asked by Dilke, 30.8.93 and 
attached correspondence.
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A Macdonald!s attitude was realistic. He personally dis-
\j
approved of the drink traffic, regarding it as a “pernicious 
import11, and he discouraged the government employees in the 
Protectorate from partaking in excessive alcohol. On the 
other hand, he felt that there was little evidence of 
drunkenness in the Protectorate, the problem being worse in 
England. There were worse evils in the Protectorate, such as 
cannibalism, human sacrifice, and the traffic in slaves. To 
endeavour to make head against these a strong administration 
was necessary. If a revenue could be raised from another 
source all well and good, if not the natives should be educa­
ted towards abolition slowly, “for that was the proper way of 
setting to work.1*1
Macdonald*s evolutionary approach came under a continual 
series of attacks from both sides. The motives of these 
attacks were rarely pure and their facts were usually mis­
placed. The Protectorate neither gained from the import of 
liquor nor did it suffer from an alleged flood of cheap gin.
It was the Commissioner^ task to steer between Scylla and 
Charybdis - and the lessons in diplomacy he learnt prepared 
him well for the future. In the short term, the liquor con­
troversy materially contributed to deterioration in relations
1. Proceedings of Royal Colonial Institute, vol.27, 1895/6 .
Minutes of meeting held at Hotel Metropole, 12.11.95.
with the Niger Company. In the long'run, however, the atti­
tude of the anti-liquor lobby came in the end to be self- 
defeating; the moral assumptions of superiority forced down 
the African's throat could not but provoke a reaction.
The controversy over the arms traffic was somewhat dif­
ferent. It centred around the problem as to whether, in 
defiance of the regulations, large numbers of rifles etc., 
were being brought into the Protectorate. The import of arms 
and ammunition was governed by Article VIII of the Brussels 
Act, which laid down stringent controls over the traffic in 
regions defined as "infected by the slave trade". As soon as 
the Act was ratified by the Powers in January 1892, Macdonald 
was told to take the necessary steps to carry it out.1 The 
facile way in which the Foreign Office delivered this instruc­
tion quite ignored the inadequate means at the disposal of the 
Protectorate to carry it out. Under the terms of the Act, all 
arms imported had to be placed in a government warehouse. At 
that time in the eight rivers the administration was far too 
busy clearing bush and erecting dwelling houses to concern it­
self with such refinements. It was not until Macdonald came 
home on leave that regulations were drawn up, based on the 
model ordinance issued for the West African colonies, arrange­
ments being made to utilise certain of the merchants' stores
1. F.O. 8^/2193. F.O. to Macdonald, 15#1.92. Brussels Act 
in 8V2011.
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1
as Government warehouses.
When these regulations reached the Coast in March 1893
a delay followed, as the Acting Consul-Generalship changed
hands three times in as many weeks, and it was not until July
that arrangements were completed whereby certain stores were
pto be made bonded stores and used as Government warehouses. 
Before Macdonald returned to the Protectorate in June 1893* 
however, a conference had been held at the Foreign Office as 
to the question of the instructions in force in the Protec­
torate and the drawing-up of various ordinances to establish 
the administration on a legal footing. The regulations for 
the control of arms were put into abeyance and Macdonald had 
no alternative but to fall back on existing instructions.
What these were, no one in the Foreign Office was certain, 
since Johnston's prohibition of the importation of arms made 
at Opobo in 1887 could not be found in the library.
It was not surprising therefore that in view of the 
doubtful legal position, the traders bombarded the Foreign 
Office with awkward questions, well aware of the government's 
embarrassment. John Holt was always 11 bothering11 Macdonald as 
to whether Johnston's regulations had any force, and when the
1. F.O. 8lf/2191+. Macdonald to F.O., 2.12.92.
2. F.O. 83/1237. W.H. Boyle & Co. to Crown Agents, 5.7.93.
Commissioner arrested Beresford Rhodes, 11 a most unprincipled
villain’1, for importing rifles, the latter turned round and
informed him that he was unaware of any regulations .^* Boyle
& Co. wanted to know when the Government had prohibited the
sale of firearms in the Protectorate and in what papers the
said prohibition was published. A similar question was
2
received from Messrs Carson concerning gunpowder. More 
important, the Germans began pressing as to when some form of 
joint action would be possible in both the Oil Rivers and . 
the Cameroons on the enforcement of the Brussels Act.^ To all 
these questions the Foreign Office could only answer that 
regulations under the Brussels Act would soon be published and 
come into force. Not surprisingly the news that an ordinance 
was about to be published and the tacit admittance that legal 
regulations were not yet in force acted as a stimulus to 
importation during I 893 rather than the reverse. During the 
year 1893/^ well over 258,000,000 percussion caps alone were 
imported, twice as many as in the previous year. Dilke's 
criticism in the Commons of the governments inaction, ”looking
to the illegality under the .Brussels Act of the trade in caps
1+
to the interior” , was entirely justified.
1. F.O. 2/6 3 . Macdonald to Hill l1*.1.93.
2. F.O. 83/1237, Boyle & Co. to Crown Agents, 5.1.93. 8V22*+9,
Messrs. Carson to F*0. 17.5.92. There are other letters in
1237-12^ .
3. F.O. 8V2217. Hatzfeldt to Rosebery, 2 8 .1 0 .9 2.
F.O. 83/1382. Question askert
correspondence. ln Commons> 30.8.95, and
The Niger Coast Fire Arms Ordinance was finally approved 
in April 189*+,^ together with the Customs and other ordinan­
ces. It was given legal inferiority to the Customs Ordinance, 
where a general prohibition was maintained under section 
forty-two. Nevertheless the powers granted under it were 
sweeping. All firearms lawfully imported by sea had to be 
deposited in a public warehouse, at importers1 cost and risk; 
no trade was permitted by land except under special licence. 
Withdrawal from the warehouse was under the control of the 
Deputy Commissioner who could not under any circumstances 
authorise the sale of other than unrifled flintlocks and trade 
powder, and even this was restricted to areas where the slave 
trade was not prevalent. Stringent returns of arms and 
powder stored were required every six months. Special licence 
was required for the withdrawal of rifles and guarantees 
given that they would not be sold. Penalties for infringe­
ment were severe, ranging from a fine of £100 to twelve 
months1 imprisonment with hard labour. The Commissioner's 
powers under the ordinance extended to the making of rules 
having the force of law, with similar penalties of fine and 
imprisonment for infringement. The ordinance was unusual in
i-;— F.O. 83/1382-;— Question asked in Commons-, *30.8 .95f ^ d - 
correspondence.
I. F.O. 83/131^. Further incomprehensible delays prevented 
it from being put into force until August, ibid.. min. by 
C.L.H., 10.8.9*.
that the Commissioner exercised powers quite untrammelled
by the Secretary of State, to whom there was no reference in
1
the Ordinance*
The passing of the Ordinance in the particular form 
which it took represented a new resolution on the part of 
government to stamp out the arms traffic. Hitherto they had 
accepted Macdonaldfs assurances that no rifles had been impor 
ted into the Protectorate since 1891, although the natives 
possessed from before that date large numbers of rifles and 
some rifled cannon. The campaigns against Nana and the Brass 
men seemed to indicate that, if the Commissioner was not 
wrong, there were still considerable dangers in the quantity 
of arms in the possession of the coastal middlemen. The 
propaganda of the Niger Company, that large-scale smuggling 
of rifles had taken place since 1891, although vigorously 
denied by the Commissioner, was not without its effect, nor 
was the comment of Blanchard, in charge of the African Direct 
Submarine Telegraph Company at Bonny until 1892, that the 
natives were still supplied with rifles by the Liverpool
2
merchants, for ’’Sir Claude cannot be everywhere at once.’1 
No laxity could be tolerated. Macdonald was therefore 
peremptorily informed in 1895 that the existing practice of
1, F.O. 2/62. N.C.P. Fire Arms Ordinance.
2. F.O. 83/1376. Major Darwin to F.O., 12.3.95.
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using traders1 warehouses as public warehouses had got to
cease. He must establish public warehouses under the sole
control of the government and if traders were unwilling to
rent on these terms he must build his own.^
The spasmodic intervention of the government was hardly
very helpful to the Commissioner. A typical case in point
was that of small shot. Macdonald had banned its import under
the Ordinance, Kirk had reversed this on his visit to the
Protectorate. After a lengthy correspondence, Macdonald was
first upheld, then overruled, on the plea of Moor. It was
August 1896 before Gallwey was authorised to withdraw the
2proclamation prohibiting small shot. Despite, therefore, 
rather than because of the government, Macdonald endeavoured 
to maintain some control over the arms traffic. By the time 
he left the Protectorate tentative beginnings had been made 
in calling in arms for purposes of marking.^ The arms taken 
at Brass and Benin were, of course, disposed of. The accusa­
tions of the Niger Company he attempted to silence by a series 
of surprise searches of merchants' premises. Whether smuggling
1. 2/82, F.O. to Macdonald, 19.10.95.
2. F.O. 2/85. Macdonald to F.O., 1^.11. & 21.11.95. 2/82,
F.O. to Macdonald, *4-.12.95 Moor had argued, not without 
some reason, that natives resorted to cutting up lead 
bars in default of shot, and the irregular shape of this 
ammunition caused more damage than would shot.
3. F.O. 2/85. Macdonald to F.O., l8 .ll.
had ceased by 1895, or whether the traders were too clever 
for the customs officers, the result was a nil yield. While 
it is unsafe to argue from an absence of evidence, there was 
little to suggest large-scale smuggling from outside the 
Protectorate. The smuggling that took place into the Niger 
Company's territory was probably a natural process of rifles 
circulating within the territories before the establishment 
of the administration. The only catches made by the Customs 
officers were from ships - two convictions were obtained 
against captains of the Elder Dempster line for having un­
declared revolvers and cap guns on board. At all times, 
even before the passing of the Ordinance, Macdonald had taken 
the liberty of seizing rifles, whether illegally or not. Cap 
guns were permitted until 189*4-, when they too came under the 
ban. Those in store at the time the act came into force, the
Commissioner ordered to be shipped back to England where a
1
number were converted into flintlocks for re-export.
By the end of 1895 the Ordinance was operating with 
reasonable efficiency, public warehouses had been established 
and rules made for their smooth running, and the classifica­
tion and marking of existing arms in the Protectorate was
2
proceeding apace. To Macdonald, however, the Ordinance was
1. F.O. 83/1382. Memo by Macdonald, 28.12.95.
2. F.O. 2/85. Moor to F.O., 28.12.95.
no final solution. The disarming of the natives, if desir­
able, was impracticable. He felt that the only way to meet 
the question of the arms already in the Protectorate was to 
gain the goodwill of the Chiefs, and to purchase the better
kinds of weapons at reduced rates. His tact brought several
offers of machine guns and cannon during 1895? but he was 
unable to agree with the Chiefs as to price.
The trade patterns of the Protectorate barely altered 
during the Macdonald administration. Free imports retained 
their lead over dutiable imports in a rough ratio of 7 s 3 •
About 75f° of the imports and 60% of the exports were conduc­
ted with Britain. The other countries with which the 
Protectorate had trade relations were France, Germany,
Holland, the Niger Territories and the West Indies. Sweden 
was the only newcomer in 1895* Nearly of the trade was 
done in British ships.
Inland the picture was the same. In the Eastern Delta 
the fall of Ja Ja failed to bring about a millennium. Indeed, 
so much did trade continue to follow the old patterns that 
before the administration was inaugurated there was a con­
siderable body of white opinion pressing for his return. 
Neville, sent out to the Rivers by the steamship companies in 
1890 with a view to obtaining beaches for the conduct of 
trade, reported:
11 The Merchants made a great mistake in going to 
the markets. Messrs Miller Bros' agent told me 
yesterday that they paid just as much now for 
their produce as when they resided at the mouth 
of the River, although in the present instance 
they have four extra factories to keep besides 
the expense of steam launches and lighters, and 
the total export from the River shows no increase 
on previous years. This view is confirmed by 
others I have c o n s u l t e d 1
In 1893 the African Association sold their up-river factories
at Akwette and Ohumbela markets for £7,000 to the native
middlemen, so ending, as far as they were concerned, the
experiment of trading directly in the interior. Miller
Brothers protested to Macdonald when the middlemen threatened
to boycott them if they did not do the same. The reply of
the Commissioner was revealing: "The middlemen11, he said,
"could not compel them to leave the markets, but 
the Oil Rivers administration could not on the 
other hand compel the middlemen to trade with 
Miller Brothers or any other individual firm 
... The action of the African Association in 
retiring from the markets is doubtless due to 
their having found that it is cheaper to have the 
native produce brought to their factories at the 
River's mouth than to fetch it themselves; and 
though I do not venture to advise /jon/ to adopt 
a similar course, I J - - ^  e-^
down-river factorie
establishing at the up-river markets, the said 
trade is threatened with extinction." 2
Even allowing for the fact that Miller Brothers and Macdonald
1. F.O. 8V2157. Neville to Elder Dempster, **.1.91. Comm, 
by Bond, ^.1.91.
2. F.O. 2/51. Macdonald to F.O., 8.2.93.
the carrying trade
1
to deal with /you/ in /your/
were "not the best of friends" it was an extraordinary
line for the Commissioner to take. Moreover, it seemed in
direct contradiction to the promise that he had given John
Holt in 1891, that
"every possible protection and encouragement will 
be given to the opening and development of trade 
beyond the line now occupied by mercantile houses." 2
In trade matters there was obviously going to be no exercise
of the "despotic influence"^in favour of the European traders.
In the Western Delta the pattern was not even disturbed until
189^, Nana ruling supreme.
In fairness to Macdonald, there was little incentive to
disturb the existing patterns or allow them to be disturbed.
In 1895 there were still vast tracts of the Protectorate
which had never been visited by a white man. In terms of the
limited resources of the Protectorate, penetration was slow,
and Macdonald could not undertake the protection of traders
who established themselves in advance of the flag. That the
construction of roads and railways would have enabled the
Protectorate to develop to a much greater degree, as Wall
a
argued, was no doubt true, but Macdonald had neither the 
inclination nor the resources to undertake a wholesale process
1. F .0. 83/1375. Min. by C.L.H. on Miller Brothers to F.O., 
25.2.95.
2. F.O. 8V 2163. Min. by Macdonald, 2.5.91* on Holt to F.O. , 
30.>+.91.
3. F.O. 8V 2083. Memo by Macdonald 1.7.90.
^  Customs ReP°rt, N.c.P., 1895.
of development. He thought a railway unnecessary in view of 
the excellent waterways which tapped the principal producing 
centres; roads he did build, but strictly supplementary to 
the waterways. By 1895 there were limited communications by 
land in all the districts, the most useful being between the 
Upper Cross and Old Calabar, which overcame the difficulties 
of navigating the Cross during the dry season.*1" In adopting 
this course Macdonald proceeded according to sound economic 
sense - water was by far the cheapest method of transport, 
if slow, and roads had limited uses before the arrival of the 
lorry.
Macdonald *s attempts to alter the unhealthy dependence 
of the Protectorate on palm oil were greeted with limited 
success • Some stimulus was given to the European traders to 
diversify by the oil season of 189^, which was one of the 
worst on record. A combination of low prices in Europe (the 
price of oil dropped to £12 per ton at one point on the 
London market), a severe epidemic of smallpox at the markets, 
and locust damage, nearly knocked the bottom out of the
o
market. During 1895 coffee, cocoa and rubber plantations 
sprang up at Warri, Quo Ibo and Old Calabar, as an insurance 
against another bad season, although a big problem was
) ■.
1. F.O. 2/8^. Macdonald to Salisbury, Annual Report.
2. ibid. Macdonald to Salisbury, 25.7.95.
shortage of labour. The India Office was asked about the
possibility of importing coolie labour, without much success
- the problems of expense and climate being considered too
great to be overcome,^ Holt asked the administration for
grants-in-aid for agricultural development, suggesting that
some portion of the large revenue be spent in
“reproductive operations calculated to open up 
new sources of labour and capital without which 
the greatly desired prosperity of the Protectorate 
cannot be assured.11
This “remarkable request for the establishment of a state-
2
aided industry" drew no response from an administration | 
which by 1895 was hard-pressed to make ends meet.
It was perhaps in the nature of things that relations 
between the administration and the traders should be conduc­
ted on am ambivalent basis. Appreciative of the stability 
brought by the new administration, the trader resented the 
fact that he was no longer a law in the land. The result was 
an elaborate game of cat and mouse. The game had begun even 
before the establishment of the administration, as the 
traders tried to “beat the duties" and “starve" the adminis­
tration by pouring in dutiable articles before the duties 
could be levied.*^ It was April 1892 before the shipments
1. F«0. 6Vl3^6. Afr. Assoc, to India Office, 1.9.93* 
83/12^3, 1.0. to F.O., 20.11.93*
2 . F.O. 8 V 2 2 6 5 .  Holt to Rosebery, 7 . 1 2 . 9 2 .  Min. by H.P.A., 
8.12.
3. F.O. 8 V 2 1 1 1 .  Mifa. by 5 . 1 0 . 9 1 .
1
began to resume their normal figures as stocks became ex­
hausted. With regard to the tariff, the Liverpool traders 
did not confine themselves to objecting to the spirit duties 
only. Great dissatisfaction was expressed at what they 
termed the exorbitant nature of the tariff, producing
11 some £300,000 per annum and this on a trade of 
about £1 million11
0
which was "simply ridiculous". Anderson dismissed the
•3
opposition with contempt as "wont to criticize adversely", 
yet if their estimates were grossly exaggerated, some of the 
comments of the Liverpool traders were shrewd, well-informed, 
and often adopted by the Protectorate. One of the earliest 
changes, as a result of Liverpool pressure, was the substi­
tution of the imperial gallon for the old wine gallon as a
If
unit of measurement. Again, the traders1 criticism of the 
lack of provision for rebates and bonding facilities for 
goods other than wine, spirits and tobacco were subsequently 
acted on by the Protectorate. Lastly even Lister agreed that 
the tax on salt was heavy.
1. F.O. 8b/22b6. Min. by T.V.L., 12.k.92.
2 . Liverpool Journal of Commerce. 21.8.91.
3. F.O. 8V2172. Min. by H.P.A., 25.8.91.
k .  F.O. 8V2179. F.O. to Afr. Assoc. 19.11.91.
5. Liverpool Journal, loc.clt. See also Chapter 5«
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Much of the opposition was however factious, but this 
did not prevent the Foreign Office from being bombarded 
during the latter part of 1891. The grain distillers com­
plained of British and foreign manufacturers being placed on 
the same footing, and wanted differential duties.'** The 
African Association on the other hand were worried that 
administrative powers and the tariff could not be enforced
against foreigners 11 which would put them at a trading dis- 
2advantage. 11 Their complaints varied from particular
grievances about the tariff and the inconvenience of shipping
specie to West Africa to meet the customs duties, to a
3
general attack on the new system of administration. To one 
of these the Foreign Office returned a comprehensive answer 
which revealed its firm belief that it was on the side of 
progress.
“The new commercial system inaugurated in'West.
Africa must inevitably cause local changes ... 
and ... the abolition of the monopoly of the 
middlemen, of which the members of the Associa­
tion were prominent advocates cannot fail, for 
a time at least, to cause some discontent among 
the Coast natives ... It is now impracticable,
1. F.O. 8V2177# Preston to Salisbury, 21.10.91. The pro­
posal was of course against the Anglo-German agreement.
2. F.0.C..P. 6351. Afr.Assoc, to Salisbury, 28.7.91* The 
Association overlooked the fact that the Chiefs had 
delegated to Britain powers over foreigners within the 
Protectorate.
3. F.O.C.P. 6351y contains a number of relevant letters.
even if it were desirable, to take any steps in 
the direction of reverting to the old system, or 
of compelling trade, in spite of new developments, 
to follow the old courses.11 1
By December it was clear that the agitation was con­
fined to the African Association. At a meeting organised by 
the Colonial Office, at which Anderson was present to meet 
the Chambers of Commerce interested in West African trade, 
the Chairman of the Liverpool Chamber asked Anderson if he 
had observed that among the grievances put forward
“there was none relating to the Oil Rivers; the 
reason of this silence was that Liverpool was 
perfectly satisfied there.11
On Anderson remarking that the African Association was still
“pouring in complaints11, he was told that “we need not mind
them:
“three or four firms, which had monopolised the 
trade, were discontented with the development 
which let in rivals and destroyed their excep­
tional position, but they were quite out of touch 
with the genuine feeling on the subject.11 2
This confirmed the impression given by Macdonald in September.
Hearing that the African Association was agitating to “get up
a protest11 against excessive duties, stating as a reason that
they alone paid £150,000 a year in duties, he had ordered
Wall to draw up a preliminary return for August. This showed
that of the revenue of £9,000, the Association paid just
1. F.O.C.P. 6351. F.O. to Afr. Assoc. 2^.10.91.
2. F.O. 8V2180. Min. by'H.P.A., 9.12.91.
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30$ -1 As their arguments were exposed, the African Associa­
tion accepted the inevitable, and tried a fresh tack - that 
of winning a position of privilege in the new order of things
In October they asked for government patronage to establish
2a banking department in the Protectorate. Various un­
successful attempts were made to acquire the supply tender 
for the administration, culminating in an attempt to acquire 
the agency in 189? after Jephson's resignation.^ Relations 
with the administration became realistic if not cordial. It 
was the Association who in 1895 lent the administration
£20,000 to overcome the short-term difficulties created by
if
the "Ivy1 purchase.
In the Rivers themselves the administration refused to 
recognise any concessions acquired before August 1891. Thus, 
Watts at Qua Ibo was told that the treaty obtained by him 
from the Kings and Chiefs, delegating all their powers and 
authorities to him, was null and void, since he had no 
authorisation from Her Majesty's Government to make it.
1. F.O.C.P. 6351* Macdonald to F.O., 16.9.95.
2* ibid. Afr. Assoc, to Salisbury, 16.10.91. The govern­
ment was not forthcoming.
3. F.O. 83/138^. Afr. Assoc, to F.O., 22.10.95.
F.O.C.P. 635l» Macdonald to F.O., 16.9.91*
Macdonald threatened him with imprisonment if he continued 
to import arms on the basis of his so-called concession.
If the Commissioner was firm in the face of a political 
challenge, he was largely powerless in the face of commercial 
harassment. There was little doubt that prices went up in 
1891 far beyond what was warranted by the tariff. A trade 
gun, for instance, leapt from 6s. to 8s., and the duty was 
only Is. The Commissioner's answer to this was to remain 
strictly neutral between black and white traders. The 
question of trade was one to be settled between the partici­
pants, and beyond apprising the European agents that he mas 
aware of sharp practice in respect of prices, and informing 
the native middlemen that anything paid "over the odds" went 
into the pocket of the European traders, he would not go.
This attitude itself, however, was a significant departure 
from the past. From Beecroft to Annesley, Consuls had been 
partisan in favour of the European. Now there was to be a 
calculated endeavour to raise the administration above the 
local disputes.
Balked by the Commissioner at the local level, the 
traders carried their attack into Parliament. The weak spot 
in the government's armour was undoubtedly the lack of pub­
lished material on the Protectorate. The first complete report
on the administration did not appear until I891*, although 
thereafter they appeared annually - after I896 in the form 
of Blue Books. There was no ulterior motive on the part of 
the government in withholding information - the Protectorate 
was hardly organised before then. In any case, the government 
had precedent on its side in that the Protectorate was re­
garded as being in the same class as a self-supporting 
colony, which did not receive a grant from imperial funds and 
was therefore not liable to provide information. In April 
189^ Kimberley told Macdonald to send home annually a com­
mercial report for publication,^ and in June agreed in the
2House that an annual report would be submitted. In October, 
however, the African Association was still protesting about 
the non-issue of any official statistics. That Macdonald 
was dragging his feet was evident; what he objected to was 
not so much the publication of trade statistics, as the 
publication of his accounts in detail. For the moment he 
won his point. The African Association's main desire was to 
see the steamship manifests, the statistics of trade and 
accounts being of secondary importance.' The report duly
1. F.O. 2/62. Kimberley to Macdonald, 9**+.9^*
2. F.O. 83/1312. Commander Bethel, M.P. Question,1q6.9*+-.
3. F.O. 83/1316. Afr.Assoc, to F.O., 26.10.9^.
k. F.O. 2/6*+. Min. by H.P.A., 30.11.91*-.
5. ibid. Jephson to Hill, 19.11.9*+-.
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went before Parliament at the end of 1891*, minus the accounts.
For the future it was agreed that reports would be published
to coincide with the financial year, the question of accounts
being held over.^
Whatever official relations the Commissioner had with
the traders, his personal relations with the agents on the
spot were always good, Pinnock thought him quite 11 the best
man Her Majesty*s Government could possibly have found or
selected11, who would ”soon make his power felt by the 
2
natives” . In part his popularity was due, as was evident 
from Pinnock, to the circumstances in which he found himself 
- the general consciousness on the part of the trading com­
munity that trade would be given a new impetus with the 
ending of the old consul and gunboat era. But personality 
could not entirely be left out of account. Pinnock was not 
the only one who felt that Macdonald was 11 an experienced and 
able administrator, firm and just in all his dealings.”
Coxon thought him quite ”unstuffy” and open handed. Similar 
sentiments were expressed by Elder Dempster, whose support
ibid. Macdonald to F.O., 7.12.91*. The first accounts 
were published in the first Blue Book, C.O. b6b/ly 1896/7*
2. F.O. 8^/2157* Jones to Macdonald, 18,2.91.
3* F.O. 8V2157* Jones to Macdonald, 18.2.91. Enc. Pinnock
to Coxon. 2/639 Macdonald to Hill, P. 11.8.9^. Enc.
Coxon to Pinnock.
the Commissioner had from the start. This support took the
tangible form of buoying the rivers, which saved the
Protectorate from expense,'1' and of a gratuitous supply of
regular information on trade shipments, and copies of manifests
- an aid to the suppression of smuggling supplied much to
2
the annoyance of the traders. Elder Dempster1 s sorrow at 
the Commissioner's departure in 1896 was genuine.
Macdonald's personal capacity to win respect had contributed 
not a little to the commercial morality of the West Coast.
Trade no longer governed but was governed.
1. F.O. 8V2195. Macdonald to F.O., 30.1.92.
2. Some of the information supplied related to imports into 
the Niger Company's territories - a useful piece of 
espionage on Goldie. See e.g. F.O. 2/85, Macdonald to 
Campbell, 23.11.95. Also Macdonald P.P., notes from 
Elder Dempster various; F.O. 83, Volumes domestic 
various, for scattered references, e.g. 83/12 +^1 , state­
ment communicated by Bond, 22.6.93; and A.R. Bezittingen 
Vols. 1301-h passim.
3. F.O. 83/1^ 0 . Elder Dempster to F.O. I3 .I.96
CHAPTER EIGHT
CHRISTIANITY AND CIVILISATION IN THE NIGER DELTA1
Missionary enterprise in the Oil Rivers was of rela- 
tively recent origin in 1891. The United Presbyterian 
Mission of Scotland arrived first, in l8*+6 , and established 
itself in Old Calabar. Its main effort was concentrated on 
the Effka, and its influence was slow to spread, but by 1879 
stations had been established up the Cross River at Ikonetu, 
Ikorofiang and Okoyong. The Church Missionary Society was 
the largest of the missions, beginning work at Bonny in 186^, 
Brass in 187^ and Okrika in 1880. Also on the coast were the
1. It must be repeated here that the present purpose is to 
examine how certain individual Europeans saw the African 
peoples with whom they came into contact at a particular 
point in time. Thus, although African sources are used 
in this chapter where relevant, it is not intended to 
paint a comprehensive picture of Christianity and civili­
sation in the Oil Rivers, but strictly to analyse 
missionary enterprise in its relation to Macdonald and the 
administration between 1891 and 1896, and also to indicate 
how the administrators interpreted the word 'civilisation* . 
This chapter is, therefore, necessarily selective. For 
fuller elucidation of the events mentioned readers are 
directed to the sources indicated.
2. Excluded here are the short-lived efforts of the Portuguese 
and others in Benin and Warri in the 16th and 17th centu­
ries, which left little trace. See A. Ryder, "Missionary 
Activities in the Kingdom of VJarri to the Early Nineteenth 
Century", J.H.S.N.. Vol. 2 no.l, i960, & Benin and the 
Europeans. 1969. caps. 2 & b.
Qua Ibo Mission, headquarters at Belfast, which began work 
among the Ibibio and Ibenos in 1887, and the Primitive 
Methodists, who moved from Fernando Po to Oron in 1892. In 
the hinterland were two Roman Catholic organisations, the 
Society of African Missions, headquarters at Lyon, and the 
Society of the Holy Ghost Fathers who, between them, carried 
out the evangelisation of the Ibo after 1885. It was, 
however, the activities of the Presbyterians and the C.M.S. 
which were of most moment to the Macdonald administration.1
The most notable feature of the work of the C.M.S. in 
the Rivers was that, up to 1890, it was under the director­
ship of a Nigerian, Bishop Ajayi Crowther. This was largely 
the result of the enlightened policy of Henry Venn, the 
secretary of the C.M.S. between 18^ -1 and 1872, who saw that 
the only way to overcome the problems of climate and com­
munications which inhibited European activity was to employ 
native agency. The task of the white missionary was reduced 
solely to the training of black clergy, and the organisation 
of a Church which, as soon as it became financially self- 
supporting, also became independent. The white missionary
1. Two works of vital importance in the study of early
missionary activity in the Rivers are J. Ajayi, Christian 
Missions in Nigeria 18^-1-1891. 1965> and E. A. Avandele, 
The Missionary Impact on Modern Nigeria 18^2-191^. 1966.
338.
would then move on to virgin ground elsewhere and repeat the
process.^- In 186^ Venn persuaded the Archbishop of
Canterbury to appoint Crowther, a freed Yoruba slave, as the
2first African Bishop on the Niger - an enormous if vaguely 
defined diocese which included the Niger Valley and the coast 
of the Bights except where European missionaries were estab­
lished.^
After Venn’s death in 1872 the policy towards native 
pastorates changed, reflecting the new urge of Europeans to 
rule over Africans. As European missionaries became part and 
parcel of the ruling class, so the position of Bishop Crowther 
as head of the local Church began to look more and more 
anomalous. Gradually his power was eroded by the C.M.S., 
first by the appointment of Europeans to manage the tempor­
alities, then by the setting-up of a European-dominated 
finance committee. In 1890 matters came to a head when the 
mission was purged by white missionaries who preferred sweep­
ing charges of immorality against the African clergy. The 
Bishop resigned from the Finance Committee, and died in the 
last hours of 1891. The parent committee made it quite clear
1. Ajayi, ’’Henry Venn and the Policy of Development11,
J.H.S.N. Vol.l n o . 1959.
2. Ajayi, Christian Missions. p.l80 ff.
3. Ajayi, op.cit.. p. 206.
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thaJr i\q bi$hoj? Wou-U t>e- <\yfpOt/chJ $uucc£6$or’ a/id
the! me African converts, seeing that the whole question of
Bishop Crowther was tied up with that of the capacity of 
Africans to govern themselves, seceded from the C.M.S. to 
form the Niger Delta Native Pastorate Church.'*'
It was in a potentially explosive situation, therefore, 
that Macdonald arrived in the Rivers in July 1891. Two 
points are of fundamental importance in understanding the 
policy which he followed toward the missions. One was his 
belief that the government of the Rivers could only be carried 
on with the support of and by consultation with the native 
rulers. The other was his own personal commitment to 
Christianity. Macdonald was a Presbyterian, 11 a good Sabba­
tarian", who in addition to his manifold duties, found time
to be a full and active member of the Church Committee of the
2
Presbyterian Mission in Old Calabar. On both these counts 
Macdonald stood apart from the normal run of administrators 
on the west coast. The evangelical disposition moved a 
normally placid temperament to violent opposition to the 
racial crudities of some of the white missionaries and pre­
pared the way logically for what followed.
1. These events are described in Ajayi, op.cit. pp.206-27*+, 
Ayandele, op.cit. cap.75 J. B. Webster, The African 
Churches among the Yoruba. Oxford 196H-, pt. 1.
2. U.P. Minutes, 30.5.93.
For Macdonald quickly indicated that in the dispute 
between the new Delta church and the C.M.S. he was not pre­
pared to use his political power in favour of Salisbury 
Square. Indeed behind an officially proclaimed neutrality^ 
he stoutly defended the African clergy. Strictly from a 
political point of view he favoured them because of their 
assistance to the Government in tribal matters, informing
Ingham, the Bishop of Sierra Leone that as far as he was
2concerned white missionaries were "of no use at all". His 
support, however, ran to more than words. At a particularly 
delicate moment, when the Church Missionary Society hoped that 
the Delta pastorate would collapse from lack of financial 
support and that a reconciliation would be arranged on the 
Society's terms, Macdonald chose to accept the position of 
patron of the pastorate and offered Archdeacon Crowther £200 
per year for industrial training in the mission schools. The
Ll
Commissioner also attended Bishop Crowtherfs funeral in Lagos, 
a gesture not lost on the African community.
1. Lambeth, Benson}. 1 llg, Macdonald to D.C* Crowther 6.7.92.
2. C.M.S. G5/A3/0, Bishop of Sierra Leone to Wigram 7.8.91.
3. Lambeth, Benson 1, llg Macdonald to Archdeacon Crowther
15.7.92.
k. C.M.S. 63/A3/65 Allan to Wigram 1.1.92. James Johnston
led the service and delivered a sermon said by Allan to
be "much too racial" .
3^1.
Instead of collapsing;the Delta Pastorate flourished 
under Macdonaldfs patronage. The removal of Ja Ja had crushed 
the last obstacle to Christian penetration on the coast.
Bonny, the centre of the new pastorate, entered into a new 
period of prosperity and the Church underwent a phenomenal 
expansion. By the middle of 1892 there were twenty chapels 
and nearly 1,000 converts in Ja Ja's old markets alone. The 
Pastorate's annual income for the first six years of its 
existence averaged not far short of £2,000. Opobo followed 
Bonny1s lead and was responsible for churches in the interior 
as far as Aba.'1’ By contrast the Church Missionary Society 
stations at Brass and Abonema were nearly empty - converts 
had left en masse.
It was natural that Salisbury Square found the Commis­
sioner's attitude intensely irritating. Their temper could 
hardly have been improved when the Commissioner patronisingly
observed that the Society's stations at Brass and Abonema
2
would be better off "if the C.M.S. settled its dissensions 
with the Delta Pastorate". Already, however, they were coming 
to this conclusion themselves. As Ayandele has noted,the 
Society's hope of nipping the movement in the bud by asserting 
rights over land and property had really crashed on the land
1. Epelle E., The Church in Opobo. Aba 1938*
2. C.M.S. 63/1^3/06 Macdonald to C.M.S. 10.3.9^.
3^2*
tenure system, whereby land which ceased to be used for the
purpose given by the grantee reverted to the people,^ At an
interview between Whiting and Baylis, on the one hand, and
Macdonald, home on leave, on the other, an agreement was
hammered out. Both sides reserved their opinion on the main
point at issue, and Whiting after asking Archbishop Benson to
use his influence with the Commissioner, refused to go back
on the main C.M.S. point of a European successor to Crowther.
The proposal to create African assistant bishops was,
however, satisfactory to Macdonald, who agreed to endeavour
to promote a reconciliation between the pastorate and the
C.M.S. He refused, however, to have James Johns|on, whom
Carter was trying to push out of Lagos, as an instrument of
2
reconciliation within the Protectorate.
Macdonald was far from being dogmatic about the question 
of white versus black missionaries. His main concern was that 
the missions should be a success. He saw Christianity as a 
unique instrument for the social betterment of the people; 
any factors, such as disputes between missions, which detracted
1. Ayandele op.cit. p.226 also C.M.S. 63/A3/0?. Report of
Deputation investigating the split. March 1892.
2. C.M.S. 63/A3/O6 . Memo, of interview 2.3*93* Johnston 
the unique nationalist instrumental in stirring up 
opinions in 1891 had paradoxically remained within the
C.M.S. Ayandele E. MAn Assessment of James Johnston and
His Place in Nigerian History: Part IIn J.H.S.N. Vol.3
No .1, 196*+.
3^3.
from the effectiveness of the missions were to be deplored.
He supported the native pastorate not only because of 
personal beliefs but because it was successful, and he believed 
that the efforts of the C.M.S. to suppress it could only 
create dissension.
Ample illustration that Macdonald was not against the 
C.M.S., as such, was given by his action over the stations at 
Abonema and Brass. In February 189^ he sent a telegram to 
Salisbury Square expressing concern that the missions had 
been for several months without a head, and urging immediate 
action. The reasons for action he revealed in a letter the 
following month - on the one hand a note from the New Calabar 
chiefs requesting the Commissioner to remove the mission once 
and for all from their country and on the other a statement 
by the Brass Chiefs that they were financially unable to 
support a mission.^
The discontent at New Calabar was caused by the over­
zealousness of a convert, Ulue, an interpreter to the Consular
Court;whom Macdonald had lent to the mission at the request of
2
the local head of the C.M.S., Dobbinson. Uluefs proselytising
1. The complete correspondence was communicated to the F.O.
in 2/63 17-3.91+.
2. The Reverend Dobbinson was a member of the finance com­
mittee which humiliated Crowther. His views mellowed 
with the years uijtil he was quite npro African” 5 Webster 
op.cit. pp.16-1 7.'
alarmed the chiefs, who feared a slave rising, and it took 
several hours of harangue on the part of the Commissioner 
before he convinced them 1 of the extreme folly of their 
request”. Macdonald removed the offender to Old Calabar.
The Mew Calabar meeting gave the Commissioner his chance 
to promote a reconciliation between the pastorate and the 
Society. Robbinson happened to be at Degema in March, and on 
the way from Old Calabar, Macdonald induced the Reverend 
Boyle at Bonny to accompany him to meet Robbinson. The two 
clerics held discussions and agreed that the latter should 
take charge of the Abonema mission until arrangements could 
be made by the C.M.S. for the further carrying on of the work. 
This represented a real breakthrough and Macdonald coupled it 
with an earnest plea to settle all dissensions.
At Brass the question was somewhat different. Accord­
ing to the Reverend D. Williams, the native pastor temporarily 
residing there, the Brass Chiefs had no objection to the 
mission, (he; indeed; had a congregation of 2?0) but they had 
informed him that, as their oil markets had been taken from 
them by the Niger Company, they could not afford to maintain 
a mission. Macdonald urged the committee to give some finan­
cial helPjsince the two churches, with their schools 
attached, were being ruined by neglect. This he regarded as 
a job for the C.M.S., since the native pastorate could not
3*+5.
afford the money which it was necessary to spend.
Macdonald, unfortunately, had not met Tugwell, the 
bishop appointed as Crowther*s successor in 189^, as, by 
the time the Bishop arrived in the Protectorate, Macdonald was 
home on leave. Moor was left with strict instructions to 
communicate with Tugwell as to the exact relationships between 
the Pastorate and the C.M.S. The reconciliation was all that 
could be desifed and the Commissioner was overjoyed. Tugwell 
was welcomed by Archdeacon Crowther and the two drew up a
constitution to regulate the affairs of the Delta Church, for
submission to the Archbishop of Canterbury. The pastorate 
was to be regarded as a true branch of the Church of England 
within an independent African diocese. The constitution which 
was ratified in 1897 preserved the identity of the pastorate; 
which was guaranteed a Bishop as soon as it was able to 
support one. By the end of 189^ mission work was beginning 
again to advance on all fronts. The Brass mission was manned 
with a staff of three, and Archdeacon Crowther completed 
arrangements for the taking over of the Abonema mission, where
1. F.O. 2/6 3 . Macdonald to F.O. 17*3«9^*
2. He was in fact the second. The first, Hill, had died in
January 189*+ six months after, consecration. Webster 
op.cit. p.3 9.
3* The C.M.S. reneged on its promise in 1902. Ayandele 
op.cit. pp.236-7 «
he was received in a friendly manner by the New Calabar
1 mchiefs. This outcome was due in no small degree to the
Commissioner himself.
Macdonald's zeal in the cause of Christianity was
naturally even more strongly reflected in matters relating to
the mission of his own church. His erection of Old Calabar
into something akin to a capital city owed not a little to
the primary establishment there of the Presbyterians. Here,
amongst his fellow Scots, Macdonald created a 'home1 which an
observer described as
"really quite civilised with its official resi­
dences. Here you can indulge in cricket, lawn 
tennis and golf. 2
With pardonable exaggeration Macdonald, looking back over
twenty years, described it as
"a beautiful park, dotted with fine buildings ... 
now ... one of the show places of West Africa." 3
Pride of place in Old Calabar went to the Hope Waddell Insti­
tute opened in 1895? probably the most ambitious and certainly 
the most comprehensive education scheme in Africa before the 
twentieth century. Planned by the mission board, the
1. F.O. 2/6*4-. Macdonald to F.O. 23.11.9^» including Baylis 
to Macdonald *4-.5*9^  and Tugwell to Moor 23.10.9^.
2. "Life in a Gunboat on the West Coast of Africa by a 
Naval Officer", United Services Magazine July 1899
3* Geographical Journal September 191*4-.
3^ 7.
Institute purported to cover all fields of education, indus­
trial, mission, teacher training and secondary. Courses were 
offered to both boys and girls - the girls learning domestic 
science and dress making, the boys naval engineering, 
carpentry, masonry, blacksmithing, coopering and civil 
engineering. Teacher training courses were offered in 
English and religious subjects, as well as technical subjects. 
The Protectorate provided the Institute with a brickworks 
complete with equipment at Okorofiong as well as £200 per 
annum from funds for industrial training. The institute was 
unique in tropical Africa. The inspiration for it was provi­
ded by Dr. Robert Laws, who had already made a name for him­
self as a colleague of Livingstone and for a less ambitious 
industrial school in Central Africa. He visited the Protector­
ate in 1893 and made a comprehensive survey of its industrial 
needs That the plan was brought to fruition in the 
remarkably short time of two years owed much to the energy of 
the Protectorate^ Public Works Department which expedited
building materials and arranged for labour under the eager eye
2
of the Commissioner.
One of the most extraordinary of the Scots colony at Old 
Calabar was the woman missionary, Mary Slessor. Born in
1. U.P. Minutes 30.5*93.
2. Goldie H. Calabar and its Mission, p.350 ff.
3^ 8.
Dundee in 1858, she had come out to Old Calabar in 1 8 7 9.
From there she moved up the Cross River to Okoyong, where, 
until her death in 1915> she exercised an extraordinary in­
fluence amongst the people, Macdonald, recognising this 
influence, had asked her to be his representative amongst the 
Okoyong, formal recognition following in 189^ as President of 
the Native C o u r t I n  1895 h© paid her the honour of an 
official visit, A remarkable scene ensued, with the Com­
missioner on one side in all his finery and the "scruffy but 
intrepid" white missionary with the chiefs on the other. He 
assured them that
"he had not come to take away their lands but to 
help them govern their country themselves ... 
but they must recognize the laws of Justice and 
humanity."
The chiefs replied that
"they had heard the words but only once, which 
did not give them importance. But now that they 
had heard them twice, they were certain they were 
good words and they would obey." 2
Such were the realities of government in the Protectorate.
The missions had no cause to bewail the indifference of
the Protectorate administration to the Christian message.
During this period two new missions were encouraged to enter
on the scene: the Roman Catholics in the shape of Father Lutz
1. Probably the only woman ever to hold this position until 
after the 2nd World War.
2. 0 !Brien B. "She had a Magic" p.l80. Livingstone W.P. 
"Mary Slessor of Calabar".
of the Society of African Missions, who asked for land in
New Calabar, and the Native Eaptist Church under Mojola
1Agbebi, who began work amongst the Ijo. The fall of Nana
allowed missionary enterprise to flourish west of the Delta.
Like Ja-Ja, Nana was an upholder of the traditional faith
and had always refused to allow missions to settle in his
territory. He boasted to Fox Bourne of the Aborigines
Protection Society of the power of his ju ju, which could
2
scare away cannibals. In 1893 both Moore Harper and Phillips,
(LivLr
the officers in charge of Benii^ and Warri, had begged Hill 
"most earnestly" for Christian Missions to begin work amongst 
the Edo and Itsekiri.^ In 189^, even before the campaign had 
taken place,Tugwell was warned to be ready "for a spiritual 
entry into the territory". Indeed every military campaign 
of the period against the centres of paganism saw a 
strengthening of the Cross. The military campaigns were not 
always Macdonald*s intention - the missionary enterprise 
invariably was. Nor were the sometimes unwilling recipients
1. F.O. 2/63 Macdonald to F.O. 17.3*93• Ayandele op.cit. p.l80
2. AP.S. Nana to Fox Bourne 5.11.9*+.
3. C.M.S. 63/A3/06. Hill to Wigram 2.1.93. Harper was 
nephew of the Bishop of New Zealand and Phillips son of 
the Archdeacon of Barrow-ih-Furness.
k. C.M.S. 63/A3/06. Tugwell to Baylis 23.7.91*.
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always ungrateful. In 1897 the first lodge of freemasons in
the Protectorate was founded at Old Calabar. It was called
Macdonald fs Lodge and formed a link between the old and the
new, the pagan and the Christian.^
A meeting point for missionary enterprise and the
2
administration was over the question of slavery. It will be 
remembered that in 1890 one of the principal objections to 
erecting the Oil Rivers into a colony had arisen on this 
question. Macdonald had early recognised the impossibility 
of a complete abolition of slavery. For a start it would have 
required a large force and social resources far beyond those 
at the Protectorate's disposal. In the second place he felt 
that he had to some degree pledged himself to the Chiefs in 
I889 that nothing would be done precipitately. His attack on 
the problem was, therefore, cautious, and largely took the 
form of issuing free papers to any domestic slaves who could 
prove continuous neglect and ill treatment. The papers in 
theory constituted a protection against interference from all 
persons within the effective zone of the administration and 
allowed the holder absolute freedom in disposing of his or her
1. First Grand Lodge of Nigeria. Masonic Directory 1951.
2. An analysis of the social side of slavery in the delta 
may be found in Jones GJ, The Trading States of the Oil 
Rivers Oxford 1963* p.57 ff.
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services. Up to 1895 comparatively few of these papers had 
been granted.^" This either illustrated the absence of genuine 
discontent amongst the slave population or a reluctance to 
bring a case before the Consular Court. The system was, 
anyway, far too crude to extend throughout the Protectorate. 
Moor was instructed to obtain the assent of chiefs to proper 
regulations under which freedom would be conferred by the 
courts in cases of ill usage, or papers of freedom given to 
masterless negroes.^
Domestic slavery was, however, merely the tip of the 
iceberg. The problems created by prisoners captured in the 
conflicts in the interior, who often ended up as human sacri­
fices, or those enslaved or seized for debt;were hardly 
amenable to the intermittent intervention of the Consular 
Courts. Here Macdonald freely admitted that he had little 
ultimate sanction beyond the use or the threat of force. As 
soon as a sufficient force of constabulary was gathered in a 
district, the chiefs were called together and harangued by the 
Commissioner on the evils of seizing a neighbour^ person and 
chattels, a process which usually involved war and general 
stoppage of trade. If these harangues were part of the pro­
cess of ‘civilising1 the African they were a very raw form of
1. 2/85 Moor to F.O. 25.12.95. Under 100.
2. 2/100 F.O. to Moor 1 8.2 .9 6.
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civilisation."*"
Civilisation was a key word in the mind of the Com­
missioner, who did not generally think in terms of warfare*
The Vice Consuls were ordered to travel, explain the Protec­
torate^ plan for the people and earn goodwill and trust by
i
their own example• Their stations were expected to be islands
of civilisation in the midst of 'savagery1* Warri was a
model example* Everything there was clean, orderly and new:
"On one side of the stream are endless mangrove 
swamps mud and oozy slime; on the other a strip 
some half a mile long has been hewn out of the 
cottonwoods which tower behind it like a sombre 
wall, and here the trading factories stand .**
In the centre there stretches a dusty compound, 
where the union jack floats over the stately 
Protectorate Consulate, a handsome wooden build­
ing, white roofed, white walled .*. with cool 
verandahs, and the space underneath between its 
supporting piles turned into a spacious court 
room and offices* One's first impression on 
looking at it is a feeling of partial blindness*
In that fierce sunlight the whitewash seems in­
candescent, and there is a certain oiliness about 
the surface of every African river which flings 
back the light like a polished mirror*" 2
From these centres the officers dispensed justice and
struck out into new realms* Gallwey proved a particularly
vigorous exponent of hinterland penetration* In October 1891
when he had barely settled at his post, he was off up river
1. F.O. 2/85 Macdonald to F.O. 17.12*95.
2. Bindloss op.cit* pp.1^3-^.
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to visit the Urhobo oil markets.^" His objects in so doing 
were
**the establishment of law and order; the selec­
tion of suitable sites for a vice consulate, 
barracks and constabulary posts; to impress upon 
the natives the great advantages to be gained by 
the cultivation of such crops as coffee, cocoa 
etc. and enquire into the reasons for the slack­
ness of trade in the Sobo district generally.*1 2
The ambitious nature of his programme of civilization was 
scarcely fulfilled. He was generally welcomed and succeeded 
in getting as far as Abraka, nearly 120 miles up the Ethiope 
River. That the nature of his welcome was dictated by con­
temporaneous Itsekiri-Urhobo relations was highly likely, for
in the event Gallwey signed no treaties nor was the enthusiasm
3
with which he was greeted lasting. He excused his failure to 
assert his authority, by the fact that the people had no 
recognized ruler and would neither understand nor observe 
treaties until European influence was established amongst
1. In December Gallwey also went from Benin to Lagos through 
the interior creeks. A canoe was lent by Nana who refused 
to lend 'boys* on the grounds they would abscond when the 
Vice Consul got to Lagos. DUgho supplied the deficiency 
to Gallwey!s gratitude. F.O. 8V219*+. Macdonald to F.O. 
9.3.92. Inc. by Gallwey.
2. F.O. 8V2111. Macdonald to F.O. 12.12.91. Inc. by 
Gallwey•
3. Salubi A. 11 The Establishment of British Rule in the Urhobo 
Country*1 J.H.S.N. Vol.l No.3 1958. For an analysis of 
the later reaction of the Urhobo to British rule.
0 . Ikime, Niger Delta Rivalry. London 1969*
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them. The one tangible result of the expedition was the
establishment of the consular post at Sapele, a post calcula­
ted to break Nanafs monopoly by tapping the Urhobo markets 
direct.^
Gallweyfs greatest achievement was a visit to Benin
City in 1892. His aim from the start was to conclude a treaty:
11 All previous attempts in this direction have been 
futile - the last attempt having been made by 
Consul Annesley in I89O . " 3
Obviously success here would be a feather in the cap of the 
new administration. Gallwey succeeded beyond his expecta­
tions. After being kept waiting three days he induced the Oba
h.
to agree to the treaty. It was a triumph which on paper at 
least brought a large area of the hinterland west of the 
Lower Niger under British protection. Gallwey was enthusias­
tic about the possibilities for the development of trade, 
mentioning ivory, copal, mahogany, gums, fibres and hard
5
woods as well as coffee and cocoa. Little was done, however,
1. Nevertheless when he revisited Abraka in May 1892 he did 
sign a treaty. F.O. 2/51 Macdonald to Rosebery 12.1.93•
2. Ryder op .cit. p .267 also Salubi art.cit.
3. F.O. 8^/219^ Macdonald to Salisbury 16.5.92.
k* The treaty was on the standard form. For a detailed
account of Gallwey*s visit see Ryder op.cit. pp.265-272.
5. Gallwey returned with an ivory tusk which Macdonald said 
was the property of the Government. 111 told him I would 
not do it again and so I was permitted to retain the 
ivory." Proc.R.G.S. South Australia 1911* pp.88-9.
to follow up his initiative. The disorganisation and stop­
page of trade upon the fall of Nana, and the report that 
McTaggart of the Niger Company had reached the city in 189^ 
led the Protectorate to send another expedition under 
Crawford during 1895* which failed, however, to get further 
than Gwato. Macdonald then on leave, ascribed the failure 
of the expedition to the fact that it was undertaken at the 
rainy season of the year.'1' The initiative was obviously 
Moorfs, who was already talking in terms of the force needed
to open up the country, to rid it of its fetish priests and
2
develop trade. Macdonald refused to agree that the time had
yet come for force or that peace measures would be ineffec­
tual. The difference in approach of the two men fore­
shadowed the change of policy under Moor. For the moment the 
Commissioner got his way. Moor was told to utilise the next 
dry season "in patient and persistent efforts to open up com­
munication with the King" and to employ "all peaceable means"
3
before the question of force could be considered.
Kenneth Campbell, the Vice Consul at Bonny, made the 
Protectorate^ first penetration into Ibo country. His
1. F.O. 2/85 Macdonald to F.O. 29.10.95.
2. F.O. 2/Qk Moor to F.O. 12.9.95. He was backed by Kirk.
F.O. 83/11+1kL Kirk to Anderson P. 1 6 .2 .9 6 . 
3. F.O. 2/85 Macdonald to F.O. 29.10.95. F.O. 2/82 F.O. to 
Moor 8.11.95. See also Ryder op.cit. p.277-283.
356.
travels in 1892 took him as far as Eiebe about fifty miles 
north of Degema. In his report to the Commissioner he 
painted a golden picture of the fertility of the land; "The 
farms are large and surround the towns", the country was 
heavily populated and "the oil palm is to be seen the whole 
way."1 Here were the real riches of the country into which 
the sooner the administration moved the better. Not unnatu­
rally the Chiefs of New Calabar were uneasy about this 
development. They threw every obstacle in Campbellfs way, 
even inducing his carriers to abscond, but he merely proceeded
to make up his party from Consular Krooboys and stopped
2
King Amachree*s subsidy of £^ -00.
Campbell's explorations revealed the diffuse nature of 
Ibo authority. For this reason Macdonald asked the Foreign 
Office for 500 treaty forms with a view to opening up the 
country as soon as opportunity occurred. The Foreign Office, 
suspecting some inconvenient treaty-making move against the 
Niger Company in the Delta, gave him 200 and wanted to know 
why he required so many. The question apparently irritated
1. F.O. 8lf/2191+. Macdonald to F.O. 9*3*92.
2. Anene Southern Nigeria p.1^3* Anene places this incident 
at Okrika instead of New Calabar. It seems unlikely, 
however, that Campbell could so have confused his geography 
as to be 30 miles east of where he thought he was; more­
over, Amachree (Amahuri) is the Kalahari royal clan. The 
King of Okrika at this time was Phibia. See Jones op.cit. 
table p .133 & following chapter for the complex clan 
relationships of New Calabar.
3* F.O. 2/62 F.O. to Macdonald 26.11.91*.
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the Commissioner, who stoutly defended his judgement of the
Ibo and his approach to treaty makings
"The large Ibo tribe ... stretches, under various 
names and talking various dialects, from Calabar 
to Benin; these people do not acknowledge any one 
paramount Chief or Chiefs, but are split into 
numerous small tribes, sometimes consisting of one 
single town, and if it is the wish of Her Majesty*s 
Government that the Protectorate should be estab­
lished by right of Treaty it will I presume be 
necessary to make treaties with them all ... If
H.Mfs advisers are of opinion that the Proclamation 
of a Protectorate over these territories is suffi­
cient to constitute them a British possession, it 
might perhaps be possible to abolish the making of 
these treaties, which is a considerable labour and 
expense to this administration". 1
Hill failed to grasp the point. He observed that
"with such a changing set of chiefs it seems hardly 
necessary to make so many individual treaties in 
our Protectorate for each separate treaty will 
probably be repudiated either by the signatory Chief 
or his neighbour."
But he did not propose to relieve the Commissioner^ burden
by accepting the suggestion of a blanket proclamation to
cover the whole Ibo hinterland. He did, however, allow that
Macdonald might be given the extra forms asked for, and the
necessary discretion. Anderson agreed, while adding "We would
2
not allow repudiation." How he proposed to prevent it he 
did not say. The whole episode is illustrative of the 
officials* confused state of thinking on the legal status of
1. F.O. 2/83 Macdonald to F.O.
2. F.O. 2/83 Minutes by C.L.H. and H.P.A. 22.2.9^.
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the Protectorate.1 It was not surprising that Macdonald
found the equivocation of the Foreign Office so irritating.
Of the Vice Consuls at the stations Gallwey and Campbell
seemed by far the most vigorous and effective. Always on the
move, they sent a stream of reports to the Commissioner at
Old Calabar. Gallwey*s report on the station for the first
2year of the administration ran to over thirty pages.
Armstrong at Opobo sent in superficial reports, often late,^ 
and D. C. Macdonald seemed far too engrossed in the grievances 
of the Brassmen to send in any reports at all. He rarely 
travelled beyond Nembe. Synge at Warri was plagued by ill 
health, and lived constantly in Gallwey!s shadow. He had the 
best station of them all as far as accommodation was con­
cerned, but was rarely able to enjoy it. His successor 
Crawford was a man of more vital personality, whose career was 
cut short in 1897 as a member of Phillips1 ill fated expedi­
tion to Benin.
In the east of the Protectorate the lead was taken not 
by a Vice Consul but by the redoubtable member of the intelli-
1. It also revealed the F.O. acceptance of the now discredited 
view that the absence of paramount chiefs was synonymous 
with the absence of political organisation. Anene Southern 
Nigeria p.162.
2. F.O. 2/51 Macdonald to Rosebery 12.1.93 Inc. by Gallway.
3. E.g. F.O. 2/51 Macdonald to F.O. 2.9.93 Enc. which contains 
little beyond platitude about how friendly the natives are.
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gence department, C a s e m e n t R o g e r  Casement was the adminis­
trations odd Job man. In between helping with Treasury work 
and deputising for Wall, he made a series of Journeys in the 
Cross river basin: from Itu, 60 miles upstream from Old
Calabar, to the Opobo River5 from Esene on the Opobo to 
Ikorasum, some six miles above Eket on the Qua Ibo; and a
road survey from Old Calabar striking the Cross some 150 miles 
2
up river. With incredible courage, Casement undertook these
Journeys quite unarmed, relying solely on his native wit to
win the trust and good will of the people. Despite many
narrow escapes, he found the people generally not unfriendly
although some were marked by a 11 certain surliness and dislike
to the presence of a white man.” Their apprehension was
understandable for as the people of Okoyong explained to him
“hitherto, they had only looked for the white man 
by the river now they must expect him from the land 
as well, and if they should have trouble with the 
government again, where were they to run away?11 3
The practical example set by the Consul General was the 
model for his subordinates. Macdonald, however, had less 
time for pure exploration and was more involved in the settle­
ment of palavers. These were frequent, but up until 189^ little
1. Anene p.IJjO-l. Anene is wrong in calling Casement a Vice 
Consul.
2. Reports on these Journeys mostly undertaken in 189^ may 
be found in F.O. 2/63.
3. F.O. 2/63 Annual Report with fcncs. 21.8.9*+.
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bloodshed marred the course of the Protectorate* This was 
undoubtedly due to the fact that disputes were settled before 
they were allowed to escalate. Personal factors were also 
prominent. Macdonald had early endeared himself to the
peoples by two acts - the return of Ja Ja*s body to the
1 2 Protectorate, and the disbanding of Annesleyrs police force.
More troublesome than Annesley*s police force was the 
legacy left by the Consul *s repulse from Akwette. This had 
raised a challenge to British authority in the hinterland 
which could not be ignored.-' The story emerged in palaver at 
Akwette on l^th October 1891. Disturbances had broken out on 
June 8th as a result of a dispute between Watson, the agent
if
for Miller Brother and some of the Akwette boys. It was not 
certain who was to blame;but when the King came down to the 
beach with the other Chiefs, order was at once restored, and 
everything that had been taken by the boys was instantly 
returned. Despite the King's entreaty Watson proceeded at
1. Ja Ja died on 7 July 1891 at Santa Cruz, Teneriffe, on his 
way home after the British government had agreed to the 
termination of his exile. Macdonald arranged for the body 
to be exhumed and brought to Opobo. Anene Southern 
Nigeria pp. 1*K)-1.
2. Supra cap.6 .
3. Anene Southern Nigeria p.1^2.
This account is taken from F.O. 8^/2111 Macdonald to 
F.O. 8 .8 .9 1. F.O.C.P. 6351 Macdonald to Salisbury 
17.10.91. F.O. 8V2250 Annesley to F.O. May 1892.
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once to Opobo, and reported the matter in a highly coloured
manner to Bruce, his superior, who sent for Annesley.
Annesley collected together a force of soldiers and
proceeded to Akwette on 17th. The Bonny men entreated the
Consul not to open fire on the Akwette people, since 11 the
palaver could easily be settled without force11. Annesley,
however, refused to listen, opened fire and killed one of the
Chiefs wives, Eleche. Not unnaturally the Akwette people
then retaliated, drove the Consul off, wounding him and five
of his men in the process.
Macdonald's equitable solution of this complex dispute
is worth recording in full:
111 gave judgement that Akwette people were to be 
fined 10 puncheons (£60) for unruly behaviour and 
that all trade goods belonging to the European 
traders and Bonny men were to be restored to them 
by the natives. This decision gave universal satis­
faction, and. the Aquetta people have promised to pay 
the fine and restore the goods within a month.
I informed the European traders that as they had 
established themselves amongst a people who had not 
signed a Protectorate treaty with Her Majesty's 
Government they had done so at their own risk, and 
that therefore I could not hold myself responsible 
for their house, property, and plant that had been 
destroyed. They had also called in Annesley*s aid, 
and they must abide by the result of any action he 
had thought fit to take.
During the £tack on the village several houses 
were burnt. Two of these belonged to one of the 
most respectable trader chiefs in the Bonny district.
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As the Bonny Chiefs did not request the Consul's 
attendance and appear to have done what they could 
to prevent him from taking extreme action, I venture 
to submit a claim made by the above chief. Should 
Your Lordship approve I propose paying this Chief 
£50 as compensation out of any surplus "comey" that 
Annesley may have remitted home.
As soon as the £80 fine is paid, I propose 
sending part of it through Armstrong to the children 
of the woman Eleche ..." 1
The willingness of the Akwette people not only to
accept a fine which Macdonald had no legal right to impose,
but also to sign a treaty (which they did on the following
day) emphasized that it was the Commissioner's approach which
was decisive. The first expansion of the Protectorate into
the hinterland was secured without using force. Trade was
2
resumed at Akwette and "tranquillity and quiet prevail"♦
Justice combined with firmness had its effect. Macdonald
had already had occasion on 5th September 1891 to harangue
the Okrikans concerning what he termed "the shame and disgrace"
of their cannibal Ju Ju house. There was also a snail matter
of an outstanding fine imposed by Hewett in 1888. On 21st
October Macdonald informed the people that
"Her Majesty's Government had now waited for three 
years for the full amount due, and that it was my 
intention to wait at Okrika till the fine was paid, 
but for every 2b hours I waited after the first 2^ 
a sum of 10 puncheons (£80) would be charged." 3
1. F.O. 8^/2111 Macdonald to Salisbury 17.10.91.
2 . ibid.
3. F.O. 8b/2111 Macdonald to F.O. 23.lO.9i.
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The amount was quickly forthcoming.
Once more did the Okrikans try the Protectorate govern­
ment, this time waiting till Macdonald had gone on leave in 
1892. A report of human sacrifice took Campbell post haste 
up to the town on 19th November. The Vice Consul demanded 
that the five who had committed the "atrocity" should be given 
up. Three were given up by Oko Dsago, a powerful chief who
had taken the highest grade in the Ekine society,"** and two by Ue.
2
King, whom Macdonald described as "a nonentity". The King's
attempt to assert his authority over Oko by fining him for
the acts committed by his boys led to disturbances between the 
two factions and stoppage of trade. Campbell again went up 
river in December and arrested Oko, and the disturbances at 
once ceased.^ Meanwhile Macdonald had ordered Moor to inves-
Ll
tigate. The contrast in the methods of the two men 
immediately appeared. Macdonald's use of personal authority 
and influence was replaced by all the paraphernalia of a show 
trial with gunboat, and a large Protectorate force to demon­
strate to the Okrikans that there was "now a permanent force
5
at the command of the Government". Amidst all this the
1. For the influence of Ekine, Jones op.cit. pp.67-8.
2. F.O. 84-/2194- Macdonald to Rosebery 5.12.92.
3. Ibid. Moor to Rosebery 19.12.92.
4-. Ibid. Memo by Macdonald 30.11.92.
5* Ibid. Moor to Rosebery 19.12.92.
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sentences of imprisonment on three of the five •boys1 went 
largely unnoticed1 as did Campbell*s considerable achievement 
in imposing his personality with no force at his disposal.
It was not that Macdonald was any sort of pacifist. It 
was rather a recognition that more could be achieved by per­
suasion and contact with the people than by force. When 
force was necessary, he used it reluctantly, hoping that the 
threat would be sufficient. The discontent at Brass was a 
typical case in point. During 1893 trouble broke out with a 
threat by the people of Fishtown to attack the European fac­
tories* Their timing was unfortunate, since two gunboats 
happened to be in the river along with Macdonald. The Com­
missioner immediately sent for Protectorate troops from
b»
Calabar, and asked the naval officers £er land marines to 
calm the fears of the Europeans. Meanwhile he opened nego­
tiations with the people of Fishtown. They refused to come 
to him, on the grounds that they were afraid of the gunboats, 
so, nothing loth and with a complete absence of pride, he 
took Captain Macdonald with him unarmed and saw them. The 
courage of the Commissioner had an immediate calming effect. 
The Chiefs agreed to the stationing of a Protectorate force
in the river to keep the peace, and accepted the warning that
2
any breach would be punished.
1. F.O.C.P. 6351 Moor to Rosebery 25.12.92.
2. F.O. 2/51 Macdonald to Rosebery 15.7«93•
j
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Another reluctant threat of force was made over human 
sacrifice at an interior town, Ohombele, 30 miles up the 
Opobo. It was not until November 189^ that the Commissioner's 
patience finally ran out after repeated admonitions and 
"friendly advice" that the practice would not be tolerated by 
the administration. Casement, the acting Vice Consul, was 
despatched with 100 men and arrested three of the main offen­
ders at the town. According to Casement, the town "apologised
1
and offered to pay any fine I might inflict" . Again it had 
not been necessary to fire a shot.
The one occasion where force had to be used before 189^
and which did result in bloodshed occurred on the Cross River.
It was here that the Protectorate administration had pene­
trated further inland than anywhere else - Macdonald himself 
went the 250 miles up to the Rapids in November 1893 and 
there was a government post at Itu, 60 miles above Old 
Calabar. Naturally this sudden influx of strangers had 
created consternation amongst the inhabitants, who began to 
realize that the natural geographical communication of the 
Cross River made them vulnerable. Political stability on the 
Cross was not assisted by the fragmentary nature of government
1. F.O. 2/6^ Macdonald to F.O. 6.12.9^ enc. by Casement.
2. F.O. 2/51 Macdonald to Rosebery 25.11.93* He was forced
back when the river fell 9 feet in 2b hours.
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along the river bank.1 Each tribe that touched the water felt 
itself at liberty to tax trade passing up or down the river, 
and for any alleged offence could stop trade, setting off a 
chain reaction which was felt at Old Calabar. After several 
interruptions of trade, matters came to a head soon after 
Macdonald returned to the Protectorate in 1893* One 
Akpotem, a Chief residing at Okeriki, in a trade dispute with 
other Chiefs of his own tribe, the Akunakuna, chopped off the 
heads of five Afikpo traders as a way of making trouble. The 
local Afikpo rushed to arms and trade came to a standstill. 
Coco Otu Bassi, the native political agent at Itu, persuaded 
all concerned to lay down their arms and await the Commis­
sioner, for whom he would send to settle the dispute. On 
2*+th August Macdonald went up to Oberiki in a steam launch 
and demanded the person of Akpotem. The majority faction 
were prepared to comply, but a.minority surrounding the chief 
prepared for resistance. Macdonald, allowed a month for the 
man to be surrendered or he would come and take him. This 
would, he explained, mean the shedding of innocent blood and 
the destruction of property. The Commissioner then returned 
to Old Calabar.
1. For a detailed analysis of the various ethnic groups along 
the Cross River see Anene: The Boundary Arrangements
for Nigeria 188^-1906 Ph.D. London I960 cap.III.
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By now, the question had become a test of the Protec­
torate^ authority -
"all the tribes on the Cross River were anxiously 
waiting to see what would happen, and several 
chiefs were heard to say that for many years past 
the Consuls had been saying what they would do and 
nothing had been done." 1
On 6th October Macdonald pounced, having decided that the 
month "had lasted long enough". Okeriki was attacked (the 
Commissioner having warned the people to remove the women and 
children) and burnt to the ground. In the process Commandant 
Price was killed and two Hausas of the Protectorate force 
wounded. The Okeriki, their fear of the Commissioner greater 
than their fear of Akpotem, handed over the offending chief. 
Macdonald wasted no time - in the presence of the Afikpo 
chiefs, Akpotem was hung from the nearest tree. The Com­
missioner^ settlement of the palaver showed in the circum­
stances remarkable clemency. No fine was imposed and Macdonald 
informed the Okeriki that, if they behaved well, he would help 
them collect their debts from the Calabar people, so that 
they might begin trading again and rebuild their town. The 
Afikpo chiefs were allowed to keep the body for two days
"so that they might send for all the Chiefs from 
the interior to show that I had kept my word to 
them." 2
1. F.O. 2/51 Macdonald to F.O. 12.10.93*
2. Ibid.
368.
When Wall went up river a month later he found everything quiet.
The role of Coco Otu Bassy was interesting. In order
to relieve the load from the Vice Consuls1 shoulders, parti*
cularly at the interior stations, the best educated and most
influential of the local chiefs were appointed political 
1
agents. They had no executive power over the people, but 
were in fact government employees who acted as mediators in 
disputes, interpreters and informers, and were paid a salary 
according to their usefulness and influence from £25 to £125 .^  
They wore a uniform emblazoned with the royal arms and accom­
panied the Consular officers on their tours when the agent's 
home area was visited. Their pride in their position had its 
humorous side. One agent had been in a fight during which 
his uniform was ripped off him. He had managed, however, to 
rescue the Royal Arms badge, and otherwise stark naked, he 
proceeded "reverently11 to carry the badge on the top of his 
head.
In the process of civilization, law and order was 
obviously a binding force. A much larger European population, 
and a number of English speaking natives were attracted into 
the Protectorate, particularly to Old Calabar after 1891. The
1 . Anene: Southern Nigeria p.l86 ff.
2. F.O. 83/1380 Exchequer & Audit Dept, to F.O. 15.7.95.
3. Geog. Journal Sept. 191^1 Speech by Macdonald.
government needed clerks, artisans and messengers who were 
obtained from the Kroo Coast, Sierra Leone and Accra. This 
labour market was often affected by rumours of ill treatment 
in the Cameroons and the Congo, making Kroos particularly 
reluctant to ship for any port going in an easterly direc­
tion."*" But including the Protectorate troops there were well 
over 1,000 Africans in the Protectorate who were governed by 
other than the traditional sanctions. They brought new ideas, 
and new demands and tended to act as a corrosive on tradi­
tional society. Many people were also detracted to Old Calabar 
who were not in the service of the government but hoped to 
gain employment either there or as advisers to the native 
chiefs. Those disappointed in their hopes stayed as traders 
or even opened shops. According to the Reverend J. Price,
there was an increase in the facilities for public drinking at
2
Old Calabar, shops opening for the sale of gin and rum*
Slowly and painfully the old forces of law and order were 
changing to be replaced by new. As Macdonald remarked "To 
bring the whole Protectorate under an effective government is 
a matter of time, money, and l i v e s . H e  might have added from 
his own store of wisdom that it was a matter of faith too.
1. See e.g. F.O.C.P. 6351 Moor to Rosebery 2^.9.92.
2. Goldie H. Calabar and its Mission p.35l
3. F.O. 2/8k Macdonald to Salisbury 25.7.95.
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CHAPTER NINE 
FRIENDS AND NEIGHBOURS
The formal relations of the Protectorate and the
colony of Lagos had their beginnings in Benin. For if the
Colonial Office was not to take responsibility for the Oil
Rivers, a boundary had to be demarcated. This was easier
said than done. In 1886 Consul and Governor had got their
lines crossed over Nana. Macdonald had added to the confusion
in this report by first undermining Nanafs position south of
the Forcados and then advocating the extension of Lagos to
the right bank. Rumours and counter-rumours were flying
around the locality as a result of the Commissioners visit,
the Benin^traders being particularly unhappy about the idea
of being transferred to Lagos, with the possibility of closer
supervision and increased taxes.*1' Though the Foreign Office
2denied that there was any truth in the rumoured transfer, 
they recognized the desirability of a boundary settlement.
To this end Macdonald was authorized to discuss the question
1. F.O.C.P. 6098 Af.Ass. to Salisbury 2.12.90. F.O.C.P. 616H- 
Traders of Lenin to Salisbury 26.11.90. They need hardly 
have worried - Lagos had done nothing to make the 1886 
Proclamation effective.
2. F.O.C.P. 6098 F.O. to Af.Ass. 12.12.90.
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with Hemming at the Colonial Office,^ before setting out for 
the coast in 1891.
It is evident that, since 1889, Macdonaldfs opinions 
regarding Lagos had undergone a change. He had not at the 
time been impressed with the energy of the Colonial adminis­
tration, yet he had advocated their claims as far as the 
Forcados as a *pis aller". By January 1891 he was having 
reservations
"as to whether Benin ought to go to Lagos - eventually 
I should say, from us its geographical position it 
will have to, for the "slavery" reason alone however, 
it would be a mistake to hand it over just at 
present." 2
By the time the negotiations opened in April, Macdonald was 
prepared positively to advocate the claims of the Protectorate 
west of the delta. What was his motive for doing so is not 
clear. He must have been aware of the potential difficulties 
of a salient thrust into the western delta and separated 
from the larger portion of the Protectorate. The only positive 
clue there is comes indirectly from the report itself. He knew 
that if his recommendations were adopted it would mean the end 
of monopoly and the end of the Company. In the event of this 
taking place by claiming’ a western salient, the Protectorate 
was laying a prima facie claim to the delta.
1. F.O. 8V2161 F.O. to C.O. 9.^.91. C.O. to F.O. 11.^.91.
2. F.O. Qb/2111 Macdonald to Larcom 13.1.91.
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There is little doubt that Macdonald went into the 
negotiations in April with the backing of the ^eninj^merchants 
This was reflected in his first boundary proposal which even­
tually proved the basis of agreement. The line was to com­
mence
11 at a point on the seashore 10 miles to the north 
west of the Benin River, and running parallel to 
this river at a distance of 10 miles from it until 
it reaches the Lagos Creek. The line should then 
cross the creek and follow the far or eastern 
banks until it reaches the Lagos Lagoon and then 
run due north parallel with the 5th degree of 
east longitude." 1
Macdonald justified pushing the colony back from the B0nin
River by arguing the prior claims of Hewett*s treaties over
the Governor!s proclamation, and the fact that Lagos had done
nothing to establish any administration there. Hemming did
R.iWr
not seem to have cared very much about the Benin|. He was
more concerned about the line from the Lagos Creek which cut
off a considerable proportion of the Yoruba country. Since
this was not Macdonald's intention he readily agreed to an
amendment of the line from the Lagos Creek to follow the
boundary of the Benin country, so as to include the territory
2within the Protectorate. The accepted line was a crude and 
vague attempt at achieving ethnic homogeneity in the two 
spheres of British rule. Officials were acutely aware of
1. F.O.C.P. 6351 Macdonald to F.O. 2.5.91.
2. C.O. 1^7/82 F.O. to C.O. 11.5.91 Min. by A.W.L.H.
3. Prescott J.R.V. The Evolution of Nigeria's Political 
Boundaries Ph.D. London 1961.
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its vagueness at the time.^ The crudeness of the arrangement
only became apparent later.
Having come to an arrangement as to limits of government,
the two administrations settled down to a cordial, if not
always easy relationship. Problems created by differences in
forms of government were on the whole slow to emerge. This
was partly because of the haphazard method of communication
between Colonial Office and Foreign Office. The Foreign
Office continued its policy1 of forwarding only a selection
of the correspondence; sending for instance the tariff
changes of the Protectorate, but not the original tariff till
it was pointedly asked for. There was another reason for
lack of friction in the early years. In his relief at not
being landed with the “pleasant colony1* Meade encouraged a
policy of co-operation on the part of Lagos as far as pos- 
2 ^
sible. Co-operation bore fruit in a number of directions.
Moor was allowed to recruit for the Protectorate force in
Yoruba country;^ the explorations of Gallwey in the direction
of Lagos Creek answered the question of inland waterway con-
If
nection to the mutual satisfaction of both governments; and
1. C.O. 1^7/82 F.O. to C.O. 11.7.91.
2. C.O. 1^7/78 F.O. to C.O. 2.6.90 Min. by R.M.
3. F.O. 83/1238 C.O. to F.O. 13.3.93.
Supra Cap.8 .
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prolonged consultation over the question of adulteration of 
produce enabled legislation to be enacted simultaneously in 
1896.1 In 1895 both administrations raised their duties 
together on liquor to prevent smuggling, in the absence of a 
comprehensive agreement to raise duties to a uniform level, 
along the whole west African coastline.
One aspect of this co-operation which did not impress 
Macdonald was the idea of Justice prevailing in Lagos. Under 
Articles 61 and 62 of the 189*+ Order in Council the Commis­
sioner was empowered to transfer persons committed for trial
to the nearest superior court in a British African possession
2
provided the act was necessary in the interests of Justice. 
This was obviously the case where a British subject on a 
capital charge requiring trial by Jury was involved. Reid, 
an agent of the African Association;was accused of beating one 
of his native servants to death, and was hauled off by the 
Commissioner to Lagos. The verdict of Not Guilty riled 
Macdonald, who felt that trial by Jury was a “hollow mockery" 
in a place where racial feelings ran high. The Jury of seven 
whites and five blacks split, the former for acquittal, the 
latter for the death sentence. The Commissioner had no doubt 
at Reidfs guilt and even Governor Carter thought the whole
1. Correspondence in F.O. 2/6k9 2/100, 83/137*+ & C .0 •
1^7/102 passim.
2. P.C. 2/3*+0 Africa Order in Council 1 8 8 9.
375.
thing uvery disgraceful1* . As Macdonald remarked "Catch me
n
bringing any more of my beauties down here for trial11. He 
never did.
X 36 x
The eastern side of the Protectorate was the only area
conterminous with the possessions of another European power.
The Germans since 188*+ despite doubts as to the permanency
of their settlement, had quickly established their presence
2in the Cameroons. Macdonald *s appointment owed something to 
this presence - his ability to get on with MichaheUes at 
Zanzibar had established his name at Berlin. He had a number 
of personal acquaintances in the German Colonial service from 
earlier days - people like Von Schuckmann the Imperial 
secretary in the Cameroons, and Von Gravenrath, the Command- 
ant whom he had known in Cairo and his ability to converse 
in German made their friendship somewhat more than formal.
All this was to his credit as far as Salisbury was concerned, 
because if there was one problem which might prove amenable to 
a new approach to friendly settlement, it was the question of
1. F.O. 8^/219^ Macdonald to Anderson 9-1*92.
2. F.O. 8^/1882 Johnston to Salisbury 12.12.88 Anderson's 
verdict uon the whole the Germans have hot done badly11.
3 . F.O. 8V2111 Macdonald to Anderson 17-12.91 P.
376.
the boundary between the British Protectorate on the east and
the German Protectorate on the West,
By 1890 the question between the British and German
Governments had reached a stalemate. The only new factor to
occur in the Ndian/Akpayafe controversy^ was an agreement in
1889 to conduct a joint survey of the Rio del Rey by British
2
and German naval officers. This was long overdue. The only
existing maps of the area were controversial, Johnston1 s of
1887 and a German one of I889. The German map went so far as
to agree with the British contention that the Akpayafe did
not flow into the basin of the Rio Del Rey, but exposed other
irregularities in Johnstons map. The Akpayafe was still
3
urged however on political grounds. It was on the result of 
the joint survey that Macdonald was to communicate with Von 
Soden, the Governor of the Cameroons, as soon as he had 
finished his investigations on the Niger-Benue.
In the event the joint survey was not held. The death
1. Supra cap.3*
2. F.O.C.P. 59*+5 Note Verbate by Hatzfeldt 25.7.89*
3. F.O.C.P. 59^5* Hatzfeldt to Salisbury 8 .6 .8 9 . Neither
Johnston's nor the German map bear much resemblance to
reality cf. D.O.S. Series 6762, 1:25000, 1959 et seq.
Some sheets of this first edition have yet to be published.
h. F.O.C.P. 59^5 F.O• to Macdonald 2 8.6 .8 9 .
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of Commander Pullen, the Senior Naval Officer on the West 
coast, and irritating delays by the Admiralty combined to 
postpone the British effort until March 1890."^ By then, 
having lost patience, the Germans had conducted their own 
survey in December. The question still lacked a joint 
authoritative basis accepted by both sides. Under the cir­
cumstances there was no point in Macdonald going to the 
Cameroons.
The Anglo-German agreement of 1890 therefore merely 
confirmed the provisional line of 1885, while recognising that 
there was no such river as the Rio del Rey. It was agreed
that this line would be subject to rectification by agree­
ment in accordance with local requirements and that Commis­
sioners should meet with the least possible delay for the
2object of such rectification*
This was the background against which Macdonald went to 
\%V
Berlin in September/, as he put it, 11 to grab as much as I
could11 Von Soden was in Germany on leave, and it was decided
to try and reach a settlement by direct negotiations between
1. F.O.C.P. 59^5* F.O. to Admiralty 2.12.89* F.O. 8V2019 
F.O. to Macdonald 8.3*90* '
2. Anglo-German agreement 1890. Articles IV and VI.
3 . Geographical Journal June 1911*-.
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the two most knowledgeable men on the spot.^ It was
Macdonald*s first excursion into the realms of high diplomacy
and he made the most of it. True the Ndian/Akpayafe dispute
was not settled, but he gained a real point with an admission
by the German Government that the Akpayafe did lie within
the British Protectorate and would constitute a concession
2on the part of the British government. Having admitted this, 
all sorts of concessions and arguments were placed before 
Macdonald to induce him to recommend the Akpayafe as a 
boundary, but to no avail. The German Government, therefore, 
insisted that, as no agreement could be reached, the position 
as at the 1890 agreement should be adhered to. It was a 
complimentary recognition that Macdonald had got the better 
of the argument.
Macdonald returned to London in November and the old 
arguments were resumed through the ambassador. Macdonald*s 
visit to Berlin had weakened the German arguments, however, 
and Anderson inclined to the view that once the Commissioner 
had settled in to his new post, and "informed11, himself, it
1. F.O.C.P. 6098 Salisbury to Beauclerk 22.7*90. F.O.
8V 2032 Malet to Salisbury 6 .8 .90.
2. F.O. 8^/2035 Trench to Salisbury 25*9*90.
3. F.O. 8V2035 Malet to Salisbury 13*10.90.
would be possible to try again to reach agreement. No one
knew what impact the Macdonald administration would have on
the rivers and there seemed everything to be gained by waiting.
To this the German Government reluctantly assented.
When Macdonald arrived in the Protectorate;the border
question was noticeably quiescent and seemed likely to remain
so for some time. The German Government raised no objection
2to his appointment as Consul to the Cameroons, and Macdonald 
spent the first months renewing old acquaintances with 
Schuckmann and establishing an understanding with the new 
governor, Zimmerer. The tariff duly came into force, care 
being taken to avoid establishing any post within the disputed 
boundary region. The Germans generally welcomed the advent of 
the new administration. Since 1889 they had been complaining 
of the
“flagrant violations of territory and plundering 
inroads of Calabar people into German possessions11
and the lack of any satisfaction from the English Consul.
These complaints were not entirely unjustified. Anderson
believed that the whole difficulty over the Eyo incident, when
the exasperated Germans at last retaliated by seizing King Eyo
and two hostages from Old Calabar in return for seven men
1. F.O. 8k/21^k Memo by H.P.A. 9.1.91*
2. F.O. 8V2129 Trench to Salisbury 13.7.91.
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seized by Calabar traders from German territory,"*" arose from
Hewett*s neglect to answer the German Governor^ letters.
2Macdonald was of the same opinion. The advent of a formal 
government, particularly one with its capital so close to 
German territory, promised if not an end to violations, the 
prospect of speedy satisfaction.
In the absence of an agreed boundary, however, trouble 
continued to erupt at periodic intervals on the eastern side 
of the Protectorate. Efik traders from Old Calabar failed to 
comprehend that their hinterland had been partitioned between 
two European powers; moreover the bickering of these two 
powers, as to their respective Jurisdictions, constituted a 
constant source of harassment. In November 1891, an Old Calabar 
chief, Ekanem Esien, who owned a plantation on the Akpayafe, 
was summoned to appear before a German Court set up at Oron, 
midway between the Ndian and Akpayafe rivers. Macdonald sent 
Roberts to investigate, and the latter discovered a certain 
Herr Clauss exercising Jurisdiction on the disputed territory. 
Clauss accepted Roberts^ protest and agreed to desist from 
holding his court, but refused to withdraw, until he had
1. The German Government apologised for what was admittedly
a breach of international law. Correspondence in F.O.C.P.
59^ 5.
2. F.O.C.P. 59^5 Hatzfeldt to Salisbury 2 5 .6 .8 9. Mins.
received instructions from the German Governor. It was 
December before Macdonald could find time himself to go to 
the Cameroons. He sailed up the Bio del Bey and what he aaw 
confirmed his opinion that the west bank should be held on to 
at all costs. Beyond the mangrove swamps lay mile upon mile 
of oil palms and hard woods. He took on board specimens of 
the timber and found by comparison they were 100$ cheaper than 
what he could buy in the Protectorate. His conversation with 
Schuckmann, the Acting Governor, merely confirmed the status 
quo. All boundary questions were allowed to stand over until 
Zimmerer returned from leave when, it.was agreed he and 
Macdonald should meet in the Rio del Rey and sketch out a 
boundary on the spot."*"
Before the two men could meet, the issue was immeasur­
ably complicated by the German grant of a trade monopoly in 
the River to the Swedish firm of Knutson and Valdait, Mac­
donald objected to this on two counts. Firstly the part of 
the concession that was exercised west of the Ndian was un­
doubtedly in debatable territory. This applied to the Swedish 
factory itself at the head of the estuary. Secondly the 
monopoly seemed to be clearly inconsistent with Art. VIII of 
the 1885 agreement which stipulated that no differential 
treatment should be applied as between each other's nationals.
1. F.O.C.P. 6351 Macdonald to Salisbury 8.12.91.
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Under this clause the Swedish firm traded freely at Old
Calabar. Since a monopoly forbade Old Calabar traders to
trade in the Bio del Bey even on the payment of duty,
1
Macdonald strongly protested.
The British protest about the monopoly and its position
2
on debated territory, delivered to Berlin on 5th September, 
and the German answer on the l*+th revealed a yawning gap 
between the two governments. The Germans denied that the con­
cession in any way infringed the British sphere, and reitera­
ted the right of Germany to both banks of the Bio del Bey.
It was the German argument concerning the monopoly which caused 
most raised eyebrows. The 1885 agreement, they said, was 
11 irrelevant1'. No limitation had been imposed on freedom of 
trade, only the right to create trading Sstablishment* by the 
granting of the concession. The reason for granting the con­
cession was stated to be compensation for the sacrifices in­
curred by the Swedish firm in opening up the country. Since 
the privilege excluded both German and English traders, this 
was interpreted as evidence of lack of discrimination!J 
Anderson1s immediate reaction over the monopoly was to note
1. F.O. 8V2195 Macdonald to Salisbury 12.7.92.
2. F.O.C.P. 6351 Malet to Rosebery 5.9*92.
3. F.O. 8V2215 Trench to Rosebery 16.9.92.
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that the argument was probably worth
umore to us than to them. We can turn this 
against them if they ever complain of Niger 
monopolies” .
Lister however was strongly opposed to any concession. The
claim of the Germans to land on the right bank he found in-
admissable, the boundary would 11 be a very bad one and lead to
much trouble” Macdonald, home on leave, reinforced
Lister *s opinions by pointing out the hardships to the Efik
2
traders at Old Calabar.
3”Twopenny affair” it may have been, it was threatening 
to cause a primary disturbance in Anglo-German relations. 
Under these circumstances it was agreed that Macdonald should 
go to Berlin and for a second time endeavour to settle the
li.
eastern boundary of the Protectorate. It was noticeable in 
the instructions given to Macdonald that the question of the 
monopoly had shrunk into relative insignificance. The Com­
missioner was not to discuss the question, but if it was 
raised he was merely to observe that the 1885 agreement would
1. F.O. 8V2215 Minutes by H.P.A. and T.V.L. 26.12.92 
On German Governments further note 20.12.92.
2. F.O. 2/51 Macdonald to F.O. 21.1.93.
3. F.O. 2/51 Rosebery*s Opinion 27.1.93*
F.O.C.P. 6^71 Various correspondence.
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not interfere with the grant of extensive monopolies to the .
Niger Company. Evidently Anderson had got his way, the
trading rights of the Efiks were nothing compared with the
threat represented to Anglo-German good neighbourliness on
1
the west coast by a disputed boundary.
The 1893 agreement, signed on ikth April, appeared to 
2
settle very little. The preamble stated quite clearly that 
the agreement was without prejudice to the lines laid down in 
18859 1886 and 1890. It made no attempt to settle the boun­
dary line beyond the head of the Kio del Rey, which was still 
to be the provisional line of 1890. The only new feature was 
the starting point of this line which was to be
"the point at the north west end of the island 
lying to the west of Or on where the two waterways 
named Urifian and Ekankan ... meet” .
From the upper end of the Rio del Rey to the sea the right
bank was to be the customs boundary as in the 1885 agreement.
This was clarified by both sides agreeing not to erect or
allow any trade settlements to exist on the Backasay peninsula,
the tongue of land forming the western enclosing arm of the
Rio del Rey. The omission of the word 'customs1 before the
signing of the agreement at the request of Macdonald and
Trench altered the whole significance of the arrangement. At
1. F.O. 2/50. Rosebery to Macdonald 13.3.93*
2. 1893 Agreement Art.I text in F.O. 2/51 Rosebery to 
Macdonald 8 .^.93.
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one stroke a practical arrangement, was turned into a political 
definition.^ The Backasay peninsula was effectively neutral­
ised and German expansion limited westwards. The Akpayafe
2controversy was finally disposed of in favour of the British. 
The Germans were saddled with the whole responsibility of 
erecting customs posts and preventing smuggling in the Rio 
del Rey. The British lost nothing beyond a few miles of 
swamp and got a good customs boundary into the bargain. The 
fixing of both ends of the provisional line enabled the ques­
tion of adequate local demarcation to be considered.
The settlement of 1893 did not mean the disposal of all 
points of issue between the Protectoi^e and the Cameroons. 
Macdonald for a start took strong exception to the way in 
which the Cameroon authorities inaugurated their fiscal 
administration in the Rio del Rey. In August 1893 Wall was 
sent to investigate whether the Germans had set up any customs 
posts consequent on the agreement. His report was negative.
In October however a number of the Calabar chiefs reported
1. F.O. 6V1302 Minute by H.P.A. seems to indicate that the
Germans were caught by surprise at the sudden English 
request and complied, although with some reluctance, with­
out realising the full implications. Marschall did - and
was annoyed. The original suggestion came from Macdonald
to Rosebery F.O. 2/51 12.^.93.
The German text may be found in "Reichs Anzieger1 
29.^.93.
2. F.O. 6V1302 Trench to Rosebery 15.^*93«
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that their trading boys and canoes had been seized in the Rio 
del Rey, apparently without any warning that new customs 
regulations had been imposed. Various of the traders alleged 
brutalities in connection with the suppression of so called 
smuggling, notably floggings. The reports sent Macdonald 
hurrying to the Cameroons, where he discovered Herr Clauss 
busy at work as Imperial German Customs Officer. About twenty 
men had been seized by Clauss and these were immediately 
released on Macdonald offering to go guarantor. The Commis­
sioner^ opinions on these proceedings expressed in a letter 
to Rosebery were strong;
"none of these people had the least idea that they 
were offending against the law of the whiteman, and 
even if they had the treatment they have been sub­
jected to was most uncalled for, and by no means in 
accordance with that spirit of friendliness and 
mutual assistance of which so much was said during 
my visit to Berlin." 1
Beyond giving rein to his feelings there was little Macdonald 
could do but protest. The Germans were within their rights, 
even if Zimmerer was guilty of a breach of faith in establish­
ing the customs posts without giving notice as promised to 
the British administration. The Commissioner^ humanitarian- 
ism was not entirely altruistic}although he was personally 
revolted at Clauss*s behaviour. What he feared above all else
1. F.O. 2/51 Macdonald to Rosebery 26.11.93.
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was another Brass at Old Calabar. Fortunately the Efik 
markets were more widely flung than the Brassmenfs. Trade 
for a time moved away from the Rio del Rey area as Efik 
traders opened up new markets on the west of the Akpayafe.
The Commissioner to avoid friction had printed copies of the 
German customs rules and tariffs circulated in English and 
Efik.1
The beginnings of a German concession policy in the
Cameroons worried the Commissioner less than the delays in the
carrying out of the demarcation of the provisional line on the
ground. Uncertainty on this score proved more comic than
serious. In 189*+ the Germans set up a customs post in
Ekanem Esien*s town in the immediate vicinity of the provisional
border. Macdonald, unable to admit that it was on German
territory, protested and sent a Protectorate force of one
officer and ten men to occupy the place on behalf of the
British government. The two sides proceeded to stare each
other out for two months before mutual good sense prevailed
2
and a simultaneous evacuation was arranged. Nevertheless, 
comic or not, it underlined the fact that continual disputes 
represented an irritant to Anglo-German relations. The time 
was therefore considered ripe to attempt a delimitation
1. F.O. 2/51 Macdonald to Rosebery 26.11.93.
2. F.O. 2/64- Macdonald to F.O. 31.12.9^ and Inc. F.O. 6V1367 
Hatzfeldt to Kimberley 18.5.95.
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commission. The initiative came from Germany who suggested 
on l*+th December that the British Government should appoint a 
commissioner to delimit the boundary with a German representa­
tive as far as the rapids on the Cross River.^
The delimitation took place in October 1895, after 
Macdonald had left the Protectorate. Close, the English 
Commissioner, and Von Besser, his German counterpart, spent 
five weeks traversing the hitherto largely unexplored region 
between the Cross Rapids and the head of the Rio del Rey.
Their report submitted in December exposed the limitations of 
the provisional line. Between the terminal points agreed 
upon in 1890 and 1893 a natural boundary was impossible to 
find. Therefore the Commissioners produced an elaborate com­
promise which swung the delimited boundary either side of the 
provisional line allotting one village to the Cameroons, the 
next to the Protectorate (this gave the British Ekanem 
Essien's). Close admitted the boundary was of an "arbitrary 
and artificial nature", but pleaded it was the best solution 
available. Moor was annoyed, in that no advantage had been 
taken to settle the boundary on natural features. Macdonald 
himself still adhered to the watershed proposal and doubted 
whether the Germans would accept the proposed boundary of the
1. F.O. 61+/131+1 Note verbale by Jenisch 14-. 12.94-.
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two Commissioners.^ The delimitation commission therefore,
having cost £1,000 apiece to the two governments, failed to
2
effect a final solution.
x x x
Macdonaldfs relations with Goldie began on an indifferent 
note, and ended in downright hostility. It was perhaps in 
the nature of things that relations between Company and 
Protectorate Administration should be difficult. The events 
of 1889-90 had seen the Company being put increasingly on the 
defensive, culminating in the collapse of the plans for 
chartered government for the delta and the formation of an 
administration which in its success (or failure for that 
matter) would provide a pointed contrast to Company rule.
This natural antagonism was given personal point by the 
appointment, as the new ruler of the coastal region, of the 
very person who had made such a searching enquiry into the 
Company. Henceforward the company adopted a policy of 
“fight everything11,3 an attitude fully reciprocated by 
Macdonald.
The future spirit in which relations were to be conducted
1. F.O. 2185 Moor to F.O. 21.12.95. Including joint report 
Close/Besser. Mins, on
2. The boundary was not finally settled before the western 
Cameroons came under British mandate in 1918.
3. F.O. 8V2181 Minute by H.P.A. 18.12.91.
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was revealed over the question of boundaries. Since two 
boundaries, one west and one east of the delta, had to be 
negotiated, the problem was doubly complex compared with that 
of the Lagos or the Cameroons boundaries. During June 1891 
Macdonald had several interviews with Goldie, each one more 
acrimonious than the last. One of the main points at issue 
was the town of Idu. Macdonald, recalling the remarks he had 
made in the report, insisted that Idu should be included 
within the Protectorate territory. Goldie equally asserted 
the company*s rights over the town, since it lay on a key 
waterway giving access to the Niger and Oguta lake. Each 
claimed that the jurisdiction of the other over the town would 
lead to grave complications and neither felt able to give way. 
Anderson1 s pious hope that “they won*t quarrel11 seemed bound 
to fall at the first obstacle, when accusations of ignorance 
were exchanged with mutual regrets about the heated tones of
-i
the other's correspondence.
To Anderson this way of conducting negotiations was 
intolerable.
“I explained to them that they were altogether on 
a wrong tack in treating with each other as if 
they were representatives of two foreign countries, 
that they were officers administering neighbouring 
British protectorates and that, as regards police 
in their territories, were rather in the position
1. F.O.C.P. 6^ -51 R.N.C. to F.O. 19.6.91 with Enc. F.O
8V2111 Macdonald to F.O. 18.6.91.
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of adjoining British countries than of France and 
Spain; that they had to make. regulations, hut with 
a common object.11 1
With Anderson in the chair an arrangement was hammered out at
the Foreign Office. On the west of the delta the boundary
was to be
“a line starting at the middle of the mouth of the 
Forcados River, following that river midway to the 
mouth of the so called Warri Creek, following that
creek midway up to a point 2|- miles below the mouth
of the creek leading to Oagbi and Akiabodo from 
where the line runs to the north east for ten
miles thence to the north for 50 miles."
The Company were to move their revenue hulk in the Warri Creek
not less than a mile above the point on the creek where the
delimitation ended. To the east of the delta, the boundary
was defined as
"a straight line commencing at a point midway between 
the Nun Mouth and the mouth of the Brass River and 
terminating at the town of Idu; it being understood 
that the line shall if necessary be diverted so as to 
leave within the Oil Rivers Protectorate a zone of 
not less than three miles to the westward of the 
stream marked on Johnston1s Map as forming a direct 
communication between Brass and Idu; and to leave 
within the Jurisdiction of the Niger Company a zone 
of not less than three miles to the eastward of the 
main stream of the Niger. This line shall be subject 
to further delimitation according to local require­
ments ."
Idu was to be under joint administration pending further 
arrangements.2
1, F.O. 8V2168 Minute by H.P.A. 2.7.91.
2. F.O. 8V2110 F.O. to Macdonald 29.7.91.
392.
The boundary agreement bore all the marks of Anderson1 s 
determination to get a settlement at all costs. It left 
Goldie grumbling that he had given up everything and got 
nothing, it left Macdonald fretting that nothing had been 
done to secure to the Brass men some of their hinterland 
markets.^ The boundary lines were confused and contradictory 
and, therefore, unworkable. This was particularly true of 
the eastern boundary. If the line was drawn straight there 
would be no access by water between Idu and Brass, except 
through the Companyfs territories; if on$ the other hand the 
line was drawn at least three miles from both the Nun and the 
Brass it would be far from straight. No arrangement more 
calculated to lead to difficulties in the existing climate of 
relations could have been devised than the joint administra­
tion of Idu.
Not surprisingly the boundaries when published came
under fire. Protests poured in from Liverpool, Bristol and
Glasgow about the cutting away of Oil Rivers markets, and the
2
arbitrary nature of the line. De Cardi trading at Bonny 
during the l890fs summed up the coaster*s opinions of those 
who in the sanctity of their rooms in the Foreign Office 
"looked upon this part of the world as a cheesemonger would a
1. F.O.C.P. 6351 Corres. 18/19.6.91.
2 .  F.O.C.P. 6351 various.
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1
cheese". From the beginning Macdonald found difficulty in 
working the boundary. Early in November 1891 he went to 
Warri to conduct a demarcation on the ground, with Wallace, 
now the Acting Agent General of the Niger Company. The line 
as laid down in the agreement ran straight through the middle 
of the Urhobo town of Egana and cut the Oagbi creek. The 
Niger Companyfs hulk at Gana Gsna was actually to the west of 
this line. This the Commissioner argued was impossible as a 
fiscal boundary. He proposed instead that the boundary should
p
follow the Warri to the Oagbi and up the latter to its source. 
Goldie, however, requested that any action on demarcation 
should be deferred until the completion of an enquiry which 
the Company was making.
What this 1 enquiry* was soon percolated through to the 
Foreign Office. With the collapse of charter extension,
Goldie had adopted a policy of rapid expansion into the Delta, 
grabbing as much as possible before the new administration 
could settle in. His prior activity in the region had already 
in the 1891 discussions enabled him to deprive the New Calabar 
people of their markets above Idu. During the early months of
1. M. Kingsley West African Studies 1st Edition 1899* App.l.
2. F.O. 8V2111 Macdonald to F.O. 12.11.91 (erroneously 
dated 1892).
3. F.O. 8V2181 R.N.C. to F.O. 17.12.91.
39*+.
1892 Goldie visited the Deltato ascertain precisely where
treaties had been made, particularly in the Warri and
Forcados regions, and to urge on the treaty-making process.
Quite obviously in such a fluid situation the last thing he
wanted was a firm demarcation.
Realizing what was going on, Macdonald telegraphed the
Foreign Office, urging that the Niger Compands treaties of
1891 should not be ratified until the boundary had been
settled. Anderson's reaction was a nonchalent
"Macdonald and Goldie will probably meet on the 
coast and fight or make friends." 1
On 7th January the storm broke. From every part of the 
United Kingdom firms engaged in the West African trade protes­
ted against the handing over of the Warri and Forcados 
regions to the Company. A formidable newcomer to the list
was Elder Dempster, the shippers, acting for the first time
 2 .......................
in complete concert with the traders. Cross, the radical
M.P. for Liverpool, informed Lister that "a tremendous onslaught
on the Niger Company was being prepared."J The attacks shook
the complacency of the Foreign Office sufficiently to address
the Liverpool Chamber of Commerce direct. The letter sent on
1. F.O. 84-/2195 Macdonald to F.O. 2.1.92.
2. F.O.C.P. 6351 Various corres.
3. F.O. 84-/224-1 Minute by T.V.L. 30.1.92.
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2nd February^a naively partisan statement of the Company*s 
case. There was no intention of altering the 1886 charter; 
the Warri branch was within the basin of the Niger, therefore 
the Company's treaties were sanctioned, only the left bank 
of the Forcados was held by the Company, and finally by the 
terms of the charter perfect free trade was secured.^
The Chamber*s answer delivered on the 27th May revealed 
the credibility gap between government and traders. The old 
arguments of monopoly were restated, coupled with a demand 
that the whole delta south of Onitsha should be restored to
the Oil Rivers Protectorate and for publication of the
2
Company*s treaties. Both demands were resisted in parliament 
and outside. Anderson*s argument that the questions implied 
the "existence of a power in Her Majesty’s Government they do 
not possess1* curiously ignored the powers of the Secretary of 
State to intervene in the Company*s affairs both on general 
matters of policy, and, under article 1 3* in questions of 
title to territories.
The resistance of government to questions in parliament, 
requests for the publication of the company's accounts and
1. R.N.C. Papers: F.O. to Liverpool Chamber of Commerce
2.2.92.
2. F.O. 8^/225^ Liverpool Chamber of Commerce to F.O.
27.5.92 and 7.6.92.
3. F.O. 8V2252 F.O. to Oil Rivers Trading Co. 20.6.92.
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treaties and impartial investigations into the Company*s 
rights owed nothing to intrigue or influence but wcV$ a matter 
of policy. The Company had secured a vast area of Africa 
against the competing claims of France and Germany. It was 
defending its territory at no cost to the Imperial exchequer.
If the Crown was to take over the territory, a large initial 
expenditure and a higher annual outlay would be necessary.
As long as the Company could do this work, then it had to be 
supported. Anderson admitted that, though theoretically 
monopoly was impossible, practically the Company did 11 not make 
newcomers welcome11. Nevertheless the benefits outweighed the 
disadvantages. It was the nearest the government came to 
condoning monopoly
Finding no change in government policy, the Liverpool 
traders turned to direct action. During 1892 the African 
Association mounted a trade war on the Niger. By trading at 
a loss they were able to comply with the Company's regulations 
and push up the price to the African producer. The Brassmen 
were supported in their efforts to get into the Niger, and the 
brief trade boom which resulted curbed their discontent.
During 1892 the Niger Company1? profits dropped by a third,
p
while the exports from Brass rose from £65*000 to £10^,000.
1. F.O. 8V2256 Memo by H.P.A. 8 .9 2.
2. F.O. 83/1382 Kirk to Salisbury 25.8.95
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By June 1893 both Company and Association had had enough.
In a comprehensive agreement Goldie bought up all the Asso­
ciation's assets on the Niger, in return for the right to 
appoint a director to the company, £7*500 in debentures* and 
5,033 £10 shares. The company agreed to stay out of the
Rivers, the Association to stay away from the Niger, and to
1
cease public attacks on the Company.
The news that the traders were coming to terms hardly
surprised Macdonald and did not alter his attitude one whit.
He had early realized that he was on a difficult line in
fighting against the government's non intervention policy.
The government's treatment of Macdonald was equivocal; a
certain gingerness brought about by awareness of the fact
that there was the one man who by his revelations could make .
life uncomfortable for the government. Thus on the one hand
he was assured that no decision would be taken on the Warri
2boundary without his being consulted. He was also asked to 
comment on the Niger Company's budget when Goldie sent it in 
... a confidence not accorded to other opponents of the 
Company.  ^ On the other hand his continual recommendations
1. John Holt Papers Box V 8 Documents on fusion with R.N.C.
1893-5 For a detailed account of the negotiations see
Flint Goldie Cap.9.
2. F.O. 8V2195 Macdonald to F.O. 13.3.92. Minute by H.P.A.
3. F.O. 8^/2193 H.P.A. to Macdonald 12.11.9 2 . P.
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for reform on the basis of the report were shelved and for­
gotten, N0 action was taken on his request that the Company 
should end its system of acting as an intermediary in the 
purchase of land by trading rivals.^" Macdonald's arguments 
in favour of ameliorating the trading conditions of the 
Company for the coastal middlemen met with a blank wall of 
resistance from Goldie, and the Foreign Office refused to 
see any reason to coerce him, as the Company had not violated 
its charter.^ In November 1892 the Company's attempt to 
enforce its duties on the provisional line led to bloodshed, 
when two canoes loaded with oil attempted to pass the 
Company's revenue hulk of Gana Gana. Shots were exchanged and 
a Niger Company official and a native trader were killed. 
Tension rose in the area, and Macdonald urged the Government 
to do something, as he considered the proceedings of the
Company "unjustifiable and likely to lead to further bloodshed
and disturbance". The people, he said,
"cannot understand why they are not allowed to
trade at their markets which have been open to 
them from time immemorial." 3
The Foreign Office desperately hoped that, without doing
1. F.O. 8b/22k0 F.O. to R.N.C. 21.1.92. The letter was
acknowledged and never referred to again.
2. F.O. 8V2259 Minute by H.P.A. .26 A.93.
3. F.O. 8V219^ Macdonald to F.O. 8.12.92.
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much to influence the situation, Goldie and Macdonald would 
come together. The constant friction around the Forcados 
alone was becoming too serious to be ignored, and although 
Goldie was "within his rights ... it would be desirable that 
the dispute should be compromised.With this in mind con­
ciliation of the natives was urged on the company, and a
2
meeting suggested with Macdonald.
The confrontation between Goldie and Macdonald on 25th 
April, 1893, at the Foreign Office was hardly to the liking of 
the Foreign Office. Goldie insisted on the Company's rights 
in introducing its financial system into the Forcados, 
Macdonald said "plainly enough that he objected altogether to 
administration by a Chartered Company". The views were irre­
concilable - they did not quarrel, but they did not agree.^
As if to underline the differences between the two men the 
meeting was held against the background of the imminent sell 
out by the African Association and the most monster petition 
yet organized by the Liverpool Chamber of Commerce. For the 
first time the Chamber attacked the charter on a basis of 
principle, recommending as preliminary reforms the appointment 
of a Crown Commissioner in the Company's territory, the pub­
1. F.O. 8V219^ Minute by H.P.A. ‘9.12.92.
2. F.O.C.P. 6351 F.O. to R.N.C. 19.12.92.
3. F.O. 8V2259 Minute by H.P.A. 26A.93.
‘too.
lication of accounts with independent audit, the abolition of 
export duties, and the placing of the whole delta under 
Macdonald.
The implacable nature of the opposition evidently 
worried the Foreign Office. When Jones of Elder Dempster 
approached Lister with a suggestion to buy out the Niger 
Company in its administrative capacity and to put the govern­
ment of the territory under Macdonald, he was not rebuffed. 
Instead, Lister went so far as to admit this “to be the proper
solution cf the question11, but there were many difficulties
2and “I prescribe patience11. The government did decide to
assert its control over the Company*s budget, however, by
limiting the amount which could be raised by revenue for three
3
years to £90,000 per annum. As Flint remarked, the restric­
tion did nothing to relax the monopoly, since it did not limit
the rate of taxation,
“the chief value of the limitation was that it made 
unnecessary the tedious annual examination in detail 
of the company*s budget, whilst also providing a 
gesture of control with which to confront critics." *+
With the agreement of Goldie with the African Association,
1. F.O. 83/1238 Liverpool Chamber to Rosebery 5.l+.93*
2. F.O. 83/12^3 Memo by T.V.L. 13.10.93*
3. F.O. 83/1239 R.N.C. to F.O. 3+.5.93.
k. Flint Goldie P.192.
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Macdonald was faced with a rapidly deteriorating situation in
the rivers. Trade at Brass slumped, as the Niger Company in
the absence of effective opposition methodically enforced its
regulations on the boundaries. The small firms outside the
African Association were too small to fill the gap at Brass
and after 189^ the Companyfs monopoly was virtually complete
on the Niger and Benue. Discontent grew as Brass canoes were
stopped or fired upon, debts were repudiated by the Ijo
producers, or proved impossible to collect, and food canoes
1
bringing supplies from up country were seized. A series of 
incidents occurred, in one of which the wife of a Brass chief 
was raped on board a revenue hulk by a Company clerk. On 
another occasion a Brass lady was beaten by the Company*s
p
beachmaster at Akassa. Abandoned by their Liverpool allies, 
suffering from an acute sense of frustration as they saw their 
trade dwindling and their food supply in danger, the native 
middlemen began to collect their weapons and to plot another 
way of remedying their grievances.
Macdonald too was suffering from an acute sense of 
frustration. He could foresee trouble and felt himself power- 
less to forestall it. During 189^ relations reached a new
1. Conditions in Brass described by Kirk to F.O. 25.8.95 
F.O. 83/1382.
2. F.O. 2/83 Macdonald to F.O. ^.2*95.
3• Ibid.
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low as the Company began advancing again on the western side 
of the delta. A treaty-making expedition was sent under 
McTaggart which actually reached Benin City. Moor protested 
that the Company was taking advantage of the Protectorate1s 
preoccupation with Nana, accused the company of violating the 
provisional boundary and threatened to take action against 
McTaggart under the Arms and Ammunition Ordinance.^ Macdonald 
and Goldie met in a tense atmosphere at Brighton, against a 
background of threats from Moor. After some discussion,
Goldie agreed to order McTaggart to retire to the Niger until 
the trouble with Nana was concluded, while Macdonald tele­
graphed to his subordihate to be “temperate in the tone of his
p
communications with Niger Company's officers". Goldie's
retreat was hardly gracious however.
“If ... the region in question is on the Niger Coast 
Protectorate side of the boundary line, the Com­
missioner's protest is superfluous; as no political 
action taken by the Company on that side can have 
any validity whatever. If, on the other hand, as 
there seems no reason to doubt the region in question 
is on the Company's side of the boundary line, the 
Commissioner would actually seem ... to be depreca­
ting a forward policy of the Company in its own 
territory." 3
Moor in his fury at what he regarded as the Company's
1. F.O. 2/6^ Moor to F.O. 21.10.9^.
2. F.O. 83/1316 Memo by H.P.A. 8 .10.9*+.
3. F.O. 83/1316 R.N.C. to F.O. 19.10.9*+.
*K>3.
attempt to force the issue over the provisional boundary, was 
determined not to take McTaggartfs expedition lying down.
Despite Macdonald's plea that both sides to the dispute should 
take up the positions they held prior to McTaggart*s expedition, 
the Foreign Office had not nullified the treaties he had 
made.1 These included several in the rich Urhobo markets 
which fed Benin and Warri. Therefore, as soon as Nana was 
disposed of, Moor authorized Gallwey to go ahead with his own 
expedition. Between September 189^ and June 1895 13 treaties 
were made in Urhobo country, at least five of which duplicated
j o
McTaggarts. Macdonald made no attempt to restrain his sub­
ordinate, himself complaining about another official of the 
Company, Zweifel^ who was busy making treaties at the back of 
Opobo. If this was going to be allowed, argued the Commis­
sioner, the Company might just as well be saddled with the 
coastal districts as well.^ Goldie strongly objected to
Gallwey*s treaties, on the grounds that they were within the
k
Company's territory. The Foreign Office succeeded in fanning 
the flames by publishing a map which purported to lay down the
1. F.O. 2/6*1- Macdonald to F.O. 12.10.9*+.
2. F.O. 2/167 and 2/168 Passim.
3. F.O. 2/83 Macdonald to F.O. 3.5*95*
*+. F.O. 83/1377 R.N.C. to*F.0. ll.*f.95.
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provisional boundary. By mistake, the town of Warri had 
been placed under the jurisdiction of the Company. The 
Liverpool Chamber of Commerce caustically suggested that 
“Her Majesty*s Government should issue a reliable map of the 
district.
Unable to decide between the conflicting claims and
• ■ ■ - p
squabbles “creditable to neither party11, the Foreign Office
referred the question of the Fore ados boundary to Kirk and
ordered a standstill on treaty making. Kirk*s report on the
boundary, received on 29th July, did little to elucidate the
question. By agreement with Macdonald and Wallace, the line
was straightened to run along the middle of the Forcados as
far as the point 2-g- miles below Oagbi, thus turning to the
south of Warri; but the line from there was not touched, Kirk
believing that a final settlement should await the time
“when the geography of the Sobo and Assay markets 
is better known and the relations of the tribes
and their trade markets better understood.11 b
If Kirk was right, he scarcely improved the situation in the
short term. Moor, on taking over from Macdonald, continued to
squabble with Goldie until the abrogation of the charter.
1. F.O. 83/1376 Liverpool Chamber to F.O. 19.3*95.
2. F.O. 2/83 Minute by K. 16.6.95.
3. F.O. 2/83 F.O. to Macdonald 2b.b.9$. F.O. 83/1377 F.O.
to R.N.C. 2*+.*+.95. ^he treaties already made were not dis­
allowed .
b. F.O. 83/1380 Kirk to F.O. 30.6.95.
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The constantly erupting dispute over boundaries was 
exacerbated by two issues, liquor and firearms. Goldie made 
much of the fact that the revenues of the Protectorate relied 
heavily on drink, whereas in nine tenths of the company!s 
territory the liquor traffic was banned. He also maintained 
that liquor was smuggled into the Company*s territories from 
the coast areas, because the Company consistently refused to 
lower its tariffs.1 What he chose to ignore was that if 
smuggling did take place over the customs frontier, it was 
into the one tenth where liquor traffic was permitted anyway, 
and was carried on by the Company, which itself imported over 
300,000 gallons during 1893.
The question of firearms was more serious, as it 
involved the carrying out of the Brussels Act, and the res­
ponsibility for disorders within the area of the Niger/Benue 
and the coast region. The difference between Macdonald and 
the company was simple. The Commissioner admitted there were 
many arms of precision introduced into and sold in the Protec­
torate before 1891, and that some of these were involved in a 
two way smuggling process across the Niger Company*s frontier. 
The natives in both Protectorates, he argued in 1895, Nad in 
their possession a number of rifles, and rifles had been sold
1. R.N.C. Papers I Special Notice to Shareholders 16.3.95*
in the Niger Company1s territories some time after the granting 
of the Charter. Since 1891, however, no rifles had been 
imported into the Protectorate. Goldie denied that any 
rifles had crossed the Company1s frontier into the Protector­
ate, and that any had been imported by the Company since 1886, 
and further said that the trade in arms of precision had 
continued since I89I into the territory under the Commissioner. 
It was an argument which threatened to become more and more 
unprofitable - both were partly right, neither could be 
absolutely sure that rifles were not being imported under the 
nose of both Company and Consul. In an atmosphere of mutual 
distrust the innuendo and the half truth were given more
credence than they deserved; as Kill remarked nThere is no
2
love lost between the two administrations. 11 It was a
realistic if tardy assessment by government.
One solution which was proposed to overcome the accusa­
tion of smuggling and the trading restrictions created by 
having two different administrations side by side was a cus­
toms union. This proposal was adopted with enthusiasm by the 
Liverpool Chamber of Commerce during 189 .^ Macdonald was
1. A typical piece of correspondence may be found in F.O. 2 /83  
Macdonald to F.O. 17.^.95* With encs.
2. F.O. 2 /83 Minute by Hill 27.5.95.
3. F.O. 6 b / l i k 6  Liverpool Chamber of Commerce to F.O.
1+07.
cautiously in favour although he did not think the Company 
would nquite tumble to itn His assessment of Goldie*s 
reaction to a suggested undermining of his monopoly was right. 
The latter, far from arguing the increase in trade and the 
saving of costs from a union, postulated the great differences 
between the two territories as necessitating a greater diver­
gence of customs rates. It was the misfortune of the Niger 
territories, that it could not bear a higher rate, since
urgent revenue was needed to open up the vast areas of Inner 
2
Africa. It would not be unreasonable, he suggested, if the
tariff of the territories was one hundred times that of the
Coast Protectorate, since the latter consisted of half a dozen
estuaries covering 20,000 square miles, and the former an
inland area out of reach of the navy of 500,000 square miles.
If they did not agree with the. sentiments, yet again the
foreign Office found it easier to agree with Goldie and do 
II
nothing. There seemed little reason to intervene between 
the Company and its imperial mission.
1. F.O. 83/1312 Macdonald to Hill 25.6.91*.
2. F.O. 83/1312 Goldie to Hill 23.6.9^. P.
3. R.N.C. Papers I Goldies Concise Memo on suggested customs 
union 6.3*95.
k , E.g. F.O. 83/1312 Answer to question by Lawrence in 
Commons 26.6.9*+.
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CHAPTER TEN.
CRISES....... AND A NEW COURSE.
It was perhaps no coincidence that the first 
major military campaign within the Protectorate took 
place while Macdonald was home on leave in 1894* Moor's 
martial instincts, his rashness and lack of patience 
with his Chief's policy have already been noted."*"
Thdy were qualities which were shown to the full as 
Moor proceeded to precipitate a crisis with Nana on 
the Benin River.
Under the new dispensation relations between
Nana and the Protectorate administration were bound
to be uneasy. Nananstood for a system based on po\'/er,
wealth and slavery; the new order stood for a system
which, while directed toy/ards. increasing the wealth .
available, sought to make itself, the only, or, at least
2
the ultimate, power in the whole of the Protectorate1.’
He yfas by far the most powerful of the Itsekiri middle­
men, his influence extending into the heart of the Urhobo 
markets. Hardly had G-allwey t^ken up his post at Benin^ 
(ihen he was inundated with complaints from the European
1. Supra, cap 8.
2. Ikirpp, 0. Niger Delta Rivalry 1969, p.100
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traders. The continual quarrels of the Itsekiri 
middlemen with both the Urhobo oil producers and the 
Oba of Benin over trade and trust kept bringing tsade 
to a standstill. The commercial undertainty created 
by the Niger Company1s encroachments in the Forcados 
tended to exacerbate conflicts. In all these disputes 
the fhture of Nana loomed large by reason of his power 
and influence. To meet the changed conditions of 
trade, which had rendered the position of the middlemen 
more precarious, Nana had endeavoured to strengthen his 
monopoly. According to Egharevba he had tried to con­
trol all Itsekiri trade with Benin, using his monopoly 
of booking salt from the pans around Ebrohimi as a 
means of bringing pressure.^ In Urhobo country he 
created a "Scientific Frontier11 about 3 miles from 
the waterside and established himself over a large area, 
"forbidding the Sobos passing the line." and threatr-
ening all those who attempted to take their trade
2elsewhere with punishment. As incidents multiplied 
between Urhobo producers and Nana, rival Itsekiri 
traders joined the European agents in urging that the 
real cause of commercial uncertainty in the Benin 
district was Nana!s monopoly.
1. Egharevba J. A Short History of Benin 3rd Ed.
Ibadan I960, p.5*
2. F.O. 2/63 Macdonald to Iiill 11.8.94. enc. Coxon to
Pinnock.
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Gallwey, at first, did not swallow the traders*
line whole. In his annual report for 1892 he gives
five reasons for the uncertainty of trade in the Benin
district\ the predominating influence of Nana; the
continued petty quarrels that occurred Between the
middlemen anct producers; the fetish rule of the King
of Benin; the inability of the native to understand
the varying price of products in the home market; and
the establishment of factories by the white traders
up country. According to him Nana was already adjusting
to the new administration. "He naturally found it very
hard at first to “relinquish so much power, but he is
a fairly sensible man and dearly sees that to thwart the
aims of the Government is very foolish policy.11 ^
V/hat infuriated Gallwey was to discover that his own
assessment was wishful thinking. A series of incidents
during 1893 clearly illustrated that for the ordinary
people Nana was still the final authority in the land,
and not the British administration. One of Nana*s
men refused to obey a consular summons on the grounds
that Nana had not told him to; another refused to sell
. . 2
provisions to Gallwey unless Nana gave him permission.
1. B.O. 2/51 Iiacdonald to Rosebery, 12,1.93.
2. R.O. 2/64 Gallwey to Nana 1.12.93.
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An understandable relation between master and servant 
was turned into an insult against the representative 
of* Her Majesty. As tension mounted between Gs^Llwey 
and Nana, rival traders took the opportunity of creating 
disturbances, knowing that such were likely to be 
blamed on the powerful Itsekiri chief. Gallwey him­
self began to believe all he was told by the European 
traders and Nana!s chief5 Itsekiri rival Dogho. Thus, 
although he had no evidence to support the charges,
of
Gallwey accused Nana wl-%h "spreading lies about the 
Government" and "with injuring trade.""*"
No progress could be expected while Nana 
continued to defy the government, which was being 
openly insulted by the Itsekin Chief. Coxon ex­
pressed the general consensus that Nana was "a d d
rascal!. I shan*t be sorry when his power is com­
pletely broken. V/e will have much better trade, and 
more profitable too."
1. P.O. 2/64 Gallwey to Nana, 1.12.93* How true this was 
is indicated by the trade figures for the Benin River 
in the ye^r in which the crisis came to a head.
Imports rose from £28,711. 10. 7dy to £84776.6.6d., 
exports from £22139. 10. 4d. to £100,411, 16.0).
Nana!s monopoly hardly brought trade to a standstill, 
Ann. Report 1893/4: P.O. 2/63.
2. See particularly P.O. 2/63 Ann. Report for Benin 
in Macdonald to Kimberley, 19.8.94.
3. P.O. 2/63 Macdonald to Hill 11.8.94. Mnc. Coxon to 
Pinnock, 1.7.94.
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Macdonald was not convinced that the time 
for action had yet come. The traders1 accounts were
•j
"somewhat highly coloured". Time must he given to
the middlemen chiefs to adjust to the loss of their
prescriptive rights. This- required tact, even in the
fact of present inconvenience to the government. He
personally believed that Nana was "clever enough to
know that any attempt at setting up his own authority
against that of Her Majesty*s government would end 
2in disaster." The administration must not be
diverted from its policy of peaceful penetration by 
the agitations of traders. Nevertheless the Com­
missioner, as a gentle but salutary reminder to the 
Itsekiri chief wrote him a personal letter informing 
him that the British administration was fully estab­
lished, and that Nana should no longer regard himself 
as TGovernor* of the Benin River'but as head of
3his house only*
In May Macdonald want on leave and Moor 
Jopk pfreiv. Gallwey immediately found himself with a 
sympathetic ear at Old Calabar and matters quickly 
aame to a head. The drop in palm oil prices in
1. Ibid.
2. F.O. 2/84 Macdonald to Salisbury, 25*7.95.
3. F.0./64 Macdonald to Nana Aprii 1894.. Lloyd states 
(V/est Africai June 1957 > p.609) that Nana*s office 
had ceased with the appointment of Gallwey in 1891. 
Neither Macdonald nor Nana saw things in this light.
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Europe during 1894 caused the ^European traders to band
together to depress prices on the coast. Nana refused
to accept the price offered and retaliated by stopping
fcoeT
trade. This brought Moor hot foot to Benin^on 21st 
June. He rapidly came to the conclusion that this 
state of affairs was "owing principally to the acts of 
the people of Chief Nana in seizing Sobo people and 
generally terrorizing the locality of the Ethiope River. 
Moor, therefore, invitee the Chief to attend the Yice 
Consulate to answer charges. Nana urged family dis­
tress and offered to send a substitute. Moor, convinced 
the excuses were spurious, wrote the Chief a letter 
ordering him to withdraw his people from the Ethiope. 
River where disturbances were being caused, and to hand 
over the Sobo people seized at the Yice Consulate. He 
was given fourteen days to carry this out.
fco«.r ^
On 9th July Moor ^returned to Beniny, with a 
small Protectorate force, and claiming his orders had 
not been carried out, he forbade Nana to trade on the 
Ethiope River, and established a blockade at its mouth. 
At the same time he sent for reinforcements, and a 
gunboat to be present at Benin^for a meeting of all 
the chiefs of the district on 2nd August. By now Moor 
was determined at the very least on a show of force oto
1. P.O. 2/63 Moor to P.O. 6.8.94.
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meet the situation. By the end of July a total of 
three officers and 87 men and H.M.S. Alecto were in 
attendance.
At the meeting on the 2nd August all the
chiefs with the exception of Bana were present. IT an a
had written to Boor saying he was afraid to attend the
meeting as he had heard rumours that he would be seized
1and deported like Ja Ja. The Acting Commissioner^ 
warlike preparations evidently produced a healthy 
distrust of promises of safe conduct from that source. 
Again he offered to send a substitute and again Hoor 
refused, saying that if B a m  wished to make his peace 
he must come in person. The purpose of the meeting 
soon became clear to the assembled chiefs. They were 
asked to ratify the contention that trade was open to 
all by signing a new treaty of the standard type in­
cluding the free trade clauses. A general amnesty 
of past offences was offered to all who signed, and 
faithfully observed its terms for the future. The 
replacement of the original treaty signed by Bana alone 
was intended to undermine his paramountcy. All the 
local Rulers signed, and lioor sent a copy to Bana in^ 
forming him he could do the same - but only a if the 
Vice Consulate. Learning that Bana had erected a
1. P.O. 2/64 Bana to Koor, 23*7*94.
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barrier across the mouth, of the creek leading to
Ebrohiini, Moor ordered him by letter to remove it.
at once or face serious consequences. '.'.Until he
complied with the. orders of the Government, the letter
concluded, he was to consider his town under blockade
and his people banned from any of "the waterways of
the Benin or V/arri districts". If they attempted to
trade their goods would be seized and forfeited, and
if canoes failed to stop they would be fired upon"* ^
Nana*s reply played into Moor*s hands. He insisted that.
the barrier had been there from his father*s time as
a defence against rival Itsekiri traders, and added
that if he scry Government launches anywhere in the creek
2
he would regard this as a declaration of war. Moor 
immediately requested Captain Heugh of *Alectof to 
blow up the barrier during the course of which opera­
tion the party of marines was fired upon* As far as 
Moor was concerned this act "materially changes the 
aspect of affairs." He proposed now, should the 
chief submit, to impose a fine of £500 and demand the
surrender of all arms and ammunition which the chief
3
would not ‘be entitled to have under the Ordinance.-.
1. P .O.  2/64. Moor to Nana, 2.8.94.
2. P .O .  2/64 Nana to Moor 4.8.94.
3. P.O.  2/63 Moor to P.O.  6.8.94.
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The news of these events dropped like a 
bombshell on the foreign Office desks. Macdonald, in 
the absence of information from the coast,"*" was as 
baffled as the rest at the apparent dramatic change 
in the peaceful course hitherto steered by the. Pro­
tectorate* There seemed nothing to be done, once 
shots had been fired, but to let Moor have his head 
and see the matter through* Whether by accident or 
design, Moor won himself a free hand to carry out the 
ensuing military campaign.
He took full advantage of it. Every nerve 
was bent to . justify military action against Nana.
All disturbances in the districts were attributed to 
his influence, and sickening atrocities were said to 
have been carried out daily in his town. In his 
fanaticism, Moor happily confused Urhobo, Ijo and 
Itsekiri, and piled contradiction upon contradiction
1. This question is interesting. The first the P.O. 
knew of any crisis on the coast was a letter from 
the Admiralty 27*7.94 transmitting a telegram from 
He ugh that he was on his way to Benin at the urgent 
request of Moor because of a threatened disturbance 
between the natives. Moor*s first despatch of 6th 
August could not have arrived in England until the 
first week in September. He did not telegraph until 
11th August, i.e. nearly two months after the June 
exchanges between himself and Nana. Bid. Moor del-, 
liberately delay information until matters had gone; 
too far because he feared Macdonald*s intervention 
against a forward policy? It is certainly very 
curious that he should have allowed shots to be 
fired before informing his superior.
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in his endeavour to prove that eveey local defiance of 
the Protectorate administration was inspired by Nana.
He aaw nothing irreconcileable in claiming that the 
Urhobo chiefs were awaiting liberation from Nana*s 
tyranny, at the same time as he was insisting that 
acts of insubordination by the same chiefs amounted to 
a ..demonstration in his favour. The real justifi­
cation. for the war he revealed in one crucial sentence 
"It has too long been the custom of the people of Benin 
and Warri districts to say that they know no Government, 
but Chief Nana and it has now become necessary to con- 
vince them to the contrary”.
Despite the fact that Nana began to plead 
for a settlement Moor pushed on his military prepara­
tions. Nana still could not see his way to fulfill 
the one essential condition as far as Moor was concerned. - 
attendance at the- Yice Consulate. By 19th August 
Moor had become convinced that a greater force was 
necessary, and asked for another gunboat and a nine 
pounder field p i e c e I f  this did not overawe Nana 
then active operations would have to be undertaken and
3
Nana deported from the district.
On 25th August all hope of a peaceful settlement
1. P.O. 2/65 Moor to P.O. 8*8.94.
2. P.O. 2/65 Moor to P.O. 19*8.94.
5. P.O. 2/65 Moor to P.O. 22.8.94.
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disappeared. A reconnoitring party sent from ’Alecto1 
to pro "be the defences of Nana’s town was forced "back 
with some .casualties. One blue-jacket was killed 
and two Protectorate officers severely wounded. Moor 
decieided that at least two more gunboats would ha needed 
and these were at once sent for. By the 18th September 
the largest force ever gathered in the Bights was 
assembled - 550 troops and marines backed by four, gun­
boats (the entire naval strength on the West Coast) 
under the supreme commander on the station, Rear - 
Admiral Bedford. Nana’s abject plea for peace, "Please 
forgive me^, I don’t want to fight the government"^ 
was summarily rejected by iioor, who was determined to 
restore the image of the Protectorate tarnished by 
the failure of 25th August.
The end ■ follows!swiftly. After increased 
bombardment an overwhelming attack was launched at 
5*30 on the morning of 25th September. By 9.a.m. 
Ebrohimi had been taken. Inside the town the attackers 
discovered some 8,300 cases of gin and an arsenal con­
sisting of 106 cannon 445 blunderbusses, over 1000 cap 
guns, 640 Baneguns^a machine gun and nearly 15 tons of
1. P.O. 2/64 Moor to P.O. 5 *10••94*
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1
gunpowder out no Nana* He had made good his escape-,
although his personal belongings were captured on 28th.
The Protectorate lost three men killed and over 7/6 
2
wounded. This was not the full extent of the direct 
cost to the Protectorate of Moor!s ambitions. In 1896 
the Admiralty sent in a bill for £7000, which after 
much pleading was reduced to a contribution of £2000 
from the Protectorate.
If Nana had conceived all along of a way to
embarrass the administration at the hands of which he
had been used no hardly, he could not have done better 
than to turn up in Lagos. Por his presence there demon­
strated, as nothing else could, the legal awkwardness
of having two totally different British ^administrations 
side by side* In view of the problems of dislocation 
consequent upon the defeat of Nana, and frustrated at . 
being kept so much in the dark by Moor, Macdonald 
suddenly cut short his leave and left for the coast on 
13th October. His arrival at Lagos coincided with 
Nanars surrender to the British authorities. A 
ludicrous situation at once arose. Governor Carter
1* P.O. 2/64 Moor to P.O. 5.10.95
2. P.O. 2/64 Moor to P.O. 20.10.94
3. P.O. 2/99 P.O. to Moor, 11.5.96.
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informed I-iacdonald that he could not surrender Nana 
without a warrant. The Commissioner hurried to Forcados^ 
procured the necessary document and returned to Lagos.
The Governor then stated that his judicial authorities 
were of opinion that Nana could not be surrendered to 
the Protectorate, because he was a Lagos British subject, 
his town being on the right bankaof the Benin River, which 
bank was the boundary proclaimed by Moloney in 1886.
To the Commissioner’s utter amazement the Governor then 
stated that "Chief Nana could bring an action against 
the Protectorate for the acts of hostility which that 
Government -had carried on against him and....that, if
1
such an action were brought Nana would win his case."
With incredible inefficiency the Lagos Govern­
ment had completely neglected to proclaim the boundary 
of 1891, and had pigeon holed and forgotten the despatch 
from the Colonial Secretary, which had laid down the 
new arrangement. l/ith some difficulty the erring 
despatch was brought to light, and the legal diffi­
culties as far as Nana was concerned were overcome
2
when the Chief voluntarily gave himself up to Macdonald.
1. P.O. 2/64 Macdonald to Kimberley, 12.11.94.
2. Ibid. Kimberleys comment "There is something in­
expressibly absurd in this difficulty about giving 
uip or even arresting a Chief who has been engaged 
in a serious conflict with British Forces". . Por 
the Lagos view C.O. 147/96 Carter to C.O. 19.11*94.
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This was something of a relief to the 
Commissioner who was averse to a trial in Lagos for 
two reasons, his own previous experience and the presence 
of native lawyers .’ready to make a rich picking off 
the prisoner. More particularly, he was well aware 
of the weakness of the case against Nana. This appeared 
in the trial in Decomber at Old Calabar. It was 
a brief affair characterised as much by the unscruplous 
determination of Moor, the chief prosecutor, to secure 
a conviction, as by anything eij.se. Macdonald, sensing 
the difficult position in which he had been left by 
his subordinate, barely spoke throughout the trial, 
unable to confirm or deny the truth of the course of 
events since May. Nana was duly convicted on the 
grounds that he had violated his treaty with Britain 
(in what way was not stated) and was deported to the 
Gold Coast on an allowance of 10/--per day.^
In contrast to the fall of Ja Ja, there 
were no misgivings in the Foreign Office about the 
deportation of Nana. If the necessity for a campaign 
was regrettable, the end result had been to remove, 
an obstacle to hinterland penetration. It was only
1. An account of the trial is given in 2/64. In 1906 
Nana was permitted to return and granted an allowance 
of £10 a month for two years. He died in 1916. A 
full account of his life and its significance in 
terms of Itsekiri - Urhobo relations, may be found 
in Ikime: . ^ Merchant Prince of the Niger Belta* 1967 
and *Niger Delta Rivalry* 1969.
4 2 2
Macdonald*s method applied in a more violent way,
and with apparently quicker if more expensive results.
The possibility of Nana*s cause being taken up was
therefore dismissed by Kimberley.^
In fact Macdonald was left with two headaches.
The first was Lagos. The Nana episode had at last
aroused the slumbering apathy of the colony. Even
when confronted with the Colonial Secretary*s letter.
Garter made difficulties about proclaiming the boundary.
His main contention was thaftiie Benin river was the
natural boundary of Lagoa11; any other boundary would
require an expensive survey. This would be unnecessary
assuming that in time, the Protectorate would be
2
administered from the Colonial Office.
Garter*s argument produced a different 
response at the Colonial Office from what it would 
have done in 1891. The new attitude reflected a 
changing awareness of imperial responsibilities which 
was to receive even greater impetus when Chamberlain 
became Colonial Secretary. It was an awareness which 
argued that the rule of subject territories was 
neither the province of private imperalists like 
Goldie, nor.the task of the foreign Office. Prom
1. 2/64 Macdonald to P.O. 13.12.94 Min. by Kimberley.
2. C.O. 147/96 Carter to C.O. 19.11.94.
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the middle of 1894 onwards, the Colonial Officials 
began to look with increasingly critical eyes on 
the way the Foreign Office was running the Coast 
Protectorate. Hemming, the head of the West Africa 
department, was the arch exponent of the new philosophy. 
He- entirely concurred with Carter that the Protectorate 
should be under the Colonial Office, and was prepared 
to await further elucidation as to the G-overnor!s 
reluctance to proclaim the boundary. Carter did 
not disappoint him. All sorts of reasons were now 
urged against the 1891 boundary. The time was in­
opportune for proclamation; in the absence of a 
survey the boundary could not be ascertained; a con­
ference ought to be held to lay down a line intelligible 
2
to all. Armed with the G-overnorTs memorandum,the 
Colonial Office suggested to the Foreign Office that 
Carter and Hacdonald should meet at Benii^^and discuss 
the matter.
The reopening of the boundary question was 
hardly welcome to the Foreign Office and even less 
welcome to Racdonald. Neither had thought that 
colonial incompetence would be sused as an excuse to
1. C.O. 147/96 Carter to C.O. 19*11.94. M n .  by A.W.L.H.
2. C.O. 147/96 Carter to C.O. 21.11.94.
go back on an agreed arrangement.^- Nevertheless a 
conference, it seemed, could do no harm if a settle­
ment agreeable to both sides could be reached. 
Unfortunately no such settlement proved possible. 
Macdonald insisted on the proclamation of the: 1891
arrangement since the territory in dispute was not
o
in a fit state to form part of a colony, Carter
equally refused to budge over the agreed boundary, 
believing it to beiunworkable, and took the offensive, 
by suggesting that the whole Protectorate should be 
taken over by the Colonial Office. Hemming agreed, 
believing the administration was l!entirely beyond the 
business and capabilities of tue P.O.'1 Determined to 
drag his feet, he suggested a continuation of the 
conference between Carter and Macdonald at the foreign 
Office. The conference was in fact, not held, since
the Colonial Office suggested that “Carter should visit 
Benin first and make himself acquainted with the matter.^- 
An impasse had thus been reached in the question when 
Moor took over the Protectorate. The. boundary was in
1. P.O. 85/1319 C.O. to P.O'. 28.12.94. Mins on.
2. P.O. 2^84 Memo by Macdonald, 9*9*95*
3. C.O. 147/102 P.O. to C.O. 17.9.95.
4 . P.O. 83/1384 C.O. to P.O. 7.10.95.
fact never settled before the amalgamation of 1906 
made it unnecessary. The important point to note 
here is that, even before the advent of Chamberlain 
the Colonial Office had begun to mount a campaign^ 
unanswerable in the. long run^ ...against the concept of 
the foreign Office Protectorate,
The second legacy of the liana dispute was 
the immediate effect, within the Protectorate, of 
the. military campaign. The danger was considerable 
that three years work in the building of confidence 
and goodwill might have been destroyed. The. gains 
up to 1894 were exemplified by the fact, that during 
August and September, when most of the Protectorate 
forces were in the Benin River, none of the other 
city states had seized the opportunity to make trouble* 
But when I-lacdonald reached the Urhobo country during 
the latj/er months of 1894, the disturbed nature of the 
district clearly indicated that the fall of Nana had 
left a power vacuum which the Protectorate adminis­
tration had hardly begun to fill. The Commissioner 
decided on an extensive goodwill tour throughout the 
Protectorate, in a bid to allay apprehensions and 
sympathies for the deported chief, whose slaves and 
property had been confiscated* Between 8th and 22nd 
of November Macdonald held meetings at Sapele, Bonny, 
Opobo, Warri, Brass, Degema and Old Calabar, as he put
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it, to consult and explain. He left no account of
what was said at these meetings, although by the turn
of the year he was able to report that all was quiet
in the P r o t e c t o r a t e I t  was the lull before the
storm. On 30th January, whilst inspecting the plant
at Opobo, Macdonald received a telegram from Harrison,
the Acting Vice Consul at Brass. It read "Akassa
attacked. Canoes (forty or fifty) returned last night.
2
factories and Consulate defenceless1'.
The one place that Macdonald visited in 
November 1894 where discontent was rife was Brass.
Trade was by then at a standstill^the Niger Company 
having blockaded all the creeks to the markets.
The sense, of frustration was deepened . by the Consul 
General1s apparent inability to do anything for the 
Brqssmen - a helplessness virtually admitted by 
Macdonald whilst on tour.^ Williams, the Church 
Missionary Society pastor^explained that as a result 
of the trade blockade practically all his congregation 
of 250 had returned to ju ju. More and more of the 
influential men lost faith in the white manfs ;God,
1. P.O. 2/83 Macdonald to P.O. 14.1.95*
2.. P.O. 2/83 Macdonald to P.O. 4.2.95.
3. P.O. 83/1374 Steinberg & Co. to P.O. 4.2.95.
4. P.O. 2/83 Macdonald to P.O. 4.2.95.
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who had allowed them to he oppressed1 and joined Koko, 
the leader of the ju ju party. In December the last 
straw was an outbreak of small-pox which carried off 
the old King Ebefa, the leader of the Christian 
party. Koko became King and demanded human sacrifices 
and cannibal rituals to forestall the disease.
Poverty, starvation and disease brought
together all natives in Brass, including the remnants
of the Christian group, in utter desperation. It was
resolved to attempt the amelioration of their lot by
one .nihilistic act of violence against the Company’s
trading headquarters at Akassa. There was no intention
of rebelling against the Protectorate, as the Brassmen
expressed in a heartrending cri de. coeur to Iiacdonald:
"And Consul after Consul, our late Chiefs,and 
King Ockiva repeatedly spoke aoout this Niger 
Company’s matter, and were offered to be 
patient. And we were in this state according 
to your rorders. In your time also we were asked 
to do so. The ill-treatments of the Niger Company 
is very bad. They said that Brassmen should eat. 
dust. According to their saying we see truly that 
we eat the dusts. Our boys fired, killed and 
plundered, and even the innocent provisions 
sellers were captured and killed likewise. If the 
Queen of England was acting in like manner as the 
Niger Company the whole of Africa would have been 
dead, through starvation. We did not kill the 
Queen*s men at all from the beginning of the 
establishment of this Brass River. But being 
they are the Queen’s men nothing such acted.
Being the Company is not the Queen’s men — and 
instead of we Brass people die through hunger we ^ 
had rather go to them and die in their swords.”
1. P.O. 2/83 Macdonald'to P.O. 4.2.95.
2. P.O. 2/83 Kings & Chiefs of Brass to Macdonald, 
4.2.95*
4 S
If die some would, others might live to see the
Niger Company "eat dust”.
The attack was organized in almost complete
secrecy. By Monday 28th January'1’ all was ready,
canoes were repaired and moved into formation, guns
were issued, cannon mounted and soon well over 100
warriors were assembled, ready to move down the creeks
to Akassa. In the meantime someone in the European
community had guessed something was "brewing, as the
natives had drawn all their credit balances at the
different factories wl.thin the previous few weeks*"
Late on the Sunday evening, 27th,Harrison received an
anonymous letter "Brass people leqving tomorrow at
noon to destroy Niger Company’s factories and lives
at Akassaf on Tuesday morning. Be sure you send at
2
once to stop them. An -.Observer".
Harrison, having no force at his disposal, 
could hardly stop the Brassmen, but he did send the 
letter through the creeks to Flint, the Company’s 
Agent General, who happened to be at Akassa. But Flint 
was sceptical*"These fumours are generally in evidence 
at this time of year**.*but, for an armed force to 
leave Brass to attack an adjoining friendly government
1. For some unknown reason Flint in G-oldit has got
the wrong month (Bee.) of the wrong year (1894) for 
the attack*
2. F.O. 2/83 Harrison to Macdonald, 5.2*95
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without your knowledge I can scarcely deem credible.
Thus, although he had twenty-one hours warning before 
the attack, Flint did nothing to defend Akassa and 
was caught virtually unprepared.
The attack was a complete success. Aided by 
mist, the Brassmen slid into Akassa virtually unnoticed 
at half past four on the morning of the 29th. The 
Krooboys and native employees were, either butchered 
in their beds or reserved for a slower fate, at Nembe.
Some succeeded in fleeing into the bush. The. Europeans 
had a providential escape when the mail steamer 
*Bathurst* arrived and the Brassmen drew off, alleging 
this was a Queen1s ship and they had no quarrel with 
the Queen. This enabled Flint and the others to get 
on board the only launch which had steam up and escape 
up river. The station was then completely looted.
Cases of gin and bales of cloth were loaded into the 
canoes, the warehouses, were then t o m  down. Anything 
not movable was smashed with crowbars, and hammers - 
the workshops machinery and the engines of the steamers 
getting particular attention.. Every building was
burnt or wrecked and the Company*s records destroyed.
/
About £2000 in speqfie was taken from the safe before 
the Brassmen decamped with their booty and prisoners
1. F.O. 2/83. Flint to Harrison 28.1.95*
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and returned to Nembe. early on 30th “with much 
tom-tomming and firing ox guns." Host of the seventy 
odd prisoners were killed and eaten in an endeavour 
to stop the small pox epidemic. About twenty five were 
however saved by the Christian party under Chief Y/arri, 
who refused to take part in the cannibalistic orgy 
and smuggled their prisoners to the Vice Consulate.
As soon as he received the news from Harrison, 
Macdonald hurried to Old Calabar, picked up all the 
available troops (about seventy) and artillery, and 
was back in the Brass River on the Evangeline1 by 
1 p.iju on 2nd ^February. The European factories 
and Consulate were at once put into a state- of defence., 
and Macdonald called upon the Brassmen to surrender 
and he would secure them a fair trial. Already, 
however, the matter was moving out of the sole control 
of the Commissioner.
Perhaps as nothing else could have done., 
the attack by the Brassmen on Akassa focused public 
attention on the anomalies of government in the Niger 
Delta. Y/ithin days the foreign Office was being 
inundated with requests for information, the reasons 
for the revolt and the necessary remedies from bodies
1. P.O. 2/83 Macdonald to foreign Office, 21.2.95.
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great and small, trader and missionary, influential 
and otherwise. More important, the attack induced
a fundamental reappraisal in foreign Office thinking. 
Kimberley was the first to strike at the heart of 
the matter: "the most serious part....... is the (ap­
parently) total absence of any attempt to remove an
C L AtL
undoubted grievance well known to acknowledged 
by Macdonald. Has no report been made to the P.O. on 
this subject, and if so wwere any steps taken?” - 
a question which provoked a chastened Anderson to 
admit the responsibility of the government; "the 
root of tho trouble is that the main Niger and the- 
Brass outlet should never have been under separate 
administrations with distinct fiscal systems.”
Thus, vhen G-oldie had recovered from tem­
porary stupefaction at the news from the Niger, ("We
■2
always looked on Akassa as being as safe as Piccadilly” )^ 
and roared into the attack, he found to his indig­
nation that it was he and not the Brassmen, who was 
in the dock. Public sympathy rallied to the under­
dog from all sides; the Liverpool, newspapers accused 
the Company of "flooding its territories with spirits
1. See particularly P.O. 83/1374.
2. P.O. 2/83 Macdonald to P.O. 4.2.95 Mins. on.
3. P.O. 83/1374 Goldie to Hill, 1.2.95.
432
and murdering natives.” The Liverpool Chamber of 
Commerce, anLthe Aborigines Protection Society de­
livered weighty memorials against the Companyls 
policy; and M.P.!s of all parties led by Dilke, 
Lawrence, Baden Powell and Bayjey worried the govern­
ment as to what they proposed to do to relieve, the
2
Brassmen1s distress.
To Goldie this was incomprehensible . The 
attack of the Brass people was the act of cannibals 
prompted by a sole desire for Hoot. The Companyls 
property had been destroyed and its servants murdered 
in cold blood. Ilore had been gained in a few hours 
looting than could be got in years of honest trade.
If the Brassmen had no quarrel with the British Govern­
ment, he did not doubt that the British Government had 
a quarrel with the Brassmen and that it was the. duty 
of all to ’’exterminate ITimbe, a nest of pirates*”
Goldie was particularly angry with., the Pro­
tectorate. officials whom he considered ought to have 
prevented the disaster,^- and were now using the affair
1. Liverpool Daily Post, 5• 3•95•
2. Hansard IY series Yols. XXX and XXXI contain on 
average a question a week throughout the session.
3. P.O.. 83/1574 Goldie to P.O. 3.2.95.
4. R.H.C. Papers IY Goldie to Scarbrough, 2.2.95.
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*to try and dispose of the Company. Moor, on leave
in England, had already told Hill that he considered
the Brassmen f,not much to blame”.1 Macdonald having
had "the unpleasant duty” of listening to the complaints
of the Brassmen for three and a half years "without
being able to gain for them any' redress” , did all he
could to pacify the Brassmen and persuade them to
submit and therefore avoid the need of a punitive
expedition. This provoked a quarrel with G-oldie.
which touched the depths of bitterness. Macdonald
was in no doubt that the reasons for the attack were
"deprivation of markets causing great distress and
starvation severe measures recently taken by the.
2
Company against smuggling."" He emphasized the 
distinctions drawn by the Brassmen between the Com­
pany1^  officials and those of the Protectorate, and 
expressed surprise not only of Plint having ignored
the warning of 27th but also "considering the turbu-
n
lent nature of the tribesj the general defenceless 
state of Akassa.^ G-oldie accused Macdonald of not 
wanting to punish the Brassmen for their crimes, of 
threatening "to wash up (the Company) in the Niger,
1. P.O. 83/1374-Min. by C.l.H. 9.2.95*
2. P.O. 2/86 Macdonald to P.O. 5.2.95"tel.
3. P.O.^2/83 Macdonald to P.O. 11.2.95.
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and of ignoring the threat posed by !an imperium in 
imperio1 in the Protectorate. He again demanded 
severe reprisals."^ Kimberley, however, sensitive to 
growing pressure in the country, refused to agree.
"If Mr. Hoor is right, the present position in the 
Brass River is impossible to justify* The frontier 
between the Companyrs territories and the Niger Pro­
tectorate is, he maintains, so drawn as to deprive a 
large population of their trade. He thinks this 
state ox things could be remedied by some agreement 
as to duties between the Compamy and the Protectorate - 
no doubt open outrage must be punished, but if a remedy 
is not at the same time aplied to remove the griev­
ances of the Brass people we shall be liable to just
9 2
and severe, blame. Kimberley determined, to wait for
a third opinion from Rear Admiral Bedford, then on 
his way to the Protectorate for the second time within 
a year, with the entire naval force (except Alecto) 
of the West Africa Station.
Bedford arrived on 9th, and, naturally 
reluctant to hazard his forces up river, soon found 
himself in agrement with Macdonald that every effort 
should be made to induce the Brassmen to surrender
1* R.N.C. papers IV G-oldie to Scarbrough, 7.2.95.
2. P.O. 83/1374 Goldie to Kimberley, 8.2.95. Min. on.
peacefully. ileamwhile an attempt was made to gain
time. Macdonald telegraphed home that he doubted
whether the punishment of burning villages, the only
one possible, would improve the situation. On 13th,
admidst feverish communication with Nembe pointing
out the futility of resistance, Macdonald telegraphed
again asking that’; the Brassmen might not be punished
until their case had been enquired into.^ Sensing
the reasons for the Commissioner^ prevarication,
Kimberley gave Macdonald a framework with which to
works ,!I need hardly say I could not approve any measure
of extreme severity but adequate reparation must be
exacted. This might be restoration of plunder, payment
of reasonable fines and surrender of arms and war
canoes. On these conditions remedy of just grievances
2
mig&t be considered." The Brassmen were now however
desperate and refused to surrender their arms unless
they were allowed to trade in the Niger. This the
Commissioner was unable to guarantee, and it was with
barely concealed disappointment that he reported
3
the. mounting of a punitive expedition.
Whilst reconnoitring was going on, Macdonald 
persisted in his efforts at n e g o g i a t i o n s T h e s e
1. P.O. 2/86 Macdonald to P.O. 13.2.95. The communi­
cations with Brass are contained in 2/83 Macdonald 
to P.O. 28.2.96.
2. P.O. 2/86 Kimberley to Macdonald, 14.2.96.
3. P.O. 2/86 Macdonald to P.O. 18.2.96.
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finally foundered w h e n n e w s  was received that the. 
creeks were being blocked, and stockades made and 
mounted with guns. At daybreak on 22nd. February the 
Admiral issued orders for a general advance on ITembe.
The Brassmen fiercely contested the advance of the 
expedition, but by mid afternoon Nembe was in flames, 
and preparations were made for an assault on Bassambri. 
Having lost five men, however, the Admiral concluded
"that the punishment inflicted on the Chiefs and people...
*1was sufficient, and a retreat was decided upon. .
During the next two days Fishtown, Tv/on and surrounding 
villages wero occupied, gun stockades and the houses 
of chiefs being blown up. On the orders of the Com­
missioner "the houses and plantations of the poor 
people were left standing."1 The light punishment 
by contemporary standards reflected the sympathies 
of both Admiral and Commissioner for the Brass merits 
case. Hardly any of the loot taken at Akassa had been 
recovered, nor had the Brass people been forced to 
disgorge their rifles. If the punishment was limited 
the indirect results v/ere not. Hunger combined, with 
small pox began to decimate the refugee population
1. P.O. 2/85 Macdonald to P.O. 28.2.96.
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in the bush creating the utmost distress in the. 
Protectorate. This as much as anything else induced 
the Brass Chiefs to offer the surrender of wqr canoes, 
cannon and such loot as remained;to throw themselves on 
the Queen1 s mercy and "humbly request an enquiry"*^
To G-oldie, sitting comfortably in London, 
Macdonald*s policy of demanding the opening of the.
Niger markets, while the Brassmen retained their rifles,
rfuu Qwces;r*<rvi £\ rrftzSTj -> I
and Macdonald waS told that he could accept the terms
offered as long as rifles were surrendered as well as 
2
cannon. Macdonald was however unwilling to make this 
demand, knowing that "a native of this part of the 
world would sooner part, a great deal sooner, with 
the wife of his buzzum than with his bundork", also 
that it would require another expedition and more 
suffering to effect the surrender. Consequently he 
telegraphed on 26th March that "considering human life 
more vahable than rifles substituted prisoners for 
latter." This annoyed Anderson, who thought that 
no terms should have been spoken of until prisoners 
were set free.^ After another interview with Goldie, 
the Poreign Office demanded the surrender of rifles
1. P.O. 2/86 Macdonald to P.O. 10.3.95*
2* P.O. 2/86 P.O. to Macdonald, 11.3*95
3. P.O. 2/83 Macdonald to Hill, 26.3*95*
4. P.O. 2/86. Macdonald to P.O. 24*3*95* Min. by Ii.P.A.
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as a preliminary to enquiry. ^
According to Lugard, Macdonald was "wild”
2
at the order and talked of resigning. Whether this
was true or not, the Commissioner certainly thought
his present position impossible* The last straw was
the arrival of the mail on the coast containing cuttings .
of articles written by G-oldie, in particular one to tha
1 Times* in which he had in thinly veiled terms accused
Macdonald of hypocrisy for supporting the Brassmen in
view of the way that the coast officers had themselves
dealt with middlemen like Nana and JaJa. Macdonald's
answer exploded through the foreign Office.
"Ja Ja was deported (and very rightly) by H*II* 
Johnston because he was a big monopolist and 
threatened to become a bigger. Nana was knocked 
endways by Moor and the gun boats for the very 
same reason, and now we have wiped the floor with 
the Brassmen because they have endeavoured to go 
for the biggest monopolist of the crowd - the 
Royal Niger Company. As I daresay you are aware, 
in the vast territories of the Niger Company there 
is not one single outside trader, black, white, 
green or yellow. The markets are all theirs.
They can open or shut any given market at will, 
which means subsistence or starvation to the 
native inhabitants of the place. They can offer 
any price they like to the producers and the latter 
must either take or starve. And why, in Heaven's 
name, why? Because they (the Company) must pay 
their 6 or 7 per cent to shareholders.t! 4
1. P.O. 2/86 P.O. to Macdonald, 26.5.95. Tel,
2. Lugard Diary Vol. IV 22*3*95*
3. The Times, 4.2.95.
4. P.O. 2/83 Macdonald to Hill 26.3.95. P. The tetter 
was made semi official by printing.
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In addressing M s  superiors thus, and . 
hazarding his career, no one could question the. 
Commissioner"s courage, integrity and humanity* 
Gertainly he continued to act, as Lugard had suggested, 
as though he felt he was burning his boats. Regard­
ing the rifles, Macdonald only agreed to endeavour 
to carry out the official orders if he could have 
the assistance of the Admiralty.^ This was a clever 
move, in the sense that he was well aware that 
Bedford would dislike the idea of another expedition* 
The Admiral*s response was not disappointing. He 
protested about the trnew conditions1*, blaming the
M g e r  Company for provoking disturbances owing to
2
neglect of ordinary precautions. In face of this 
united front the resolution of the foreign Office 
began to waver. Macdonald v/as informed that Her 
Majesty*s Government placed full reliance on his 
judgement but "how, if arms are not surrendered... 
will...natives be made to understand that re­
paration for massacre of prisoners and accompanying
atrocities must precede consideration of alleged 
3
grievances ♦**
1. P.O. 2/86 Macdonald to P.O. 27.3.95.
2. P.O. 83/1376 Admiralty to P.O. 29.3.95; also 1377 
Admiralty to P.O. 8.4.95.
3. P.O. 2/86 P.O. to Macdonald, 5.4.95.
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Sensing the retreat of the Foreign Office, hacdonald 
hammered home his advantage in a passionate appeal. 
"Brass people thoroughly understand that reparation 
has heen and is being made for past offences; canoes, 
cannon, prisoners and plunder surrendered; those 
chiefs who committed atrocities fined; trade almost 
ruined; towns destroyed; hundreds killed; women and 
children starving in bush; small-pox rife; rainy 
season commencing. I have visited towns destroyed 
and seen all this. In name of humanity, strongly 
deprecate further punishment and request settlement 
of question. S.IT.O. entirely concurs.1,1
At this deeply moving appeal, Kimberley 
capitulated completely. For the first time, Goldie 
found himself outmanoeuvred on a point which he re­
garded as essential. hacdonald earned himself a mild 
censure for not having reported the distress earlier, 
but was authorized to reopen trade and alleviate 
suffering. Under the circumstances a commissioner
would be sent out as soon as possible to investigate
2
the entire question.
This concession to the growing pressure in 
Parliament^ and the press went a long way towards 
pacifying the Brqssmen. The chiefs announced their
1. F.O. 2/86 hacdonald to F.O. 9*4*85.
2. F.O. 2/86 Kimberley to Kacdonald 10.4*95*
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willingness to co-operate with Macdonald in returning 
loot, and agreed to pay a fine of £516 to compensate 
the dependents of the victims of Akassa. The Com­
missioner evaded the demand for the judicial trial 
of individuals by pleading the national nature of the 
movement. The apparent insensibility of both Macdonald 
and the critics of the Company in Parliament to canni­
balism puzzled the Foreign Office. The Commissioner 
dismissed it as "a form of sacrifice which their fore­
fathers have practised ftwft time immemorial." Kimberley 
did not regard this "quasi apology" with "much edifi­
cation" and was not ^"particularly pleased" with 
Macdonaldrs way "of treating this affair."^
Still less was Goldie. The appointment of 
a commissioner represented a setback to the Company, 
whose position was clear that there was nothing to 
investigate. Goldie denied that the Brassmen were 
in any distress whatever, harped on the dangers of 
their being allowed .to retain their rifles and re-
2
iterated all the old charges concerning smuggling.
The allegations were clearly aimed at getting up a. 
case for the Commissioner before he left for the coast*
The rivalry of the Protectorate and Company was para­
llelled locally. Correspondence was barely polite,
1. F.O. 2/85 Macdonald to F.O. 1.5.95. Mins. On.
2. F.O. 85/1377 R.B.C. to F.O. 11.4.95 and 17.4.95.
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and it could not have been entirely inadvertence on 
G-oldie!s part which permitted a passg'.ge in one of 
Wallace!s letters to be transmitted to the Foreign 
Office uncensored, calling for the dismissal of Mac­
donald as a man "utterly unfit for the position he 
holds.’1'*" In such an atmosphere , in which fruitful? 
negotiations between Company and Consul were next to 
impossible, the decisions and recommendations of an 
impartial commissioner assumed a new importance. The 
Foreign Office looked forward to the report with 
eagerness.
The nan chosen to undertake the enquiry was 
Sir John Kirk, sometime Consul. General at Zanzibar, 
also a director of the hast Africa Company, which had 
recently lost its charter. In choosing Kirk, the 
government had compromised between selecting a 
colonial official, who would by his background be 
prejudiced against the charter principle, and appoint­
ing a company official v/ho would be equally biassed 
in the opposite direction. The care thus taken in 
selection was evidence of the high Importance attached 
to the enquiry. Both the Prime Minister and the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer saw KirkTs instructions
1. F.O. 33/1382 Kirk to Salisbury 25*8.95. Inc. Wallace 
to Council R.IT.C. 17.4*95.
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before they were despatched by Kimberley. These 
instructions took the form of a demand for a compre­
hensive enquiry into the Niger Company's administration 
with emphasis on the grievances of the Brassmen* The 
foreign Secretary personally indicated that the suggest­
ions for amelioration should include methods by which 
the Brassmen could trade in the Niger, and ways by 
which a joint customs administration could be set up*^
The inquiry therefore clearly envisaged the end of the 
Company's monopoly*
Kirk conducted his inquiry with commendable 
celerity* Arriving at Lagos on 6th June, in a fort­
night, he had completed his investigation at Brass,
Akassa and in the forcados*. By 30th June he was on 
his way home. His : report took eight weeks to com­
pose and was in the hands of Salisbury, back as foreign 
Secretary after the June election, by the end of August* 
The speed with which the enquiry was conducted did 
not^ forestall rumours or allay fears. One of the 
most persistent of these, because it was known to be
advocated by G-oldie himself, was the transfer of the
t o  C o** . B k t S  »Ooi?leC Vvcxoo e>\«.ur*e«C r o
trade freely in the Company's territories, but the 
very prospect raised a storm of enquiries -at the foreign
1. f.O. 83/1378. Kimberley to Kirk, 6.5•95*
I
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1
I Office during August. Critics in the Commons wanted
2
; the report to be laid. This, as with the hacdonald
report, the government refused to/do.^;
There fyvere good reasons why the government- 
wished to keep the report secret. Kirk had proposed 
! much Eiore fundamental reforms- than a mere transfer of
territory. These arose out of the conclusions he 
, had drawn from the information he had received on the
I coast. His enquiry exonerated the Brassmen in seme
I measure from blame. That they smuggled was undoubt-
; edly true, but they needed to in order to conduct a
profitable trade. It exonerated the Company, whose 
regulations, if harsh, v/ere approved by the Government 
at home, and who were therefore justified in using 
force to uphold .their regulations. It exonerated 
the Protectorate. government which^faced with a 
rapidly deteriorating situation at Brass about.which 
they could do nothing, had been unable to exercise- 
sufficient authority to prevent smuggling* If there 
we re a villain of the. piece, it was the British 
Government, which had allowed all these things to
1. R.g. P.O. 83/1381 Oil Rivers Trading Co. to P.O. 
14.8.95, 1382 Liverpool Chamber of Commerce to 
P.O. 27.8.95*
2. P.O. 83/1382 Dilke, Baden Powell, Lawrence.
3. The Report was, in fact, laid in 1896 but in such 
a butchered form as to make it virtually worthless 
as a factual document. 1896 Vol. LIS C 7977*
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happen, and had failed to comprehend the impossibility 
of having two different fiscal administrations in the 
delta. Responsibility had evidently come home to 
roost.
But Kirk was not concerned to apportion 
praise or blame. This was too negative. To remedy 
the revealed defects, he proposed two schemes - 
the one, a partial scheme of reform, the other a 
general and radical proposal to alter the whole pattern 
of government in the Niger territories. The first 
partial scheme was a variation of the Liverpool pro­
posal of 1892 that the delta south of Onitsha should 
be handed over to the Protectorate. Kirk did not 
propose to remove the delta area from the control of 
the Company, but to combine it in a customs union 
with the Protectorate. This would substitute the 
fiscal boundaries on either side of the Niger for one 
at the head of the delta, the Companyfs territories 
north of this point being governed as heretofore.
In the delta area licenses would be abolished and 
free trade allowed. The common tariff needed would 
be a compromise between the high rates of the Com­
pany and the low rates of the Protectorate, with the 
exception of the duty on spirits, which would be 
raised to 4/-. ;The revenue from customs Kirk
estimated would yield £450,000, which would be split
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equally between the two administrations. Two ob­
jections Kirk saw to a partial scheme; the Company 
would still continue to trade - a source of potential 
friction in an area of free competition; and the 
illogicality of halting the free trade frontier at 
the head of the delta.
It was a full reorganisation therefore 
that Kirk favoured as being easier to achieve in the 
long run. The basis of this proposal was that the 
Company should cease trading completely and become 
a purely administrative organization to prepare the 
way for British rule. A customs union, a common 
tariff and system of taxation would be established 
between the whole of the Company!s territories and 
the Coast Protectorate. The two divisions of the 
British Protectorate would be treated financially as 
one with a common fund. The eventual aim of this 
reorganisation was to pave the way for direct control 
as a Crown Colony.^
The change of government in June 1895 was 
not a good omen for the implementation of the Kirk 
report. For the first time it brought to the 
Colonial Office a man, Joseph Chamberlain, who had his
1. F.O. 85/1582 Kirk to Salisbury 25.8.95. Kirk
elaborates in detail the necessary reorganization 
of the Company. Flint ^ Groldie* pp. 210-212.
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own ideas as to how the imperialestates should be run.
We have already seen how officials in the Colonial 
Office v/ere beginning to develop a greater interest 
in the British territories outside their control.
T£eir interest was under the new Colonial Secretary^ 
given an impetus and a direction which gradually 
emerged as a coherent ideology. Government, in 
the person of Chamberlain, who held a ^position of 
real power in the Cabinet, was now prepared to invest 
both money and men in Africa. The Foreign Office 
v/as faced with increasing pressure from the Colonial 
Office to decide the future of. the Niger Territories 
once and for all. It was clear that no discussions 
on the Kirk report could take place without the major 
participation of the Colonial secretary.
Company attitudes v/ere altering too. Dr.
Flint ably analyzes 'how' Goldie "began to tire of the 
crude profit of his now perfect monopoly", and demon­
strates his increasing concern with politics and 
administration. Undoubtedly, he realized the threat 
to which his Company was now exposed from the Colonial 
Office. Broadly aware of the Kirk p r o p o s a l s h e  
became their most ardent advocate in a desperate bid 
for a settlement before Chamberlain could get his grip
1. Flint ^Goldie, p. 197^
4 4 8
on the reins. Salisbury, however, refused to be' 
hurried, and it was not until December 7th that Goldie, 
succeeded in gaining a personal interview with the 
Prime Minister. Unable to force governments hand 
he adopted a new tack. It v/as nothing less than a 
revival of the charter extension plans of 1889-90. 
Negotiations were undertaken between Jones, representing 
the shipping lines, Holt from the African Association, 
and Goldie himself. Goldie was to run the adminis­
tration in London, commercial affairs would be directed 
by Holt, and it was hoped to give the plan respecta­
bility by persuading hacdonald to act as Governor.
It was Jones v/ho informed hacdonald, who reacted at 
once by denouncing such "unholy designs" to Anderson.^"
2
Anderson agreed the idea was "not worthy of discussion":
3
Goldie "must know that he was talking nonsense".
The Under Secretary.reflected the mood of Salisbury, 
who was content to await the opinionsof his masterful 
colleague. Over Christmas prolonged discussions were 
held between Chamberlain and the Prime hinister. The 
outcome was revealed in a curt note from Barrington to 
Goldie on 3rd January 1896 to the effect that the Kirk
1. P.O. 2/85 Confidential Memo, by hacdonald, 13.11.95*
2. Ibid. Min. by H.P.A. 13.11.95.
3. P.O. 83/1385 Memo, by H.P.A. 20.11.95.
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scheme "would be absolutely unacceptable to Parliament.
That action did not follow immediately on 
what amounted to a decision forcing both Company and 
Consul under the Colonial Office was due not to any 
lack of conviction on a matter of principle,but to a 
lack of opportunity as the crisis with Prance over 
both Niger and Nile began to assume aalarming proportions. 
As it v/as, the decision not to implement the Kirk 
report, or to act quickly^as a consequence produced 
an intolerable position in the Niger Territories.
The unreformed Company was left to fight on for fo ur 
more years, burdened by increasing pressure from the 
north, its forces committed to maintaining a fiscal 
system in the delta which had been shown to be harsh.
The Protectorate struggled on, its administration 
in constant dispute with the Company on the boundaries, 
its traders still cut out from the Niger. Above all 
the Brassmen, whose attack on Akassa had first brought
i
the Niger situation to effective public notice, be­
trayed at the last by the Queen’s Government in wh/ofa 
they had trusted, continued to suffer the undeserving 
fate of being the wrong side of the Imperial Boundary.
1. P.O. 33/1440 Barrington to G-oldie, 3.1.96.
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It. was not /long before the dreary round:ef charge and 
counter charge, which Kirk had done his best to settle, 
began to appear again in the correspondence*^
The activity of the Colonial Office began 
to have its impact on the administration of the Pro­
tectorate. For the first time the Foreign Office 
realized how much freedom the Consul General had had 
to decide and order policy. While the Protectorate 
was not, as it were, in the news, and the Colonial 
Office was quiescent, there had been little incentive 
to interfere in the administration, which caused no 
trouble and was completely self supporting. But 
within the space of a year the Protectorate had been 
involved in two crises which had involved the inter­
vention of the entire Imperial naval force on the 
west coast. On neither occasion was tne Consul General 
in a position to stop such crises developing. In 
the Kana dispute Macdonald*s subordinate had precipitated 
a conflict to which the Government was a spectator; 
the Brass affair had developed over the years and was 
beyond the power of the consul general to solve.
1. E.g. P.O. 83/1383 R.H.C. to P.O. 5.9.95. 2/84
Macdonald to P.O. 13.9.95. During 1896 some effort 
was made at local agreement between Moor and Goldie 
to benefit Brass, 2/100 passim the Protectorate, paid 
the Company ^20,000 in compensation for the attack 
l\Tov. 1897. C.O. 464/1 q.v.
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Clearly the time had now come to tighten government 
control over the administration.
The resignation from the Protectorate Agency 
of Sir Alfred Jephson provided the opportunity to be­
gin with finance. The necessary financial control was 
to be secured by the turning over of the agency business 
to the Crown Agents for the Colonies, who would be the 
responsible body for the accounts - a proposal
1
Chamberlain was only too willing to entertain.
Arrangements were quickly made, and, by 1st February
1896, were complete. The treasurer was relieved of
all expenditure and from the necessity of keeping a
banking account, and was reduced to a subordinate role
of receiving and examining accounts and preparing
balance sheets and estimates. This new system, it
was hoped, would irprevent such scandals as the
2
unauthorized expenditure of £53,000 on ’Ivy1.
In turning the material side of the Pro­
tectorate over to the Crown Agents, the Foreign Office 
could hardly have been unaware that they v/ere paving 
the way for the peaceful takeover of the Protectorate 
by the Colonial Office. Yet March 1896 still found
1. F.G. 83/1386 'Crown Agents to P.O. 9.12.95.
2. P.O. 83/1387 Ommaney to Hill, 23.12.95*
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the Foreign. Office denying that any such step was being 
contemplated. • An awkward system of triangular 
correspondence developed, with the Foreign Office 
writing to the Crown Agents, and Crown Agents replying, 
then the matter in hand being referred to the Colonial 
Office and that office replying direct to the Foreign 
Secretary. There was not a dissenting voice in the 
Colonial Office now to the question of the transfer of 
the Protectorate. Read, the young headoof the Y/est 
Coast Department^expressed the general consensus when 
he wrote MI doubt whether the P.O. saves itself much 
work by keeping the R.C.P., for either they consult 
us and give us as much trouble as if we had the whole 
thing in our hands... .or else they donrt consult us 
and strike out a new line of their own, so that when 
the 1T.C.P is transferred to the C.O. there will be 
endless trouble with regard to vested rights etc.... 
the evils of having Lagos hinder one control and the R.C.P.
OL fl L  '
if R.N.C, under another are b&'ng efelt in (all)
2
directions.. . Chamberlain agreed, but it was not 
until the end of 1393 that a joint committee to decide 
the future of the territories at last met. From it the
1. F.-0. 85/1442 Reply to Lilke, R.P. 19*3.06.
2. C.O. 147/109 F.O. to C.O. 14.8.96. Kins on.
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"two Protectorates of Southern and northern Bigeria 
v/ere bom.
The latter part of 1895 saw ldacdonald 
busy at work on the orders of the Foreign Office 
initiating the new course of the administration*
This involved the drawing up of elaborate rules re­
garding employment, finance and estimates in concert 
with the Crown Agents. At the centre however, was 
the political reorganization of the Protectorate.
This again reflected the growing influence of the 
Colonial Office with the reduction in the number of. 
senior officers, and the renaming of the junior officers, 
District Commissioners, and Assistant District Com­
missioners. The number of districts was reduced to 
three, the Eastern Comprising the Protectorate, east 
of the t^ ua Ibo, the Central consisting of the Opobo, 
Bonny, hew Calabar and Brass Vice Consulates^ and the 
Western which took in the whole Protectorate on the 
west of the delta.' Both the last two were to be in 
the charge of a Vice Consul, the Eastern to be under a 
Consul who vn uld take over from the Consul General in 
his absence. Assisting the senior officers were four
L
i
District Commissioners and 13 Assistant District Com­
missioners. As Liacdonald explained^this arrangement 
involved no increase in the establishment, nor, since 
no jnew Vice Consuls had been appointed since 1894,
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would it involve any demotions. Moor was to be the
new Consul General, Crawford in charge of the Central
and Gallwey in charge of the western districts. As
Moor!s deputy, an officer seconded from the Gold Coast,
Phillips^was appointed. The appointment of Phillips
naturally stiffened the “official” element in the
administration.1 The reorganization was the first
step towards dividing the territory into artificial
units cutting across the traditional divisions.
The new administrative regime was inaugurated
in a series of despatches during the early part of 1896.
Iioor was informed amongst other things that his estimates
must not be exceeded without special sanction, that
all vacancies in the European staff were to be reported,
and no appointments made without the approval of the
Secretary of State, that he was to undertake no
punitive expeditions without'approval, and that he
was to be governed at all times by the rules drawn
up by Macdonald in concert with the Crown Agents.
The Protectorate had evidently ceased to be a one man 
2
show.
1. P.O. 2/85 Macdonald to P.O. 19*12.95. Por appointments 
see 2/l00 Moor to P.O. 9*2.96.
2. See P.O. 2/99 various particularly P.O. to Moor.
5*1.96.
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A new course was evident in the' Protectorate
as well. It was clear that, under Moor, the periods
of peace were likely to become shorter and shorter.
Moor had not the temperament to try all peaceful
means before resorting to force. Macdonald had hardly
left the Protectorate in July, 1895, before Moor was
off up the Gross River destroying towns "not wheeling
into line at all" - their offence being to interrupt
trade.. Benin as well caught the Acting Commissioners
eye.. "Should we succeed in getting an invite" he.
argued "will take full advantage of it and act like
Soapy Sponge - Once we get in he *11 find it hard to
get rid of us again.1,1 This activity alarmed Hill,
who thought it "unfortunate, that most of the expeditions
2
are marked by shelling and burning." Macdonald too, 
was at a loss to understand why there should be dis­
turbances, as in most of tne towns mentioned by Moor
3he (Macdonald) "was hospitably and well received."-' 
Anderson was definite that Macdonald was not 
going to work the new system.^" It was asking too
1. P.O. 2/85 Moor to Macdonald, 9.10.95 P.
2. P.O. 2/85 Macdonald to P.O. 26.10.95.
3. P.O. 2/85 Macdonald to P.O. 26.10.95.
4. P.O. 83/1386 Min. by IMP.A. 28.11.95.
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much, to expect the man responsible for operating the 
hitherto flexible system, to succeed in divesting him­
self of so much authority in the now strait-waistcoated 
Protectorate. Moreover there were other factors to 
be cohsidered. Macdonald had never been able to 
work with Goldie; their relationship had reached a 
personal low in 1895. Since there was no prospect 
of shifting Goldie, or of a speedy end to the Niger 
Company, the only way to ease relations between the 
two Protectorates was to shift Macdonald. Macdonald*s 
new appointment in January 1896 reflected the con­
fidence in his ability entertained by Salisbury, and 
a recognition of his success in the Protectorate.
His talents carried him into the higher echelons of 
the diplomatic service as Ambassador at Peking on a 
salary of £6,900 per year. It was the very reverse 
of a slight, and enabled the ex-Commissioner to scale 
far greater heights than he could ^ver have done on 
the Bights of Benin and Biafra.
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CHAPTER BhBVU N .
CONCLUSION. '
hacdonaldfs elevation to Peking at the lo­
ginning of 1896 marked the end of the period of ex­
periment in the Oil Rivers. Prom now on the Pro­
tectorate was to follow more othodox courses, leading 
eventually into the fond embrace of the Colonial Office 
system. Yet if the Foreign Office Protectorate system 
was the child of expedienpy, which could not last, d 
during the brief summer of its operation it proved, 
on the Niger Coast, at any rate, a remarkably 
efficient.means of ruling peoples who, in the peculiar 
power structures created during the early partition 
period, were neither foreign nor subject. Iiore than 
anything else the system provided a protective 
umbrella for the Colonial Office, to find its bearings, 
before hatching the egg of colonial rule. One is 
not here concerned with the moralityxtf or otherwise 
of colonial rule of one more powerful people sub­
jecting another to its authority. , The fact remains 
it was the breakdown of indigenous authority on 
the west coast brought about largely by tha erosive 
contact with European commerce which drew the British 
to fill an increasing power vacuum. The peoples lost
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their authority without realizing at what stage they 
had lost what. After 1885 the British, set about 
building a new system of government, albeit hap­
hazardly, containing elements indigenous and European, 
to replace the old. The first six years were spent
in arguing how this was to be done. As a result of 
an independent -investigation on the Niger one man was 
charged to carry out his own ideas in 1891. This he 
proceeded to do and succeeded in stamping his own 
personality unalterably on the Rivers.
hacdonald1 s ideas long outlasted his ap­
pointment as Commissioner, despite their ^temporary 
reversal by hoor# For in the long run he proved 
that more could be achieved by persuasion, and by a 
slow process of evolution from traditional rule than 
by force. This was the lesson applied by Lugard and 
all subsequent administrators in Nigeria. But there 
was a vital difference between Nacdonajd and those who 
came later. hacdonald was a Victorian through and 
through. He believed both in the superiority of 
western civilisation, and the necessity for change..
He was, therefore, no indirect ruler committed to 
preserving African institutions for their own sake, 
but a man who believed that the people could be per­
suaded by an influence, more or less despotic, to
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adopt western ways into their own culture, stripped 
of its barbarities, and raise themselves in the plahe 
of civilization. If his assumptions as to the super­
iority of western civilization may now be questioned, 
he was clearly far more of a realist than the indirect 
rulers in postulating that, come what might, the 
people were avid for western technology and would 
eventually govern themselves on western rather than 
African lines.
I-lacdonald1 s policy struck a chord in that
gfeat intellectual precursor of the African nationalist
movement, Edward Wilmot Blyden, who believed above all
else in the co-operation of the races for development
and progress: "We must enlist the help of the
Europeans, but not to Europeanize o u r s e l v e s , h e .
wrote to Governor Pope Hennessy. Blyden saw in
Macdonald just such a European helper:
"Sir Claude Macdonald......has performed his
difficult task with admirable ability. He has 
in that short time created a revenue, which 
more than suffices for the work of administration. 
He has abolished barbarous customs and suppressed 
marauding practices. The natives* he has dis­
covered, have a perfect knowledge and appreciation 
of the immense industrial resources of their 
country, and a readiness to take advantage of 
them, together with an aptitude for imitation, 
and a desire for instruction which are most 
hopeful indications of progress Phe progress
1. E.W. Blyden 1 The West African University1 
Freetown, 1872*
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lias been rapid, as well as steady *9 and may be 
measured from month, to month, almost from year 
to year.*1 x
Progress, then, was the keynote of the 
Iiacdonald administration. This was the sole justi­
fication for the imposition of alien rule - that by 
it, the social, cultural and material conditions of 
the ruled might be improved. This philosophy in­
cluded the punitive expedition as an extraordinary, 
not an ordinary, instrument of government. . Until 
1894 by temperament patience and tact Hacdonald had 
achieved his ends with the minimum friction. Sub­
sequent events showed how far this was due to his 
personality and how easy it was to disturb .' the 
balance of peace within the Protectorate. , He was 
fully aware of the natural opposition to the peace­
ful imposition of the new order, of the tenacity of 
such customs as slavery, and human sacrifice. It 
was his task to make sure that he did not provoke 
this opposition to the,surface. This sometimes led 
him onto lonely eminences of isolation as far as 
his fellow countrymen were concerned* It was no&t 
easy to defend the drink traffic, cannubalism, or 
for that matter the plundering of the Brass traders.
1. E.V/, Blyden:' f.The African Problem1 North American 
Re vie v/, Sept. 1895.
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Such defences snacked of casuistry to the attackers,
an alien concept to ;a fundamentally honest man.
Yet Macdonald was only led into these courses be- 
#
cause, he believed that these customs, although he found 
them personally repugnant, acted as a social cement 
in society. Solid progress was not to be achieved 
by superficial acts of legislation which looked good, 
on ..paper, Macdonald therefore only really took 
issue with his critics on a question of time not of 
principle. Above all, his humanity objected to what 
could only be enforced by force.
Behind his administration lay the investigation 
of 1889 and the report of 1890. It is here that one 
finds the genesis of his ideas - the attack, for 
instance, on the concept implicit in chartered company 
rule, that profits for British interests were synonymous 
with'the' interests of the indigenous inhabitants; or 
that the just interests of the inhabitants must always 
give way before the demands. (£ the European. Mac­
donald^ final recommendation of a vigorous admini­
stration undertaking pioneer development without the 
cumbersome machinery of a Grown Colony cast aside 
with contempt the previous attitudes of reluctance on 
the piart of government to accept responsibility. This 
reluctance had by 1889 created an impossible situation 
in the rivers, a mess of government. All that was now
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to end. The new regime, taxing the liquor trade, 
tut keeping trade open to all, would have a large 
enough revenue to really govern.
1890 therefore marks a real turning point 
in the history of late Victorian imperialism. for 
the first time an instrument of governmentfs re­
luctance to assume burdens, the chartered company, 
was investigated, assessed impartially and found 
wanting. from then 011 the system itself was on the 
defensive, Lacdonald stated clearly that the govern­
ment of large areas was not the province of private 
enterprise.
It was not his fault that government aceepted 
his recommendations with regard to the administration 
of the new area, while rejecting this proposals to 
reform the Company. The acceptance of only half the 
report was responsible for most of the subsequent 
difficulties in the Oil Rivers, leqding to the tragedy 
of the Brassmen. Governments attitude was under­
standable. .Goldie was fulfilling a vital imperial 
mission of holding the Niger against Prance. To 
destroy the monopoly was to destroy the Charter, 
and Government was not yet ready to undertake the 
burden of ruling so vast a territory. But let Goldie 
cease to fulfil his imperial mission through lack of 
resources or otherwise, and his raison d !etre would go.
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This happened in 1898, and in less than two years 
the Company lost its charter. But in 1895 the 
competing claims of the Protectorate to fulfil an 
imperial mission were already weakening the Company*s 
case. In fact, from 1890 onwards, the Company, 
forced on the defensive, was merely a necessary evil, 
tolerated without being loved. ‘ The impossibility 
of Government escaping responsibility by delegating 
to a chartered company was seen to be illusory in 
theory as well as in practice. After the Ifacdonald 
Report there would be no more charters in Africa.
Paradoxically, the administrative system 
arising out of the part of the report which was 
accepted was more short lived than the destruction 
of the chartered company system, arising out of the 
shelved part of hacdonald&s recommendations. . The 
foreign Office Protectorate, a Aubtle 'combination.' 
of diplomacy and rule, which was never defined, could 
not in the long run compete with the office whose 
job it was to rule subject pieoples. And yet such 
was the success of the hacdonald administration, and 
the unwillingness of the Colonial Office to undertake 
direct burdens, that up to 1895 the foreign Office 
looked likely to be saddled with the Oil Rivers for 
the foreseeable future. The attitude of the Colonial
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Office began to change, at first slowly, then, with 
the advent of Chamberlain, at a faster pace. An 
ageing Prime minister was in no mood to resist the 
importunities of his imperious colleague, whose 
argument that the rule of subject peoples was not 
within the capacities of the foreign Office was 
logically unanswerable. Slowly the unique power 
exercised by hacdonald was whittled'down until, in 
1900, the Niger Coast Protectorate was ready to 
assume its proper place under the Colonial Office. 
After 1895 the Colonial Office was willing itself 
to undertake the rule of subject peoples from the 
beginning, although this did not initially imply the 
disturbance of existing vested rights in chartered ■ 
companies or in the foreign Office in Africa.
Short lived though the administration under 
Nacdonaldls control was, it had shown an astonishing 
virility compared with other territories on the 
west coast under the Colonial Office. This may have 
been partly owing to the fact it owed more to common 
sense than to law* It was not until 1894 that the 
first ordinances were promulgated in the Protectorate 
and it was in 1894 by a peculiar coincidence that ) 
things started to go wrong. Certainly from 1894 the 
Protectorate began to lose that flexibility which had
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given it life. Until then all was progress.' The 
revenue of the Protectorate in the first year of 
the new administration was equal to that of Lagos.
By March 1894 the Lagos revenue had gone up 30/f on 
the 1891 figure, that of the Protectorate 100f/t. This 
wa^iot all. After thirty years of British rule, the 
Lagos writ scarcely ran to the other side of Lagos 
Lagoon. No Governor, before Carter in 1896 bothered 
to visit and explore :the Benin River, which Lagos 
claimed as its boundary. It was 1892 before the 
Colonial C-ovemment penetrated beyond Ijebu, a bare, 
fifty miles to the norti. east, 1914 before the inde­
pendence of Abeokuta 7Q miles to the north was finally 
extinguished. Within two years of hacdonald1□ 
arrival in the Rivers Out** stations were established 
at Sapele 70 miles, Degema 50 miles and Itu 100 miles 
inland. Moreover,' the Commissioner himself had 
been the 250 miles up the Cross River as far as the 
Rapids. The contrast could not have been more extreme.
Unhampered by a growing bureaucracy, or the 
accoutrements of civilization such as lawyers, and 
journalists prepared to question every legislative, 
act, hacdonald and his Yice Consuls pushed, inland, 
settling palavers and disputes on a largely ad hoc 
basis, but bringing government to’the people as the
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colonial system seemed unable to do. Departments 
of government, the post office, public works, the 
customs, followed the consuls in a demonstrable 
pattern of tutorship to the indigneous- inhabitants.
It was a system which gave the premium to initiative, 
but at the same time put a tremendous strain on the 
individual.
In a sense the administration*s assets were 
also its fundamental weaknesses. The system was too 
personal, placed too heavy reliance, on individual 
capacity in a climate notoriously unkind to the 
Duropean. As the Protectorate, expanded, it became 
too big for one man,,or even several men, to handle on 
the old basis. Then, as was inevitable, guide lines 
had to be laid down and lays made, so that ninety per 
cent of administration would not require the personal 
Intervention of a senior officer. By 1895 this 
process had begun, and no one could deny its necessity. 
The Vice Consuls were becoming increasingly weighed 
down by the burden of supervising the details of 
political administration, and the attention they 
could give to postal and customs matters was becoming 
more and more desultory. Macdonald recognised 
the problem to some extent, by increasing the native 
staff in the departments; but this in itself was a 
recognition of the passing of the personal system
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and the need for a bureaucracy* Slowly the de­
partments of government were hived off and assumed 
independent status apart from the political, officers.
As this, the Colonial system, became more apparent 
so too did the administration lose its pioneering 
instinct and expansion into the interior, if not the 
actual penetration of the hinterland became, slower. 
Government for instance, knew little more about the ■ 
Urhobo in 1914 than what was contained in Gallwey!s 
despatches of 1892-5.^ hacdonaldls knowledge of the 
fragmentary nature of the Ibo political system was 
barely noted under the Lugard regime, which persisted 
in trying to thrust chiefs on the hapless people.
nevertheless, the foundations for the future 
had been solidly laid. The administration, launched 
in 1891 on £14.000 p.a. was by 1906 paying handsome 
dividends in the form of trade in. excess of £5,000,000 
(as against 1^ million in 1891), a large surplus of 
revenue over expenditure, and an expanded platform on 
which modern Nigeria was'to grow. But the material 
angle was only one side of the coin. It was hacdonald 
who placed the responsibility for the administration 
of this tropical dependency squarely where it belonged - 
on the shoulders of the imperial government, and not on
3U See Ihirne 1 Niger Delta Rivalry* 1969, p. 127
those of a private company. In arguing thus, he 
was activated by the highest motives of humanity - 
a belief that the people who inhabited the country 
did not exist solely for the benefit of European 
exploitation, but had their own independent right 
to existence. If imperialism was basically a selfish 
force, it had its noble exponents. Hacdonald was one 
of these, liberal in intention, by belief, and in act, 
he laboured hard in the cause of justice, peace and 
tolerance for the people whom he felt bound to serve. 
It is to be hoped for the state, of Nigeria he did 
not labour in vain.
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TABLE 1
REVALUE ALL EXPEL 1)1 JURE 1891-6. £'s STERLING.- 
Income. Expenditure Balance
3.6.91 )
31.3.92)
53,411 34,289
1.4.92 ) 
31.3.93)
98,322 93,165
1.4.93 ) 
31.3.94)
173,605 138,538
1.4.94 ) 127,574 171,282
31.3.95)
1.4.95 ) 
31.3.96)
155,513 145,044
CUSTOMS
1891-2 51,000
1892-3 96,692
1893-4 169,218
1894-5 117,716
1895-6 150,106
Total Credit 
19,122
5,157 24,279
55,067 '59,546
45,708 15,658
10,469 26,107
cjo of Rev,
95.5
97.5 
97.4 
92.2 
96*5
19,122
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TABLE 2 .
LAIN HEADS OF EXPENDITURE £' s STERLING
*
5'» 1894-5 $ 1895-6 1o
Cons .G-en. 184 0.1 3,652 2.1 4,255 2.9
Dep. Corns. 
& V.C.!s
10,416 7.5 12,453 7.3 13,973 9.6
Customs 3,462 2.6 3,866 2.3 5,123 3.5
Treasury 1,420 1.0 2,385 1.4 2,666 1.8
Post Office 1,980 1.4 2,164 1.3 2,369 1.6
I'iarine 18,534 13.5 39,174 22.9 43,584 30.0
Botanical 1,021 .7 1,183 .7 1,017 .7
B.C.P. 16,294 11.8 17,896 lQ.4-i- 21,583 14.9
Iiedical & 
Sanitary
5,308 3.8 ■ 6,729 3.9 7,550 5.2
Transport 13,937 10.1 13,064 7.6 4,221 2.9
Krooboys 12,727 9.2 14,661 8.6 10,243 7.1
Surveyor .Gen. 
& Intell.
3,551 . 2.6 4,053 2.4 3,909 2.7
Public liorks 39,679 28.9 34,334 20.0 10,165 7.0
Others 10,025 7.3 15,668 9.2 14,306 9.9
Total 138,538 171,282 145,044
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TABLE 3a
ports
norts
;al
.ance
1.8*91 to 
31.7.92
748,423/12/8
780,139/17/1
1,528,563/9/9
31,716/4/5
1.8.92 to 
31.7.93
808,044/14/5
967,543/17/9
1,775,588/12/2
159,499/3/4
1.4.94 to 
31.3.95
1.4.95 to 
31.3.96
739,864/1/6 656,977/18/4
825,098/11/3 785,605/5/3
1,564,962/12/9 1,441,583/3/7
85,234/9/9 129,427/8/11
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TABLE 4.
PRINCIPLE IPPORTS INTO THE N.G.P.
1891-2 1894-5
Article Value Duty Value Duty
Cotton 177,376/16/11 160,590/19/7
goods
(
Gin and 81,038/6/2 34,276/4/0 107,704/4/1 61,416/9/0
Geneva
Hardware & 70,365/1/9 55.797/118
Cutlery
Coopers 52,124/13/6 52,732/1/11
Stores
Tobacco 48,444/19/8 17,440/5/5 50,321/12/0 16,835/8/6
Rum 34,586/0/3 23,631/7/0 34,325/17/8 29,782/11/3
Guns 29,373,/2/8 4,520/6/6 8,876/9/1 1,860/10/0
Specie 21,231/4/0 31,288/12/1
Beads 16,815/17/10 7,029/13/10
Silk goods 16,703/0/4 11,774/9/10
Provisions 15,815/4/9 21,365/10/3
Rice 15,664/16/1 17,526/9/5
Brass & 14,933/19/4 19,721/18/6
Copperware
Wearing 12,193/10/1 11,455/6/9 1 \ I b/ -LJ, 0
Apparel
Salt 10,983/6/5 1,261/4/0 12,145/18/9 1,478/16/9
Gunpowder 10,931/14/9 5,298/4/2 8,236/17/3 5,121/8/8
Building 10,163/13/5 16,305/5/7
materials
Earthenware 10,041/0/7 6,276/2/11
Other 9,522/1/9 1,268/11/9 12,752/14/6 927/17/8
Dutiable
Other non- 84,310/2/ 93,136/5/10 t
Dutiable
Total 748,423/12/8 87,695/18/10 739,864/1/6 117,423/1/1
Pos
1.
2.
rr
3.
4.
5 .
6.
17.
7. 
20
13.
8 . 
10.
9.
14.
12.
18. 
11.
21.
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Ia RLE g .
PRINCIPLE EXPORTS PROM IRE N.O.P.
1891-2 °/t 1894-5 #
of total pf total
Palm Oil 462,859/12/3 58 505,636/13/8 61
Palm
Kernels
274,756/18/9 36 295,312/12/0 36
Rubber 15,536/14/8 2 13,281/17/5 1.5
Ebony 1,717/19/7 1 5,458/6/3 1
Ivory 1,023/1/5 1 1,202/4/4 1
Cocoas 308/9/9 1 1,159/11/7 1
23,937/10/8 3 3,047/6/0 0.5
Total 780,139/17/1 100 825,098/11/3 100
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